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In Turkey, a festival revives a jewel of the Sephardic world and aims to break stereotypes
IZMIR, Turkey (JTA) — Prague has the dubious honor of being chosen by Adolf Hitler to be a record of what he hoped would be the vanquished Jews of Europe. The Nazis left many of the city’s synagogues and Jewish sites relatively intact, intending to showcase them as the remnants of an extinct culture.
That has made Prague a popular tourist destination for both Jewish travelers and others interested in Jewish history since the fall of the Iron Curtain: the city provides an uncommon look into the pre-war infrastructure of Ashkenazi Europe.
Could Izmir, Turkey’s third largest city, become a Sephardic version, in terms of history and tourism? That’s the goal for Nesim Bencoya, director of the Izmir Jewish Heritage project.
The city, once known in Greek as Smyrna, has had a Jewish presence since antiquity, with early church documents mentioning Jews as far back as the second century AD. Like elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, though, its community grew exponentially with the influx of Sephardic Jews who came after their expulsion from Spain.
At its peak, the city was home to around 30,000 Jews and was the hometown of Jewish artists, writers and rabbis — from the esteemed Pallache and Algazii rabbinical families, to the musician Dario Marino, to the famously false messiah, Shabbetai Zevi, whose childhood home still stands in Izmir today.
Today, fewer than 1,300 remain. The establishment of the state of Israel, coupled with a century of economic and political upheaval, led to the immigration of the majority of Turkish Jewry.
“From the 17th century, Izmir was a center for Sephardic Jewry,” Bencoya told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “We can’t recreate that, but we cannot forget that either.”
Izmir is located on Turkey’s Aegean coast. (David I. Klein)
Celebrating in the former Jewish quarter
Bencoya, who is in his late 60s, was born in Izmir but spent most of his adult life in Israel, where he led the Haifa Cinematheque, but he returned to Izmir 13 years ago to helm the heritage project, which has worked to highlight the the culture and history of Izmir’s Jewish community.
Over nine days in December that included the week of Hanukkah, thousands attended the annual Sephardic culture festival that he has organized since 2018. The festival included concerts of Jewish and Ladino music, traditional food tastings, lectures on Izmir’s Jewish community, and — since it coincided with Hanukkah and also a Shabbat — both a menorah lighting ceremony and havdalah ceremony were conducted with explanations from Izmir’s leading cantor, Nesim Beruchiel.
This year’s festival marked a turning point: it was the first in which organizers were able to show off several of the centuries-old synagogues that the project — with funding from the European Union and the local municipality — has been restoring.
The synagogues, most of which are clustered around a street still called Havra Sokak (havra being the Turkish spelling of the Hebrew word chevra, or congregation) represent a unique piece of cultural heritage.
Nesim Bencoya speaks from his office next to the restored Sinyora Synagogue in Izmir. (David I. Klein)
Once upon a time, the street was the heart of the Jewish quarter or “Juderia,” but today it is right in the middle of Izmir’s Kemeralti Bazaar, a bustling market district stretching over 150 acres where almost anything can be bought and sold. On Havra Sokak, the merchants hock fresh fruits, and hopefully fresher fish. One street to the south one can find all manner of leather goods; one to the north has markets for gold, silver and other precious metals; one to the west has coffee shops. In between them all are other shops selling everything from crafts to tchotchkes to kitchenware to lingerie.
Several mosques and a handful of churches dot the area, but the synagogues revive a unique character of the district that had been all but lost.
“The synagogues here were built under the light of Spain. But in Spain today, there are only two major historic synagogues, Toledo and Cordoba, and they are big ones. You don’t have smaller ones. Here we have six on one block, built with the memory of what was there by those who left Spain,” Bencoya said.
Those synagogues have been home to major events in Jewish history — such as when Shabbetei Zvi broke into Izmir’s Portuguese Synagogue one Sabbath morning, drove out his opponents and declared himself the messiah (he cultivated a large following but was later imprisoned and forced to convert to Islam). The synagogue, known in Turkish as Portekez, was among those restored by the project.
Today, only two of Izmir’s synagogues are in regular use by its Jewish community, but the others that were restored are now available as exhibition and event spaces.
Educating non-Jews
Hosting the festival within Izmir’s unique synagogues has an additional purpose, since the overwhelming majority of the attendees were not Jewish.
“Most of the people who come to the festival have never been to a synagogue, maybe a small percentage of them have met a Jew once in their lives,” Bencoya said.
That’s particularly important in a country where antisemitic beliefs are far from uncommon. In a 2015 study by the Anti-Defamation League, 71% of respondents from Turkey believe in some antisemitic stereotypes.
The festival included concerts of Jewish and Ladino music, traditional food tastings and lectures on Izmir’s Jewish community.(David I. Klein)
“This festival is not for Jewish people to know us, but for non-Jews,” Bencoya said. Now, “Hundreds of Turkish Muslim people have come to see us, to listen to our holidays and taste what we do.”
Kayra Ergen, a native of Izmir who attended a Ladino concert and menorah lighting event at the end of the festival, told JTA that until a year ago, he had no idea how Jewish Izmir once was.
“I know that Anatolia is a multicultural land, and also Turkey is, but this religion, by which I mean Jewish people, left this place a long time ago because of many bad events. But it’s good to remember these people, and their roots in Izmir,” Ergen said. “This is so sad and lame to say out loud, but I didn’t know about this — that only 70 years ago, 60% of this area here in Konak [the district around Kemeralti] was Jewish. Today I believe only 1,300 remain. This is not good. But we must do whatever we can and this festival is a good example of showing the love between cultures.”
“I think it’s good that we’re respecting each other in here,” said Zeynep Uslu, another native of Izmir. “A lot of different cultures and a lot of different people. It’s good that we’re together here celebrating something so special.”
Izmir’s history as a home for minorities has not been all rosy. At the end of the Ottoman period, the city was around half Greek, a tenth Jewish and a tenth Armenian, while the remainder were Turkish Muslims and an assortment of foreigners. In the Greco-Turkish war of 1919-1922 — remembered in Turkey as the Turkish War of Independence — the Greek and Armenian quarters of Izmir were burned to the ground after the Turkish army retook the city from the Greek forces, killing tens of thousands. A mass exodus of the survivors followed, but the Jewish and Muslim portions of the city were largely unharmed.
Izmir is not the only city in Turkey which has seen its synagogues restored in recent years. Notable projects are being completed in Edirne, a city on the Turkish western border near Bulgaria, and Kilis, on its southeastern border near Syria. Unlike Izmir, though, no Jews remain in either of those cities today, and many have accused the project of being a tool for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government to assuage accusations of antisemitism, without actually dealing with living Jews.
Losing Ladino and a ‘quiet’ mindset
Bencoya lamented that he is among the last generation for whom Ladino — the Judeo-Spanish language traditionally spoken by Sephardic Jews, but only spoken by tens of thousands today — was at least a part of his childhood.
“When you lose language, it’s not only technical, it’s not only vocabulary, it’s a whole world and a way of thinking,” Bencoya said.
The project is challenging a local Jewish mentality as well. Minority groups in Izmir, especially Jews, “have for a long time preferred not to be seen, not to be felt,” according to Bencoya.
That mindset has been codified in the Turkish Jewish community’s collective psyche in the form of a Ladino word, “kayedes,” which means something along the lines of “shhh,” “be quiet,” or “keep your head down.”
“This is the exact opposite that I want to do with this festival — to be felt, to raise awareness of my being,” Bencoya said.
The Bikur Holim Synagogue is one of the few still functioning in Izmir. (David I. Klein)
One way of doing that, he added, was having the festival refer to the community’s identity “as Yahudi and not Musevi!” Both are Turkish words that refer to Jews: the former having the same root as the English word Jew — the Hebrew word Yehuda or Judea — while the latter means “follower of Moses.”
“Yahudi, Musevi, Ibrani [meaning Hebrew, in Turkish] — they all mean the same thing, but in Turkey, they say Musevi because it sounds nicer,” Bencoya said. “To Yahudi there are a lot of negative superlatives — dirty Yahudi, filthy Yahudi, and this and that. So I insist on saying that I am Yahudi, because people have a lot of pre-judgements about the name Yahudi. So if you have prejudgements about me, let’s open them and talk about them.”
“I am not so romantic that I can eliminate all antisemitism, but if I can eliminate some of the prejudgements, then I can live a little more at peace,” he added.
So far, he feels the festival is a successful first step.
“The non-Jewish community of Izmir is fascinated,” Bencoya said. “If you look on Facebook and Instagram, they are talking about it, they are fighting over tickets, which sell out almost immediately.”
Now, he is only wondering how next year he will be able to fit more people into the small and aged synagogues.
“For Turkey, [the festival] is very important because Turkey can be among the enlightened nations of the world, only by being aware of the differences between groups of people, such as Jews, Christians, others, and Muslims,” he said.
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The post In Turkey, a festival revives a jewel of the Sephardic world and aims to break stereotypes appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
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CAIR Denies Connections to Turkey Amid Ongoing Scrutiny Over Muslim Brotherhood Links
CAIR officials give press conference on the Israel-Hamas war. Photo: Kyle Mazza / SOPA Images/Sipa USA via Reuters Connect
The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) has denied that its recently launched political arm, CAIR Action, has any institutional ties to Turkey, following questions about the origins of the organization’s social media presence.
In a statement provided to The Algemeiner, CAIR said that speculation about foreign influence or overseas coordination is categorically false and that “their director regularly visits his family in Turkey and set up CAIR Action’s account while he was there using a local phone.”
Questions surfaced after observers noted that CAIR Action’s social media activity appeared to originate outside the United States. A new feature on the social media platform X unveiled this past week weekend now reveals the locations behind all accounts. Users quickly pointed out that CAIR Action’s page originated in Turkey, despite the group purporting to be rooted in the United States to advocate on behalf of American Muslims. Some online commentators suggested the possibility of foreign links or influence, a charge CAIR rejects.
CAIR has been under fire in recent weeks. Texas Gov. Greg Abbott last week announced the state-level designation of the Islamic group as a terrorist organization. Abbott’s proclamation described CAIR as a “successor organization” to the Muslim Brotherhood, a global Islamist network that the governor also designated as a terrorist group.
“The Muslim Brotherhood and CAIR have long made their goals clear: to forcibly impose Sharia law and establish Islam’s ‘mastership of the world,’” Abbott said in a statement. “These radical extremists are not welcome in our state and are now prohibited from acquiring any real property interest in Texas.”
Following Texas’s decision, US President Donald Trump signed an executive order directing his administration to determine whether to designate certain chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood as foreign terrorist organizations and specially designated global terrorists.
According to analysts, the Turkish government maintains close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and supports its ideology, likely fueling much of the online scrutiny this week of CAIR Action’s social media page originating in Turkey.
The Palestinian terrorist group Hamas has also long been affiliated with the Brotherhood, drawing both ideological inspiration and even personnel from its ranks. For years, US authorities have scrutinized CAIR for alleged ties to Hamas.
In his state-level proclamation, Abbott note that CAIR officials “publicly praised and supported Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack against Israel,” a charge which CAIR denied.
However, as The Algemeiner previously reported, multiple top CAIR officials expressed public support for Hamas’s Oct. 7 invasion of and massacre across southern Israel.
The head of CAIR, for example, said he was “happy” to witness Hamas’s rampage of rape, murder, and kidnapping of Israelis in what was the largest single-day slaughter of Jews since the Holocaust.
“The people of Gaza only decided to break the siege — the walls of the concentration camp — on Oct. 7,” CAIR co-founder and executive director Nihad Awad said in a speech during the American Muslims for Palestine convention in Chicago in November 2023. “And yes, I was happy to see people breaking the siege and throwing down the shackles of their own land, and walk free into their land, which they were not allowed to walk in.”
About a week later, the executive director of CAIR’s Los Angeles office, Hussam Ayloush, said that Israel “does not have the right” to defend itself from Palestinian violence. He added in his sermon at the Islamic Society of Greater Oklahoma City that for the Palestinians, “every single day” since the Jewish state’s establishment has been comparable to Hamas’s Oct. 7 onslaught.
CAIR has filed a lawsuit claiming that Abbott’s proclamation threatens its free speech rights.
Abbot called out the group on X on Monday.
“CAIR’s X account is routed through the Turkish App Store. This sure seems like an international operations link between CAIR and a country tied to the Muslim Brotherhood. I designated CAIR a terrorist and transnational criminal organization because of ties like this to that group,” Abbott posted.
CAIR’s X account is routed through the Turkish App Store.
This sure seems like an international operations link between CAIR and a country tied to the Muslim Brotherhood.
I designated CAIR a terrorist and transnational criminal organization because of ties like this to that… pic.twitter.com/CpiIBtI2Tr
— Greg Abbott (@GregAbbott_TX) November 24, 2025
On its official website, CAIR Action claims that it “is dedicated to enhancing the civic engagement, political participation, and impact of the American Muslim community in local, state, and federal elections.” The group purports to “engage, educate, and mobilize Muslim voters, train emerging leaders, and champion policy priorities that enhance the well-being and representation of Muslim communities.”
CAIR Action launched earlier this year as a separate advocacy entity aimed at increasing Muslim civic engagement, supporting candidates aligned with its priorities, and promoting policy initiatives. Although the organization considers itself legally and financially distinct from CAIR’s charitable arm, both groups are closely associated and share overlapping goals.
Notably, in comments made to The Algemeiner, CAIR denied ever suffering legal blowback due to alleged ties to Hamas and other extremist groups and sent this outlet a link to a webpage which attempts to explain the allegations.
“There is no legal implication to being labeled an unindicted co-conspirator, since it does not require the Justice Department to prove anything in a court of law,” the webpage reads.
In the 2000s, the advocacy group was named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation terrorism financing case. Politico noted in 2010 that “US District Court Judge Jorge Solis found that the government presented ‘ample evidence to establish the association’” of CAIR with Hamas.
According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), “some of CAIR’s current leadership had early connections with organizations that are or were affiliated with Hamas.” CAIR has disputed the accuracy of the ADL’s claim and asserted that CAIR “unequivocally condemn[s] all acts of terrorism, whether carried out by al-Qa’ida, the Real IRA, FARC, Hamas, ETA, or any other group designated by the US Department of State as a ‘Foreign Terrorist Organization.’”
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Oct. 7 families’ lawsuit says Bitcoin CEO, whom Trump pardoned, facilitated $1B in payments to Hamas and its allies
(JTA) — The families of victims of Hamas’ Oct 7, 2023, attack on Israel filed a lawsuit against the cryptocurrency fund Binance and its CEO, claiming they facilitated over $1 billion in funding to the terror group and others behind the attacks.
The latest lawsuit against Binance CEO Changpeng Zhao comes one month after he was pardoned by President Donald Trump for his November 2023 conviction on violating anti-money-laundering and sanctions laws. Zhao, who pleaded guilty, had been sentenced to four months in prison, and Binance paid more than $4.3 billion in fines.
When asked about the pardon earlier this month on “60 Minutes,” Trump distanced himself from Zhao and Binance, which struck a $2 billion deal with the Trump family’s crypto venture last spring.
“I don’t know who he is,” Trump said of Zhao. “I know he got a four-month sentence or something like that. And I heard it was a Biden witch hunt.”
The complaint, filed Monday in U.S. federal court in North Dakota, lists 306 American plaintiffs and their family members who were killed, injured or taken hostage on Oct. 7 or in other subsequent terror attacks.
They include the families of Hersh Goldberg-Polin, an American-Israeli hostage who was murdered by Hamas in Gaza, and Itay Chen, an American-Israeli soldier whose body was returned by Hamas earlier this month.
The lawsuit joins a growing list of legal cases seeking redress for the families and victims of the Oct. 7 attacks, including one filed by the Anti-Defamation League in September against eight foreign terrorist groups for their efforts in orchestrating the attacks.
The complaint accuses Binance of “knowingly, willfully, and systematically” assisting Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard of moving over $1 billion through its crypto platform, including more than $50 million after Oct. 7.
It also accuses Binance’s conduct of being “far more serious and pervasive” than what the federal government prosecuted in its November 2023 investigation.
“To this day, there is no indication that Binance has meaningfully altered its core business model,” the complaint read.
The post Oct. 7 families’ lawsuit says Bitcoin CEO, whom Trump pardoned, facilitated $1B in payments to Hamas and its allies appeared first on The Forward.
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The Cross-Continental Threat: Iran and Venezuela’s US-Defying Partnership
Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro meets with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, Oct. 24, 2024. Photo: Miraflores Palace/Handout via REUTERS
Bad actors stick together. Few relationships prove that more clearly than Iran and Venezuela’s. The regimes’ close ties are on full display with Iran’s foreign ministry on November 15, threatening the United States with “dangerous consequences” over the US military buildup near Venezuela’s shores.
It’s not just talk: the Iran-Venezuela strategic partnership has matured into a robust, multi-dimensional alliance, impacting both regional security and US foreign policy calculations. Iran and Venezuela’s cooperation spans the social, political, diplomatic, economic, and military domains — and is directly influencing the US posture toward Venezuela, including the recent military buildup near its shores and targeted strikes on drug trafficking operations.
The Iran-Venezuela partnership began in the 1950s and has deepened substantially, especially after former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez declared the countries “brothers” in 2005.
Chávez signed a formal partnership in 2007 with then-Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The presidents developed a notably close personal and political relationship, highlighted by frequent state visits, public demonstrations of solidarity, and formal agreements spanning the economic, energy, and industrial sectors. Today, both countries maintain comprehensive diplomatic ties via their official embassies and frequent high-level exchanges. The partnership intensified under current Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and includes regular presidential meetings, official delegation visits, and joint commission sessions.
Iran has used this leverage to establish a robust foothold in Latin America, constructing a dense network involving both direct state-to-state links and the integration of proxy actors like Hezbollah. The bilateral relationship has been solidified by defense pacts, including a 20-year agreement signed in 2022, and joint manufacturing of Iranian drones and weapons on Venezuelan soil, including potential deployments of loitering munitions and jamming devices.
Economically, the alliance is built on mutual circumvention of Western sanctions. Iran and Venezuela have exchanged oil, gold, and infrastructure assistance, often using Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah-linked front companies for money laundering and sanctions evasion. This economic cooperation enables the Maduro regime to survive by generating hard currency and illicit financial streams, while also facilitating transnational criminal activity including drug trafficking, with groups such as Cartel de los Soles and Tren de Aragua working with Hezbollah proxies to move drugs into US territory. The proceeds fuel both regimes and deepen their partnership and resilience to international pressure.
Simultaneously, Iran and Venezuela collaborate on energy trade that is inimical to US interests and enriches Russia. Iran not only exports refined crude oil to Venezuela to enrich itself, but also helps Venezuela build and fix energy infrastructure, increasing Venezuelan storage and refining capacity. In turn, that boosts Caracas’s appetite for Russian naphtha, a petroleum product that further enables Venezuela to dilute and export its oil, giving Russia a new and growing energy market for its exports to replace Europe and undermining Western sanctions.
As the US presence in the region grows, Venezuela and Iran have enhanced their military coordination. Recently, Venezuela requested additional Iranian drones, military electronics, and asymmetric warfare technologies. Iran provides technical personnel and expertise, optimizing Venezuela’s capacity for electronic warfare and irregular tactics, thereby enhancing deterrence and complicating US intervention plans.
Against this backdrop, the United States has deployed significant naval assets and possibly special operations elements off the coast of Venezuela, amounting to the largest regional buildup since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Officially, the United States has justified this surge to counter escalating drug trafficking, with at least 20 recent kinetic strikes on alleged narco-trafficking vessels departing Venezuelan ports. Many of these drug networks are tied to Venezuelan state actors and Iran-linked proxies. It would not be a stretch to assume that the Maduro regime is leveraging its Iranian connection as strategic insurance.
Venezuela provides Iran and Hezbollah with greater access to the Western Hemisphere. This expanding axis has regional security consequences beyond criminality and drug flows. Venezuelan threats toward neighbors like Guyana, coupled with the risk to Western energy interests and the broader use of Iranian technology, could draw the United States and its partners into more direct conflict. Furthermore, Iran’s strategy of exporting proxy warfare to the Western Hemisphere — mirroring tactics used in the Middle East — creates parallel dilemmas for US policy in both regions.
To counter these threats, enhanced sanctions enforcement against the Iranian–Venezuelan illicit oil trade, improved intelligence and interdiction of military shipments, and regional efforts to dismantle Hezbollah networks are essential. Disrupting the financial pipeline sustaining both the regime and its Iranian backers is critical for neutralizing their broader destabilizing potential.
Iran — along with its proxy Hezbollah — and Venezuela are force multipliers. All three work in concert to enrich the Iranian regime, strengthen Venezuela’s military and imperil regional stability, and facilitate transnational crime that threatens the US homeland. Washington should not allow this Venn diagram of threats to continue converging.
LTG Ray Palumbo, USA (ret.) is the former Deputy Commander of US Army Special Operations Command and a 2021 Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) Generals and Admirals Program participant. Yoni Tobin is a senior policy analyst at JINSA.