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Hebrew school enrollment across US down by nearly half since 2006, report says
(JTA) — Living in Brooklyn, surrounded by synagogues and Jewish schools, Rachel Weinstein White and her husband hoped to find a place where their children could receive a Jewish education for a few hours each week.
But they knew they didn’t want to enroll at a traditional Hebrew school associated with a local synagogue. For one thing, White wasn’t interested at the time in participating in prayer services, the main offering of most congregations. Plus, her husband is Black and not Jewish, and they were not sure how well he or their children would be welcomed.
So about eight years ago, she started her own program together with a few families, setting up a cooperative and hiring a teacher in an early version of the “learning pods” that would become a pandemic fad.
“It was just this incredible, magical year,” White said. “So many people started hearing about our little class and asked to join that it became necessary to create a second class. … It just kind of grew organically from there.”
Today the school, Fig Tree, enrolls about 350 children across three locations and plans are underway to expand further. In hour-long classes on Sundays and weekday afternoons, children learn about Jewish holidays and history, engage in art and creative play, explore their local Jewish communities and learn basic Hebrew, in a program that culminates in a b’nai mitzvah year. It overlaps significantly with traditional Hebrew schools, but outside the usual setting — a synagogue classroom — that has become a cultural shorthand among American Jews for rote, uninspiring Jewish education.
That dynamic may be why Fig Tree is an outlier in a stark trend revealed in a new report: Enrollment in supplemental Jewish schools — those that students attend in addition to regular schooling in public or secular private schools — is down by nearly half over the last 15 years.
Even as the estimated number of Jewish children in the United States rose by 17% between 2000 and 2020, enrollment in Hebrew schools fell by at least 45% between 2006 and 2020, according to the report by the Jewish Education Project, a nonprofit that promotes educational innovation and supports Jewish educators in a wide array of settings.
The report identifies pockets of growth, mostly in the small number of programs like Fig Tree that operate outside of or adjacent to synagogues, and in schools operated by the Hasidic Chabad-Lubavitch movement. But overall, according to the report, just 141,000 children attend supplemental Jewish schools in the United States and Canada, down from more than 230,000 in 2006 and 280,000 in 1987.
Some of the decline in Hebrew school enrollment is countered by increasing enrollment in Jewish day schools, where students study Jewish topics for at least part of every day. The number of U.S. children attending Jewish day schools has risen by roughly the same amount, 90,000, that Hebrew school enrollment has fallen since 2006, according to the report, though a significant portion of the increase stems from population growth in Orthodox communities, where the vast majority of students attend day schools.
Miriam Heller Stern, a professor at Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion who was tapped to help design the study, said the results suggest that, as with many aspects of religious life today, Hebrew school enrollment cannot be counted on as an act of obligation or tradition.
“There’s this idea that parents send their kids to Hebrew school because they went to Hebrew school and that’s a rite of passage in North America, but that may be a myth,” she said. “People don’t want to push their kids to have to do the same thing they did, necessarily, anymore.”
The report speculates about what has fueled the enrollment decline — from demographic changes to shifts in how American Jews think about countering antisemitism to increased access to Jewish learning online — and also about what has allowed some schools to thrive. It notes that all of the supplemental schools that responded to its census said their schools help children feel connected to the Jewish people.
“We believe that many factors have led to the decline in enrollment of students in supplemental schools in the last decade,” said David Bryfman, the Jewish Education Project’s CEO. “However, it’s also a myth that all supplemental schools don’t work.”
The group is planning a series of online sessions with some of the dozens of researchers and practitioners involved in the report, with one goal the sharing of success stories identified by the survey. Of the six identified in the report, a common theme is urging experiential, community-based learning. Some of the promising models explicitly position themselves as infusing Jewish content into child care, filling a pressing need for American families.
Still, it may be hard to counter the demographic realities of contemporary American Jews: Just a third of U.S. Jews in a 2020 survey said someone in their household was a member of a synagogue. That was the case even for the majority of non-Orthodox Jews who said they identified with a particular denomination, a marker of traditional engagement.
The waning of synagogue affiliation is borne out in the Jewish Education Project’s report, which found that more than 700 supplemental schools shuttered between 2006 and 2020 — most outright, though as many as 200 have survived in a new form after merging.
Temple Solel, a small Reform congregation in Fort Mill, South Carolina, shut down its Hebrew school in recent years. The volunteer-run program had up to eight students at a time, according to Russ Cobe, a lay leader.
“We sort of hit a point where we weren’t able to sustain it,” Cobe said. “We only had a couple of people teaching and students from a wide range of ages and they wouldn’t show up every week. Also, our wheelhouse seems to be retirement age and above. We don’t have a lot of young families.”
Hebrew school mergers offer one possible approach to countering the enrollment decline. Two synagogues, one Reform and one Conservative, located half a mile apart in Oak Park, Michigan, established a joint school about seven years ago and called it Yachad, which means “together” in Hebrew.
“One day a week we meet at the Conservative congregation and one day a week we meet at the Reform congregation, so we are keeping our kids involved in both,” said Gail Greenberg, Yachad’s director. “My goal is to make it at the highest common denominator. For example, all of our food is kosher so anyone who wants to eat here can.”
The arrangement appears to be working. Last year, about 90 students were enrolled, and this year, enrollment is at 128, including 26 new kindergarteners, with even larger numbers expected in the future.
Another set of programs has grown dramatically in recent years: those affiliated with the Chabad movement, which tend to operate even when small and cost less than synagogue programs. Since 2006, the study says Chabad’s market share in terms of enrollment has grown from 4% to 10%, and in terms of the number of schools from 13% to 21%.
Those figures might represent an undercount, according to Zalman Loewenthal, director of CKids, the Chabad network of children’s programs. While the study says there are some 300 Chabad programs in the United States, Loewenthal said he is aware of at least 500 and perhaps as many as 600 — a number driven up in the last decade amid a push by Chabad to launch more Hebrew schools. His count is based on the number of customers purchasing the curriculum offered by his organization, which is also new in the last decade and in his view has contributed to improved quality among Chabad Hebrew schools.
In general, non-traditional approaches to Jewish education may be attractive at a time when American families have packed schedules and competing needs, according to Stern.
“People want to be able to have bite-sized pieces just like you sign up for a six-weeks art class, they might want a six-weeks Jewish class,” she said. “In this atmosphere, some communities are finding ways to be more modular and more flexible, and meet people’s needs in different ways.”
Stern also said, referring to six programs highlighted in the study as success stories, that the future calls for programs to offer an “immersive” experience, meaning that children become part of a community.
“They are getting something beyond just knowledge,” Stern said. “They’re also getting connection and belonging, which provides the foundation for something bigger in their lives.”
Stern said she thought the report pointed to gaps in the way American Jewish communities allocate their resources.
“Supplementary education really was abandoned as a communal priority,” she said. “Individual communities had to find ways to fund it on their own. And I think that is part of why we’re seeing a decline.”
Bryfman said he’s optimistic, both about the power of supplemental schools and the potential for them to generate new support from Jewish donors.
The Jewish Education Project had sought outside funding to pay for its study and failed, he said. But now that the numbers are clear, he is beginning to see interest from philanthropies.
“I don’t want to count the dollars before they’re granted,” Bryfman said. “But the study is already beginning to have the desired effect of bringing more resources to the field.”
Fig Tree isn’t set up to benefit in a possible future of increased charitable investments in Jewish education. That’s because the school is set up as a business — an expression of confidence in its growth and to insulate itself from the vagaries of philanthropy.
“It’s a very unusual model for the Jewish education and I would argue a self-sustaining one,” White said. “We don’t have to rely on fundraising… and we’re not beholden to some of the other requirements that a nonprofit would necessitate, which allows us to be nimble.”
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20 Percent of UK Students Would Not Share Room with Jews, Report Says Amid Deepening Antisemitism Crisis
Cambridge students march against Israel on March 10, 2025. Photo: Martin Pope / SOPA Images via Reuters Connect.
A new report by the Union of Jewish Students (UJS) say that Jewish campus life in Great Britain is rapidly deteriorating amid a resurgence of antisemitism across the nation.
Released on Monday, the report, titled “Time for Change: A Landmark Report on UK Campus Antisemitism,” highlights a climate of increasing fear for Jewish students.
47 percent of Jewish students, for example, report having heard their classmates justify the Oct. 7 massacre in which Hamas slaughtered civilians and committed mass rape; 23 percent have witnessed Jewish students persecuted over their identity; as many 36 percent have either lost friends in this new milieu or know someone who has; and a shocking 40 percent report “having changed their journey through campus” to avoid anti-Zionist protests occurring every week at some universities.
“This report demonstrates that antisemitism on campus is not isolated but normalised,” Union of Jewish Students president Louis Danker said in a statement. “No Jewish student should have to face social ostracism, abusive language or physical violence — there is a right to protest but not harass. If we are serious about combatting extremism in Britain, we have to start on campus, where half of students have seen glorification of Hamas or Hezbollah. Concerned sentiments and piecemeal progress are not enough.”
Some of report’s most concerning findings focused on anti-Jewish sentiments expressed by non-Jewish students. 20 percent said they prefer not be roommates with a Jewish person, while a quarter of students surveyed say that arguing that “Zionists control the media/government” does not constitute antisemitism. Responding to a separate question, 16 percent expressed approval of saying outright that “Jews control the media/government.”
“An environment in which Jews cannot be full members of the community, one which we are ‘othered’ and excluded and insulted is a failing environment,” David Finklestein, a member of the upper house of Parliament, said in a foreword contributed to the report. “Universities are a place where people can exchange ideas and learn facts in an atmosphere of civility, equality, and respect. Bullying people because of their ethnicity or history or political views is completely unacceptable and a university administration that ignores such bullying is failing in its duties.”
The Algemeiner has previously reported on campus antisemitism Great Britain. At City St. George’s, University of London Israeli professor Michael Ben-Gad has been unrelentingly pursued by a pro-Hamas organization which calls itself City Action for Palestine. It has subjected him to several forms of persecution, including social media agitprop, spontaneous, unlawful assembly at his place of work, and even a petition of their own.
In 2023, just months before Hamas’s Oct. 7 massacre in southern Israel, the National Union of Students (NUS), a body representing thousands of university students in the UK, apologized for discriminating against Jewish students.
In November 2022, NUS removed president Shaima Dallali after finding her guilty of antisemitism and other misconduct. Dallali’s tenure at NUS brimmed with controversies, including the discovery of tweets in which she called Hamas critics “Dirty Zionists” and quoted the battle cry, “Khaybar, Khaybar o Jews, the army of Muhammad will return,” a reference to the Battle of Khaybar in 628 that resulted in a massacre of Jews.
Follow Dion J. Pierre @DionJPierre.
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We Should Be Welcoming All Jews and Bringing Them Closer — Despite Religious Differences
Reading from a Torah scroll in accordance with Sephardi tradition. Photo: Sagie Maoz via Wikimedia Commons.
We Jews have always liked to argue about religion, and everything from kashrut to conversion. Often these differences are far from polite. In every branch and variation of Judaism (as elsewhere), there are sects and extremes, iconoclasts and revisionists, insiders and outsiders. It pains me that we seem so incapable of overcoming such differences and conflicts amicably.
There is an axiom in religious life (all religions, not just Judaism) that those more religious than you are fanatics, and anyone less religious is a doomed sinner. The joke may be extreme, but I think we can all relate to the sentiment.
I could never understand why, for many years, the established Orthodoxy was opposed to going to and teaching at Jewish conferences simply because there might also be people there whose ideas about Judaism they did not share. Neither could I understand the argument that one should not go to Reform communities to teach Torah. On the contrary, if they are so misled by their heretical rabbis, surely it would only be beneficial to go and share another point of view — unless one is so insecure that there might be a risk of backsliding.
The Lubavitch movement is successful precisely because it does not prejudge, and regards every Jew as worthy of attention, regardless of background. And on the other side, anyone vaguely familiar with Reform Judaism in Israel and much of the Diaspora knows that much (not all) of it is seriously trying to come to terms with how to get back to a more traditional way of life with more Hebrew and study.
Of course, as a traditionalist, I disagree with those who make light of our religious traditions and laws. But to some extent, we all choose what to focus on and what not to. I can understand communities that want to preserve their specific identities by excluding those who wish to undermine them. But we can still treat others with tolerance and understanding out of simple good manners. We are such a small people, we cannot afford to lose even more people than we do through ignorance and defection. And thank goodness for those of all variations we welcome in with open doors.
I may not agree with much of Reform ideology and ritual, but I also believe Orthodoxy could have and should be much more flexible. I admire a great deal in the Haredi world, but I think they are seriously mistaken over their attitude to serving Israel’s military needs. And I deplore Neturei Karta’s support of Iranian mass murderers, as I do secular Israelis who want to undermine the Jewish State. Opposition comes from both sides.
There is a Talmudic principle that a Jewish child captured by non-Jews, a Tinnok SheNishba, could not possibly be found guilty of breaking Jewish law since he (or she) would have had no positive experiences of it to be able to make a positive decision. The saintly rabbi known as the Chafetz Chaim (Yisrael Meir Kagan 1838-1933) used this to argue that most modern Jews have never experienced the passion and intensity of genuine Torah spirituality, and therefore cannot be blamed for rejecting something they know nothing of. You can only be a genuine heretic if you really know what it is you are rebelling against!
I would welcome anyone, no matter who, from whatever background, who wanted to identify as a Jew, study and participate. They should be welcomed and encouraged to explore the varieties of Jewish experience and decide where they fit in. And we should do our best to draw them closer and help with any problems of integration they might face.
On Pesach, we will read about the four different sons including the “bad one” with different approaches to Torah. But at least they sat around the same table and were participating in the Seder.
We should use Torah to bring Jews closer — including those who have drifted, and the misguided ones — not to insult them and push them further away just because they have a different view than ours.
The author is a writer and rabbi, based in New York.
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Tehran’s Escalation Doctrine: Why Iran Is Targeting the Entire Middle East
Smoke rises after reported Iranian missile attacks, following United States and Israel strikes on Iran, as seen from Doha, Qatar, March 1, 2026. Photo: REUTERS/Mohammed Salem
Iran’s latest missile and drone strikes across the Gulf signal a dangerous strategic shift. What once appeared to be a confrontation primarily between Tehran, Israel, and the United States is rapidly transforming into a wider regional conflict. By conducting military assaults on Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, the Islamic Republic has effectively widened the battlefield and placed the stability of the entire Middle East at risk.
On March 7, 2026, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian publicly apologized to Iran’s Gulf neighbors after Iranian missile and drone strikes triggered air defense alerts in those states. In a televised statement, he expressed regret for the attacks and claimed that Tehran would halt strikes on neighboring countries unless attacks against Iran originated from their territory. But even as he spoke, air defense sirens and missile interceptions were continuing across the Gulf region. Then the government walked the statement back.
For many countries in the Middle East, the contradiction is glaring. Iran’s apology appeared less a genuine effort at de-escalation and more a familiar Iranian tactic: spinning rhetorical damage control while continuing its aggression.
This pattern is hardly new. For decades, the Islamic Republic has pursued a strategy that blends diplomacy, denial, and deception with relentless expansionism. The result is a geopolitical doctrine aimed not merely at confronting Israel or the United States, but at reshaping the entire Middle East under Tehran’s ideological and strategic dominance.
Iranian leaders have long framed their military posture as defensive, but the reality unfolding across the Middle East tells a very different story. Missiles fired toward Saudi territory, drones intercepted over Gulf cities, and attacks linked to Iranian proxies across multiple theaters point to a broader strategy of coercion. Rather than confining its conflict to direct adversaries, Tehran is increasingly pressuring neutral or semi-neutral states in order to expand the battlefield.
The remarks of Muhammad‑Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of Iran’s parliament, made this explicit. Ghalibaf declared on social media that Iran’s defense doctrine follows the ideological guidance of the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary leadership and warned that peace will remain impossible as long as American military bases exist in the region.
This statement was effectively a strategic threat to every Middle Eastern state hosting American forces. It confirmed what regional leaders have long suspected: Iran views the entire Gulf security architecture, not merely Israel, as a legitimate target.
One of the most striking aspects of Iran’s recent escalation is that it has drawn states into the conflict that were actively attempting to avoid confrontation. Countries across the Gulf Cooperation Council had pursued diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions between Iran and its adversaries. Oman, for example, had played a leading mediating role in discussions surrounding Iran’s nuclear program.
Yet Iranian missiles and drones have now placed these very states directly in the line of fire. Strategically, this approach is baffling. By striking Gulf territories or allowing projectiles to fall near critical infrastructure, Tehran risks transforming potential mediators into determined adversaries. Analysts have long warned that attacks on Gulf states could collapse the region’s delicate neutrality and push Arab governments into closer alignment with the United States and Israel. In other words, Iran’s escalation may be strengthening the very coalition it claims to oppose.
The Islamic Republic’s behavior cannot be understood purely in military terms. At its core lies an ideological framework embedded in the doctrine of Vilayat-e-Faqih: “Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.” This system, created after the Iranian Revolution, grants ultimate political authority to the clerical leadership rather than elected institutions. The result is a hybrid regime in which electoral politics exist but real power rests with a religious elite that defines foreign policy through ideological confrontation.
For this leadership, regional dominance is not merely a strategic ambition. It is a revolutionary obligation. From Iraq to Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, Tehran has cultivated proxy networks that extend its influence far beyond its borders. These networks allow Iran to wage asymmetric warfare while maintaining plausible deniability. The expansion of this strategy into the Gulf itself marks a new and dangerous phase.
Iran’s confrontation with Gulf states is not only militarily reckless. It is economically self-destructive. The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz form one of the most vital arteries of global commerce. Disruptions in the region affect energy markets, maritime trade routes, and strategic industrial supply chains.
Iranian actions that threaten shipping lanes risk destabilizing not only regional economies but also global technological industries. Qatar, for example, plays a significant role in the export of helium, a critical resource used in semiconductor manufacturing and advanced technologies. Any disruption in Gulf logistics reverberates across industries ranging from artificial intelligence to aerospace.
If Tehran’s objective is to impose costs on its adversaries, it must recognize that such disruptions will also inevitably damage Iran itself. Economic isolation, sanctions pressure, and investor flight are predictable consequences of escalating regional conflict. In strategic terms, Iran’s current approach resembles an “economic own goal” — a policy that undermines its own long-term stability.
The Islamic Republic’s external aggression reflects deep internal vulnerabilities. Years of economic hardship, corruption scandals, and political repression have eroded public confidence in the ruling establishment. Anti-government protests have repeatedly shaken the regime, revealing widespread dissatisfaction across Iranian society. The leadership in Tehran therefore faces a familiar dilemma.
Authoritarian systems often attempt to consolidate power by redirecting domestic frustration toward external enemies. Foreign confrontation becomes a tool for internal cohesion. In this context, escalation abroad may serve a political purpose at home: reinforcing the narrative that Iran is surrounded by hostile forces and must rally behind its revolutionary leadership. Yet such strategies carry enormous risk. History demonstrates that regimes relying on external conflict to sustain legitimacy often accelerate their own downfall.
The Middle East now faces a critical strategic question: Will Iran’s campaign of intimidation continue unchecked, or will the threatened regional states coordinate a collective response? The growing convergence of security interests between Israel and several Arab states represents one possible outcome. Iranian escalation may inadvertently accelerate regional cooperation against Tehran’s ambitions. The normalization processes that began in recent years could gain renewed urgency if the Gulf states conclude that Iran’s threats are directed not only at Israel but at the entire regional order.
At the same time, the United States remains a central factor in the strategic equation. In Tehran’s calculus, American military installations across the Gulf serve as both deterrents and potential targets. Iran’s repeated warnings about these bases indicate that the regime views the broader American security architecture as a critical obstacle to its regional ambitions.
Another factor shaping Iran’s future is the question of leadership. The Islamic Republic now faces a profound political vacuum. Despite widespread dissatisfaction with the regime, no unified opposition figure has yet emerged capable of mobilizing the population around a coherent alternative vision. This absence of leadership allows the ruling clerical establishment to maintain its grip on power even as public frustration grows. Yet history suggests that such conditions rarely remain static. The pressures created by economic stagnation, international isolation, and internal dissent can eventually converge to bring about transformative political change.
For Iran, the central challenge is whether a new leadership capable of reconciling the country with its neighbors and the international community will emerge before the current system pushes the region into wider conflict.
The Iranian regime’s recent missile and drone attacks across the Gulf reveal a dangerous strategic reality: Tehran’s confrontation is no longer limited to Israel or the United States. It is evolving into a broader campaign of intimidation against the entire Middle Eastern order.
By targeting or threatening Gulf states that had sought neutrality, the Islamic Republic risks uniting the region against it. By escalating military pressure while offering hollow diplomatic apologies, it exposes the contradiction at the heart of its strategy. And by prioritizing ideological confrontation over economic stability, it places the welfare of the Iranian people at risk.
If the current trajectory continues, Iran will not succeed in dominating the Middle East. Instead, it may accomplish the opposite — driving its neighbors, the United States, and Israel into an increasingly unified coalition determined to contain the ambitions of a regime whose revolutionary ideology has turned regional leadership into a permanent state of war.
Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury is editor of the Bangladesh-based publication Blitz and a commentator on Islamist extremism, terrorism, and South Asian geopolitics. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.