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Indonesia removed as host of U-20 FIFA World Cup over Israel objections
(JTA) — Indonesia has been stripped of its hosting rights for the upcoming FIFA Under-20 Men’s World Cup, after the country objected to Israel’s participation.
FIFA, soccer’s global governing body, announced the decision Wednesday, saying Indonesia was removed as host “due to the current circumstances,” without providing further clarification. The Football Association of Indonesia may also face further penalties.
The tournament is set to begin May 20, with 24 teams from around the world participating. Israel had qualified for the first time after reaching the semifinals in the Under-19 European Championship.
The draw for the U-20 tournament, originally scheduled to take place Friday in Bali, was canceled after Bali also objected to Israel’s presence in the tournament.
Indonesian President Joko Widodo said his country had agreed to host before knowing Israel would be playing. Dozens protested Israel’s inclusion in Indonesia’s capital on Monday.
Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim-majority nation, does not have diplomatic relations with Israel and supports the Palestinian cause.
Israel’s participation “has nothing to do with the consistency of our foreign-policy position toward Palestine, because our support for Palestine has always been solid and strong,” Widodo said on Tuesday, according to The New York Times. He also said that people should “not mix sports and politics.”
This is not the first time Indonesia’s opposition to Israel has impacted global soccer events.
Indonesia, along with Turkey and Sudan, dropped out of qualifiers for the 1958 World Cup to avoid playing against Israel — letting Israel win the Africa and Asia group qualifiers without playing a game. In 1962, Israel withdrew from the Asian Games after Indonesia, then the host country, refused to issue visas to Israeli players.
According to the Associated Press, the Palestinian ambassador to Indonesia had no objection to Israel’s participation, and some Indonesians disagreed with their country’s decision.
“The rejection of the Israeli national team by some people in Indonesia, including a number of regional heads and politicians is regrettable,” said Hikmahanto Juwana, a professor of international law at the University of Indonesia. “As long as Indonesia has declared itself willing to be the host, Indonesia must take the risk not to reject any members from international event organizers.”
This episode comes only days after an international rugby tournament in South Africa disinvited an Israeli team.
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The post Indonesia removed as host of U-20 FIFA World Cup over Israel objections appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
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Nvidia in Advanced Talks to Buy Israel’s AI21 Labs for Up to $3 Billion, Report Says
A smartphone with a displayed NVIDIA logo is placed on a computer motherboard in this illustration taken March 6, 2023. Photo: REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration
Nvidia is in advanced talks to buy Israel-based AI startup AI21 Labs for as much as $3 billion, the Calcalist financial daily reported on Tuesday.
Nvidia declined to comment, while AI21 was not immediately available to comment.
A 2023 funding round valued AI21 at $1.4 billion. Nvidia and Alphabet’s Google participated in that funding.
AI21, founded in 2017 by Amnon Shashua and two others, is among a clutch of AI startups that have benefited from a boom in artificial intelligence, attracting strong interest from venture capital firms and other investors.
Shashua is also the founder and CEO of Mobileye, a developer of self-driving car technologies.
Calcalist said AI21 has long been up for sale and talks with Nvidia have advanced significantly in recent weeks. It noted that Nvidia‘s primary interest in AI21 appears to be its workforce of roughly 200 employees, most of whom hold advanced academic degrees and “possess rare expertise in artificial intelligence development.”
Calcalist said the deal to buy AI21 is estimated at between $2 billion and $3 billion.
Nvidia, which has become the most valuable company in history at more than $4 trillion, is planning a large expansion in Israel with a new R&D campus of up to 10,000 employees in Kiryat Tivon, just south of the port city of Haifa – Israel’s third-largest city.
Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang has described Israel as the company’s “second home.”
Nvidia has said that when completed, the campus will include up to 160,000 square meters (1.7 million square feet) of office space, parks and common areas across 90 dunams (22 acres), inspired by Nvidia‘s Santa Clara, California, headquarters. Nvidia expects construction to begin in 2027, with initial occupancy planned for 2031.
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How The New York Times Used Selective West Bank Data to Shape a False Moral Verdict
The New York Times’ recent interactive project on the West Bank avoids incendiary terminology. It does not accuse Israel of ethnic cleansing outright. Yet the impression it leaves readers with is unmistakable: a story of systematic dispossession, driven by Israeli settlers and tolerated by the state.
That conclusion is not argued directly. It is constructed indirectly, through selective facts, emotional imagery, and critical omissions.
The article portrays a daily reality of Palestinian villagers under siege by armed settlers, shielded by Israeli soldiers, and backed by state institutions. The tone is stark and accusatory. But the apparent coherence of this narrative depends on three elements that are completely biased.
1/
The New York Times doesn’t use the phrase “ethnic cleansing” in its West Bank project.It doesn’t have to.
Selective imagery, distorted data & erased Palestinian terrorism lead to one conclusion: Israel is driving Palestinians off their land.
That claim is false.
pic.twitter.com/a4boarQwVq
— HonestReporting (@HonestReporting) December 22, 2025
Casualty Statistics
The first is the use of casualty statistics. The Times relies extensively on data from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) to demonstrate a dramatic rise in settler violence.
What readers are not told is how those numbers are assembled. UNOCHA does not consistently distinguish between civilians and terrorists killed while carrying out attacks. Palestinians who die while attempting stabbings, shootings, or vehicular assaults, are frequently recorded simply as casualties.

This methodology matters. It collapses perpetrators and victims into the same category and inflates the appearance of civilian harm. When such figures are presented without explanation, they create a misleading picture of violence divorced from context. The New York Times adopts these numbers uncritically, allowing a flawed dataset to underpin its central claim.
Ignoring Palestinian Terrorism
Second, the article ignores Palestinian terrorism. Over the past year, according to Israel Security Agency data, thousands of attacks have targeted Israelis in the West Bank, ranging from shootings and stabbings to Molotov cocktails and explosive devices. Many were intercepted before civilians were harmed. This sustained campaign is essential to understanding Israeli military operations and security measures. Yet it appears only faintly, if at all, in the article.
HonestReporting visualization based on B’Tselem data of Palestinians killed by Israeli forces from October 7, 2023, to October 31, 2025.
The absence extends further. Palestinians killed during Israeli counterterror operations are frequently affiliated with armed groups such as Hamas or Islamic Jihad, particularly in hotspots like Jenin and Nablus. These affiliations are rarely acknowledged. Readers are left with an image of indiscriminate force rather than targeted security activity.
Visual Storytelling
The third biased element in the article is the visual storytelling, which reinforces the narrative.
Images of demolished homes and emptied landscapes suggest deliberate displacement. But the legal framework governing much of the territory is barely explained.
Many demolitions occur in Area C, which, under internationally recognized agreements, falls under Israeli civil and security authority. Construction there requires permits. Unauthorized structures, whether Palestinian or Israeli, are subject to enforcement. By omitting this context, regulation is reframed as expulsion.

The article also implies that Israeli institutions tolerate or even enable extremist settler violence. This claim overlooks documented realities.
Israeli political and military leaders have repeatedly condemned such acts, warning that they undermine security and divert resources. Extremist settlers have been arrested, prosecuted, and in some cases have violently clashed with Israeli soldiers themselves. Internal accountability exists, but it is erased from the story.

Criticism of Israeli policy is legitimate and necessary. But journalism carries an obligation to present complexity honestly. When context is stripped away, when flawed data is treated as fact, and when terrorism is sidelined, reporting stops informing and starts directing. The New York Times’ project offers readers a powerful story, but not a complete one. And when narrative takes precedence over evidence, the public is misled.
HonestReporting is a Jerusalem-based media watchdog with a focus on antisemitism and anti-Israel bias — where a version of this article first appeared.
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Israel, Greece, and Cyprus: In Search of New Synergies
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (center), Cyprus President Nikos Christodoulides (left), and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis hold a joint press conference after a trilateral meeting at the Citadel of David Hotel in Jerusalem, Dec. 22, 2025. Photo: ABIR SULTAN/Pool via REUTERS
The 10 trilateral summit of Israel, Greece and Cyprus, which took place in Jerusalem on December 22, showcased the continuing commitment of the three countries to the expansion of their collaboration. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hosted his Greek counterpart Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides in an effort to revitalize the trilateral mechanism. The ninth trilateral summit took place on September 4, 2023 in Nicosia, and the regional order has changed a great deal in the two years since. Israel responded to the terrorist invasion of October 7, 2023 by engaging in wars on multiple Middle East fronts, including a 12-day war with Iran. Despite the multidimensional and complex character of all these conflicts, Israel managed to show its power and resilience.
Both Greece and Cyprus continued to value their strategic partnership with Israel even as the Jewish State was being roundly condemned and vilified. Unlike the EU member states that chose to condemn Israel for the war in Gaza, Athens and Nicosia took a mild and balanced approach. Premier Mitsotakis has been able to prioritize what he perceives as Greece’s national interests and fend off criticism from other parties. Nikos Androulakis, the leader of the main opposition PASOK party, did not hold back in his excoriation of Israel in the context of the war in Gaza, inaccurately using the terms “ethnic cleansing” and “genocide” to describe Israel’s conduct during the war and denying that both terms in fact apply to Hamas’s assault on Israel, as well as to its ongoing plans for that country. On October 16, 2025, Androulakis called Netanyahu a “butcher” and demanded that Mitsotakis apologize for aligning Greece’s interests with those of Israel. Similarly, the parliamentary spokesperson of PASOK, Dimitris Mantzos, spoke of a “live-streamed genocide” and wondered “what strategic partnership might endure the pain of this bloodshed.”
Interestingly, it was the former leader of PASOK, George Papandreou, who laid the foundations for the Greek-Israeli friendship while serving as prime minister in 2010.
During the Israel-Iran war of June 2025, Greece and Cyprus served as hubs for Israeli civilians unable to return to their country. Planes belonging to Israeli airlines were stationed at Greek and Cypriot airports, and the aircraft serving Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Isaac Herzog departed for Athens after Operation Rising Lion was launched on June 13. When the conflict ended, the Greek and Cypriot authorities coordinated with the Israeli government to implement Operation Safe Return to facilitate the repatriation of Israelis. Former Knesset member Gadeer Kamal-Mreeh praised Greece and Cyprus in a Jerusalem Post commentary in which he argued that the two countries had stepped up to help Israel – with actions, not just with words – at a time of serious crisis.
In the sphere of defense, Greece and Cyprus have looked favorably towards the Israeli market for years. Greece is now finalizing an agreement with Israel to purchase 36 PULS rocket artillery systems for $757.84 million. The Greek Parliament and the Government Council for National Security have approved the budget for the purchase, according to a press release from Elbit, the PULS manufacturer. Cyprus reportedly deployed Israel Aerospace Industries’ Barak MX air defense system last September and is eyeing new military deals with Israel to equip its National Guard. In addition to the arms transactions, Jerusalem, Athens and Nicosia are expected to conduct joint drills in 2026. In the past, Greek-Israeli exercises in the area between Israel and the island of Crete have allowed Israeli pilots to engage in bombing exercises and to rehearse the kind of aerial refueling necessary to cover a distance equal to that separating Israel from Iran’s Natanz nuclear enrichment facility.
Israel, Greece and Cyprus are all apprehensive about Turkish tactics in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, a common concern that facilitates dialogue. Jerusalem is of course primarily concerned about Ankara’s attitude toward Hamas and presence in Syria, while Athens and Nicosia are more focused on Ankara’s policies in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean as well as on the Cyprus question. Israel, Greece and Cyprus support the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which bypasses Turkey, though IMEC will inevitably have limitations. The Turkish market is too big to be ignored, and the Corridor is still lacking tangible investments.
Energy also brings the three countries closer. Last November, Israeli Energy and Infrastructure Minister Eli Cohen put the idea of the East Med pipeline back on the table. Cohen made the comment on the sidelines of a ‘3+1’ Energy Ministerial Meeting in Athens that was also attended by US Energy Secretary Chris Wright. Although the East Med pipeline project remains expensive and technically difficult, attention is being directed towards a connecting of Israeli gas fields and LNG facilities in Cyprus. Israel is keen on selling its natural gas to Cyprus. The Energean company, which is drilling in Israeli waters, has proposed the construction of a subsea pipeline from its Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) to Cyfield’s planned power generation facility in Cyprus. According to Reuters, the cost will be around $400 million, while the capacity of the new pipeline will be 1 billion cubic meters a year. Theoretically, Israel, Greece and Cyprus remain committed to the Great Sea Interconnector project, but the Cypriot government seems to be having second thoughts about its viability. Athens and Nicosia have openly disagreed on this matter over the past few weeks.
Last but not least, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus are expected to improve coordination in accessing EU Horizon programs and other external funding sources. When the European Commission proposed, in July 2025, to partially suspend Israel’s integration into the European Innovation Council, Greece and Cyprus were among the EU member states to oppose the idea.
The trilateral Jerusalem summit welcomed the Cypriot presidency of the Council of the EU for the first semester of 2026, and Greece will hold the EU presidency in the second semester of 2027. The next two years should be a good opportunity to recalibrate EU-Israel relations under the aegis of Cyprus and Greece as well as to intensify the European fight against antisemitism.
Dr. George N. Tzogopoulos is a BESA contributor, a lecturer at the European Institute of Nice (CIFE) and at the Democritus University of Thrace, and a Senior Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

