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Israeli democracy may not survive a ‘reform’ of its Supreme Court

(JTA) — On Dec. 29, Israel swore in Benjamin Netanyahu’s sixth government. The Likud leader became Israel’s prime minister once more, and one week later, Israel’s long-anticipated judicial counterrevolution began.

In the Knesset Wednesday, newly minted Justice Minister and Netanyahu confidant Yariv Levin unveiled a package of proposed legislation that would alter the balance of power between Israel’s legislature and its Supreme Court.

At the core of this plan is a bill to allow the Knesset to override the Supreme Court. Levin’s proposals — which almost certainly have the immediate support of a Knesset majority, regardless of Levin’s assurances that they would be subject to “thorough debate” — would pave the way for Israel’s new government to pass legislation that curtails rights and undermines the rule of law, dealing a blow to Israeli democracy.

The dire implications of this proposed judicial reform are rooted in key characteristics of the Israeli political system that set it apart from other liberal democracies. Israel has no constitution to determine the balance of power between its various branches of government. In fact, there is no separation between Israel’s executive and legislative branches, given that the government automatically controls a majority in the parliament. 

Instead, it has a series of basic laws enacted piecemeal over the course of the state’s history that have a quasi-constitutional status, with the initial intention that they would eventually constitute a de jure constitution. 

Through the 1980s, the Knesset passed basic laws that primarily served to define state institutions, such as the country’s legislature and electoral system, capital and military. In the 1990s, there was a paradigm shift with the passage of two basic laws that for the first time concerned individuals’ rights rather than institutions, one on Human Dignity and Liberty (1992) and the other on Freedom of Occupation (1994). These laws enshrined rights to freedom of movement, personal freedom, human dignity and others to all who reside in Israel. 

Aharon Barak, the president of Israel’s Supreme Court from 1995 to 2006, argued that these laws constituted a de facto bill of rights, empowering the court to review Knesset legislation and to strike down laws that violate civil liberties, a responsibility not explicitly bestowed upon the court in the basic law pertaining to the judiciary. In 1995, the Supreme Court officially ruled that it could indeed repeal legislation that violates the country’s basic laws, heralding an era of increased judicial activism in Israel in what became known as the “judicial revolution.” The court has struck down 20 laws since, a fairly modest number compared to other democracies.

The judicial revolution of the 1990s shifted the balance of power in Israel’s political system from one of parliamentary sovereignty, in which the Knesset enjoyed ultimate power, to one in which the legislature is restricted from violating the country’s (incomplete) constitution. Israel’s Supreme Court became a check on the legislative branch in a country that lacks other checks and balances and separations of power.

As a result of these characteristics, the Supreme Court currently serves as one of the only checks on the extraordinary power of Israel’s 120-member Knesset — which is why shifting that balance of power would have such a dramatic impact on Israel’s democracy.

Levin’s proposed judicial overhaul includes several elements that would weaken the power and independence of Israel’s Supreme Court. The plan includes forbidding the Supreme Court from deliberating on and striking down basic laws themselves. It would require an unspecified “special majority” of the court to strike down legislation, raising the threshold from where it currently stands. 

Levin has also called for altering the composition of the selection committee that appoints top judges to give the government, rather than legal professionals, a majority on the panel. It would allow cabinet ministers to appoint legal advisors to act on their behalf, rather than that of the justice ministry, canceling these advisors’ role as safeguards against government overreach. Should a minister enact a decision that contravenes a basic law, the ministry’s legal advisor would no longer report the violation to the attorney general, and would instead merely offer non-binding legal advice to the minister. 

The pièce de résistance is, of course, the override clause that would allow the Knesset to reinstate laws struck down by the Supreme Court by 61 members of Knesset, a simple majority assuming all members are present. The sole restriction on this override would be a provision preventing the Knesset from re-legislating laws struck down unanimously, by all 15 judges, within the same Knesset term. 

This plan’s obvious and most immediate result would be the effective annulment of the quasi-constitutional status of Israel’s basic laws. If the Knesset’s power to legislate is no longer bound by basic laws, these de facto constitutional amendments no longer have any teeth. There are no guardrails preventing any Knesset majority from doing as it wishes, including violating basic human rights. The Knesset could pass laws openly curtailing freedom of the press or gender equality, for example, should it choose to do so.

This counterrevolution, in effect, goes further than merely undoing what occurred in the 1990s.

Most crucially, the Knesset that would once again enjoy full parliamentary sovereignty in 2022 is not the Knesset of Israel’s first four decades. Shackling the Supreme Court is essential to the agendas of the new government’s various ultra-right and ultra-religious parties. For example, the haredi Orthodox parties are eager to re-legislate a blanket exemption to the military draft for their community, which the court struck down in 2017 on the grounds that it was discriminatory. They also have their sights on revoking recognition of non-Orthodox conversions for immigrants to Israel, undoing a court decision from 2021

The far-right, Jewish supremacist parties of Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, meanwhile, see an opportunity to deal a decisive blow to an institution that has long served as a check on the settlement movement. They hope to tie the court’s hands in the face of oncoming legislation to retroactively legalize settlements built on private Palestinian land, which are illegal under Israeli law. But this is only the beginning: Neutering the authority of the court could pave the way for legal discrimination against Israel’s Arab minority, such as Ben-Gvir’s proposal to deport minorities who show insufficient loyalty. 

The timing of Levin’s announcement Wednesday could not be more germane. The Knesset recently amended the basic law to legalize the appointment of Aryeh Deri, the Shas party leader who is serving a suspended sentence for tax fraud, as a minister in the new government. The Supreme Court convened Thursday morning to hear petitions against his appointment from those arguing that it is “unreasonable” to rehabilitate Deri given his multiple criminal convictions, a view shared by Israel’s attorney general. Levin’s proposals would bar the court from using this “reasonability” standard. 

The Israeli right has long chafed at the power of the Supreme Court, which it accuses of having a left-wing bias. But a judicial overhaul like this has never enjoyed the full support of the government, nor was Netanyahu previously in favor of it. Now, with a uniformly right-wing government and Netanyahu on trial for corruption, the prime minister’s foremost interest is appeasing his political partners and securing their support for future legislation to shield him from prosecution.

In a system where the majority rules, there need to be mechanisms in place to protect the rights of minorities — political, ethnic and religious. Liberal democracy requires respect for the rule of law and human rights. Yariv Levin’s proposals to fully subordinate the Supreme Court to the Knesset will concentrate virtually unchecked power in the hands of a few individuals — government ministers and party leaders within the coalition who effectively control what the Knesset does. That those individuals were elected in free and fair elections is no guarantee that the changes they make will be democratic. 


The post Israeli democracy may not survive a ‘reform’ of its Supreme Court appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

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UNRWA vs. UNHCR: How the UN Created a Permanent Refugee Class

Palestinians pass by the gate of an UNRWA-run school in Nablus in the West Bank. Photo: Reuters/Abed Omar Qusini.

For more than 70 years, the United Nations has administered two refugee systems operating under the same flag but guided by fundamentally different moral compasses. One system exists to end refugeehood. The other exists to preserve it.

The contrast between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is not a technical footnote in international policy. It is one of the central reasons the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains frozen in place.

The events of October 7 brutally exposed what many have warned about for decades: UNRWA is no longer a humanitarian agency in any meaningful sense. It is a political instrument that has helped entrench radicalization, prolong suffering, and ultimately enable war.

UNHCR, established in 1950, was designed with a clear mission: provide temporary protection and pursue durable solutions. Its success is measured by how many refugees stop being refugees.

Over the decades, UNHCR has helped tens of millions of people rebuild their lives; Europeans after World War II, Vietnamese people, Balkan refugees, Rwandans, Syrians, Afghans, and most recently Ukrainians. Resettlement, integration, and naturalization are not failures under UNHCR’s framework; they are the goal.

UNRWA, created a year earlier for a single refugee population, operates on the opposite logic. Its mandate does not aim to resolve refugeehood but to maintain it indefinitely.

Palestinians are the only group in the world whose refugee status is automatically inherited, generation after generation, regardless of citizenship, residence, or living conditions.

The numbers tell the story. Roughly 700,000 Arabs were displaced during the 1948 war launched by Arab states against the newly declared State of Israel. Today, UNRWA claims nearly six million Palestinian refugees. Refugee populations are supposed to shrink as lives stabilize. This one grows exponentially. That is not humanitarian failure, it is institutional design.

This design has consequences. When refugeehood becomes an inherited political identity rather than a temporary legal status, grievance replaces hope. Dependency replaces empowerment. Conflict becomes a resource to be managed rather than a tragedy to be ended.

UNRWA’s budget, influence, and relevance depend on the persistence of the conflict. Peace would render it obsolete. Integration would reduce its scope. Resolution would end its mandate.

Nowhere is this more evident than in education. UNRWA operates hundreds of schools, shaping the worldview of generations of Palestinian children. Education should be a bridge to coexistence.

Instead, repeated investigations and reports have documented curricula that erase Israel from maps, glorify “martyrdom,” deny Jewish historical ties to the land, and frame violence as both justified and inevitable. Antisemitic tropes and conspiracy theories have surfaced again and again. This is not accidental oversight. It is tolerated, minimized, and excused as “context.”

The moral collapse of this system was laid bare after October 7. In the aftermath of Hamas’ massacre of Israeli civilians, evidence emerged that UNRWA employees were directly involved in the attack. Others were found to have celebrated the killings. Weapons were discovered in or near UNRWA facilities. Terror tunnels were uncovered beneath UNRWA schools. Hostages were reportedly hidden or moved through civilian areas linked to UNRWA infrastructure. This was not infiltration from the outside. It was contamination from within.

If UNHCR staff had participated in mass murder or aided a terrorist organization, the agency would have been dismantled immediately. Yet UNRWA survived on explanations, damage control, and the insistence that the problem lay with a few individuals rather than a compromised system. That argument no longer holds.

The tragedy is that Palestinians themselves have paid the highest price for this failure. UNRWA did not prepare Gazans for self-governance or peace. Hamas prepared Palestinians for war, and UNRWA looked away.

October 7 was not an aberration. It was the inevitable result of a system that monetized suffering and normalized extremism for decades.

The solution is not complicated, but it requires moral clarity. Palestinians deserve the same humanitarian standards applied to every other refugee population on earth. That means ending UNRWA’s exceptional status and transferring responsibility to UNHCR. It means redefining refugeehood as a temporary condition, not a hereditary identity. It means de-radicalizing education, dismantling terror infrastructure, and replacing grievance with opportunity.

One world cannot operate two refugee systems and still claim moral credibility. One system resolves crises. The other perpetuates them.

If the international community truly cares about peace, dignity, and human rights, both Israeli and Palestinian, it must finally acknowledge that UNRWA is part of the problem, not the solution.

Sabine Sterk is CEO of the foundation, “Time To Stand Up For Israel.”

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The Houthis Aren’t Done — Are We?

Smoke rises in the sky following US-led airstrikes in Sanaa, Yemen, Feb. 25, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Adel Al Khader

The US Navy spent over $1 billion and suffered an additional $100 million in equipment losses and damages during Operation Rough Rider, countering the Houthi threat in the Red Sea. Yet Iran’s Yemeni proxy remains heavily armed and prepared to resume its attacks. 

Over the past two years, the Houthis continued to fire their extensive stockpile of Iranian missiles and drones at Israel and maritime targets despite repeated US and Israeli airstrikes against them. As the Houthi threat to regional security and Red Sea trade persists, the United States can work with Israel to prepare for any potential future operations if the Houthis resume attacks by expediting the sale of necessary military equipment to Israeli forces, and collaborating with Israel to improve intelligence on critical Houthi targets to neutralize.

Protecting global freedom of navigation through international waterways, safeguarding maritime trade, and supporting Israel’s security remain core US interests. Yet, the Iranian-armed and funded Houthi terrorist group has compromised these interests over the past two years by firing hundreds of drones and missiles at both Israel and ships transiting the Red Sea.

The Houthis’ violent assault on US Navy and commercial shipping assets in the region prompted several rounds of US airstrikes, including Operation Rough Rider, which resulted in US forces carrying out over 1,100 strikes against the group’s infrastructure in early 2025. However, since the May 6 agreement between the Houthis and the US — which bans Houthi attacks against American ships but does not prohibit targeting other commercial vessels or Israel — the terrorist group has fired over 150 projectiles at Israel and ships transiting the Red Sea, including several that injured Israeli civilians and sunk two commercial vessels.

While these attacks prompted retaliatory Israeli strikes on the terror group, including one operation that killed several Houthi senior leaders in August, the Iranian proxy remained undeterred and fired nearly 50 projectiles in September alone.

The current pause in Houthi attacks is not the time to rest; instead, the United States and Israel should strengthen their readiness for future operations against the enduring threat that the well-armed Houthis pose to regional stability, security, and maritime trade. With Iran continuing to strengthen its proxy during this pause by funneling it more weapons to replace those it has fired or lost, the United States should work with Israel to prevent this arms proliferation and prepare for any potential offensive operations against the Houthis if they resume their regional assault. 

To start, US and Israeli forces should take advantage of the current ceasefire to refine their intelligence gathering and counter-terror strategies, particularly by establishing a comprehensive list of Houthi targets in case of resumed attacks. Before the Houthis began firing at ships and targeting Israel, countering their activities was not a priority for the US or Israeli militaries and intelligence agencies. The limited effectiveness of these airstrikes further exposed this lack of focus. The Houthis’ persistent ability to launch attacks throughout the war, coupled with Iran’s ongoing proliferation of advanced weaponry, underscores critical intelligence gaps that both the United States and Israel must address to anticipate and effectively prepare for future military operations.

For example, Israel’s operations in the fall of 2024 against Hezbollah, and Operation Rising Lion against Iran’s nuclear and military targets, vividly illustrated a military campaign’s effectiveness when leadership prioritizes planning and intelligence preparation during peacetime. Unlike the situations in Gaza or against the Houthis, Israel spent years meticulously preparing for large-scale operations in Lebanon and Iran, and this preparation enabled it to achieve rapid and decisive results. To position US and Israeli forces for similar levels of success, it remains crucial for both to collaborate on acquiring intelligence for targets while the Yemen front remains quiet.

With Israeli aircraft needing to fly thousands of miles to conduct strikes in Yemen — even further than the distance to Iran — the United States would improve Israeli operations in both countries by expediting the delivery of KC-46 aerial refueling aircraft to Israel. These advanced aircraft have better range, refueling capacity, and defensive capabilities than Israel’s current fleet of over 50-year-old Ram tankers, based on Boeing 707s. Israel is currently set to receive the first of four KC-46 aircraft it has purchased by the end of 2026 and requested two more in August, but expediting the sale and delivery of these refuelers would position Israel’s forces to sooner carry out more effective counter-terror operations if the Houthis resume attacks. In addition, the United States should begin training Israeli pilots immediately on how to operate these aircraft, ensuring they are ready to carry out any future missions in Yemen once the new refuelers arrive.

The United States and Israel must remain vigilant, despite the relative calm. With the Houthis still a capable threat to regional stability, now is the time to prepare for any future conflict with Iran’s Yemeni proxy.

VADM Michael J. Connor, USN (ret.) is Former Commander of United States Submarine Forces and a participant in the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (JINSA) 2018 Generals and Admirals Program.

Sarah Havdala is a Policy Analyst at JINSA.

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The Story of Joseph: True Strength Is Shown in Restraint, Not Using Power Over Others

A Torah scroll. Photo: RabbiSacks.org.

You may be surprised to hear that the first novel ever written, The Tale of Genji, wasn’t European, or even Western, but Japanese. It was composed more than a thousand years ago by a quirky lady in the imperial court of Japan, Murasaki Shikibu, a woman with an uncanny eye for human weakness and emotional nuance. 

I’ve been reading it recently, in preparation for an upcoming visit to Japan, and it is surprisingly modern in its portrayal of the characters. I had been bracing myself for stiffly described royal shenanigans and melodramatic intrigue, but that isn’t what this book is at all. 

The Tale of Genji is highly readable, portraying the life of a minor royal, Genji, who, despite being deliberately sidelined in the imperial succession, wields enormous behind-the-scenes influence: socially, politically, and emotionally. His presence opens doors, his favor reshapes lives, and his disapproval can quietly undo people. In time, he rises to become Honorary Retired Emperor (Daijō Tennō), but long before that, his power is almost unrivaled.

Imperial Japan of the early Middle Ages was a world where status determined everything, and a careless word or fleeting encounter could alter a life in the most unexpected ways. More importantly, the most powerful figures were not always the emperor or his heirs, but court notables like Genji, who ran the court’s affairs like chess grandmasters.

One of the most unsettling relationships in the book is Genji’s long and complicated bond with Lady Murasaki, whom he first encounters as a child and later raises within his household. He oversees her education, shapes her tastes, and becomes the unquestioned center of her emotional universe. 

Genji is keenly aware that the imbalance in their relationship grants him enormous power over Lady Murasaki’s inner life, and at crucial moments, he restrains himself, hesitating to dictate her future or to press his authority in ways that would leave her entirely without agency. 

These pauses really matter. They do not erase the asymmetry of the relationship, nor do they free Lady Murasaki from dependence, but they do limit the harm that his overwhelming dominance might otherwise inflict on the course of her life.

A similar pattern appears later in the novel, when Genji reaches the height of his political influence and effectively controls the machinery of court life. His patronage determines appointments, and his presence subtly distorts the balance of power around him. Increasingly conscious of this, Genji begins to withdraw from the center of political life. 

The retreat is gradual and motivated by many factors, but it is both deliberate and voluntary. By stepping back, he reduces the extent to which his personal influence dominates the system. Court rivalries do not disappear, but they lose both their urgency and spite, and the political order becomes less tightly centered on a single figure. Genji comes to understand that power, when held in check, is less corrosive than when it is relentlessly exercised.

The reason Genji is such a compelling figure is that he never feels like a literary device or a moral symbol. Clearly modeled on a court patrician of the era in which the book was written — perhaps a composite of several historical figures whose names are now lost — he emerges as a fully dimensional human being: gifted, cultured, and often admirable, but also inconsistent, self-indulgent, and prone to misjudgment. 

What is attractive about Genji is not his moral perfection, but his relatability. He understands, sometimes with painful clarity, that his actions ripple outward, shaping lives long after the moment has passed. He reflects, hesitates, withdraws, and more than occasionally restrains himself — not because he must, but because he senses the weight of what he does.

And what makes reading The Tale of Genji particularly intriguing is how familiar the narrative feels to anyone steeped in the narratives of the Hebrew Bible. Time and again, we encounter the same dynamic: a figure of immense influence operating just below the throne, shaping outcomes while remaining formally subordinate to the king. 

Examples from the Hebrew Bible, such as Joseph in Egypt, David navigating the court of Saul, the volatile triangle of Haman, Esther, and Mordechai under Achashverosh, and Daniel in the courts of Nebuchadnezzar, Belshazzar, and Darius, illustrate this theme. In each case, real power is not ultimately exercised by the crowned monarch but by those who understand how proximity to authority can quietly determine the fate of nations and individuals alike.

And particularly as we read the closing portions of Bereishit, the parallels between Genji and Joseph become increasingly striking. Like Genji, Joseph operates at the heart of a royal court, navigating the palace of Pharaoh and controlling the affairs of Egypt while carefully shaping the outcome of his relationship with those most vulnerable to his power  —  his brothers. 

Joseph is not the formal ruler of the realm, but he is the man who effectively runs it. His control over Egypt  —  and over the fate of everyone in his orbit  —  is absolute. What distinguishes Joseph is his acute awareness of that power. He does not stumble into influence or discover its consequences by accident. From the outset, he understands that every move he makes will affect the lives of others. 

And so, even as he deliberately orchestrates events and manipulates circumstances to bring about the outcome he seeks, he remains strikingly intentional and sensitive about how that power is exercised  —  determined that his extraordinary authority should never cross the line into abuse.

The Malbim in his commentary on Parshat Vayigash notes that Joseph’s first instinct at the climactic moment he reveals his identity to his brothers is not to announce who he is in the presence of others. He sends everyone out of the room, stripping himself — very deliberately — of the public trappings of power. The revelation is not staged as a triumph or as a vindictive reckoning, but as an intimate act of repair. 

By removing the court, Joseph ensures that his brothers are not confronted like criminals in a spectacle of humiliation, but as family members standing before a long-lost brother who has forgiven them. It is a breathtaking act of moral self-restraint: the conscious refusal to allow power to turn vulnerability into disgrace. 

In his commentary, Rav Hirsch repeatedly emphasizes that Joseph never confused political authority with moral authority. He may govern Egypt, but he refuses to govern his brothers’ souls through fear or domination.

It is against this backdrop that Genji’s restraint feels so familiar. He, too, seems to sense the danger of unchecked influence, which is why he attempts — imperfectly and often too late — to step back when power threatens to overwhelm the dignity of those whose lives he affects. 

The difference, however, is telling: where Genji only gradually discovers the moral cost of dominance, Joseph instinctively anticipates it, acting decisively to ensure that his authority becomes a tool for repair rather than a weapon that harms.

Power always reveals more than it conceals. The question is not whether we will ever find ourselves in positions of influence, but how alert we are to what that influence can do to others. The Tale of Genji shows how easily power can drift into damage, even in the hands of a reflective and sensitive person. 

Joseph shows us something rarer and far more demanding: the discipline to anticipate that danger, and to restrain oneself before any harm is done. 

In telling the story of Joseph’s behavior toward his brothers, the Torah teaches that the measure of a person is never found in outcomes alone, but in how carefully human dignity — and one’s own integrity — are preserved as we pursue them. Remember: true strength is shown through restraint, not domination.

The author is a rabbi in Beverly Hills, California. 

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