Uncategorized
The Other Iranian Energy Crisis: How Israeli Gas Disruptions Will Cost the Jewish State’s Economy
The production platform of Leviathan natural gas field is seen in the Mediterranean Sea, off the coast of Haifa, northern Israel June 9, 2021. Picture taken June 9, 2021. Photo: Reuters/Amir Cohen
The global oil shock created by Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz obscured a second energy crisis that unfolded much closer to Israel’s borders. The month-long shutdown of Israel’s Leviathan and Karish gas fields, caused by repeated Iranian and Hezbollah missile attacks, was the longest gas export disruption since Israel began supplying gas to Jordan and Egypt.
This interruption, the third in the past two years, exposed how dependent Israel’s neighbors have become on Israeli gas for electricity generation, and reinforced a broader strategic lesson for them.
Viewing Israeli supplies as unreliable, Jordan, Egypt and even Syria are now more likely to deepen hedging strategies by expanding renewables, maintaining costly backup fuels, increasing liquefied natural gas (LNG) flexibility, and looking for alternative regional transport and energy corridors. The bright side is that this shift may strengthen the case for IMEC (the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor) by reframing it less as a Europe-oriented transit initiative and more as a domestic infrastructure project for ensuring intra-regional energy security.
The East Mediterranean energy crisis that accompanied the Iran war was distinct from the better-known oil crisis centered on Hormuz. Israel’s wartime safety procedures forced it to shut down its northern Leviathan and Karish gas fields and divert all the gas from its single remaining field (Tamar) to serve the Israeli market at the expense of its export commitments to Jordan and Egypt.
The Leviathan gas field, the largest source of Israeli gas, eventually resumed operations on April, 2, 2026, 32 days after its initial shutdown. Karish opened a week later on April 9, 2026. Together, these closures mark the longest gas supply disruption since Israel began exporting gas to its neighbors, and the third major disruption following the eruption of the Gaza War on October 7, 2023 and the 12-day war with Iran that took place in June 2025.
The importance of these supply disruptions lies not only in their immediate economic effects, but in the fact that they have become recurrent. From the perspective of Israel’s neighbors, the problem is no longer a one-off technical interruption but a recurring pattern of conflict-driven unreliability. That unreliability is concerning because Israeli gas has become structurally important to the region’s power sectors. In 2025, Israel’s natural gas exports to Egypt and Jordan grew by 13%, reaching about 13.2 BCM – an amount that is set to increase significantly over the next 15 years, to an additional 130 BCM, following Israel’s landmark gas deal with Egypt in 2025.
Jordan is especially exposed to this dependence, as natural gas accounts for roughly 68% of its electricity generation and Israeli gas supplies over half of that gas demand.
During the disruption, Jordanian officials moved quickly to reassure the public that the power supply would remain stable, but the emergency steps they took highlighted the depth of the problem.
The National Electric Power Company (NEPCO) had to shift parts of its electricity generation to heavy fuel oil and diesel at a time when oil prices were at a record high and diesel was in short supply worldwide. Jordan had to tap into its limited petroleum stockpiles, import additional LNG cargoes through Aqaba at a higher cost, and reduce gas deliveries to its industry. These measures preserved grid stability, but at significant cost. Jordan’s energy minister stated that substituting diesel for natural gas raised NEPCO’s daily operating costs by about 1.8 million Jordanian dinars (~2.5m USD) and that its strategic reserves were being quickly depleted. The actual fiscal burden is likely to be much higher than that, and does not take into account the additional cost of refilling depleted stockpiles in the months ahead.
Egypt is less dependent on Israeli gas than Jordan, but it too faced a major challenge following the disruption.
Israeli gas accounts for about 15-20% of Egypt’s total gas consumption, and Egypt’s electricity sector is overwhelmingly gas-dependent. Unlike in June 2025, when Egyptian fertilizer producers were forced to halt operations after Israeli gas imports dropped, the steps taken by Egypt during the March-April 2026 crisis point to a broader emergency response.
Cairo increased LNG purchases, relied more heavily on alternative fuel imports, and introduced demand-side conservation measures, including early closing hours for shops, restaurants, malls, cinemas, and other venues. Egypt’s LNG receipts reportedly tripled year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026, from $560 million to $1.65 billion, while its monthly energy import bill rose sharply as it replaced cheaper Israeli pipeline gas with more expensive LNG and liquid fuel imports. This is a striking development for a country that only a few years ago was hoping to leverage its liquefaction infrastructure and offshore resources to become a major gas exporter; it now relies on gas imports to keep the lights on.
Finally, a third casualty of Israel’s gas closures was Syria, which has been involved since early 2026 in a new gas arrangement with Jordan based on Israeli-sourced gas. In January 2026, Jordan and Syria signed an agreement by which the former would supply the latter with up to 4 million cubic meters of natural gas per day.
Jordanian officials stated that gas deliveries to Syria had already begun on January 1, albeit at much lower volumes than agreed, with the goal of helping Syria operate power plants and reduce chronic electricity shortages. When Israeli production and exports were disrupted at the start of the war, gas flows from Jordan to Syria declined or stopped, worsening Syrian power shortages. These developments underscore the extent to which Syria’s fragile electricity recovery is now linked not only to Jordanian infrastructure and Gulf financing but also to the reliability of Israeli gas supplies.
The strategic implication is that Jordan, Egypt, and Syria are now more likely to view Israeli gas through a dual lens, a process that for Jordan and Egypt had already begun in October 2023. Israel remains attractive as a gas supplier because it is geographically close and is already integrated into regional infrastructure, and its gas is often significantly cheaper than liquefied alternatives.
But repeated wartime interruptions make overdependence increasingly difficult to justify. Even if the political will still exists among all parties to continue energy trade, the risk that supply remains susceptible to frequent war-related precautionary closures and wider regional escalation is too serious to ignore.
As a result, neighboring states are likely to intensify their efforts to diversify both fuel sources and generation structures. The most plausible response is not a complete abandonment of Israeli gas but a strategy of hedging against its interruption. That logic is already visible in Jordan’s reliance on backup fuels and LNG capacity and in Egypt’s move toward large-scale LNG purchases and regasification expansion.
But this trend is also likely to expand interest in non-gas electricity sources, especially renewables. Solar and wind do not provide a full substitute for baseload gas generation, but they can reduce marginal dependence on imported fuel and improve resilience in systems where gas is used primarily for power generation. The political meaning of this shift is that the “green energy transition” in the East Mediterranean will no longer be viewed only as a climate or development issue but as a security issue. The repeated shutdown of Israeli gas exports has made that connection harder to ignore.
The second measure Jordan and Egypt will take is to seek more diversified physical supply routes, whether through domestic exploration, additional import infrastructure, or overland pipeline projects that connect Arab markets more deeply to one another. This includes the long-promoted prospect of oil and gas pipelines from Iraq to Jordan, from Saudi Arabia to Egypt, and from Turkey to Syria. This logic applies not only to Jordan and Egypt but also, indirectly, to the wider Levantine energy system. Even where Israeli gas is re-exported, blended, or politically relabeled to find its way to Syria or even Lebanon, the region is still exposed to the same upstream vulnerabilities.
These developments also have implications for how Israel and its partners should think about regional projects such as IMEC (the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), and whether it is a net win or net loss for Israel itself.
If such corridor projects continue to be presented mainly as infrastructure meant to serve Israeli regional interests and European energy needs, they risk appearing politically detached from the immediate needs of neighboring Arab states. In Jordan especially, the overtly Israel-centered regional branding of IMEC remains difficult to sell.
However, if future corridors are framed primarily as tools for East Mediterranean resilience and not as transit corridors for the West, their logic becomes more compelling. A rail, pipeline, or fuel corridor that improves Jordan’s, Syria’s, Lebanon’s and Egypt’s access to alternative supplies, or that deepens connectivity between Arab states before connecting onward to Israel and Europe, is likely to be more politically palatable and strategically sustainable. In this sense, the repeated gas disruptions strengthen the case for IMEC, but only if it treats the East Mediterranean as an energy-consuming region first and an energy exporting region second. The infrastructure itself will still benefit Israel in the long term, but the corridor’s regional acceptability is likely to depend on its being presented as an intra-regional public good rather than a Europe-facing geopolitical flagship.
For Israel, the lesson emerging from these trends is not that gas exports to neighboring states have lost their strategic value, but that gas interdependence alone does not create durable regional energy security.
Israeli gas exports remain one of the few concrete mechanisms linking Israel economically to the region. If Israel wants its gas diplomacy to retain strategic value, it will need to think less in terms of singular export leverage and more in terms of system resilience.
That means hardening offshore infrastructure, improving redundancy, coordinating emergency arrangements with importers, and recognizing that partner states will actively seek alternatives after each disruption. Leviathan’s planned expansion may increase Israel’s export capacity over time, but larger volumes will not by themselves solve the core problem of ensuring reliability under conflict conditions, as the recent war revealed once again.
For Jordan and Egypt, the likely post-crisis response is not disengagement from Israeli gas but a hedging strategy. Jordan will continue using Israeli supply because it remains economically attractive, but it is also likely to preserve and strengthen backup arrangements through Aqaba, reserve fuels, and renewable generation. Egypt, facing a sharper structural gas deficit, will continue buying Israeli gas but will simultaneously expand LNG imports, regasification capacity, and upstream exploration.
The larger implication is that the East Mediterranean should increasingly be understood not only as a potential export platform, but as an energy-consuming region with growing internal interdependence and shared vulnerability. That shift in perspective should encourage policymakers to ask not merely how the region can ship product outward, but how it can better absorb shocks at home. In that sense, the East Mediterranean gas crisis was not a side story to the oil drama that unfolded during the Iran War. It was a warning about the fragility of the region’s emerging gas order, and a signal that future regional strategy must be built around deeper intra-regional connections and shared infrastructure.
Dr. Elai Rettig is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Studies and a senior research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University. He specializes in energy geopolitics and national security. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
Uncategorized
Saudi Warplanes Struck Militias in Iraq During War, Sources Say
F-15SA fighter jets are seen at King Faisal Air College in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Jan. 25, 2017. Photo: REUTERS/Faisal Al Nasser
Saudi fighter jets bombed targets linked to powerful Tehran-backed Shi’ite militias in Iraq during the Iran war, while retaliatory strikes were also launched from Kuwait into Iraq, multiple sources familiar with the matter said.
The strikes are part of a broader pattern of military responses around the Gulf that remained largely hidden during a conflict that began with US-Israeli attacks on Iran and has spread to the wider Middle East.
For this report, Reuters spoke to three Iraqi security and military officials, a Western official, and two people briefed on the matter, one of them in the US.
The Saudi strikes were carried out by Saudi air force fighter jets on Iran-linked militia targets near the kingdom’s northern border with Iraq, one Western official and the person briefed on the matter said. The Western official said some strikes took place around the time of the April 7 US-Iran ceasefire.
They targeted sites from which drone and missile attacks were launched at Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, the sources said.
Citing military assessments, the Iraqi sources said rocket attacks were launched on at least two occasions from Kuwaiti territory on Iraq. One set of strikes hit militia positions in southern Iraq in April, killing several fighters and destroying a facility used by Iran-backed militia Kataib Hezbollah for communications and drone operations, they said.
Reuters could not determine whether the rockets from Kuwait were fired by the Kuwaiti armed forces or the US military, which has a large presence there. The US military declined to comment. The Kuwaiti information ministry and the Iraqi government did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
SAUDI ARABIA ALSO HIT IRAN
A Saudi foreign ministry official said Saudi Arabia sought de-escalation, self-restraint and the “reduction of tensions in pursuit of the stability, security, and prosperity of the region,” but did not address the issue of strikes on Iraq. A spokesperson for Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah also did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
On Tuesday, Reuters reported that Saudi Arabia launched strikes directly on Iran during the war in retaliation for attacks on the kingdom, the first time Riyadh is known to have hit Iranian soil. The UAE also carried out similar strikes on Iran, three people familiar with the matter said.
But hundreds of the drones that targeted the Gulf emanated from Iraq, all the sources said.
Militia-linked Telegram channels repeatedly posted statements during the war claiming attacks on targets in Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Reuters could not independently confirm their authenticity.
Sustained attacks from a second front in Iraq prompted Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to lose patience with the militias, which collectively command tens of thousands of fighters and arsenals including missiles and drones.
Kuwait summoned Iraq’s representative in the country three times during the war to protest cross-border attacks, as well as the storming of the Kuwaiti consulate in the city of Basra on April 7. Saudi Arabia also summoned Iraq’s ambassador on April 12 to protest attacks.
IRAQ-GULF TIES DEFINED BY SUSPICION
Gulf Arab relations with Iraq have long been defined by suspicion. Ties were severely damaged in 1990 when Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s forces invaded Kuwait and fired Scud missiles at Saudi Arabia, and they remained strained for decades.
The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq deepened Gulf concerns by empowering Shi’ite political factions and armed groups closely tied to Tehran, turning Iraq into a key node in Iran’s regional network of proxies.
Gulf states have repeatedly accused Baghdad of failing to rein in those groups, which operate with significant autonomy and have launched attacks across borders.
A China-brokered détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 had offered hope for broader regional stabilization. But the outbreak of war has severely tested those gains, drawing Gulf states into a conflict they had sought to avoid and exposing the limits of diplomatic progress made in recent years.
In March, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had warned Baghdad via diplomatic channels to curb rocket and drone attacks by pro-Iranian groups against Gulf states, according to two Iraqi security officials and a government security adviser.
Iraqi forces say they intercepted some attempted attacks, including the seizure of a rocket launcher west of Basra intended to strike Saudi energy facilities.
But Iran-backed militias continue to fly surveillance drones along Iraq’s borders with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, conducting reconnaissance and feeding intelligence to Iran, according to four Iraqi security sources and a person briefed on the matter.
“They are gathering information on what has been damaged, what is still working. They are preparing for the next strike,” the person briefed on the matter said.
Uncategorized
Swiss Considering Rival Air Defenses After Washington Delays Patriots Over Iran War
US Patriot missile defense systems at a US army base in Pyeongtaek, South Korea, March 10, 2026. Photo: REUTERS/Kim Hong-Ji
Switzerland said on Wednesday it will look into whether to buy air-defense systems from other suppliers, after the United States informed it that long-delayed Patriot missile systems will be held up further because of the war in Iran.
Switzerland ordered the five Patriot missile-defense systems in 2022 with an initial expectation they would be supplied in 2026-2028, a timeline that has already slipped by four to five years because of the war in Ukraine.
The government said it had now been told by Washington that the Iran war would lead to additional delays and cost increases, with a delay of five to seven years now to be expected.
“All options would lead to delivery delays as well as substantial additional costs,” the government said.
Switzerland expects to receive feedback by the end of the month from five additional suppliers of long-range ground-based air-defense systems, the government said. It did not identify the suppliers but said they came from Germany, France, Israel, and South Korea. It said it would prefer if the systems were produced in Europe.
The governing Federal Council is expected to decide on next steps in the coming months, the statement added.
The Swiss government said in April that terminating the Patriot purchase was an option.
The price for the five Patriot systems could double from 2.3 billion Swiss francs ($2.9 billion) to 4.6 billion francs, Swiss newspaper Tages-Anzeiger said, citing informed sources.
Swiss procurement agency armasuisse and the Pentagon did not immediately reply to requests for comment on the report.
Reuters reported last month that the US had informed European counterparts of likely delays in previously contracted weapons deliveries, as the Iran war continues to draw on weapons stocks.
Uncategorized
All American Jews should acknowledge Nakba Day — for Israel’s sake, and Palestine’s
Many American Jews were raised with the word “Nakba” absent from our vocabularies.
We were taught, correctly, about the miracle of Israel’s founding; the refuge Israel provided after the Holocaust; and the flourishing of Jewish life in our ancestral homeland. What went unmentioned was the other side of that joy: the Nakba, meaning “catastrophe” in Arabic, the name by which the displacement and dispossession of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians during the creation of the state of Israel is known through the Arab world.
For Palestinians, the Nakba is the defining experience of their collective life — carried in family histories, in refugee camps and in the enduring statelessness of millions. It is living memory, not ancient history. The remarkable story of Israel’s creation is real, essential and worth celebrating. But it’s time that all Jews — Zionists alongside anti-Zionists — acknowledge that it was never the only story.
Acknowledging Nakba Day — an annual commemoration on May 15 — can feel uncomfortable, even threatening. There is a fear within much of the Jewish community that recognizing Palestinian loss will in some way undermine Jewish claims to self-determination, or feed efforts to delegitimize Israel.
I understand that fear. I lead a Jewish organization with Zionist roots; I feel this tension in my daily work and life. But I also believe this fear is misguided.
When we deny or minimize the full history of 1948, we deny not just the humanity and pain of the Palestinian people, but also our own honest understanding of today’s reality. For Jewish leaders struggling to understand why younger American Jews won’t simply follow their lead when it comes to support for Israel, this is part of the answer.
When we avoid learning and teaching about the Nakba, we do not make Palestinian loss disappear. Rather, we simply reinforce the perception that we are unwilling to confront this essential part of Israel’s story.
And when we expand our historical understanding we do not weaken our connection to Israel, or that of our children. On the contrary, we strengthen it. A relationship built on selective memory is fragile and incomplete. One grounded in truth — even uncomfortable truth — is far more honest and resilient.
The best reasons to commemorate Nakba Day are the moral mandate to recognize the truth, the value of opening a door to allow for transformational relationships.
Two truths can coexist. It is true the establishment of Israel was a moment of profound liberation for the Jewish people, and it is equally true that it was a moment of profound loss for Palestinians. Holding both facts is not easy. To do so challenges the binary narratives many of us were raised with. But maturity — personal and communal — requires sitting with complexity rather than retreating from it.
Embracing that complexity carries real world implications.
The dismissal of Palestinian grievances is already harming Israel, degrading security and imperiling the country’s future as an integral part of the Middle East. That rejection salts the soil in which deep relationships between Israeli Jews and their Arab neighbors might otherwise take root.
Durable peace will not come from either side insisting that their narrative is the only legitimate one. It will come — if it comes at all — from mutual recognition of history, suffering and shared humanity.
For Jews and Jewish organizations to acknowledge Nakba Day can be one small step in that direction. Doing so would signal a willingness to listen, learn and take Palestinian perspectives seriously. That is an expression of respect that any shared future requires.
To American Jews who find this proposal uncomfortable: It is time for some courage. The easy path is silence. That silence will bring us more isolation, and hamper our capacity to foster relationships grounded in trust with Palestinians. The harder path is to expand our understanding, starting with a more complete and honest account of the past.
Jewish tradition gives us a framework for exactly this kind of engagement.. We regularly recount our own moments of vulnerability, exile and moral failure. We imagine ourselves as slaves departing Egypt and remind ourselves of the ethical obligations that follow. Applying that same ethic in the present day does not betray our story. It honors it.
Commemorating Nakba Day recognizes that the past shapes the present. It embraces intellectual and moral honesty. It affirms that Palestinian lives and histories matter and must coexist alongside Jewish lives and history.
In a time of deep polarization — within the Jewish community, between Israelis and Palestinians, and across American society — the temptation is to retreat into camps, to draw sharper lines and to insist on simpler stories. Giving in to that temptation will not lead us to a future of peace, justice, and mutual dignity.
Instead, we need to complicate our narratives. We need to listen more than we speak. And we need to find ways to honor the humanity of those whose experiences do not mirror our own. Recognizing Nakba Day on May 15 is a good place to start.
The post All American Jews should acknowledge Nakba Day — for Israel’s sake, and Palestine’s appeared first on The Forward.