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Russians’ Negative Views About Israel Are Unprecedented in Modern Times

Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with then-Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi during a meeting in Moscow, Russia, Dec. 7, 2023. Photo: Sputnik/Sergei Bobylev/Pool via REUTERS

A year has passed since the beginning of the war that Israel, with the support of its allies, primarily the United States, has been waging against the “Axis of Evil” — an anti-Western alliance consisting of Iran, its satellites (Syria, Iraq), and terrorist proxies that have effectively taken control of their respective regions, such as Hezbollah and Hamas.

As the conflict escalates, the issue of international support for Israel’s actions has become increasingly pressing.

Of particular concern to Jerusalem, naturally, is the stance of Western countries, especially Israel’s allies, most notably the United States and several key European nations.

As the fighting intensifies, the diplomatic rhetoric of these governments has increasingly emphasized the “humanitarian dimension” of the conflict, largely driven by the growing trends in local public opinion, which are not always favorable to the Jewish State. However, a closer look reveals that the sympathies of some segments of the public in democratic countries towards the Palestinian Arabs do not, in most cases, translate into support for the radical Islamist terrorist groups in the Middle East. The primary diplomatic message from Washington and the majority of its NATO partners remains steadfast support for Israel’s right to self-defense.

Another perspective is that of the so-called “Global South,” a diverse and loosely organized conglomerate of developing and moderately developed countries from the Third World and, to some extent, the former Second World. The majority of these nations tend to hold either moderately pro-Palestinian views regarding the current Middle Eastern conflict or, more commonly, remain neutral. However, this does not prevent both groups from almost automatically voting in favor of anti-Israel resolutions at the UN, in line with the traditions of the still residual “Non-Aligned Movement.” The approach of regimes vying for leadership of the “Global South” looks fundamentally different. Competing for this status, they attempt, to varying degrees, to challenge the global economic and political dominance of the so-called “Global West,” typically associated with the US-led bloc of “old” and “old-new” democracies of both the New and Old Worlds.

The discussion is generally about Russia, China, and, to a lesser extent, India. While Delhi, whose relations with Jerusalem have reached a state of strategic partnership in recent years, maintains a largely neutral position in the conflict between Israel and Iran, as well as its Arab proxies, Moscow and Beijing have taken sides — and it’s clearly not Israel’s side.

China’s support for Iran remains largely moral, and Tehran has little chance of dragging Beijing into a direct confrontation with Israel. However, Russia’s support for its current closest partner in the region — Iran — is significantly more tangible, despite some differences between them. This includes direct solidarity from Moscow with Tehran’s Arab satellites, including Hamas and Hezbollah.

All of this significantly distinguishes the current situation from Moscow’s previous strategy of balancing and mediating between nearly all parties involved in the Middle East conflict, which was intended to position itself as an “impartial mediator.”

Factors of Views of Israel in the Russians Public Discourse

Over the course of 12 months of Israel’s war with Iranian proxies, the Russian leadership’s propaganda and diplomatic efforts in support of these regimes and groups, often loosely and not always convincingly framed as “solidarity with the Palestinians,” have become quite significant. On the flip side of this trend, there has been a series of anti-Israel moves, featuring elements bordering on antisemitism.

Unsurprisingly, the reaction of Russian society, which is highly susceptible to official propaganda — particularly pro-Kremlin television (which, according to polls, remains the main source of information for Russians) — and “patriotic” Telegram channels, has also shifted.

Public sentiment among Russians, who were generally quite favorable toward Israel in the past, changed almost instantly. This is notable given that, according to public opinion monitoring conducted by the reputable Levada Center since 1988, Israel has historically been viewed positively in Russia. The country’s economically established, younger, and better-educated citizens, as well as residents of Moscow, have been the most likely to show interest in and sympathy toward Israel.

Twenty years ago, in 2004, over two-thirds of respondents in a Levada Center poll reported very positive or somewhat positive attitudes toward Israel, while fewer than one-fifth of those surveyed held the opposite view. One possible factor contributing to such favorable sentiments was the emerging public partnership between Jerusalem and Moscow in the fight against terrorist groups. This included Russia’s willingness — expressed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during a visit to Israel — to learn from Israel’s experience following the Beslan school tragedy in North Ossetia, where an attack by armed Islamists killed over 350 people, half of them children.

However, by 2006, the proportion of those with positive views of Israel had dropped by about half, while the share of those holding negative opinions increased from less than 20% to over 30%.

A March 2006 poll appears to have captured a surge in public frustration, likely driven by the sharp and widely discussed response from official Jerusalem to Moscow’s refusal to classify Hezbollah and Hamas as terrorist organizations. This frustration was compounded by the high-level reception of a Hamas delegation in the same month (and again a year later), led by Khaled Mashal, the head of the group’s political bureau and one of Israel’s most bitter enemies. Additionally, the Hamas delegation’s meeting with Patriarch Alexy II, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, was seen by many as not just political but also religious legitimization of the radical Islamist group.

These negative sentiments among the Russian public regarding Israel were, at the very least, not softened during the 34-day Second Lebanon War in July–August 2006, when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched an operation against Hezbollah, the pro-Iranian Shia terrorist group controlling southern and eastern Lebanon.

The rise in Russian-Israeli relations began in the second half of the 2000s, as Russia reestablished itself as a significant player in the Middle East. Moscow recognized that, unlike the Soviet Union, modern Russia could not rely solely on its ties to the Arab world and sought greater understanding with Israel as well. This approach was positively received by Israel’s leadership at the time. The shift toward a close partnership with Russia was considered one of the foreign policy priorities of Benjamin Netanyahu’s second government (2009–2013). Netanyahu viewed his personal relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin as a valuable political asset.

Most of the second decade of the 21st century indeed saw a significant revitalization of Russian-Israeli relations, including rapid growth in mutual trade, as well as increased cooperation in economic, technological, scientific, cultural, and humanitarian sectors — although the scale of this cooperation lagged behind the real potential of both countries. Political dialogue at the highest levels was also very active. While these political and diplomatic contacts were “more symbolic than practical,” as noted by prominent Russian political analyst Fyodor Lukyanov, this symbolism reflected an unusual situation where “Russia’s relations with Israel were better than with almost the entire Arab world. Apart from the Iran issue, there were few significant points of differences between Moscow and Tel Aviv [sic]. Meanwhile, Russia’s cooling relations with most Arab regimes were tied to its support for Syria.”

This positive portrayal of Russian-Israeli relations in both federal and regional Russian media was paralleled by a gradual improvement in Russian public opinion toward Israel. By 2010, according to Levada Center data, favorable attitudes toward Israel had peaked at 70%. However, over the next decade, this support steadily declined. A notable exception was a sharp drop in 2014, likely in response to the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) anti-terror operation in Gaza, Protective Edge. Nonetheless, this dip was short-lived, and thanks to the relatively balanced position taken by Russian authorities during the conflict, public sympathies for Israel rebounded to around 60%. This level of support remained fairly stable over the following four years.

The 2015–2017 agreements on the “deconfliction” of Russian and Israeli interests in Syria, as well as numerous meetings — around two dozen – between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu, likely played a key role in the development of their relations. Netanyahu, who valued his warm personal relationship with Putin as a crucial factor in bilateral cooperation and a significant resource for both his foreign and domestic policies, met with Putin roughly twice as often as he met with US presidents during the same period. However, even at that time, it was clear that this was more of a tactical partnership, based on overlapping interests and mutually agreed-upon “rules of the game.” As a result, there were lingering concerns that if the political landscape changed, so would the interests.

The first signal that these fears were well-founded came with the incident in the skies over Syria on September 23, 2018. During this incident, one of the dozens of missiles fired by Syrian air defense batteries equipped with Russian S-200 systems shot down a Russian IL-20 electronic intelligence aircraft. The Russian side quickly blamed the Israeli Air Force, which had been conducting an operation to destroy Iranian equipment intended for the production of precision missiles in Syria. According to Israeli and foreign media, by the time the Syrian forces began their “indiscriminate firing,” the Israeli F-16s had already completed their mission and were back in Israeli airspace.

Despite this, the Russian Ministry of Defense — and to a lesser extent, the Kremlin—blamed Israel without substantiation. However, both Jerusalem and Moscow soon moved to de-escalate the diplomatic conflict, clearly showing a desire to maintain their coordination mechanism in Syria. It was harder to ignore the “patriotic” campaigns in many Russian media outlets, including federal TV channels, where numerous public figures competed in making harsh anti-Israel statements, some of which bordered on or crossed into antisemitism. Although this media campaign was quickly wound down—likely due to guidance from relevant authorities—it became evident that the reintroduction of Soviet-era anti-Israel and antisemitic clichés into Russia’s legitimate public discourse was a real possibility, should such narratives be required by the government.

The impact of this political atmosphere on the Russian public was quickly evident. The once-positive attitude of Russians toward Israel began to sharply decline, while negative sentiment toward the Jewish State increased in parallel. For example, compared to 2018, when 60% of surveyed Russians still had a “very positive” or “mostly positive” view of Israel, and less than one-fifth held an opposing view, by 2020 Israel’s positive rating had dropped by 10%, while negative perceptions rose by 50%.

This trend accelerated dramatically after the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, and even more so with the onset of Israel’s war with the Iranian bloc in October 2023. Although Israel, unlike NATO member states that provided Ukraine with security guarantees, did not directly align itself with the Western coalition opposing Russia, official Jerusalem condemned the Russian invasion, offered significant humanitarian and material aid to Ukraine, provided diplomatic and political support, and supplied the Ukrainian Armed Forces with some types of defensive and non-lethal equipment. Despite attempts to maintain a sense of “business as usual,” this approach caused notable irritation within the Russian leadership. Consequently, public support for Israel among Russians dropped to 35%, a historic low, nearly matching the share of those holding a negative view of Israel for the first time in Levada Center’s years of polling.

By September 2024, 51% of Russians expressed a negative attitude toward Israel, marking a 34 percentage point increase from 2018. Meanwhile, positive sentiment toward Israel fell by 32 percentage points, reaching just 27%.

Since the collapse of the USSR, Russian-Israeli relations have experienced both highs and lows, but the current situation, where the number of Russians with a negative view of Israel nearly doubles the number of its supporters, is unprecedented in the post-Soviet era.

It seems reasonable to assume that the opinions and sentiments of Russians, at least regarding the subject of this text, are largely — if not entirely — a reflection of the foreign policy vision of the Russian political establishment, shaped by the tools it controls to influence public consciousness. In other words, we are witnessing a phenomenon that, until recently, appeared to be a relic of the distant past.

Prof. Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin lectures in Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and is Academic Chairman of the Institute for Euro-Asian Jewish Studies in Herzliya, Israel. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post Russians’ Negative Views About Israel Are Unprecedented in Modern Times first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Examining Three Remarkable Women From Jewish History in These Turbulent Times

A Torah scroll. Photo: RabbiSacks.org.

Anyone interested in history will know that the Yalta Conference was a meeting between the leaders of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union that took place in February 1945 towards the end of the Second World War. There is a famous photograph of Roosevelt and Stalin sitting next to an unhappy Winston Churchill, who realized he was being marginalized. As we now know, Stalin suckered Roosevelt into believing him to be someone that could be worked with, when he was actually a murderous fanatic. And it seems so far that Putin is going to sucker Trump over Ukraine, and I fear Iran will too.

Like Roosevelt, Trump wants a deal. But as Barack Obama has shown, naive appeasement is the road to disaster. Only time will tell if the case with Iran is going to be another example.

But here, by way of distraction, I am writing about a person. This Yalta was a distinguished lady from a noble and wealthy family who lived in Babylon between the end of the Second and the Third centuries. She had a strong sense of self-worth, and self-confidence in an era of almost total male dominance. She was, according to Rashi, the daughter of the Exilarch, the head of the Jewish community in Babylon. She was familiar with Jewish law. But she had a temper. When she thought she was being slighted, she smashed four hundred barrels of wine after a guest offended her and women in general (TB Brachot 51b.)

Yalta showed her expertise in kashrut matters. In a debate that hinted at current questions of what constitutes meat if it is produced artificially, she asked her husband about kosher food that would taste like meat cooked in milk. She argued the halachic case expertly. And he accepted the argument (TB Chullin 109b). She also argued the law in other matters such as purity.

Yalta was a doctor too. She personally took Rav Amram to the bathhouse to soak in hot water for a cure when he was stricken with an unknown disease (TB Gittin 67b). And she offered her husband counsel on how to deal with someone who was arguing with him disrespectfully (TB Kidushin 70b). Perhaps these were not in themselves major issues — but they were indicative of her importance in that society, where the only chance women had beyond the home depended either on independent wealth or a compliant husband.

The more famous Talmudic woman however, was Bruria, the daughter of the saintly Chaninah Ben Teradion (an outstanding scholar, from a very wealthy family and martyred by the Romans). She was the wife of Rebbi Meir, who lived in Israel during the second century CE. He is the third most frequently mentioned rabbi in the Mishnah.

She was admired for her breadth of knowledge. She was said to have learned 300 laws from the rabbis on a single cloudy day (TB Pesachim 62b) and was happy to challenge rabbis she thought less knowledgeable than she was. She was also renowned for her sharp wit and often caustic jibes, attacking males for underestimating women. Rebbi Meir was sorely troubled by local louts and prayed that they should die. Bruria argued that he should rather pray that evil disappear. Not people.

The third important woman is Rav Chisda’s daughter. Her actual name is never mentioned. She was gifted with the power of prophecy. She predicted her marriage to her father’s two students (consecutively). First, she was the wife of the Rami Bar Chama, and after his death she married Rava (both were Amoraim of the third generation). She is mentioned many times in the Talmud and commentaries in the Talmud and its commentaries only as “the daughter of Rav Chisda.” The Talmud (TB Bava Batra 12b) says she sat on her father’s lap as he taught Torah in the academy and taught her and her sisters Torah and laws, personally. There were rabbis in those days and later who recognized the value of female scholarship and empowerment — even in times when the rest of the world resolutely refused to encourage it.

Right now, we need people who demonstrate leadership through creativity and flexibility. Most are being silenced by the plague of conformity and the fear of stepping out of line. But the reality is that more and more women within the Orthodox world are studying to the highest levels and making their mark. There are signs of their campaigning to achieve political power too. More power to their elbows (so long as they are covered of course)! You can’t keep a good woman down forever. And more young men are volunteering to serve in the army.

Trump seems to have learnt the lesson of Yalta. But will his natural desire for a long-term deal end up with his being suckered by Iran’s ideology of deceit to achieve victory? Time will tell. Meanwhile, I pray Israel will take a long hard look at its divisive politics.

The author is a writer and rabbi, currently based in New York.

The post Examining Three Remarkable Women From Jewish History in These Turbulent Times first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Battling to Survive, Hamas Faces Defiant Clans and Doubts Over Iran

Hamas terrorists carry grenade launchers at the funeral of Marwan Issa, a senior Hamas deputy military commander who was killed in an Israeli airstrike during the conflict between Israel and Hamas, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, in the central Gaza Strip, Feb. 7, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Ramadan Abed

Short of commanders, deprived of much of its tunnel network, and unsure of support from its ally Iran, the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas is battling to survive in Gaza in the face of rebellious local clans and relentless Israeli military pressure.

Hamas fighters are operating autonomously under orders to hold out as long as possible, but the Islamist group is struggling to maintain its grip as Israel openly backs tribes opposing it, three sources close to Hamas said.

With a humanitarian crisis in Gaza intensifying international pressure for a ceasefire, Hamas badly needs a pause in the fighting, one of the people said.

Not only would a ceasefire offer respite to weary Gazans, who are growing increasingly critical of Hamas, but it would also allow the Islamist group to crush rogue elements, including some clans and looters who have been stealing aid, the person said.

To counter the immediate threat, Hamas has sent some of its top fighters to kill one rebellious leader, Yasser Abu Shabab, but so far he has remained beyond their reach in the Rafah area held by Israeli troops, according to two Hamas sources and two other sources familiar with the situation.

Reuters spoke to 16 sources including people close to Hamas, Israeli security sources, and diplomats who painted a picture of a severely weakened group, retaining some sway and operational capacity in Gaza despite its setbacks, but facing stiff challenges.

Hamas is still capable of landing blows: it killed seven Israeli soldiers in an attack in southern Gaza on Tuesday. But three diplomats in the Middle East said intelligence assessments showed it had lost its centralized command and control and was reduced to limited, surprise attacks.

An Israeli military official estimated Israel had killed 20,000 or more Hamas fighters and destroyed or rendered unusable hundreds of miles of tunnels under the coastal strip. Much of Gaza has been turned to rubble in 20 months of conflict.

One Israeli security source said the average age of Hamas fighters was “getting lower by the day.” Israeli security sources say Hamas is recruiting from hundreds of thousands of impoverished, unemployed, displaced young men.

Hamas does not disclose how many of its fighters have died.

“They’re hiding because they are being instantly hit by planes, but they appear here and there, organizing queues in front of bakeries, protecting aid trucks, or punishing criminals,” said Essam, 57 a construction worker in Gaza City.

“They’re not like before the war, but they exist.”

Asked for comment for this story, senior Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhri said the group was working for an agreement to end the war with Israel but “surrender is not an option.”

Hamas remained committed to negotiations and was “ready to release all prisoners at once,” he said, referring to Israeli hostages, but it wanted the killing to stop and Israel to withdraw.

‘IT DOESN’T LOOK GOOD’

Hamas is a shadow of the group that attacked Israel in 2023, killing 1,200 people and taking another 251 hostages. Israel responded with a military campaign aimed at freeing the hostages and dismantling Hamas.

The damage inflicted by Israel is unlike anything Hamas has suffered since its creation, with most of its top military commanders in Gaza killed. Founded in 1987, Hamas had gradually established itself as the main rival of the Fatah faction led by President Mahmoud Abbas and finally seized Gaza from his control in 2007.

With a US-brokered truce in the Iran-Israel war holding, attention has switched back to the possibility of a Gaza deal that might end the conflict and release the remaining hostages.

One of the people close to Hamas told Reuters it would welcome a truce, even for a couple of months, to confront the local clans that are gaining influence.

But he said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s terms for ending the war – including Hamas leaders leaving Gaza – would amount to total defeat, and Hamas would never surrender.

“We keep the faith, but in reality it doesn’t look good,” the source said.

Yezid Sayigh, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, said he believed Hamas was simply trying to survive. That was not just a physical challenge of holding out militarily, he said, but above all a political one.

“They face being eliminated on the ground in Gaza if the war doesn’t stop, but they also face being erased from any governing formula that ends the war in Gaza (if such a thing can be found),” he wrote in response to Reuters’ questions.

Palestinian tribes have emerged as part of Israel’s strategy to counter Hamas. Netanyahu has said publicly that Israel has been arming clans that oppose Hamas, but has not said which.

One of the most prominent challenges has come from Abu Shabab, a Palestinian Bedouin based in the Rafah area, which is under Israeli control.

Hamas wants Abu Shabab captured, dead or alive, accusing him of collaboration with Israel and planning attacks on the terrorist group, three Hamas sources told Reuters.

Abu Shabab controls eastern Rafah and his group is believed to have freedom of movement in the wider Rafah area. Images on their Facebook page show their armed men organizing the entry of aid trucks from the Kerem Shalom crossing.

Announcements by his group indicate that it is trying to build an independent administration in the area, though they deny trying to become a governing authority. The group has called on people from Rafah now in other areas of Gaza to return home, promising food and shelter.

In response to Reuters’ questions, Abu Shabab’s group denied getting support from Israel or contacts with the Israeli army, describing itself as a popular force protecting humanitarian aid from looting by escorting aid trucks.

It accused Hamas of violence and muzzling dissent.

A Hamas security official said the Palestinian security services would “strike with an iron fist to uproot the gangs of the collaborator Yasser Abu Shabab,” saying they would show no mercy or hesitation and accusing him of being part of “an effort to create chaos and lawlessness.”

Not all of Gaza’s clans are at odds with Hamas, however.

On Thursday, a tribal alliance said its men had protected aid trucks from looters in northern Gaza. Sources close to Hamas said the group had approved of the alliance’s involvement.

Israel said Hamas fighters had in fact commandeered the trucks, which both the clans and Hamas denied.

IRAN UNCERTAINTY

Palestinian analyst Akram Attallah said the emergence of Abu Shabab was a result of the weakness of Hamas, though he expected him to fail ultimately because Palestinians broadly reject any hint of collaboration with Israel.

Nevertheless, regardless of how small Abu Shabab’s group is, the fact Hamas has an enemy from the same culture was dangerous, he said. “It remains a threat until it is dealt with.”

Israel’s bombing campaign against Iran has added to the uncertainties facing Hamas. Tehran’s backing for Hamas played a big part in developing its armed wing into a force capable of shooting missiles deep into Israel.

While both Iran and Israel have claimed victory, Netanyahu on Sunday indicated the Israeli campaign against Tehran had further strengthened his hand in Gaza, saying it would “help us expedite our victory and the release of all our hostages.”

US President Donald Trump said on Wednesday that great progress was being made on Gaza, adding that the strike on Iran would help get the hostages released.

A Palestinian official close to Hamas said the group was weighing the risk of diminished Iranian backing, anticipating “the impact will be on the shape of funding and the expertise Iran used to give to the resistance and Hamas.”

One target of Israel’s campaign in Iran was a Revolutionary Guards officer who oversaw coordination with Hamas. Israel said Saeed Izadi, whose death it announced on Saturday, was the driving force behind the IranHamas axis.

Hamas extended condolences to Iran on Thursday, calling Izadi a friend who was directly responsible for ties with “the leadership of the Palestinian resistance.”

A source from an Iran-backed group in the region said Izadi helped develop Hamas capabilities, including how to carry out complex attacks, including rocket launches, infiltration operations, and drones.

Asked about how the Israeli campaign against Iran might affect its support for Hamas, Abu Zuhri said Iran was a large and powerful country that would not be defeated.

The post Battling to Survive, Hamas Faces Defiant Clans and Doubts Over Iran first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Israeli Strikes Targeting Hezbollah Pummel South Lebanon Hilltops

Smoke billows from the Nabatieh district, following Israeli strikes, as seen from Marjayoun, in southern Lebanon, June 27, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Karamallah Daher

More than a dozen Israeli air strikes battered a row of hilltops in southern Lebanon on Friday, security sources said, with the Israeli military saying it had attacked a damaged military site that terrorist group Hezbollah was seeking to restore.

The simultaneous strikes hit a mountainous strip near the southern Lebanese city of Nabatieh, according to the Lebanese security sources, who said Iran-backed Hezbollah likely still had arms depots there. There was no immediate comment from the Islamist group.

The Israeli military said its fighter jets had attacked a site used to manage Hezbollah’s “fire and defense system.” It said the site was destroyed in last year’s war but that Hezbollah was attempting to resume activities there in breach of the November truce that ended the conflict.

Lebanon‘s President Joseph Aoun on Friday fired the same accusation back at Israel, saying it was continually violating the US-brokered ceasefire deal by keeping up strikes on Lebanon.

The ceasefire deal stipulates that southern Lebanon must be free of any non-state arms or fighters, Israeli troops must leave southern Lebanon as Lebanese troops deploy there. and all fire across the Lebanese-Israeli border must stop.

Israeli troops remain in at least five posts within Lebanese territory and its air force regularly kills rank-and-file Hezbollah members or people affiliated with the group.

The post Israeli Strikes Targeting Hezbollah Pummel South Lebanon Hilltops first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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