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After the Recent War with Iran, Should Israel’s Bomb Stay ‘In the Basement’?
Israel’s nuclear reactor near Dimona. Photo: Wikicommons
In war, short-term operational success does not necessarily support long-term survival outcomes.
Despite achieving its immediate goals during the “Twelve-Day War,” Israel will still have to make substantial deterrence policy modifications. Potentially, the Jewish State, smaller than America’s Lake Michigan, now faces greater perils than before the latest war.
How can this be possible? Didn’t the combined effects of Israeli and American bombings “obliterate” Iran’s nuclear military threat?
There is a succinct answer. Though this threat has been degraded, it has not been removed. In assorted increments, Iran could return to where it was before the war, and then advance further in tangibly quantum leaps. At some stage, already-nuclear state allies of Iran could agree to function as Tehran’s nuclear surrogate. Here, both North Korea and Pakistan should come quickly to mind.
What is Israel’s most immediate task? Above all, Jerusalem should do whatever is needed to upgrade and enhance its nuclear deterrence posture. This posture, which includes both doctrine and strategy, will depend on Israel’s decipherable willingness to replace “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” with “selective nuclear disclosure.”
It’s not just about reaffirming the obvious. Controlled nuclear disclosure will be needed to assure Iran and other adversaries (nuclear and non-nuclear) that Israel’s ordnance would be available at all levels of foreseeable military conflict.
This means that Jerusalem will need to make less ambiguous that its presumed nuclear weapons are seemingly “usable” — that is, not too-destructive. Though counter-intuitive and misunderstood, viable nuclear deterrence requires weapons that are recognizably amenable to situational adjustments and calibrations.
Even after Israel’s recent victories over Iran, it would be unreasonable to assume that “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” could work indefinitely.
Even if Iran’s nuclear potentialities were meaningfully set back by “twelve-day war” bombardments, there would remain other worrisome enemy states. After the just-halted conflict, Pakistan reaffirmed “complete solidarity” with Iran. This declaration included explicit threats of direct nuclear retaliation against Israel if Iran were to face an Israeli nuclear attack. For example, nuclear North Korea has a history of belligerent interactions with Israel and could conceivably serve Iran as a fearsome nuclear proxy.
How do matters stand right now? Using Reason as decisional criterion, Israel will need to update its national strategic posture by shifting from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure.”
If Israel remained committed to its “bomb in the basement” nuclear posture, the country’s intra-war opportunities to achieve “escalation dominance” would be severely limited. Even if Tehran were to accept the “usability” of Israel’s nuclear options, it might still not believe that Jerusalem would be willing to exercise these options. As a result, a tit-for-tat dynamic of conventional warfare could proceed unabated and Israel might have to face the exhausting prospect of seemingly interminable attrition warfare.
Iran is planning to buy Chinese Chengdu J-10C fighter jets compatible with PL-15 missiles, the same ordnance used by Pakistan’s air force. China already assists Iran by buying its oil, a vast benefit to Tehran that could accelerate resumed efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Less directly, any planned US sale of F-35 stealth fighter jets to Turkey could offer multiple military benefits to Iran.
In essence, Israel cannot rely indefinitely on an implicit nuclear deterrence posture. Regarding any future or impending war with Iran, Israel needs to consider once-speculative but no longer unrealistic scenarios. Among the narrative possibilities, Pakistan and/or North Korea could sometime become actual nuclear proxies for a still non-nuclear Iran. At that point, any Israeli continuance of “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” would be manifestly irrational.
Israel needs to ensure “escalation dominance” in all plausible conflict scenarios. Inter alia, this will mean keeping Iran non-nuclear. Although there will be many technical questions about optimal levels and times of “selective nuclear disclosure,” this is not yet the moment for raising such queries.
There is more. Even a pre-nuclear Iran could make combat use of radiation dispersal weapons and/or conventional missiles/drones launched against Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor. In a worst case scenario, Iranian ally North Korea would place nuclear assets at Tehran’s operational disposal. Pyongyang, it should be recalled, built a nuclear reactor for Syria that was destroyed by Israel’s Operation Orchard on September 6, 2007.
While it is doubtful that “selective nuclear disclosure” would end Iran’s belligerent designs against Israel, a more selectively-explicit Israeli deterrence posture represents Jerusalem’s only rational choice. At the same time, even this enhanced doctrine and strategy might not be enough. It follows that Jerusalem, with or without its American ally, could sometime still need to launch new rounds of measured preemptive strikes.
There is one final observation. The prevailing “mood” in Israel seems opposed to taking the “bomb” out of the “basement.” Though such wariness is understandable (“why stir the pot if deterrence is already working”), it fails to take account of changing enemy intentions and capabilities. Moreover, the expected benefits to Israel of strategic changes to “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” would outweigh the expected costs of pressures to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Prof. Louis René Beres was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) and is the author of many books and scholarly articles dealing with international law, nuclear strategy, nuclear war, and terrorism. In Israel, Prof. Beres was Chair of Project Daniel (PM Sharon). His 12th and latest book is Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016; 2nd ed., 2018).
The post After the Recent War with Iran, Should Israel’s Bomb Stay ‘In the Basement’? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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US Links $1.9 Billion in State Disaster Funds to Israel Boycott Stance
A resident enters a FEMA’s improvised station to attend claims by local residents affected by floods following the passing of Hurricane Helene, in Marion, North Carolina, US, Oct. 5, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Eduardo Munoz
US states and cities that boycott Israeli companies will be denied federal aid for natural disaster preparedness, the Trump administration has announced, tying routine federal funding to its political stance.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency stated in grant notices posted on Friday that states must follow its “terms and conditions.” Those conditions require they certify they will not sever “commercial relations specifically with Israeli companies” to qualify for funding.
The requirement applies to at least $1.9 billion that states rely on to cover search-and-rescue equipment, emergency manager salaries, and backup power systems among other expenses, according to 11 agency grant notices reviewed by Reuters.
The requirement is the Trump administration’s latest effort to use federal funding to promote its views on Israel.
The Department of Homeland Security, the agency that oversees FEMA, in April said that boycotting Israel is prohibited for states and cities receiving its grant funds.
FEMA separately said in July that US states will be required to spend part of their federal terrorism prevention funds on helping the government arrest migrants, an administration priority.
The Israel requirement takes aim at BDS, the boycott, divestment, and sanctions movement designed to isolate the world’s lone Jewish state on the international stage as a step toward its eventual elimination.
“DHS will enforce all antidiscrimination laws and policies, including as it relates to the BDS movement, which is expressly grounded in antisemitism,” a spokesperson for Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem said in a statement.
The requirement is largely symbolic. At least 34 states already have anti-BDS laws or policies, according to a University of Pennsylvania law journal. The BDS movement did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
The American Jewish Committee supports the Trump administration’s policy, said Holly Huffnagle, the group’s director of antisemitism policy. The AJC is an advocacy group that supports Israel.
Under one of the grant notices posted on Friday, FEMA will require major cities to agree to the Israel policy to receive a cut of $553.5 million set aside to prevent terrorism in dense areas.
New York is due to receive $92.2 million from the program, the most of all the recipients. Allocations are based on the agency’s analysis of “relative risk of terrorism,” according to the notice.
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Iran Sets Up New Defense Council in Wake of War With Israel
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian speaks during a meeting in Ilam, Iran, June 12, 2025. Photo: Iran’s Presidential website/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS
Iran‘s top security body approved the establishment of a National Defenxe Council on Sunday, according to state media, following a short air war with Israel in June that was Iran‘s most acute military challenge since the 1980s war with Iraq.
“The new defense body will review defense plans and enhance the capabilities of Iran‘s armed forces in a centralized manner,” the Supreme National Security Council‘s Secretariat was quoted as saying by state media.
The defense council will be chaired by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, and consists of the heads of the three government branches, senior armed forces commanders, and relevant ministries.
On Sunday, the commander-in-chief of Iran‘s military, Amir Hatami, warned that threats from Israel persist and should not be underestimated.
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Israel to Decide Next Steps in Gaza After Ceasefire Talks Collapse
Smoke rises from Gaza as the sun sets, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border. Photo: REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will convene his security cabinet this week to decide on Israel‘s next steps in Gaza following the collapse of indirect ceasefire talks with Hamas, with one senior Israeli source suggesting more force could be an option.
Last Saturday, during a visit to the country, US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff had said he was working with the Israeli government on a plan that would effectively end the war in Gaza.
But Israeli officials have also floated ideas including expanding the military offensive in Gaza and annexing parts of the shattered enclave.
The failed ceasefire talks in Doha had aimed to clinch agreements on a US-backed proposal for a 60-day truce, during which aid would be flown into Gaza and half of the hostages Hamas is holding would be freed in exchange for Palestinian prisoners jailed in Israel.
After Netanyahu met Witkoff last Thursday, a senior Israeli official said that “an understanding was emerging between Washington and Israel,” of a need to shift from a truce to a comprehensive deal that would “release all the hostages, disarm Hamas, and demilitarize the Gaza Strip,” – Israel‘s key conditions for ending the war.
A source familiar with the matter told Reuters on Sunday that the envoy’s visit was seen in Israel as “very significant.”
But later on Sunday, the Israeli official signaled that pursuit of a deal would be pointless, threatening more force: “An understanding is emerging that Hamas is not interested in a deal and therefore the prime minister is pushing to release the hostages while pressing for military defeat.”
“STRATEGIC CLARITY”
What a “military defeat” might mean, however, is up for debate within the Israeli leadership. Some Israeli officials have suggested that Israel might declare it was annexing parts of Gaza as a means to pressure the Palestinian terrorist group, which has ruled the enclave for nearly two decades.
Others, like Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir want to see Israel impose military rule in Gaza before annexing it and re-establishing the Jewish settlements Israel evicted 20 years ago.
The Israeli military, which has pushed back at such ideas throughout the war, was expected on Tuesday to present alternatives that include extending into areas of Gaza where it has not yet operated, according to two defense officials.
While some in the political leadership are pushing for expanding the offensive, the military is concerned that doing so will endanger the 20 hostages who are still alive, the officials said.
Israeli Army Radio reported on Monday that military chief Eyal Zamir has become increasingly frustrated with what he describes as a lack of strategic clarity by the political leadership, concerned about being dragged into a war of attrition with Hamas terrorists.
A spokesperson for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) declined to comment on the report but said that the military has plans in store.
“We have different ways to fight the terror organization, and that’s what the army does,” Lieutenant Colonel Nadav Shoshani said.
On Tuesday, Qatar and Egypt endorsed a declaration by France and Saudi Arabia outlining steps toward a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which included a call on Hamas to hand over its arms to the Western-backed Palestinian Authority.
Hamas has repeatedly said it won’t lay down arms. But it has told mediators it was willing to quit governance in Gaza for a non-partisan ruling body, according to three Hamas officials.
It insists that the post-war Gaza arrangement must be agreed upon among the Palestinians themselves and not dictated by foreign powers.
Israel‘s Foreign Minister Gideon Saar suggested on Monday that the gaps were still too wide to bridge.
“We would like to have all our hostages back. We would like to see the end of this war. We always prefer to get there by diplomatic means, if possible. But of course, the big question is, what will be the conditions for the end of the war?” he told journalists in Jerusalem.