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Russia Will Likely Support Iran in a Middle East War — But to What Degree?

Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with then-Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi during a meeting in Moscow, Russia, Dec. 7, 2023. Photo: Sputnik/Sergei Bobylev/Pool via REUTERS

Relations between Iran and Russia have significantly expanded since the onset of the full-scale military conflict in Ukraine in February 2022.

Iran’s new president has promised to sign a strategic cooperation agreement with Moscow during the BRICS summit in Russia, scheduled to take place in Kazan from October 22 to 24, 2024. This agreement is expected to replace the 10-year cooperation treaty signed in 2001, which has been extended every five years, most recently in 2021. The new Russian-Iranian agreement will officially establish the “comprehensive strategic nature” of the partnership between Moscow and Tehran, although it will not constitute an official military alliance.

This distinction is crucial, especially given the post-Soviet tradition of not adhering to official military alliances. For example, despite the Collective Security Treaty (1994), Russia refused to deploy troops to southern Kyrgyzstan following the anti-Uzbek pogroms that erupted after the 2010 revolution, and later did not provide military support to Armenia during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020. Similarly, other participants in the Collective Security Treaty (with the notable exception of Belarus and its president, Alexander Lukashenko, albeit with certain reservations) did not support Russia in its conflict with Ukraine.

Talk of a Russian-Iranian military alliance intensified after the Russian Security Council Secretary, former Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, met with Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, and the commander of the Iranian armed forces, Brigadier General Mohammad Bagheri, on August 5. General Bagheri told Shoigu that the relations between their countries are “deep, long-term, and strategic” and will only expand under Iran’s new government.

We are ready for full cooperation with Iran on regional issues,” Shoigu stated. Following this meeting, reports emerged in the press about Russian air defense systems being supplied to Iran.

Given the intense conflict between Iran and Israel, teetering on the brink of full-scale war, a deep analysis of the nuances in the growing closeness between Russia and Iran becomes increasingly relevant. To what extent will Russia be willing to support Iran if it decides to launch a full-scale attack on Israel?

A model for analysis could be the earlier rapprochement between Russia and China, the logic of which as a “marriage of convenience” is well described in Bobo Lo’s renowned work, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics. Bobo Lo argues that the relationship between Russia and China is a pragmatic alliance based on shared interests and benefits rather than deep trust or mutual affinity. On the one hand, this limits the possibility of such relations evolving into a full-scale military alliance like the one that once existed between Stalin and Mao Zedong. On the other hand, it does not provide grounds to predict that the partnership between the Kremlin and China will cease as long as it remains beneficial and no more advantageous alternatives arise.

Let us try to apply a similar logic, as employed by Bobo Lo, to analyze the relationship between Russia and Iran. It will become apparent that the instances of pure benefit that the Russian leadership derives from cooperation with Iran are far fewer than in the case of China, and the opportunities to gain from refraining from a sudden change of position are much greater.

Lack of ideological unity. Despite Russia’s extensive use of left-wing “anti-colonial” and simultaneously right-wing “conservative” rhetoric, which brings modern Russian and Iranian ideologies closer together, there remains a chasm between the Kremlin’s ideology and the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini once described the Soviet Union as the “lesser Satan” compared to the “greater Satan” of the United States. It is unlikely that the conservative Tehran elite perceives the heirs of the Soviet KGB in any other light.

The Kremlin, having long fought against radical Islam in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East, cannot have serious trust in Iranian Islamists. While Russia’s struggle was primarily against Sunni Islamic radicals, with whom Iran itself is in conflict, it is doubtful that a broad segment of the Russian elite wants to delve into the nuances of conflicts between different groups of Islamists who practice similar terrorist tactics. If we look at the comments of Putin’s most sincere ideological supporters, the Z-bloggers, regarding the fighting between Israel and its opponents — allies of Iran — it becomes clear that most of them do not have strong sympathies for either side of the conflict.

Their antisemitic and Islamophobic sentiments clearly compete with each other. The dominant right-wing ideology of Russia today is racist in its essence, and, therefore, all the elements of “anti-colonialism” that Putin tries to add to it look to Russian elite as an ideological trick for foreign consumption. One can find this mood in the paper published by former deputy head of presidential administration Vladislav Surkov, who often in his previous papers predicted Putin’s future policy.

In the paper titled “The birth of the North,” Surkov predicted that Russia in the future will become an organic part of the “Global North” (including Russia, USA and EU), while the idea of the “Global South” is basically unacceptable for Russia. Some experts see this as a description of potential compromise between Putin and Trump, with refusal of an alliance between Russia and Iran being the inevitable price for such a compromise.

Relationships Based on Pure Benefit. Here, the situation is even more complex compared to China. The relationship between Russia and Iran is built on geopolitical, military, and economic benefits. However, in almost all these cases, the benefits are questionable, making the constant search for alternative alliances a realistic possibility for both sides.
Geopolitically, Russia’s key area of interest is now the post-Soviet space, particularly the European direction, with Ukraine at the forefront. This focus does not conflict with Iran’s interests, but neither does it advance them. Therefore, Iran can always exchange Russian support for a compromise with the U.S. (for example, lifting sanctions in exchange for a compromise on its nuclear program) if such an opportunity arises. Iran is focused on advancing its “axis of resistance” project in the Middle East. For Russia, this is useful only as a way to distract the U.S. from Ukraine and other post-Soviet issues. Thus, if the opportunity arises, Russia may trade its support for Iran for a compromise with the West.
Military cooperation has now become the most promising area in Russia-Iran relations. Russia has received drones and drone production technologies from Iran. However, Iran is avoiding supplying certain types of missiles to Russia due to US pressure. Russia may have started supplying air defense systems to Iran, but these deliveries are clearly not very extensive. Deliveries of military aircraft from Russia are limited to training aircraft. Both sides, being involved in military conflicts, simply cannot afford large-scale supplies of modern military equipment, as they need it for themselves.
From an economic perspective, unlike China, which has become a full-fledged alternative to Russia’s previously dominant trade relations with Europe, Iran cannot offer much to Russia. The economies of Russia and Iran are similar, both being heavily focused on fuel and raw materials, leaving them with little to trade. The trade balance is in favor of the more developed Russia. Putin’s Russia has already faced many situations where politically motivated trade expansion led to the accumulation of trade imbalances, debt, and subsequent debt write-offs. It is likely that the same will happen with Iran. A similar pattern is seen in Rosatom’s relations with all its clients, to whom it built nuclear power plants using Russian budget funds, with the expectation of repayment later. Iran refused to repay the debt for the construction of the Bushehr-2 nuclear power plant. In the area of oil smuggling to bypass Western sanctions, Russia and Iran are competitors, mainly vying for the Chinese and, to a lesser extent, the Indian market. The International North-South Transport Corridor, promoted by Russia and Iran, is losing the support of its key participant—India—due to the current geopolitical situation. India initially joined the project in search of partners to counter the Pakistan-China bloc. Now, Russia and Iran are partners of China and its Belt and Road Initiative. The North-South project is not advantageous for China and is not included in the Belt and Road Initiative. China, along with Pakistan, is developing a transport project through the Pakistani port of Gwadar, while the Iranian port of Chabahar, a key point on the North-South route, is a competitor to Gwadar.
Limited Trust: Despite mutual interests, there is significant distrust between Russia and Iran. Iran is well aware of the conflict prevention mechanism in Syria between Russian and Israeli forces. This mechanism allows Israel to carry out airstrikes against pro-Iranian groups in Syria without fearing a direct conflict with Russian forces stationed there. Taking advantage of Russia’s difficult position in the war with Ukraine, Iran has long delayed signing the expanded strategic partnership agreement, constantly introducing new conditions.
The Tactical Nature of the Alliance and Possible Exit Strategies. The relationship between Russia and Iran is characterized as tactical and situational, even though both sides formally call it “strategic.” It evolves and deepens depending on external circumstances, such as Iran’s conflict with Israel and Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. In a tactical alliance, when circumstances change, it is always possible to switch sides. Simply put, Moscow and Tehran are constantly forced to fear that their partner might “betray” them, while simultaneously working on scenarios in which they are prepared to “betray” their partner.

Let us try to analyze the possible exit strategies from the alliance for Russia and Iran. For the Kremlin, the conflict in the Middle East is beneficial as it distracts the West’s attention from Ukraine and could lead to a rise in oil prices. The latter is necessary for Russia in the context of the growing problems in its economy.

Under what conditions might an exit from the alliance with Iran occur? It is evident that such conditions could arise if Donald Trump wins the US presidential election. Trump and his inner circle are quite skeptical about supporting Ukraine. Trump has hinted multiple times that he is willing to resolve the Ukrainian issue with Putin. At the same time, Trump places great importance on addressing Middle Eastern problems and containing Iran. Consequently, Trump and Putin could theoretically attempt to agree on some form of freezing the Ukrainian conflict in exchange for Putin’s withdrawal of support for Iran.

In this scenario, Trump might use both a “stick” (e.g., the threat of reaching an agreement with Saudi Arabia to increase oil production or expanding oil extraction in the US) and a “carrot” (withdrawing support for Ukraine and pressuring Kyiv to give up territories controlled by Russia) in his dealings with Putin. In turn, Saudi Arabia could theoretically agree to increase oil production in exchange for Trump’s promise to intensify military pressure on Iran, making this threat quite real.

For Iran, an interesting opportunity to abandon the alliance with Russia might arise if Vice President Kamala Harris wins the election. She represents the more left-wing faction of the Democratic Party, which is more skeptical of the alliance with Israel. As a result, this faction might be potentially more inclined towards a deal with Iran as potential instrument to pressurize Russia. The victory of reformist President Pesezhkian in Iran, following a long period of conservative dominance, also creates such an opportunity. Pesezhkian is more inclined to compromise with the West than many of his predecessors (although he is significantly constrained in his real capabilities by the control of Iran’s actual leader, Ayatollah Khamenei). Under certain conditions, a new Democratic administration in the US might decide that the best way to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue is to return to the nuclear deal that Donald Trump withdrew from. In this case, Iran would have the opportunity to release significant volumes of oil onto global markets, potentially leading to a drop in prices and serious problems for the Russian economy. Unlike the Republicans, the Democrats do not have internal divisions regarding the Ukrainian issue. Therefore, they might very well attempt to use agreements with Iran as a means of pressuring Russia.

Let us try to analyze from the perspective of the “marriage of convenience” logic described above the extent to which Russia might increase its military assistance to Iran. It is unlikely that Russia would be willing to extend its nuclear umbrella over Iran in the event of a major war. It is evident that Moscow would prefer to reserve this “last argument of kings” for serious complications in Ukraine or for the defense of Russian territory itself.

Of course, in theory, Moscow could issue a nuclear ultimatum in support of Iran, similar to Khrushchev’s approach during the Suez Crisis of 1956 (it should be noted that Khrushchev’s ultimatum, which led to the withdrawal of the anti-Nasser coalition troops from Egypt, was possible only because the United States did not support the UK, France, and Israel at that time). However, the threat of nuclear war over distant Iran, especially after Russia refrained from such an ultimatum concerning Ukraine, would seem odd even to the Russian elite itself.

It is more logical to assume that Russia’s support for Iran will be primarily political, accompanied by limited deliveries of advanced weapons, given Russia’s growing need for modern weaponry. However, such deliveries are unlikely to shift the balance of power in the air, even between Israel and Iran, not even mentioning huge disparity between the US and Iran.

According to leaked reports in the press, during a visit to Tehran on August 5th, Russia’s Security Council Secretary Shoigu conveyed Putin’s request to Ayatollah Khamenei to respond cautiously to the elimination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. This aligns well with the “marriage of convenience” logic. It is more advantageous for Russia to use the threat of a major war in the Middle East as leverage in its relations with the US, specifically as a threat and as a means to compel the American leadership to negotiate over Ukraine. If a war in the Middle East were to break out, it would be too late to use such an argument for negotiations with the US.

In 2015, the Russian leadership deployed troops to Syria to give Moscow an instrument to influence Middle Eastern problems. The Kremlin’s goal at the time was to trade what it described as “counterterrorism cooperation” in the Middle East for the West’s withdrawal of support for Ukraine following the start of the conflict in 2014. Now, Russia has the opportunity to wield a much more powerful key to the Middle Eastern conflict through its interaction with Iran. From this perspective, it is beneficial for Russia to supply small quantities of weapons to Iran with one hand while signaling to the Americans with the other, offering to negotiate over Ukraine.

Limited cooperation with Iran is a win-win for the Kremlin. If a major war breaks out in the Middle East, it would lead to a significant diversion of Western resources away from Ukraine. Additionally, it would cause a rise in oil prices, delivering a severe blow to the global economy but providing relief to Russia’s economy. If a war in the Middle East does not occur, Russia will be perceived as a key player without whom the Middle East problem cannot be resolved. Theoretically, Russia could even act as some kind of peacemaker, restraining Iran. Putin already has such experience in successful mediation from 2013 in the case of Syrian chemical weapons under President Obama.

In any scenario, Russia cannot allocate many air defense systems to Iran. Ukraine has started receiving American fighter jets, so Russia needs air defense systems for itself. If a war breaks out between Iran and Israel, many experts believe that Russia will support Iran very cautiously and not on the scale that America supports Israel. For now, Russian supplies can be seen more as a diplomatic gesture, signaling that Moscow is an important player in the Middle East and that the US should negotiate with it (preferably regarding Ukraine). Of course, this policy may change in the future, but today the style of Kremlin’s game seems clear: to use Middle East as an instrument of Putin’s Ukraine policy.

So, the answer to the question “Will Russia Support Iran?” will be, yes, but this support will be very limited and mostly political. It will be also an instrument for improving Kremlin’s position in Russian-Ukrainan conflict, therefore, Russia can quickly reverse it policy if it becomes beneficial from this point of view.

The analysis above is based solely on considerations of the Kremlin’s rational interests. For the most part, Putin has adhered to non-sentimental and even brutal rationality in his actions, including in the Middle East, so this analysis has some validity. Of course, considering that in 2022 the Kremlin’s policy on Ukraine showed an obvious miscalculation (or a deviation from rational policy based on identity or emotions), it is reasonable to consider that the same type of miscalculation or deviation could also occur regarding the Iran issue. Nevertheless, the experience of 2022 should already make the Kremlin more cautious. Therefore, it can be said that going beyond the logic of a “marriage of convenience” in Russia-Iran relations, as described in this article, is theoretically possible, but it does not seem very likely, at least for a year or two.

Prof. Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman (PhD, Dr.Sc.) affiliated research fellow at the PSCR Program, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University. Expert on Central Asia and Afghanistan, Russia’s foreign and security policy, and energy policy. He has previously worked in the Moscow Higher School of Economics, Moscow state institute of international relations, the European University Institute (Italy) and served as a Visiting Scholar at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Germany). A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post Russia Will Likely Support Iran in a Middle East War — But to What Degree? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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US House Members Ask Marco Rubio to Bar Turkey From Rejoining F-35 Program

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio attends a cabinet meeting at the White House in Washington, DC, US, April 10, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Nathan Howard

A bipartisan coalition of more than 40 US lawmakers is pressing Secretary of State Marco Rubio to prevent Turkey from rejoining the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, citing ongoing national security concerns and violations of US law.

Members of Congress on Thursday warned that lifting existing sanctions or readmitting Turkey to the US F-35 fifth-generation fighter program would “jeopardize the integrity of F-35 systems” and risk exposing sensitive US military technology to Russia. The letter pointed to Ankara’s 2017 purchase of the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile system, despite repeated US warnings, as the central reason Turkey was expelled from the multibillion-dollar fighter jet program in 2019.

“The S-400 poses a direct threat to US aircraft, including the F-16 and F-35,” the lawmakers wrote. “If operated alongside these platforms, it risks exposing sensitive military technology to Russian intelligence.”

The group of signatories, spanning both parties, stressed that Turkey still possesses the Russian weapons systems and has shown “no willingness to comply with US law.” They urged Rubio and the Trump administration to uphold the Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and maintain Ankara’s exclusion from the F-35 program until the S-400s are fully removed.

The letter comes after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan claimed during a NATO summit in June that Ankara and Washington have begun discussing Turkey’s readmission into the program.

Lawmakers argued that reversing course now would undermine both US credibility and allied confidence in American defense commitments. They also warned it could disrupt development of the next-generation fighter jet announced by the administration earlier this year.

“This is not a partisan issue,” the letter emphasized. “We must continue to hold allies and adversaries alike accountable when their actions threaten US interests.”

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US Lawmakers Urge Treasury to Investigate Whether Irish Bill Targeting Israel Violates Anti-Boycott Law

A pro-Hamas demonstration in Ireland led by nationalist party Sinn Fein. Photo: Reuters/Clodagh Kilcoyne

A group of US lawmakers is calling on the Treasury Department to investigate and potentially penalize Ireland over proposed legislation targeting Israeli goods, warning that the move could trigger sanctions under longstanding US anti-boycott laws.

In a letter sent on Thursday to US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, 16 Republican members of Congress expressed “serious concerns” about Ireland’s recent legislative push to ban trade with territories under Israeli administration, including the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.

The letter, spearheaded by Rep. Claudia Tenney (R-NY), called for the US to “send a clear signal” that any attempts to economically isolate Israel will “carry consequences.”

The Irish measure, introduced by Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Simon Harris, seeks to prohibit the import of goods and services originating from what the legislation refers to as “occupied Palestinian territories,” including Israeli communities in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Supporters say the bill aligns with international law and human rights principles, while opponents, including the signatories of the letter, characterize it as a direct extension of the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement, which seeks to isolate Israel as a step toward the destruction of the world’s lone Jewish state.

Some US lawmakers have also described the Irish bill as an example of “antisemitic hate” that could risk hurting relations between Dublin and Washington.

“Such policies not only promote economic discrimination but also create legal uncertainty for US companies operating in Ireland,” the lawmakers wrote in this week’s letter, urging Bessent to determine whether Ireland’s actions qualify as participation in an “unsanctioned international boycott” under Section 999 of the Internal Revenue Code, also known as the Ribicoff Amendment.

Under that statute, the Treasury Department is required to maintain a list of countries that pressure companies to comply with international boycotts not sanctioned by the US. Inclusion on the list carries tax-reporting burdens and possible penalties for American firms and individuals doing business in those nations.

“If the criteria are met, Ireland should be added to the boycott list,” the letter said, arguing that such a step would help protect US companies from legal exposure and reaffirm American opposition to economic efforts aimed at isolating Israel.

Legal experts have argued that if the Irish bill becomes law, it could chase American capital out of the country while also hurting companies that do business with Ireland. Under US law, it is illegal for American companies to participate in boycotts of Israel backed by foreign governments. Several US states have also gone beyond federal restrictions to pass separate measures that bar companies from receiving state contracts if they boycott Israel.

Ireland has been one of the fiercest critics of Israel on the international stage since the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, massacre across southern Israel, amid the ensuing war in Gaza, leading the Jewish state to shutter its embassy in Dublin.

Last year, Ireland officially recognized a Palestinian state, a decision that Israel described as a “reward for terrorism.”

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US Families File Lawsuit Accusing UNRWA of Supporting Hamas, Hezbollah

A truck, marked with United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) logo, crosses into Egypt from Gaza, at the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, during a temporary truce between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah, Egypt, Nov. 27, 2023. Photo: REUTERS/Amr Abdallah Dalsh

American families of victims of Hamas and Hezbollah attacks have filed a lawsuit against the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, accusing the organization of violating US antiterrorism laws by providing material support to the Islamist terror groups behind the deadly assaults.

Last week, more than 200 families filed a lawsuit in a Washington, DC district court accusing the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) of violating US antiterrorism laws by providing funding and support to Hamas and Hezbollah, both designated as foreign terrorist organizations.

The lawsuit alleges that UNRWA employs staff with direct ties to the Iran-backed terror group, including individuals allegedly involved in carrying out attacks against the Jewish state.

However, UNRWA has firmly denied the allegations, labeling them as “baseless” and condemning the lawsuit as “meritless, absurd, dangerous, and morally reprehensible.”

According to the organization, the lawsuit is part of a wider campaign of “misinformation and lawfare” targeting its work in the Gaza Strip, where it says Palestinians are enduring “mass, deliberate and forced starvation.”

The UN agency reports that more than 150,000 donors across the United States have supported its programs providing food, medical aid, education, and trauma assistance in the war-torn enclave amid the ongoing conflict.

In a press release, UNRWA USA affirmed that it will continue its humanitarian efforts despite facing legal challenges aimed at undermining its work.

“Starvation does not pause for politics. Neither will we,” the statement read.

Last year, Israeli security documents revealed that of UNRWA’s 13,000 employees in Gaza, 440 were actively involved in Hamas’s military operations, with 2,000 registered as Hamas operatives.

According to these documents, at least nine UNRWA employees took part directly in the terror group’s Oct. 7, 2023, invasion of and massacre across southern Israel.

Israeli officials also uncovered a large Hamas data center beneath UNRWA headquarters, with cables running through the facility above, and found that Hamas also stored weapons in other UNRWA sites.

The UN agency has also aligned with Hamas in efforts against the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), an Israeli and US-backed program that delivers aid directly to Palestinians, blocking Hamas from diverting supplies for terror activities and selling them at inflated prices.

These Israeli intelligence documents also revealed that a senior Hamas leader, killed in an Israeli strike in September 2024, had served as the head of the UNRWA teachers’ union in Lebanon, where Lebanon is based,

UNRWA’s education programs have been found by IMPACT-se, an international organization that monitors global education, to contribute to the radicalization of younger generations of Palestinians.

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