The Hamas terror organization has a weapon that can snatch victory from the jaws of defeat: the fact that Western democracies want the illusion of success, but will never follow through on what is required to achieve it. That’s what’s happening right now at the United Nations.

The UN Security Council is preparing to vote this month on the future of Gaza, a plan that requires Hamas to disarm.

The terror organization is “cooperating” by declaring it will give up “offensive” weapons, but not “defensive” weapons — whatever that means. Hamas knows it’s not truly fooling the Security Council. Rather it’s giving Western democracies the opportunity to say to their constituents, “we’ve disarmed Hamas,” without actually disarming it.

The Security Council’s plan involves international stabilization forces, meant to oversee Gaza’s reconstruction and political future.

Hamas is already arranging to quietly choose the stabilization force’s leadership, thus maintaining its power regardless of who pretends to take charge. The West just might accept this, in order to avoid a bloody conflict between stabilization forces and a still armed and active Hamas. The only other option would be the hard and dangerous work of true disarmament, which Western democracies tend to avoid.

Hamas’ strategy works because Western democracies relish the opportunity to declare “success,” knowing that if and when an arrangement falls apart, it will be after the next election cycle, and somebody else’s problem.

When I was a child, the neighborhood kids had a slang expression for bad ideas: “let’s not, and say we did.” For example, your immature friend might say, “hey let’s go throw rocks at pigeons,” and you’d respond, “let’s not, and say we did.”

This is exactly the philosophy that Hamas is proposing to the Western world: let’s not disarm, let’s not rebuild, let’s not stabilize — but say we did.

Winston Churchill famously said, “democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others.” Indeed, life under democracy beats dictatorships and terror regimes any day of the week, but there’s a downside that occurs when democratic “leaders” follow the whims of a largely uninformed public, even on complex questions that require real expertise. The time horizon for “success” is sometimes no longer than the next midterms, and many decisions are therefore not only short term, but superficial and dangerous, like covering up a crumbling foundation with a fresh coat of paint.

This thinking characterized the JCPOA, also known as the 2015 Iran “Nuclear Deal.” The Nuclear Deal gave the Islamic Republic of Iran access to significant cash and time, which it used to advance the very nuclear program it was supposed to give up. The same resources also helped Iran fund its terror proxies throughout the Middle East.

This philosophy also motivated a bizarre idea in the 1990s to essentially pay North Korea to not develop nuclear weapons. Pyongyang, predictably, accepted billions of dollars in aid and sanctions relief, and then successfully tested its first nuclear bomb just a few years later.

How is it possible for such an obvious game to fool the West?

The key is to present a seductive (and dishonest) narrative that the public wants to believe.

North Korea, for example, sold the idea that its push for nuclear weapons had resulted from poverty and desperation. The poverty was real, the logic was not. The West enthusiastically jumped on the idea that it could resolve everything by giving North Korea aid, fuel, and sanctions relief. The “solution” was meant to look easy, elegant, and most of all, to sound great in the next State of the Union address. And it did — though it required utterly ignoring North Korea’s openly stated goal to “blast the United States from the face of the Earth.”

Similarly, Iran claimed to seek nuclear capacity only for “peaceful purposes,” and objected to Western “bullying,” thus tapping into the West’s aversion to war and its adulation of negotiations and diplomacy.

This narrative worked not because it fooled most experts, but primarily because much of the voting public wanted to believe it. Much like in the case of North Korea, this delusion required ignoring routine chants of “Death to America” in the Iranian parliament, not to mention that Iran’s “peaceful” nuclear program was, suspiciously, hidden under a mountain.

Even Israel, a country typically more savvy than most (out of existential necessity) is not entirely immune.

For decades, terror groups including Hamas, sold the idea that terrorism is the result of poverty and desperation rather than ideology: the old North Korea trick. The “solution”? Flood Gaza with aid, including Qatari cash. According to non-public sources in Israel’s COGAT unit (which handles coordination with the Palestinian territories), Hamas modulated its terror activity up and down in response to how much cash came into Gaza — thus reinforcing the narrative.

Even entrepreneur-turned-politician Naftali Bennett, Israel’s loudest critic of sending Hamas “suitcases full of cash,” did essentially the same thing once he became Prime Minister himself.

The terror group’s publicly declared raison d’être (annihilating Israel and wiping out all Jews) was minimized or ignored. The narrative was just too seductive, and the alternative (all out war) was unacceptable to much of the Israeli public. In the end, all out war happened anyway: beginning in the most horrific possible way, with Hamas’ massacre on October 7, 2023.

In fairness to Israel, the relative quiet before October 7 filled a deep social and emotional need for the war-weary Israeli people, and enabled the country to build significant prosperity and resources — which proved vital to Israel’s economic resilience during its two year “combat marathon,” which continues even now.

Despite some conspiracy theories to the contrary, Israel’s mistakes do not “cause” Hamas’ violence, any more than America “caused” Iran or North Korea’s hatred and nuclear ambitions. To the contrary, the entire Western world tries constantly to balance the need for day-to-day quiet and prosperity against the need for long-term safety. Both priorities are important, yet when the West blunders in trying to achieve this balance, its enemies are quick to take advantage.

In a recent article, I discussed why Israel and Hamas are likely to resume combat. In summary: every element of peace, including international stabilization forces and reconstruction, is impossible until Hamas disarms and dismantles its power structure; but Hamas is ideologically incapable of doing so voluntarily. (The article is a thorough deep dive, and well worth checking out!)

Israel is now raising concerns about the proposed UN framework – in short, the plan appears to encapsulate the principle of “let’s not, and say we did”: let’s not disarm Hamas, let’s not make a meaningful change in Gaza, let’s not make the world any more peaceful or any more safe — but say we did.

Yet there is hope.

Last April, US President Donald Trump gave Iran 60 days to negotiate the dismantling of its nuclear program. Israelis saw this as a mistake, fearing that Trump had fallen into the same trap that seduced former Presidents Obama and Biden: allowing Iran to play for time as it races toward “the Bomb.” Yet immediately after the deadline, rather than allowing extensions, Trump and Israel coordinated a devastating attack on Iran’s nuclear program, achieving in 12 days what years of negotiations had not.

Two years ago, Israel learned the real cost of willful blindness in the most painful possible way, and now insists on nothing less than true safety. For his part, Trump learned last June that negotiation can sometimes be useless and dangerous, whereas appropriate military action can be both limited and effective.

Between Israel’s hard-won wisdom, and Trump’s recent history of learning from prior mistakes, the world just may stand a chance of defeating Hamas after all. Yet if Hamas wins (and it very well might), the philosophy of “let’s not, and say we did” will be the reason why.

Daniel Pomerantz is the CEO of RealityCheck, an organization dedicated to deepening public conversation through robust research studies and public speaking.