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A ‘Long War’ Is Not the Answer to Israel’s Security Problem — and Could Lead to Destruction (PART ONE)

An Israeli military convoy moves inside the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, as seen from Israel, June 17, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Amir Cohen

The October 7 disaster shattered many beliefs and concepts in Israeli society, and the war Israel has been waging since that day differs from the wars of its past.

David Ben-Gurion and Ze’ev Jabotinsky believed that rounds of war in which the enemy is smashed against an “Iron Wall” would eventually cause the countries of the region to come to terms with Israel’s existence; this would in turn cause them to change their strategy and choose the path of peace, as did Egypt’s Anwar Sadat and Jordan’s King Hussein. Ben-Gurion’s understanding that an end to the conflict cannot be forced, and that Israel cannot develop and advance in a state of  continuous war, led him to the security concept that was in effect until October 7, 2023.

Israel’s security concept has to address a fundamental problem: that the country 1) exists within a hostile region that does not accept its existence, and 2) cannot maintain a large army on a daily basis while advancing economically and socially. The solution — until October 2023 — was to maintain a small regular army to address ongoing security challenges; try and postpone wars by deterring enemies from exercising resistance; and maintain a large and agile reserve army that is mobilized on the basis of intelligence alerts. Because the mobilization of the reserves stalls Israel’s economy, this security concept required that wars be short.

The first commandment of Israel’s security concept was that Israel would never be able to force an end to the conflict on its antagonists because it is simply too small relative to the collective Arab and Muslim world. This approach created the dynamic of cycles of short wars.

Israel was destined to mobilize for a significant clash once every few years, to beat the enemy in a short and powerful war, and thereby gain a few years of relative calm. Israel used these periods of calm, together with the assets it gained during the wars (time, territory, deterrence, strategic stability) to transform from a tiny young country into a regional military and economic power.

But the periods between the rounds of war — that is, the “routine” phase of the security concept — were never calm from a security point of view. In fact, since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, not a month has passed without a security incident in one of the conflict areas. Israel’s routine security situation is in fact a routine of limited conflict.

Throughout its short history, Israel has never been able to completely eliminate any of its enemies. Ten days after the end of the Six-Day War — Israel’s greatest victory, in which it achieved the total disintegration of the Egyptian army — Egypt renewed fire.

Israel’s strategic success in expelling the PLO from Lebanon following the Lebanon War did not eliminate Palestinian hostility from Lebanon, and it certainly did not prevent Hezbollah’s development and indeed acceleration of strength. Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, and the transition from Yasser Arafat to Abu Mazen, who changed his predecessor’s policy of support for terrorism, did not lead to the elimination of Palestinian terrorism. To this day, the IDF is required to carry out operations almost every night to fight Palestinian terrorism in Judea and Samaria.

Israel made good use of the routine periods and turned itself from a small, weak, resource-poor country into a regional power in every respect. Along with strengthening economically, Israel also strengthened militarily. It hit the enemy repeatedly, sometimes so severely that it caused them to weaken and change. But as expected, Israel has failed to force an end to the conflict on its enemies. As Ben-Gurion said, “We cannot have a final battle.”

It can be argued that if Israel is fated to go to war at intervals over and over again forever, then all the Sisyphean security activity during the routine periods is unnecessary — in other words, it fails to bring results, as war inevitably breaks out again anyway. But Israel’s ongoing defensive and offensive military effort makes it possible to postpone the next war and maintain a tolerable level of violence during the routine periods.

Why does Israel allow the other side to arm itself more than it can be expected to tolerate? Why not act before the other side is dangerously well-armed? The answer is clear. Israel uses the routine periods to build and develop. Overly frequent wars might make it more difficult for Israel’s enemies to strengthen, but they would foil the part of Israel’s strategy that depends on the periods of routine. The “addiction to peace” — as the Israeli desire to extend the routine periods is sometimes called by opponents of the Ben-Gurion security concept — is not a sign of the concept’s weakness, but a by-product of its implementation.

If Israel cannot force an end to the conflict on its enemies, and its enemies include those who wish to act against it with violence, what prevents those enemies from acting all the time and arming themselves without limit?

If Israel cannot keep its entire army mobilized and active and must be content with a small regular army, what prevents its enemies from attacking it every day that the army is not mobilized? Why hasn’t every day of Israel’s existence been an October 7?

This is where deterrence and early warning come into play.

Israel’s enemies are usually deterred from starting a high-intensity war against it because Israel has proven that it is stronger than they are, and that a high-intensity war would hurt them more than they are willing to suffer. Deterrence keeps wars from starting and helps Israel maintain a tolerable level of violence during the routine periods. But deterrence is not supposed to, and should not be expected to, prevent war from ever breaking out. Nor is it meant to completely prevent any violence from ever occurring during the routine periods.

Israel tries to strengthen its deterrence capacity not to prevent war but to keep war away for as long as possible, on the understanding that war will eventually break out. At the same time, Israel invests a continuous effort in defense to make it difficult for the other side to cause it harm during the routine periods. Defense cannot, and clearly does not, prevent all violence.

Israel invests a great deal of effort in intelligence, the first purpose of which is to warn of the enemy’s intention to go to war. Because early warning might fail, Israel built a routine defense system designed to stop an attack in the event of such a failure.

Defense needs to respond to both threats from the borders and terrorism that occurs during the routine periods. This dual role — protection against low-intensity violence and an “insurance policy” in the event of a failure of early warning — can create confusion about the defense mission and even the scenario for which the defense is being prepared.

This seems to be what happened on October 7. The IDF failed to recognize the potential for a major Hamas raid on the Israeli villages and towns near Gaza. The IDF is prepared to prevent infiltration, not invasion. Whether the failure was in the IDF’s understanding of the intelligence or in the degree of protection afforded by the new barrier it built around Gaza, the IDF’s preparations did not take into account the possibility of a breach of the barrier or the potentially broad dimensions of such a raid. The IDF did not prepare for this scenario and did not prepare orders or routines for such a case. The Intelligence Division did not build a warning model to protect against such a move, and therefore did not provide warning. Weak preparation, and the failure to prepare a response in case of surprise, allowed Hamas to penetrate the border and carry out the October 7 attack, with all its catastrophic consequences.

But were there elements in the Hamas attack that Israel had no ability to defend against? Had Hamas discovered operative tools against which Israel could not prepare a defensive response? Did Hamas prepare in a way that Israeli intelligence could not discover?

The tragedy is that the answer to all these questions is no.

Has anyone in Israel ever believed that Hamas is interested in peace? Was anyone surprised to learn that Hamas still opposes Israel’s very existence and believes it should be violently resisted until it is destroyed? Did anyone in Israel think the IDF could deter Hamas to the point of forcing it to end the conflict — a principle that is contrary to the first commandment of the security concept?

The horrific harm inflicted on Israeli civilians on October 7, the taking of hundreds of captives, and the appearance of the loss of Israeli power caused Israel to go to war. The object of that war is to make clear that Hamas made a grievous mistake and to renew Israel’s strategic positioning in the arena. But did the magnitude of the blow inflicted on Israel suddenly make it more capable than it ever believed itself to be before the war? Did the catastrophic failure of Israel’s defense and early warning system paradoxically make Israel so strong that it can now force its enemies to end the conflict?

Did the atrocities committed by Hamas in its attack somehow make the IDF strong enough to eliminate the threat of Hamas from Gaza, bearing in mind that Israel has never been able to eliminate any of the threats that surround it? Did the terrible damage suffered by the surrounding communities make Israel’s economy and society so strong that Israel can suddenly conduct a long and intense war?

The shock and sense of rupture caused by October 7 led many to think that the Hamas attack had irreparably broken Israel’s security concept. Israel’s deterrence and early warning both failed, and Hamas was not deterred. Hence: it is no longer true that Israel cannot have a final battle. It is possible to go to war to eliminate Hamas once and for all — to wage a final war and achieve a complete victory.

We will try to formulate this alternative “October 8” concept of security. According to this view, Israel cannot ignore threats against it. It should act decisively and continuously towards the complete elimination of its enemies and their replacement with political elements that accept Israel’s national policies and goals. Thus, the goal of the war in Gaza should be the complete elimination of the military power of Hamas and the dissolution of its civilian rule in the Strip, until it can be ensured that it no longer poses a threat to the surrounding settlements.

Let’s ignore for the moment the endless consequences of this concept when applying it to Lebanon and the other arenas. Gaza is a limited geographical space with a topography that supports maneuvering. But even if it were possible to achieve complete victory in Gaza, what would it look like? Full and lasting Israeli control over the territory, à la Judea and Samaria?

After 10 months of war, the IDF has occupied most of the Gaza Strip and destroyed countless buildings and terrorist and tunneling infrastructures. Hamas still exists and functions, though it is unable to launch significant military operations. But it is possible that the manner in which the IDF used its force was wrong.

Even if the IDF had acted differently, it is not clear how Hamas fighters can be eliminated when they withdraw and assimilate into the general population. How can every last Hamas fighter be eliminated when they are the ones who choose whether to fight or blend into the crowd? A similar logic applies to buildings and infrastructure. The IDF has shown no mercy to buildings and tunnels in Gaza. It has used an unprecedented quantity of aerial weapons and explosives on the ground, and the number of homes it has destroyed is enormous. Notwithstanding claims that the Americans withheld armaments from the IDF, they provided Israel with tens of thousands of bombs that it did not possess at the beginning of the war. Could yet more infrastructure have been destroyed?

Will anyone be surprised if, after the complete victory in Gaza is achieved and Hamas is defeated, there continues to be a threat of terrorism from Gaza, including the occasional rocket launch? Can this be prevented? And if not, what is the advantage of continuing the war without end?

The IDF has been at war at varying levels of intensity for 10 months now. The regular soldiers are fighting almost continuously, and the reserve forces are already in their third round of action. Is this not enough? Is there no limit to the hours the engine of the IDF machine can continue to function? And is there a correlation between the prolonging of the war in Gaza and the problematic strategic situation in the north?

Supporters of the alternative view claim that Ben-Gurion’s view no longer provides security. According to them, avoiding a complete victory stems first and foremost from weakness. But their new concept ignores the reality of the difficulty that would be involved in achieving either the means or the international support necessary to prosecute such a long war. When asked what Israel should do about the lack of armaments, their answer is often that Israel will simply have to achieve independence in the field. But how can a war be waged right now with armaments that we do not yet have? And can Israel really afford to ignore its need for American military and political assistance? Can Israel stand alone against all the threats that surround us, which are not only military but also political and economic? Can Israel survive without American support at the UN? Can it survive a global boycott?

Col. (res.) Gur Laish served as head of the campaign planning department in the Israel Air Force and as head of the security concept division at the National Security Council. He has a master’s degree in political science from the University of Haifa. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post A ‘Long War’ Is Not the Answer to Israel’s Security Problem — and Could Lead to Destruction (PART ONE) first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Switzerland Moves to Close Gaza Humanitarian Foundation’s Geneva Office Over Legal Irregularities

Palestinians carry aid supplies received from the US-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation in the central Gaza Strip, May 29, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Ramadan Abed/File Photo

Switzerland has moved to shut down the Geneva office of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), a US- and Israeli-backed aid group, citing legal irregularities in its establishment.

The GHF began distributing food packages in Gaza in late May, implementing a new aid delivery model aimed at preventing the diversion of supplies by Hamas, as Israel continues its defensive military campaign against the Palestinian terrorist group.

The initiative has drawn criticism from the UN and international organizations, some of which have claimed that Jerusalem is causing starvation in the war-torn enclave.

Israel has vehemently denied such accusations, noting that, until its recently imposed blockade, it had provided significant humanitarian aid in the enclave throughout the war.

Israeli officials have also said much of the aid that flows into Gaza is stolen by Hamas, which uses it for terrorist operations and sells the rest at high prices to Gazan civilians.

With a subsidiary registered in Geneva, the GHF — headquartered in Delaware — reports having delivered over 56 million meals to Palestinians in just one month.

According to a regulatory announcement published Wednesday in the Swiss Official Gazette of Commerce, the Federal Supervisory Authority for Foundations (ESA) may order the dissolution of the GHF if no creditors come forward within the legal 30-day period.

The Trump administration did not immediately respond to requests for comment on the Swiss decision to shut down its Geneva office.

“The GHF confirmed to the ESA that it had never carried out activities in Switzerland … and that it intends to dissolve the Geneva-registered branch,” the ESA said in a statement.

Last week, Geneva authorities gave the GHF a 30-day deadline to address legal shortcomings or risk facing enforcement measures.

Under local laws and regulations, the foundation failed to meet several requirements: it did not appoint a board member authorized to sign documents domiciled in Switzerland, did not have the minimum three board members, lacked a Swiss bank account and valid address, and operated without an auditing body.

The GHF operates independently from UN-backed mechanisms, which Hamas has sought to reinstate, arguing that these vehicles are more neutral.

Israeli and American officials have rejected those calls, saying Hamas previously exploited UN-run systems to siphon aid for its war effort.

The UN has denied those allegations while expressing concerns that the GHF’s approach forces civilians to risk their safety by traveling long distances across active conflict zones to reach food distribution points.

The post Switzerland Moves to Close Gaza Humanitarian Foundation’s Geneva Office Over Legal Irregularities first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Key US Lawmaker Warns Ireland of Potential Economic Consequences for ‘Antisemitic Path’ Against Israel

US Sen. James Risch (R-ID) speaks during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Washington, DC, May 21, 2024. Photo: Graeme Sloan/Sipa USA via Reuters Connect

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman James Risch (R-ID) issued a sharp warning Tuesday, accusing Ireland of embracing antisemitism and threatening potential economic consequences if the Irish government proceeds with new legislation targeting Israeli trade.

“Ireland, while often a valuable U.S. partner, is on a hateful, antisemitic path that will only lead to self-inflicted economic suffering,” Risch wrote in a post on X. “If this legislation is implemented, America will have to seriously reconsider its deep and ongoing economic ties. We will always stand up to blatant antisemitism.”

Marking a striking escalation in rhetoric from a senior US lawmaker, Risch’s comments came amid growing tensions between Ireland and Israel, which have intensified dramatically since the Hamas-led attacks on southern Israel on October 7, 2023. Those attacks, in which roughly 1,200 Israelis were killed and more than 200 taken hostage, prompted a months-long Israeli military campaign in Gaza that has drawn widespread international scrutiny. Ireland has positioned itself as one of the most vocal critics of Israel’s response, accusing the Israeli government of disproportionate use of force and calling for immediate humanitarian relief and accountability for the elevated number of Palestinian civilian casualties.

Dublin’s stance has included tangible policy shifts. In May 2024, Ireland formally recognized a Palestinian state, becoming one of the first European Union members to do so following the outbreak of the war in Gaza. The move was condemned by Israeli officials, who recalled their ambassador to Ireland and accused the Irish government of legitimizing terrorism. Since then, Irish lawmakers have proposed further measures, including legislation aimed at restricting imports from Israeli settlements in the West Bank, policies viewed in Israel and among many American lawmakers as aligning with the controversial Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement.

While Irish leaders have defended their approach as grounded in international law and human rights, critics in Washington, including Risch, have portrayed it as part of a broader pattern of hostility toward Israel. Some US lawmakers have begun raising the possibility of reevaluating trade and diplomatic ties with Ireland in response.

Risch’s warning is one of the clearest indications yet that Ireland’s policies toward Israel could carry economic consequences. The United States is one of Ireland’s largest trading partners, and American companies such as Apple, Google, Meta and Pfizer maintain substantial operations in the country, drawn by Ireland’s favorable tax regime and access to the EU market.

Though the Trump administration has not echoed Risch’s warning, the remarks reflect growing unease in Washington about the trajectory of Ireland’s foreign policy. The State Department has maintained a careful balancing act, expressing strong support for Israel’s security while calling for increased humanitarian access in Gaza. Officials have stopped short of condemning Ireland’s actions directly but have expressed concern about efforts they see as isolating Israel on the international stage.

Ireland’s stance is emblematic of a growing international divide over the war. While the US continues to provide military and diplomatic backing to Israel, many European countries have called for an immediate ceasefire and investigations into alleged war crimes.

Irish public opinion has long leaned pro-Palestinian, and Irish lawmakers have repeatedly voiced concern over the scale of destruction in Gaza and the dire humanitarian situation.

Irish officials have not yet responded to The Algemeiner’s request for comment.

The post Key US Lawmaker Warns Ireland of Potential Economic Consequences for ‘Antisemitic Path’ Against Israel first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Israel Condemns Iran’s Suspension of IAEA Cooperation, Urges Europe to Reinstate UN Sanctions

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar at a press conference in Berlin, Germany, June 5, 2025. REUTERS/Christian Mang/File Photo

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar on Wednesday condemned Iran’s decision to halt cooperation with the UN’s nuclear watchdog and called on the international community to reinstate sanctions to curb Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.

“Iran has just issued a scandalous announcement about suspending its cooperation with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency),” Saar wrote in a post on X. “This is a complete renunciation of all its international nuclear obligations and commitments.”

Last week, the Iranian parliament voted to suspend cooperation with the IAEA “until the safety and security of [the country’s] nuclear activities can be guaranteed.”

“The IAEA and its Director-General are fully responsible for this sordid state of affairs,” Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi wrote in a post on X.

The top Iranian diplomat said this latest decision was “a direct result of [IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi’s] regrettable role in obfuscating the fact that the Agency — a full decade ago — already closed all past issues.

“Through this malign action,” Araghchi continued, “he directly facilitated the adoption of a politically-motivated resolution against Iran by the IAEA [Board of Governors] as well as the unlawful Israeli and US bombings of Iranian nuclear sites.”

On Wednesday, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian approved a bill banning UN nuclear inspectors from entering the country until the Supreme National Security Council decides that there is no longer a threat to the safety of its nuclear sites.

In response, Saar urged European countries that were part of the now-defunct 2015 nuclear deal to activate its “snapback” clause and reinstate all UN sanctions lifted under the agreement.

Officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), this accord between Iran and several world powers imposed temporary restrictions on Tehran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.

During his first term, US President Donald Trump withdrew from the deal and reinstated unilateral sanctions on Iran.

“The time to activate the Snapback mechanism is now! I call upon the E3 countries — Germany, France and the UK to reinstate all sanctions against Iran!” Saar wrote in a post on X.

“The international community must act decisively now and utilize all means at its disposal to stop Iranian nuclear ambitions,” he continued.

Saar’s latest remarks come after Araghchi met last week in Geneva with his counterparts from Britain, France, Germany and the European Union’s Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas — their first meeting since the Iran-Israel war began.

Europe is actively urging Iran to reengage in talks with the White House to prevent further escalation of tensions, but has yet to address the issue of reinstating sanctions.

Speaking during an official visit to Latvia on Tuesday, Saar said that “Operation Rising Lion” — Israel’s sweeping military campaign aimed at dismantling Iran’s nuclear capabilities — has “revealed the full extent of the Iranian regime’s threat to Israel, Europe, and the global order.”

“Iran deliberately targeted civilian population centers with its ballistic missiles,” Saar said at a press conference. “The same missile threat can reach Europe, including Latvia and the Baltic states.”

“Israel’s actions against the head of the snake in Iran contributed directly to the safety of Europe,” the Israeli top diplomat continued, adding that Israeli strikes have set back the Iranian nuclear program by many years.

The post Israel Condemns Iran’s Suspension of IAEA Cooperation, Urges Europe to Reinstate UN Sanctions first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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