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Beyond the ‘Day of Hate’: The best strategy to keep American Jews safe over the long term
(JTA) — My synagogue sent out a cautiously anxious email yesterday about an event coming this Shabbat, a neo-Nazi “Day of Hate.” The email triggered fuzzy memories of one of the strangest episodes that I can remember from my childhood.
Sometime around 1990, in response to local neo-Nazi activity, some Jews from my community decided to “fight back.” I don’t know whether they were members of the militant Jewish Defense League, or perhaps just sympathetic to a JDL-style approach. When our local Jewish newspaper covered the story, it ran on its front cover a full-page photo of a kid from my Orthodox Jewish high school. The photo showed a teenage boy from behind, wearing a kippah and carrying a baseball bat that was leaning threateningly on his shoulder.
As it happens, “Danny” was not a member of the JDL, he was a kid on his way to play baseball. Sometimes, a baseball bat is just a baseball bat. But not for us anxious Jews in America: We want to see ourselves as protagonists taking control of our destiny, responding to antisemites with agency, with power, with a plan. I’m sorry to say that as I look around our community today, it seems to me that we have agency, and we have power — but we certainly don’t seem to have a plan.
The tactics that the American Jewish community uses to fight back against antisemitism are often ineffective on their own and do not constitute a meaningful strategy in the composite. One is that American Jews join in a partisan chorus that erodes our politics and fixates on the antisemitism in the party they don’t vote for. This exacerbates the partisan divide, which weakens democratic culture, and turns the weaponizing of antisemitism into merely a partisan electoral tactic for both sides.
Another tactic comes from a wide set of organizations who have declared themselves the referees on the subject and take to Twitter to name and shame antisemites. This seems to amplify and popularize antisemitism more than it does to suppress it.
A third common tactic is to pour more and more dollars into protecting our institutions with robust security measures, which no one thinks will defeat antisemitism, but at least seeks to protect those inside those institutions from violence, though it does little to protect Jews down the street. Richer Jewish institutions will be safer than poorer ones, but Jews will continue to suffer either way.
A fourth tactic our communal organizations use to fight antisemitism is to try to exact apologies or even fines from antisemites to get them to retract their beliefs and get in line, as the Anti-Defamation League did with Kyrie Irving, an approach that Yair Rosenberg has wisely argued is a no-win proposition. Yet another tactic is the insistence by some that the best way to fight antisemitism is to be proud Jews, which has the perverse effect of making our commitment to Jewishness dependent on antisemitism as a motivator.
And finally, the most perverse tactic is that some on both the right and the left fight antisemitism by attacking the ADL itself. Since it is so hard to defeat our opponents, we have started beating up on those that are trying to protect us. What could go wrong?
Steadily, like a drumbeat, these tactics fail, demonstrating themselves to be not a strategy at all, and the statistics continue to show a rise in antisemitism.
Perhaps we are too fixated on the idea that antisemitism is continuous throughout Jewish history, proving only that there is no effective strategy for combating this most persistent of hatreds.
Instead, we would do well to recall how we responded to a critical moment in American Jewish history in the early 20th century. In the aftermath of the Leo Frank lynching in 1915 – the murder of a Jewish man amid an atmosphere of intense antisemitism — Jewish leaders formed what would become the ADL by building a relationship with law enforcement and the American legal and political establishment. The ADL recognized that the best strategy to keep American Jews safe over the long term, in ways that would transcend and withstand the political winds of change, was to embed in the police and criminal justice system the idea that antisemitism was their problem to defeat. These Jewish leaders flipped the script of previous diasporic experiences; not only did they become “insiders,” they made antisemitism anathema to America itself. (And yes, it was the Leo Frank incident that inspired “Parade,” the forthcoming Broadway musical that this week attracted white supremacist protesters.)
For Jews, the high-water mark of this strategy came in the aftermath of the Tree of Life shooting in Pittsburgh. It was the low point in many ways of the American Jewish experience, the most violent act against Jews on American soil, but it was followed by a mourning process that was shared across the greater Pittsburgh community. The words of the Kaddish appeared above the fold of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. That is inconceivable at most other times of Jewish oppression and persecution. It tells the story of when we are successful – when antisemitism is repudiated by the general public. It is the most likely indicator that we will be collectively safe in the long run.
We were lucky that this move to partner with the establishment was successful. I felt this deeply on a recent trip to Montgomery, Alabama. Seeing the memorials to Black Americans persecuted and lynched by and under the very system that should have been protecting them from the worst elements of society is a reminder that not all minorities in America could then — or today — win over the elements of American society that control criminal justice.
Visitors view items left by well-wishers along the fence at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh on the first anniversary of the attack there, Oct. 27, 2019. (Jeff Swensen/Getty Images)
A strategic plan to defeat antisemitism that must be collectively embraced by American Jews would build on this earlier success and invest in the infrastructure of American democracy as the framework for Jewish thriving and surviving, and continue the historic relationship-building that changed the Jews’ position in America. It would stop the counterproductive internecine and partisan battle that is undermining the possibility of Jewish collective mobilization.
It means more investment, across partisan divides, in relationships with local governments and law enforcement, using the imperfect “definitions of antisemitism” as they are intended — not for boundary policing, but to inform and help law enforcement to monitor and prevent violent extremism. It means supporting lawsuits and other creative legal strategies, like Integrity First for America’s groundbreaking efforts against the Unite the Right rally organizers, which stymie such movements in legal gridlock and can help bankrupt them.
It means practicing the lost art of consensus Jewish collective politics which recognize that there must be some baseline agreement that antisemitism is a collective threat, even if any “unity” we imagine for the Jewish community is always going to be be instrumental and short-lived.
It means supporting institutions like the ADL, even as they remain imperfect, even as they sometimes get stuck in some of the failed strategies I decried above, because they have the relationships with powerful current and would-be allies in the American political and civic marketplace, and because they are fighting against antisemitism while trying to stay above the partisan fray.
It means real education and relationship-building with other ethnic and faith communities that is neither purely instrumental nor performative — enough public relations visits to Holocaust museums! — so that we have the allies we need when we need them, and so that we can partner for our collective betterment.
And most importantly, it means investing in the plodding, unsexy work of supporting vibrant American democracy — free and fair elections, voting rights, the rule of law, peaceful transitions of power — because stable liberal democracies have been the safest homes for minorities, Jews included.
I doubt we will ever be able to “end” individual antisemitic acts, much less eradicate antisemitic hate. “Shver tzu zayn a Yid” (it’s hard to be a Jew). We join with our fellow Americans who live in fear of the lone wolves and the hatemongers who periodically terrorize us. But we are much more capable than we are currently behaving to fight back against the collective threats against us. Instead, let’s be the smart Americans we once were.
The real work right now is not baseball bats or billboards, it is not Jewish pride banalities or Twitter refereeing: It is quiet and powerful and, if done right, as American Jews demonstrated in the last century, it will serve us for the long term.
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US Involvement in Gaza Is Not a Threat — It’s a Strategic Opportunity
Then-IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi meets with then-US Central Command (CENTCOM) chief Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie at CENTCOM headquarters on June 22, 2021. Photo: CENTCOM Public Affairs / Tom Gagnier
In recent weeks, voices in Israel have argued that the country has “lost control” over the situation in Gaza and ceded it to the United States.
While there is a grain of truth to the claim — insofar as the US has indeed become a central actor in Gaza’s operational, humanitarian, and political arenas — this view misses the broader strategic transformation that has taken place. What appears to be growing American dominance in Gaza is in fact the latest expression of a deeper structural shift that began in 2022, a shift whose significance most Israelis are only now beginning to understand.
To grasp the change, one must start with how the US military is structured.
The United States operates six global geographic Combatant Commands, each responsible for an enormous region: Europe, Africa, South America, the Indo-Pacific, North America, and the Middle East. Each is headed by a four-star general who reports directly to the Secretary of Defense and the President. These commands are not mere administrative divisions, but strategic frameworks through which the US organizes alliances, coordinates multinational training, conducts combined operations, and integrates intelligence on a global scale.
Geographically, Israel naturally belongs under the Central Command, CENTCOM, which oversees the Middle East. Yet for decades, Israel was placed under the European Command, EUCOM. The reason was political rather than military: Arab states that opposed normalization with Israel refused to be grouped with it under the same command. Allocating Israel to EUCOM allowed Washington to maintain deep military cooperation with Israel without jeopardizing its relations with key Arab allies.
The Abraham Accords fundamentally altered this arrangement.
Once the UAE, Bahrain, and later Morocco agreed to open security and diplomatic cooperation with Israel, the longstanding Arab veto effectively collapsed. The US announced Israel’s move to CENTCOM in 2021, and by 2022, it was fully implemented. Israel thus became an official component of the regional security architecture that the United States had been building for years — an emerging multinational framework designed to counter Iran through shared intelligence, integrated air defense, maritime cooperation, and coordinated operational planning.
This new reality was quickly reflected in joint exercises that had been impossible up to that point. Israel took part in IMX-22, a massive naval drill led by the US Fifth Fleet, in which Arab and Israeli naval forces operated openly under the same command structure for the first time. A year later came Juniper Oak 2023, the largest US-Israeli military exercise ever conducted, involving strategic bombers, fighter jets, naval forces, special operations units, and advanced intelligence platforms. Operationally, it marked the institutionalization of deep, routine, high-tempo military cooperation.
Still, it was not until Hamas’ October 7 attack that the full meaning of Israel’s integration into CENTCOM became clear. The brutality of the massacre underscored to Washington that the Israeli-Palestinian arena is inseparable from the broader regional struggle against Iran. The US responded with a rapid, large-scale deployment: aircraft carriers, missile defense ships, electronic warfare aircraft, and enhanced intelligence assets. In effect, the US provided Israel with a strategic umbrella that reduced the likelihood of a northern escalation and signaled unmistakable deterrence toward Iran and Hezbollah.
The most dramatic developments, however, took place in the context of Iran’s large-scale missile and drone attacks on Israel in 2023 and 2024. These were among the most extensive long-range strikes Iran had ever launched. For the first time, the emerging regional defensive network was activated. US aircraft intercepted dozens of drones over Iraq and the Red Sea; American, British, and French ships shot down cruise missiles; Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE provided air corridors and shared tactical intelligence; Israel synchronized its Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow systems with US command elements. The result was an unprecedented multinational defensive effort that successfully neutralized what could have been devastating strikes. What had long been discussed as a concept became a functioning regional defense mechanism with Israel at its core.
After a temporary ceasefire was established following the Trump plan in Gaza, the US and Israel set up a joint command center in Kiryat Gat. The goal of the joint headquarters is primarily to ensure that the Trump plan is implemented on the ground. This should not be understood as an American takeover of operational decision-making, but as a mechanism to deepen coordination. The joint headquarters facilitates real-time intelligence sharing, access to American reconnaissance capabilities, humanitarian coordination with international actors, and continuous operational deconfliction in a highly complex arena. The physical presence of American officers alongside Israeli commanders has also heightened US understanding of Hamas’ methods — its use of human shields, for example, and diversion of humanitarian aid — and the impossibility of managing the Gaza arena without intense and constant intelligence work.
Israeli critics tend to focus on potential drawbacks: US political leaders may attempt to leverage rapid progress for domestic purposes; they may choose to overlook Hamas’ refusal to disarm, and American expectations may not align with Israel’s interests regarding the end state in Gaza. These risks are not imaginary. However, Israeli defense officials repeatedly emphasize that the current level of cooperation with the US is unprecedented, and no attempt has been made thus far to impose decisions contrary to Israel’s security interests.
For decades, Israel has grappled with the question of whether it should pursue a formal defense treaty with the United States. The idea resurfaced repeatedly at moments of strategic uncertainty after the Lebanon wars, during periods of Iranian nuclear acceleration, and amid discussions about long-term deterrence. A formal treaty promised clear advantages: it would codify America’s commitment to Israel’s security, bolster deterrence against regional adversaries, and guarantee large-scale military assistance in times of crisis. Yet successive Israeli governments hesitated. The central concern was a potential loss of autonomy: a treaty would restrict Israel’s freedom of action, require American approval for sensitive military operations, and bind Israel’s hands precisely in situations where speed and unilateral initiative are essential.
The current arrangement, while not a formal defense pact, effectively delivers many of the benefits associated with one without the drawbacks. It offers deep operational coordination, shared real-time intelligence, integrated regional air defense, and the ability to conduct joint action when necessary. Crucially, it does all this without formally limiting Israel’s sovereignty or imposing rigid treaty obligations. In practice, it creates a “hybrid model” in which Israel enjoys the strategic advantages of quasi-alliance integration while retaining independent decision-making.
The broader strategic reality has changed. For years, Israel feared that the United States was withdrawing from the Middle East. Today the opposite is true: the US is re-engaging, strengthening allies, escalating pressure on Iran, and signaling a renewed commitment to the regional balance of power. This shift naturally raises concerns in Israel about over-dependence, yet in practice, it represents a dramatic enhancement of Israel’s strategic position. For the first time in decades, Israel finds itself embedded within a regional defense architecture that magnifies its strengths and compensates for its vulnerabilities.
Israel has not “lost control.” It would be more accurate to say that Israel has entered a fundamentally new framework, one in which it operates shoulder to shoulder with the United States and, increasingly, with key Arab partners. This emerging de facto regional alliance provides Israel with strategic depth, intelligence and logistical support, operational coordination, and a dramatically improved international posture. In the long term, the advantages of this integration far outweigh its limitations.
Prof. Eitan Shamir serves as the head of the BESA Center and as a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University. His latest book is The Art of Military Innovation: Lessons from the IDF, Harvard University Press, 2023 (with Edward Luttwak). This article appeared at the BESA Center, and in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune in December 2025.
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European-Funded NGO on Palestinian TV: The World Has ‘Gotten Over’ Antisemitism
A woman keeps a candle next to flowers laid as a tribute at Bondi Beach to honor the victims of a mass shooting that targeted a Hanukkah celebration at Bondi Beach on Sunday, in Sydney, Australia, Dec. 16, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Flavio Brancaleone
The world has “gotten over” Israel’s “claims of antisemitism,” said the head of an EU-funded NGO on official Palestinian Authority (PA) television just a month before the Bondi Beach Hanukkah massacre of Jews.
According to Omar Rahal, director of the SHAMS Human Rights and Democracy Media Center, complaints about antisemitism were all false “claims” by “Netanyahu and his extremist government,” whereas Palestinians are the ones who are the victims of Israel’s attacks:
The Palestinian discourse has gained dominance, and the claims of antisemitism and violent discourse — the world has now gotten over them and there have been direct responses from presidents and state leaders to [Israeli Prime Minister] Netanyahu and the pillars of his extremist government. In other words, go find another topic [to talk about]. They [Israel] are the ones who attacked us.” [emphasis added]
[Official PA TV, Palestine This Morning, Nov. 16, 2025]
Rahal is absolutely correct on one point, however.
Palestinian hate speech, which calls for “Palestine to be free from the river to the sea” and for the globalization of the “Intifada,” has indeed gained dominance.
When that is combined with a world that has “gotten over” claims of antisemitism, attacks on Jews in Israel and around the world inevitably become commonplace. When antisemitism is denied as real, when violence against Jews is erased as a distinct phenomenon, and when Jews are collectively portrayed as aggressors who deserve blame everywhere, then the cost is paid in Jewish lives.
It is also unsurprising that such an outrageous statement would be featured on official PA TV. Considering how PA TV routinely denies the Holocaust, one would be hard-pressed to expect better.
The question here, though, should be: where is the condemnation of the EU and UN for Rahal’s public statements?
Rahal’s SHAMS organization is supported by the EU and proudly advertises its partnership with the UN Economic and Social Council. It incredibly also lists the International Organization for Tolerance as one of its many partners.
Palestinian Media Watch calls on the EU, the UN, and all international donors to examine not the slogans of their funded NGOs, but their actual messages.
Ephraim D. Tepler is a contributor to Palestinian Media Watch (PMW). Itamar Marcus is the Founder and Director of PMW, where a version of this article first appeared.
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Israel Says It Will Respond to Hamas ‘Violation’ of Gaza Truce, Terror Group Denies Responsibility
A drone view shows Palestinians walking past the rubble, following Israeli forces’ withdrawal from the area, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, in Gaza City, Oct. 11, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Dawoud Abu Alkas
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Wednesday that Israel would retaliate after a military officer was wounded by a blast in Gaza, while the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas denied responsibility, suggesting the explosive device had been left over from the conflict.
In a speech at a graduation ceremony for Air Force pilots, Netanyahu mentioned the incident in Rafah, part of Gaza where Israeli forces still operate, and said Hamas had made clear it had no plan to disarm as foreseen under the October truce deal.
“Israel will respond accordingly,” he said.
The Israeli military earlier said that an explosive device had detonated against a military vehicle in the Rafah area and that one officer had been lightly injured.
Hamas said the incident had taken place in an area where the Israeli military was in full control and that it had warned that explosives remained in the area and elsewhere since the war, reiterating its commitment to the October 10 ceasefire.
Hamas official Mahmoud Merdawi said in an earlier post on X that mediators had been informed about the issue.
ISRAELI DELEGATION MEETING OFFICIALS IN CAIRO
A 20-point plan issued by US President Donald Trump in September calls for an initial truce followed by steps toward a wider peace. So far, only the first phase has taken effect, including a ceasefire, release of hostages and prisoners, and a partial Israeli withdrawal.
An Israeli delegation met officials from mediating countries in Cairo on Wednesday to discuss efforts to return the remains of the last Israeli hostage, police officer Ran Gvili, from Gaza, Netanyahu’s office said later on Wednesday.
The delegation included officials from the Israeli military, the Shin Bet domestic intelligence service, and the Mossad intelligence service.
Trump’s plan ultimately calls for Hamas to disarm and have no governing role in Gaza, and for Israel to pull out. Hamas has said it will hand over arms only once a Palestinian state is established, which Israel says it will never allow.
Violence has subsided but not stopped since the Gaza truce took effect, with the sides regularly accusing each other of violations. The Hamas-controlled Gazan Health Ministry, which according to analysts has falsified casualty figures, says Israel has killed more than 400 people in the territory while Israel says three soldiers have been killed in terrorist attacks.
Hamas “openly declares it has no intention of disarming, in complete contradiction to President Trump’s 20-point plan,” Netanyahu said.
NETANYAHU ALSO WARNS LEBANESE HEZBOLLAH
Netanyahu said Hezbollah in Lebanon, which Israel severely weakened in strikes last year that also ended in a US-brokered truce, also had no intention to disarm “and we are addressing that as well.”
Israel still needs to settle accounts with Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen as well as Iran itself, he added.
“As these old threats change form, new threats arise morning and evening. We do not seek confrontations, but our eyes are open to every possible danger,” Netanyahu said.
Netanyahu is set to meet with Trump next week, mainly to discuss the next phase of the US president’s Gaza plan.
Hamas said in a statement later on Wednesday that a delegation led by its chief negotiator Khalil al-Hayya had discussed Gaza with Turkey’s foreign minister in Ankara.
Al-Hayya warned against what he described as the continuation of Israeli violations of the ceasefire, saying they were aimed at hindering the move to the next phase of the ceasefire deal.