Amid the war in Iran, one Iranian Jewish woman who lives in the United States, but whose family remains in Iran, has been wracked with fear. Before the ceasefire, she spoke with her parents once a week for exactly one minute — both because of the exorbitant cost, about $50 per minute, and because of the fear of surveillance.

During one call a few days into the war, she said, something felt off.

“I could see that something is so wrong. It’s as if someone was there,” the woman, who moved to the U.S. in 2008, said in an interview with the Forward. “It seemed like my mom was actually reading from a note.”

She later learned that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had come to her parents’ home, questioning why they frequently called an American number. They instructed her parents to download Bale, an Iranian messaging app widely believed to be monitored by authorities, before making any further calls.

“It’s a spy app, and everyone knows that,” the woman said with a wry laugh. Her parents refused. Instead, they were told to call their daughter and read from a script while IRGC members watched.

“Basically, they said to prove that you are with us and not with Israel, read this when you call her,” the woman said. “After that day, they didn’t call for a long time.”

Eventually, she learned that her parents had fled to a safer part of the country to escape bombardment.

Her family are among the estimated 10,000 Jews who still live in Iran, in the largest Jewish community in the Middle East outside of Israel. Once numbering around 120,000, the community has dwindled significantly since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, when life for religious minorities fundamentally changed. Today, Jews who remain in Iran must carefully navigate life under the regime, publicly expressing loyalty to avoid being falsely accused of Zionist espionage.

Amid Iran’s war with the U.S. and Israel, that pressure has intensified.

With an ongoing internet blackout, communication is limited and closely monitored. To understand what life is like for Iranian Jews today, I spoke with several people in the U.S. who remain in sporadic contact with family members inside Iran. Everyone interviewed requested that they not be identified, fearing repercussions for either themselves or their families.

A synagogue vigil for the Supreme Leader 

On April 16, Tehran’s Yusef Abad synagogue held a memorial for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed on the first day of the war. The event was attended and reported on by several state-affiliated media channels, filming as participants from Iran’s Jewish community shared their appreciation for the deceased Supreme Leader.

Inside and around the synagogue, posters featuring photos of Khamenei were displayed alongside Farsi slogans like “Unity of Iran’s faiths against aggression — condemnation of the attack on the Tehran synagogue by the child-killing Zionist regime and criminal America” and “The Jewish faith is separate from Zionism.”

Regime media pointed to the vigil as evidence of Jewish support for Iran’s theocratic government. But experts say that interpretation misses the reality.

Beni Sabti, an Iranian-born analyst at Tel Aviv’s Institute for National Security Studies, said displays like the synagogue vigil are often a matter of survival. Jews who remain in Iran are frequently compelled to demonstrate loyalty to the regime — and opposition to Israel — in order to avoid suspicion of having ties to Israel. Allegations of such ties have often led to imprisonment and executions following the Islamic Revolution in 1979.

To protect the community, Jewish leaders — especially rabbis — often participate in pro-regime events, including memorials for senior regime figures. In some cases, Iranian rabbis have even sat alongside members of Hamas and Hezbollah to pay their respects to senior IRGC commanders responsible for funding and training terror groups across the Middle East.

The regime exerts significant pressure to stage these displays, Sabti said, “because it’s good for them to show the world, ‘You see, we don’t oppress anyone.’”

Beyond public displays, much of Iran’s economy is tied to the state — what officials often describe as a “resistance economy.” In that system, some say, expressions of loyalty can become intertwined with economic survival.

The woman who left Iran in 2008 said one of her relatives was once pressured to confiscate land from dozens of people and transfer it to the government in order to keep his job — a loyalty test she says was especially harsh because of his Jewish identity. “In the job interview, they told him, you have a Jewish background, so you have to first prove how far you will go,” she explained.

Since the 12-Day War between Israel and Iran in June 2025, the situation has grown even more tense. More than 30 Jewish Iranians were reportedly detained during that conflict because of alleged contact with Israel. While some Jewish community members were arrested during the wave of anti-regime protests that occurred at the beginning of the year, Sabti said he has not heard of a similar wave of arrests during the current war.

Still, the fear remains.

Synagogues as shelter

Some Iranian Jews have managed to stay in touch with relatives via landline phones, although calls are expensive and likely monitored. Most avoid discussing politics, using their limited time simply to confirm they are alive.

​“After the 12-Day War, people really didn’t talk on the phone,” said the woman who moved to the U.S. in 2008. “We do talk, it’s not like they literally cannot, it’s just like they realized that the scrutiny was so high that no one has meaningful conversations.”

Even so, fragments of sentiment emerge.

One 25-year-old Iranian Jew from Los Angeles said his Jewish cousins in Iran cried tears of joy when they heard of the Ayatollah’s death.

​He said his great uncle and cousin told him over the phone, “I don’t care, whatever the cost. If you can eliminate Khamenei, if you can eliminate Mojtaba, his son, if you can eliminate any threat… do it.” He added, “Most Persian Jews in Iran are happy, is what I hear.”

Amid the current ceasefire, a 64-year-old Iranian Jewish woman from LA said her Jewish friends in Iran have expressed relief. “They are happy that the situation is calm, but on the other hand, nobody is happy. They all want it to get finished,” she said, adding that they hope for “regime change.”

For Nora, an Iranian Jew living in New York, the war has come at a time of crisis for her family in Iran. She says her aunt has been focused on caring for her son, who is suffering from bone marrow cancer. Because the family keeps kosher, her aunt has had to leave the house — even during bombardments — to ensure he has food and other necessities.

Around three weeks into the war, her house in Tehran was destroyed after a nearby police station was struck. She briefly moved into a local synagogue; now, she lives with another Jewish family who opened their home to her. Her son remains too sick to leave the hospital.

A synagogue destroyed

Nora’s aunt is not the only Iranian Jew to find shelter in a synagogue. Sabti heard from another Jewish family inside Iran that Jewish communities have been using synagogues as bomb shelters throughout the war. He recalled doing the same during his youth at the time of the Iran-Iraq war that began in 1980.

Beyond using the space for physical safety, synagogues have also become a place for Jews to be together during the difficult time. “They come just to gather there, passing the time, meeting and having a little bit better time together,” he said.

​For members of the Rafi’ Nia synagogue, a 150-year-old religious institution in Tehran, this sense of comfort has disappeared. On April 6, the community gathered there for Passover services. The next morning, they learned the building had been destroyed by an Israeli strike.

​The Israel Defense Forces said that the target of the strike was not the synagogue, but rather a top commander from Khatam al-Anbiya, Iran’s military emergency command. But Iranian media suggested that the IDF had intentionally targeted the building. The head of the synagogue made a statement condemning the attacks and wishing the Iranian regime success in the war.

​The woman who immigrated in 2008 had visited the Rafi’ Nia synagogue during Passover around 10 years ago. She described it as a beautiful old building. Seeing images of its destruction brought back painful memories of her family’s past.

She and her family were forcibly converted to Islam around 70 years ago, she said, with one uncle publicly hanged after he refused to convert. Her family continued practicing Judaism in secret — celebrating Shabbat behind locked doors and in her grandmother’s basement, always afraid.

She believes her family became a target for conversion after the synagogue in their area was destroyed, leaving them without formal affiliation to a recognized religious institution. On two occasions, she said, the IRGC raided their home during Jewish holidays, searching for evidence of religious practice. When they found a menorah, her father was detained. “When my dad came back, he was a ghost.” She fears that members of the destroyed synagogue could now face a similar vulnerability.

In Iran, certain religious minorities, including Jews, are constitutionally recognized. But she says that their protection is closely tied to existing institutions.

“When we talk about the lack of protection, it has a very nuanced meaning. In Iran, this doesn’t mean that the synagogues cannot exist, but it means that the existing synagogues are the only legal protection that Jews do have,” she said. “Good luck with rebuilding that place. Good luck with asking for a new synagogue.”

Sabti said the regime has already used the synagogue’s destruction as propaganda, publicly condemning the attack while reinforcing the state narrative of religious inclusion. “The head of the Islamic clerics condemned Israel and paid condolences to the Jews,” he said. “Everyone pays condolences and says, ‘Oh, sorry, we are in this together’ … but everyone knows that the other one also is lying.”

An American Jewish detainee

For one Iranian American Jew, the war has made a dire situation worse.

​Kamran Hekmati, a 70-year-old Iranian American from Great Neck, New York, traveled to Iran in June 2025 and was detained during the 12-Day War. According to advocates, his alleged crime was traveling to Israel 13 years earlier for his grandson’s bar mitzvah.

Kieran Ramsey of the Global Reach advocacy group, who represents Hekmati’s family, said in an interview that Kamran being the Iranian regime’s only Jewish American prisoner puts him in a particularly precarious position. “There can be risk of retribution or reprisals against him at any moment,” Ramsey said, “from prison guards or other prisoners…his identity certainly puts him at higher risk.”

On March 16, almost three weeks into the war, Secretary of State Marco Rubio designated Hekmati as wrongfully detained, a status that allows the federal government to deploy all possible levers — diplomatic, legal, and economic — to secure his release. Ramsey says that change in designation is helpful, but only goes so far.

His organization is now pushing for the release of all American prisoners in Iran to be an integral part of the U.S.-Iran negotiations to end the war.

“Our hope is that Kamran Hekmati and the other Americans that are being held are put to the front of the list in terms of issues to decide, and not as a deal sweetener,” he said adding, “We know the U.S. negotiators have a list of American names. We know Kamran is at the top of that list…. We also know there are some very rational actors inside the regime, and we are trying to convince them that you have a no-cost way to open doors. Use Kamran as that no-cost way.”

The last time the woman who emigrated in 2008 visited Iran was two years ago. Even then, she worried that photos taken of her in the U.S. wearing a Jewish star necklace might draw the regime’s suspicion.

Now, she believes whatever space existed for quiet concessions from the Iranian government to Jews may disappear. The regime’s efforts to retain a firm grip on the Iranian people following January’s massive anti-regime protest wave and the war pose new risks.

“Just because of everything that has happened… I’m sure that any type of like ‘OK, let this go,’ ‘Let this person go,’ will end,” she said.

“Now I know that I could not go back,” she added. “I really feel if the Islamic Republic stays — and they probably have a good chance of staying — I feel like I lost Iran.”

The post Monitored phone calls and fear of arrest: What life looks like for Iran’s Jews now appeared first on The Forward.

Any article about Hasan Piker should start by explaining that he said “America deserved 9/11,” according to Congressman Ritchie Torres (D-NY). It should then say that Piker referred to Ultra-Orthodox Jews as “inbred.”

Piker is one of the most popular streamers on Twitch and just did a major interview with a Jewish outlet, speaking with the Jewish Telegraphic Agency’s Andrew Lapin.

Lapin’s article left it up to the reader to keep score, as good articles do. It’s worth a read.

Hasan Piker is a major force in pushing Democrats to turn against Israel. He is calculating. He knows that people care about status and charisma. They care about looking smart, not actually being intelligent.

Piker is physically attractive, and has been the subject of glowing articles in outlets like People and The New York Times.

So why did Piker pick this time to give an interview to a Jewish media outlet? Because he sees he has the backing of influential people to downplay his evil. He knows that politics is about power, and he has more chutzpah than many American Jews do — he’ll go to a Jewish outlet, and claim to support Jews.

He can go to Yale and other colleges like he is someone to be admired and get applause. According to Congressman Torres, in addition to supporting terrorist groups like Hezbollah and championing “resistance” against Israel, “Piker has even gone as far as to incite violence, telling his followers to ‘kill’ and ‘murder’ people ‘in the streets’ and ‘let the streets soak in their red-capitalist blood.’”

In an Opinion article for The Forward, Emily Tamkin writes: “If pushing back against antisemitism is the top priority for our community, I suspect that writing Piker off as an antisemite with whom engagement simply can’t be countenanced will do more harm than good.”

She says that his statements and attitudes are different than Nick Fuentes, and that “this distinction matters. Fuentes’ antisemitism is so extreme and all-encompassing that his fans and followers will never be allies to American Jews. There is little evidence to believe the same is true for Piker. To successfully fight antisemitism, American Jews need a broad base of allies. In that context, Piker’s audience — including nearly 3 million followers on the streaming platform Twitch — is one that it would be a mistake for us to wholly write off.”

While I don’t know if it’s a good use of time to worry if Fuentes or Piker is worse, it is important to note that Fuentes will not be joining any major candidates on the political stage, while Piker will. I also would not be surprised if Piker eventually decides to run for office himself.

Many Democrats like Torres and Josh Gottheimer (D-NJ) realize how dangerous and extreme Piker is. But many more Democrats are ready to embrace him.

Piker is anti-American — and also obviously hates Israel.

A failure to protest the normalization of Piker into mainstream politics signifies that Jews are not only okay with being America’s punching bag, but we prefer the bully sit next to us at the table, so we can tell ourselves we are cool. Ezra Klein is a disgrace to try to give Piker a positive profile — as are many other progressives of all stripes (Jewish and non-Jewish alike). We are way past mental gymnastics. We are at the point where fools have broken the balance beam.

Piker has calculated that many Jews are stupid, afraid, or don’t have the chutzpah to protest him, because so many are like Thomas Friedman and will do anything to stay relevant. The sad thing is that Piker may be right.

The author is a writer based in New York.

The Epic Fury/Roaring Lion War cast a spotlight on the power index of many countries and the global and regional balance of power. For the purposes of this paper, a country’s power is defined as its security and economic posture. A country may have additional supporting strengths (once called “soft”), such as diplomacy, influence, and internal resilience. For the weaker player, such strengths provide power, but their effectiveness is limited. Ultimately, they are embodied in two main ones: strategic-security posture and economic dominance.

There is a gap between a country’s self-perception and its actual power, as Russia learned after its decision to invade Ukraine. This paper assesses “objective” power rather than a country’s self-perception.

One country in the world today is considerably more powerful than all others: the United States. There are weak countries in the world. In fact, out of about 200 countries, a significant portion of them are either weak or have small yet sufficient power relative to their surroundings. A new member of the latter club is Spain, which was once a global empire but which is now weak in terms of both security and economy.

The other countries rest on a continuum. They can be divided into two types: those that strive for power and those that flee from weakness. The Epic Fury War held up a mirror to the global and regional arena, allowing for a recalibration of the position of various countries on the continuum.

There are several reasons why Epic Fury is a better indicator of countries’ strength than the war in Ukraine or the situation in the China Sea:

1. It is the first global war crisis during the presidency of Donald Trump, who has placed the issue of power at the center of his strategy;
2. it transformed from a regional crisis into a global one due to the energy issue and the supply chain challenges, which have intensified in recent years, especially since the Covid-19 pandemic; and
3. it puts key geostrategic arenas to the test, such as Russia-Europe, India-Pakistan, and, in the Pacific, from China to Australia.

Estimating change in the power index of key countries

The description below is intended to provide initial directions for the professional and academic discourse on the issue.

Iran: The Islamic Republic has returned to fleeing from weakness. In the first two decades of its existence, the regime fled from weakness, with the trauma of the Iran-Iraq War playing a central role. However, in the last two decades, it changed course and moved toward striving for power. The Iranians decided that security power was more important than economic, and were willing to pay the painful price of sanctions in exchange for it. The main milestones of this shift seem to have been the regime’s success in suppressing the “Green Movement” protest in 2009; the absence of restrictions on its behavior in the missile field and in the regional arena in the JCPOA in 2015; its ability to supply advanced missile capabilities to proxies; and the victories of its axis in aiding the Assad regime in Syria and in the Houthis’ fight against the Saudis and the UAE. Unlike Qassem Soleimani, who strove for regional power in a calculated manner while managing risk, his successors were less rigorous, as evidenced by their inability to control Hamas on October 7. The current war, even if the Islamic regime does not yet fully understand it as such, is a severe blow to its striving after power. During the process of internalizing the results of the war, the regime will likely grasp that it has to return to the approach of fleeing from weakness.

United States: The US has strengthened its pursuit of power. Epic Fury was a purposeful display of the Americans’ absolute military superiority, especially as it was supported by an ally who is a “running horse,” not a “lazy donkey.” It experienced a slight backlash in the area of ​​economic power, because it is still internally sensitive to energy price fluctuations, but this negative is insignificant relative to its achievements.

China and the Pacific: The Chinese have come out ahead in their pursuit of power. On the one hand, an ostensible ally of Beijing has been severely damaged and isolated. But on the economic level, through the strength it has built in recent years in the field of supply chains, China has demonstrated clear superiority over its Japanese, South Korean and Australian neighbors. On the military side, what happened in the Persian Gulf hardly whet the world’s appetite for further conflict in the China Sea, which strengthens China’s bargaining power.

Russia and Europe: The Russian balance sheet for the pursuit of power, especially vis-à-vis Europe, is positive. In economic terms, the war boosted its ability to profit from energy sales and balance the economic difficulties resulting from the long war and sanctions. In the security sphere, Europe’s weakness strengthens Russian power. Like Russia, Ukraine – a country that is by definition fleeing from weakness, especially in the current war – also managed to strengthen its position in the form of security and economic gains. On the other hand, Europe, fleeing from weakness, suffered another blow to its security power: the practical disintegration of the NATO alliance and the distancing from Europe of the United States, NATO’s critical component.

India and Pakistan: India’s quest for power has been negatively affected. Pakistan succeeded – in a process that has been going on for more than a year – in positioning itself as an asset to the United States, but was exposed for its weakness as a military partner of Saudi Arabia. However, this development should be analyzed more in the context of India, since the rapprochement between the United States and Pakistan is an American challenge to the independent strategy that India is pursuing, among other areas, in the Russian context. In addition, the war revealed weaknesses in the Indian supply chain. These developments reflect the fact that India still faces significant challenges in its quest for global power.

Germany, Great Britain and France: Here we see a reversal of roles. Germany is the one striving after power, while Britain and France, which, in recent decades, have exercised security power in various arenas, have been revealed as unable to exert power, mainly for internal reasons. They are now deep along the continuum among those fleeing from weakness, while Germany appears to have passed through another stage in its complex return to being a security power.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Epic Fury posed a challenge to the Saudi approach of striving for power and fleeing from the weakness of the other Gulf countries. For decades, Saudi Arabia positioned itself as the key regional player striving for power through its enormous economic capabilities. The current de facto ruler, Muhammad bin Salman, attempted to regulate this effort through Vision 2030. In this pursuit, Saudi Arabia prioritized economic power over security power, and this resulted in painful military losses to the Houthis over the past decade. The Iranian decision to militarily attack the Gulf states and oil exports as a central strategic approach (albeit with no choice) represented a security challenge to the Gulf states’ economic power. Saudi Arabia will now have to reexamine whether it can continue to strive for power or must shift to the more realistic approach of fleeing from weakness.

In the other Gulf states, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait, the situation is even clearer. Their basic strategy is to flee from weakness. The war proved to them that they need to improve their capabilities, mainly in the security field and in alternatives to oil and gas flows.

Turkey‘s approach also retreated somewhat as a result of the war. It has shifted from a country that strives more and more after power to one that flees from weakness.

Israel: Epic Fury/Roaring Lion constituted a significant achievement in Israel’s pursuit of power – with an asterisk.

David Ben-Gurion’s national security strategy was designed as a flight from inherent weakness. It created a durable force with five components: a qualitative conventional military advantage, an image of nuclear deterrence, special relations with a superpower, economic and technological superiority, and national resilience.

Over a long process, Israel’s approach transformed from a flight from weakness to the pursuit of power. A number of key events can be highlighted: the Six-Day War, which confirmed Israel’s military power in the region and ultimately led to the peace agreement with Egypt; the leap to a hi-tech, free-market economy that manifested from 1992; and the process, resulting from the shock of the October 7, 2023 attack, of releasing itself from the constraints it had placed upon itself on its use of military force. That unshackling manifested in the operation in Khan Yunis in early 2024, the beeper operation and elimination of Nasrallah at the end of that year, and Operation Rising Lion in ​​2025. The State of Israel today is, as a result of the current war, a country with military and economic power much greater than its objective geo-political posture. However, when we look forward, we see that its position is unbalanced. Israel must re-strengthen the other elements of its power (see Perspective Paper No. 2347, June 3, 2025): an advanced, resilient society and economy, with improved long-term positioning of its relations with the United States and other powers.

Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai is a senior researcher at the BESA Center and an expert in national security, strategic planning, and strategic communication. He is a cyber security strategist and a consultant to leading companies in Israel. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.