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What’s Really Behind Attacks on AIPAC?
AIPAC CEO Howard Kohr speaking at the annual AIPAC Policy Conference in Washington, D.C., March 2, 2020. Photo: AIPAC.
In the age of websites tracking “pro-Israel money” and politicians questioning American support for Israel, one claim has become a rallying cry: AIPAC should register as a foreign agent. It’s repeated so often that many accept it as fact. But repetition doesn’t make something true, and this claim reveals more about the accusers than about AIPAC.
The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) requires registration by those who act “at the order, request, or under the direction or control” of a foreign entity while engaging in political activity on that entity’s behalf.
Notice what’s required: not merely sympathy with a foreign country or advocating for policies that benefit it, but actually operating under its direction or control. This crucial distinction is what AIPAC’s critics ignore.
If the Department of Justice, which has dramatically ramped up FARA enforcement since 2016, believed AIPAC met the legal threshold, it would be an obvious target. Yet the DOJ hasn’t pursued AIPAC. Professional prosecutors evaluating the actual legal standards apparently don’t find the case compelling. But that hasn’t stopped the pundit class.
The claim that AIPAC operates under Israeli government control crumbles under scrutiny. DOJ guidance asks whether an organization acts independently or as “an agent or alter ego of the foreign principal.” The evidence overwhelmingly supports AIPAC’s independence.
When Isaiah “Si” Kenen founded what would become AIPAC in the 1950s, he described the idea that he was an Israeli “agent” as ludicrous, pointing to constant disagreements with Israeli diplomats. When the US planned to arm Iraq, Israeli diplomats wanted to immediately campaign for arms to Israel. Kenen disagreed, arguing that opposing arms to the entire region was the better strategy.
During the Oslo Accords, AIPAC publicly supported the agreement while internally opposing Israel’s request to send US aid directly to Yasser Arafat, insisting instead that it go to Palestinians more broadly with proper monitoring.
These aren’t the actions of an organization under foreign control. They’re the actions of an independent American organization whose members at times disagree with Israeli policy and advocate for their opinion of what’s best.
Organizations like the United States India Political Action Committee (USINPAC) operate nearly identically to AIPAC. Founded in 2002, USINPAC helped secure the landmark 2008 US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. Additionally, a 2009 Foreign Affairs article stated that “the India Lobby is the only lobby in Washington likely to acquire the strength of the Israel lobby.”
Yet when you search for “FARA” and “USINPAC” together, you find essentially nothing. Meanwhile, countless articles, entire books, and dedicated websites exist solely to “expose” AIPAC and its alleged foreign agent status.
This isn’t about legal analysis. It’s about targeting one ethnic lobby while giving identical organizations a pass. Irish, Armenian, and Cuban lobbies have all shaped American foreign policy throughout our history. AIPACis targeted because its members are Jews.
What if AIPAC did register under FARA? According to FARA specialist Matthew Sanderson, it would mean filling out a few extra documents with essentially no practical effect.
AIPAC already operates under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, requiring extensive public disclosure: lobbying expenditures, specific issues and officials lobbied, lobbyist identities, funding sources, and political contributions.
Since AIPAC doesn’t accept money from foreign entities, the FARA funding disclosure forms would be blank. Since it doesn’t lobby under foreign control, it wouldn’t need to file interpersonal disclosure documents detailing who it contacted or announce itself as a foreign agent during lobbying calls — requirements that only apply when an organization operates as an extension of a foreign principal. The only potential requirement might be labeling some materials as coming from a “foreign agent,” but in today’s climate, where everyone already has opinions about AIPAC, this would have a negligible impact.
If FARA registration would change nothing practically, why does this matter?
First, truth matters. The claim is false. When bad-faith actors misrepresent AIPAC’s history as sinister subterfuge, often with antisemitic overtones reminiscent of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, capitulation legitimizes their framing.
Second, selective scrutiny reveals troubling double standards. The vast chasm between scrutiny of AIPAC versus identical organizations, suggests factors beyond legal analysis drive this narrative. When the campaign focuses overwhelmingly on the Jewish State’s supporters while ignoring others, we should call it what it is.
Third, FARA’s ambiguity makes it a potential weapon. A statute so broad it could require registration for “routine business activities” becomes dangerous when applied selectively based on political preferences. This sets a disturbing precedent.
AIPAC is an American organization, funded by Americans, run by Americans, advocating for what its American members believe serves American interests. That some disagree doesn’t make it a foreign agent. It makes it a lobby, like hundreds of others in Washington.
The next time someone claims AIPAC should register as a foreign agent, ask: Where’s the evidence of foreign control? Why don’t they make the same claim about similar organizations? And why aren’t DOJ prosecutors, who’ve ramped up FARA enforcement dramatically, pursuing this supposedly obvious case?
The answers reveal this isn’t about law. It’s about politics — and prejudice.
Alexander Mermelstein, a recent USC graduate with a Master’s degree in Public Policy and Data Science, is an aspiring policy researcher with a focus on Middle East affairs and combating antisemitism.
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Oct. 7 families’ lawsuit says Bitcoin CEO, whom Trump pardoned, facilitated $1B in payments to Hamas and its allies
(JTA) — The families of victims of Hamas’ Oct 7, 2023, attack on Israel filed a lawsuit against the cryptocurrency fund Binance and its CEO, claiming they facilitated over $1 billion in funding to the terror group and others behind the attacks.
The latest lawsuit against Binance CEO Changpeng Zhao comes one month after he was pardoned by President Donald Trump for his November 2023 conviction on violating anti-money-laundering and sanctions laws. Zhao, who pleaded guilty, had been sentenced to four months in prison, and Binance paid more than $4.3 billion in fines.
When asked about the pardon earlier this month on “60 Minutes,” Trump distanced himself from Zhao and Binance, which struck a $2 billion deal with the Trump family’s crypto venture last spring.
“I don’t know who he is,” Trump said of Zhao. “I know he got a four-month sentence or something like that. And I heard it was a Biden witch hunt.”
The complaint, filed Monday in U.S. federal court in North Dakota, lists 306 American plaintiffs and their family members who were killed, injured or taken hostage on Oct. 7 or in other subsequent terror attacks.
They include the families of Hersh Goldberg-Polin, an American-Israeli hostage who was murdered by Hamas in Gaza, and Itay Chen, an American-Israeli soldier whose body was returned by Hamas earlier this month.
The lawsuit joins a growing list of legal cases seeking redress for the families and victims of the Oct. 7 attacks, including one filed by the Anti-Defamation League in September against eight foreign terrorist groups for their efforts in orchestrating the attacks.
The complaint accuses Binance of “knowingly, willfully, and systematically” assisting Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard of moving over $1 billion through its crypto platform, including more than $50 million after Oct. 7.
It also accuses Binance’s conduct of being “far more serious and pervasive” than what the federal government prosecuted in its November 2023 investigation.
“To this day, there is no indication that Binance has meaningfully altered its core business model,” the complaint read.
The post Oct. 7 families’ lawsuit says Bitcoin CEO, whom Trump pardoned, facilitated $1B in payments to Hamas and its allies appeared first on The Forward.
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The Cross-Continental Threat: Iran and Venezuela’s US-Defying Partnership
Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro meets with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, Oct. 24, 2024. Photo: Miraflores Palace/Handout via REUTERS
Bad actors stick together. Few relationships prove that more clearly than Iran and Venezuela’s. The regimes’ close ties are on full display with Iran’s foreign ministry on November 15, threatening the United States with “dangerous consequences” over the US military buildup near Venezuela’s shores.
It’s not just talk: the Iran-Venezuela strategic partnership has matured into a robust, multi-dimensional alliance, impacting both regional security and US foreign policy calculations. Iran and Venezuela’s cooperation spans the social, political, diplomatic, economic, and military domains — and is directly influencing the US posture toward Venezuela, including the recent military buildup near its shores and targeted strikes on drug trafficking operations.
The Iran-Venezuela partnership began in the 1950s and has deepened substantially, especially after former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez declared the countries “brothers” in 2005.
Chávez signed a formal partnership in 2007 with then-Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The presidents developed a notably close personal and political relationship, highlighted by frequent state visits, public demonstrations of solidarity, and formal agreements spanning the economic, energy, and industrial sectors. Today, both countries maintain comprehensive diplomatic ties via their official embassies and frequent high-level exchanges. The partnership intensified under current Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and includes regular presidential meetings, official delegation visits, and joint commission sessions.
Iran has used this leverage to establish a robust foothold in Latin America, constructing a dense network involving both direct state-to-state links and the integration of proxy actors like Hezbollah. The bilateral relationship has been solidified by defense pacts, including a 20-year agreement signed in 2022, and joint manufacturing of Iranian drones and weapons on Venezuelan soil, including potential deployments of loitering munitions and jamming devices.
Economically, the alliance is built on mutual circumvention of Western sanctions. Iran and Venezuela have exchanged oil, gold, and infrastructure assistance, often using Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah-linked front companies for money laundering and sanctions evasion. This economic cooperation enables the Maduro regime to survive by generating hard currency and illicit financial streams, while also facilitating transnational criminal activity including drug trafficking, with groups such as Cartel de los Soles and Tren de Aragua working with Hezbollah proxies to move drugs into US territory. The proceeds fuel both regimes and deepen their partnership and resilience to international pressure.
Simultaneously, Iran and Venezuela collaborate on energy trade that is inimical to US interests and enriches Russia. Iran not only exports refined crude oil to Venezuela to enrich itself, but also helps Venezuela build and fix energy infrastructure, increasing Venezuelan storage and refining capacity. In turn, that boosts Caracas’s appetite for Russian naphtha, a petroleum product that further enables Venezuela to dilute and export its oil, giving Russia a new and growing energy market for its exports to replace Europe and undermining Western sanctions.
As the US presence in the region grows, Venezuela and Iran have enhanced their military coordination. Recently, Venezuela requested additional Iranian drones, military electronics, and asymmetric warfare technologies. Iran provides technical personnel and expertise, optimizing Venezuela’s capacity for electronic warfare and irregular tactics, thereby enhancing deterrence and complicating US intervention plans.
Against this backdrop, the United States has deployed significant naval assets and possibly special operations elements off the coast of Venezuela, amounting to the largest regional buildup since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Officially, the United States has justified this surge to counter escalating drug trafficking, with at least 20 recent kinetic strikes on alleged narco-trafficking vessels departing Venezuelan ports. Many of these drug networks are tied to Venezuelan state actors and Iran-linked proxies. It would not be a stretch to assume that the Maduro regime is leveraging its Iranian connection as strategic insurance.
Venezuela provides Iran and Hezbollah with greater access to the Western Hemisphere. This expanding axis has regional security consequences beyond criminality and drug flows. Venezuelan threats toward neighbors like Guyana, coupled with the risk to Western energy interests and the broader use of Iranian technology, could draw the United States and its partners into more direct conflict. Furthermore, Iran’s strategy of exporting proxy warfare to the Western Hemisphere — mirroring tactics used in the Middle East — creates parallel dilemmas for US policy in both regions.
To counter these threats, enhanced sanctions enforcement against the Iranian–Venezuelan illicit oil trade, improved intelligence and interdiction of military shipments, and regional efforts to dismantle Hezbollah networks are essential. Disrupting the financial pipeline sustaining both the regime and its Iranian backers is critical for neutralizing their broader destabilizing potential.
Iran — along with its proxy Hezbollah — and Venezuela are force multipliers. All three work in concert to enrich the Iranian regime, strengthen Venezuela’s military and imperil regional stability, and facilitate transnational crime that threatens the US homeland. Washington should not allow this Venn diagram of threats to continue converging.
LTG Ray Palumbo, USA (ret.) is the former Deputy Commander of US Army Special Operations Command and a 2021 Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) Generals and Admirals Program participant. Yoni Tobin is a senior policy analyst at JINSA.
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Israel Moves to Admit Entire Bnei Menashe Community From India Amid Rising Ethnic Tensions
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu participates in the state memorial ceremony for the fallen of the Iron Swords War on Mount Herzl, Jerusalem, Oct. 16, 2025. Photo: Alex Kolomoisky/POOL/Pool via REUTERS
The Israeli government on Sunday approved a plan to revive long-stalled efforts to bring the entire Bnei Menashe Jewish community from northeast India to Israel amid rising ethnic tensions, seeking to reunite families and advance their integration into the country.
According to a statement from the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, the plan envisions the relocation of 1,200 members of the Bnei Menashe community by the end of 2026, with another 4,600 expected to follow by 2030.
Amid rising instability and ethnic violence in their home region in India, members of the ethnic community from the northeastern states of Mizoram and Manipur are seeking to rebuild their lives through reintegration into Israeli society.
As part of government efforts to repopulate the northern part of the country, which was heavily affected by last year’s war with the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah, the new immigrants are expected to settle in Nof HaGalil and other northern cities after thousands of residents were forced to flee.
“I welcome the important and Zionist decision adopted today by the government, which will bring about an additional wave of immigration of the Bnei Menashe community to the Land of Israel,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in a statement.
“The new immigrants will settle in the north of the country, as part of the government’s policy to strengthen and develop the North and the Galilee,” the Israeli leader continued.
In coordination with the Indian government, the plan was initiated by Netanyahu and Aliyah and Integration Minister Ofir Sofer, with Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Minister Zeev Elkin, who oversees the Northern Rehabilitation Directorate, also involved in the decision.
“This wave of immigration joins the blessed immigration we have seen over the past two years from many Jewish communities around the world — an immigration that strengthens the resilience, solidarity, and renewal of the State of Israel,” Sofer said in a statement.
In the past two decades, approximately 4,000 members of the community have made aliyah to Israel under previous government efforts, with authorities now moving to complete the community’s settlement in the Jewish state.
Under this initiative, the government will provide initial financial support, Hebrew language instruction, job guidance, temporary housing, and social programs to help newcomers settle, allocating approximately $27.4 million for the first phase.
Next week, an Israeli delegation will travel to India, joined by officials from the Chief Rabbinate, Conversion Authority, Aliyah and Integration Ministry, Population and Immigration Authority, Foreign Ministry, and the Jewish Agency, to evaluate the community members’ eligibility under a 2007 decision allowing groups to enter Israel for conversion and naturalization purposes.
After receiving approval from Israel’s Chief Rabbi and the president of the Great Rabbinical Court, the government confirmed that the new immigrants will enter on A/5 visas, allowing them to undergo conversion and ultimately gain Israeli citizenship.
Identified as descendants of the biblical tribe of Manasseh, one of Israel’s “lost tribes,” the Bnei Menashe largely practiced Christianity before converting to Judaism and gaining recognition from Israel’s Chief Rabbinate.
Until 2005, Israel did not formally endorse Bnei Menashe immigration, when the then-Sephardi Chief Rabbi officially recognized the community as descendants of one of Israel’s lost tribes.