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Russia Will Likely Support Iran in a Middle East War — But to What Degree?
Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with then-Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi during a meeting in Moscow, Russia, Dec. 7, 2023. Photo: Sputnik/Sergei Bobylev/Pool via REUTERS
Relations between Iran and Russia have significantly expanded since the onset of the full-scale military conflict in Ukraine in February 2022.
Iran’s new president has promised to sign a strategic cooperation agreement with Moscow during the BRICS summit in Russia, scheduled to take place in Kazan from October 22 to 24, 2024. This agreement is expected to replace the 10-year cooperation treaty signed in 2001, which has been extended every five years, most recently in 2021. The new Russian-Iranian agreement will officially establish the “comprehensive strategic nature” of the partnership between Moscow and Tehran, although it will not constitute an official military alliance.
This distinction is crucial, especially given the post-Soviet tradition of not adhering to official military alliances. For example, despite the Collective Security Treaty (1994), Russia refused to deploy troops to southern Kyrgyzstan following the anti-Uzbek pogroms that erupted after the 2010 revolution, and later did not provide military support to Armenia during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020. Similarly, other participants in the Collective Security Treaty (with the notable exception of Belarus and its president, Alexander Lukashenko, albeit with certain reservations) did not support Russia in its conflict with Ukraine.
Talk of a Russian-Iranian military alliance intensified after the Russian Security Council Secretary, former Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, met with Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, and the commander of the Iranian armed forces, Brigadier General Mohammad Bagheri, on August 5. General Bagheri told Shoigu that the relations between their countries are “deep, long-term, and strategic” and will only expand under Iran’s new government.
“We are ready for full cooperation with Iran on regional issues,” Shoigu stated. Following this meeting, reports emerged in the press about Russian air defense systems being supplied to Iran.
Given the intense conflict between Iran and Israel, teetering on the brink of full-scale war, a deep analysis of the nuances in the growing closeness between Russia and Iran becomes increasingly relevant. To what extent will Russia be willing to support Iran if it decides to launch a full-scale attack on Israel?
A model for analysis could be the earlier rapprochement between Russia and China, the logic of which as a “marriage of convenience” is well described in Bobo Lo’s renowned work, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics. Bobo Lo argues that the relationship between Russia and China is a pragmatic alliance based on shared interests and benefits rather than deep trust or mutual affinity. On the one hand, this limits the possibility of such relations evolving into a full-scale military alliance like the one that once existed between Stalin and Mao Zedong. On the other hand, it does not provide grounds to predict that the partnership between the Kremlin and China will cease as long as it remains beneficial and no more advantageous alternatives arise.
Let us try to apply a similar logic, as employed by Bobo Lo, to analyze the relationship between Russia and Iran. It will become apparent that the instances of pure benefit that the Russian leadership derives from cooperation with Iran are far fewer than in the case of China, and the opportunities to gain from refraining from a sudden change of position are much greater.
Lack of ideological unity. Despite Russia’s extensive use of left-wing “anti-colonial” and simultaneously right-wing “conservative” rhetoric, which brings modern Russian and Iranian ideologies closer together, there remains a chasm between the Kremlin’s ideology and the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini once described the Soviet Union as the “lesser Satan” compared to the “greater Satan” of the United States. It is unlikely that the conservative Tehran elite perceives the heirs of the Soviet KGB in any other light.
The Kremlin, having long fought against radical Islam in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East, cannot have serious trust in Iranian Islamists. While Russia’s struggle was primarily against Sunni Islamic radicals, with whom Iran itself is in conflict, it is doubtful that a broad segment of the Russian elite wants to delve into the nuances of conflicts between different groups of Islamists who practice similar terrorist tactics. If we look at the comments of Putin’s most sincere ideological supporters, the Z-bloggers, regarding the fighting between Israel and its opponents — allies of Iran — it becomes clear that most of them do not have strong sympathies for either side of the conflict.
Their antisemitic and Islamophobic sentiments clearly compete with each other. The dominant right-wing ideology of Russia today is racist in its essence, and, therefore, all the elements of “anti-colonialism” that Putin tries to add to it look to Russian elite as an ideological trick for foreign consumption. One can find this mood in the paper published by former deputy head of presidential administration Vladislav Surkov, who often in his previous papers predicted Putin’s future policy.
In the paper titled “The birth of the North,” Surkov predicted that Russia in the future will become an organic part of the “Global North” (including Russia, USA and EU), while the idea of the “Global South” is basically unacceptable for Russia. Some experts see this as a description of potential compromise between Putin and Trump, with refusal of an alliance between Russia and Iran being the inevitable price for such a compromise.
Relationships Based on Pure Benefit. Here, the situation is even more complex compared to China. The relationship between Russia and Iran is built on geopolitical, military, and economic benefits. However, in almost all these cases, the benefits are questionable, making the constant search for alternative alliances a realistic possibility for both sides.
Geopolitically, Russia’s key area of interest is now the post-Soviet space, particularly the European direction, with Ukraine at the forefront. This focus does not conflict with Iran’s interests, but neither does it advance them. Therefore, Iran can always exchange Russian support for a compromise with the U.S. (for example, lifting sanctions in exchange for a compromise on its nuclear program) if such an opportunity arises. Iran is focused on advancing its “axis of resistance” project in the Middle East. For Russia, this is useful only as a way to distract the U.S. from Ukraine and other post-Soviet issues. Thus, if the opportunity arises, Russia may trade its support for Iran for a compromise with the West.
Military cooperation has now become the most promising area in Russia-Iran relations. Russia has received drones and drone production technologies from Iran. However, Iran is avoiding supplying certain types of missiles to Russia due to US pressure. Russia may have started supplying air defense systems to Iran, but these deliveries are clearly not very extensive. Deliveries of military aircraft from Russia are limited to training aircraft. Both sides, being involved in military conflicts, simply cannot afford large-scale supplies of modern military equipment, as they need it for themselves.
From an economic perspective, unlike China, which has become a full-fledged alternative to Russia’s previously dominant trade relations with Europe, Iran cannot offer much to Russia. The economies of Russia and Iran are similar, both being heavily focused on fuel and raw materials, leaving them with little to trade. The trade balance is in favor of the more developed Russia. Putin’s Russia has already faced many situations where politically motivated trade expansion led to the accumulation of trade imbalances, debt, and subsequent debt write-offs. It is likely that the same will happen with Iran. A similar pattern is seen in Rosatom’s relations with all its clients, to whom it built nuclear power plants using Russian budget funds, with the expectation of repayment later. Iran refused to repay the debt for the construction of the Bushehr-2 nuclear power plant. In the area of oil smuggling to bypass Western sanctions, Russia and Iran are competitors, mainly vying for the Chinese and, to a lesser extent, the Indian market. The International North-South Transport Corridor, promoted by Russia and Iran, is losing the support of its key participant—India—due to the current geopolitical situation. India initially joined the project in search of partners to counter the Pakistan-China bloc. Now, Russia and Iran are partners of China and its Belt and Road Initiative. The North-South project is not advantageous for China and is not included in the Belt and Road Initiative. China, along with Pakistan, is developing a transport project through the Pakistani port of Gwadar, while the Iranian port of Chabahar, a key point on the North-South route, is a competitor to Gwadar.
Limited Trust: Despite mutual interests, there is significant distrust between Russia and Iran. Iran is well aware of the conflict prevention mechanism in Syria between Russian and Israeli forces. This mechanism allows Israel to carry out airstrikes against pro-Iranian groups in Syria without fearing a direct conflict with Russian forces stationed there. Taking advantage of Russia’s difficult position in the war with Ukraine, Iran has long delayed signing the expanded strategic partnership agreement, constantly introducing new conditions.
The Tactical Nature of the Alliance and Possible Exit Strategies. The relationship between Russia and Iran is characterized as tactical and situational, even though both sides formally call it “strategic.” It evolves and deepens depending on external circumstances, such as Iran’s conflict with Israel and Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. In a tactical alliance, when circumstances change, it is always possible to switch sides. Simply put, Moscow and Tehran are constantly forced to fear that their partner might “betray” them, while simultaneously working on scenarios in which they are prepared to “betray” their partner.
Let us try to analyze the possible exit strategies from the alliance for Russia and Iran. For the Kremlin, the conflict in the Middle East is beneficial as it distracts the West’s attention from Ukraine and could lead to a rise in oil prices. The latter is necessary for Russia in the context of the growing problems in its economy.
Under what conditions might an exit from the alliance with Iran occur? It is evident that such conditions could arise if Donald Trump wins the US presidential election. Trump and his inner circle are quite skeptical about supporting Ukraine. Trump has hinted multiple times that he is willing to resolve the Ukrainian issue with Putin. At the same time, Trump places great importance on addressing Middle Eastern problems and containing Iran. Consequently, Trump and Putin could theoretically attempt to agree on some form of freezing the Ukrainian conflict in exchange for Putin’s withdrawal of support for Iran.
In this scenario, Trump might use both a “stick” (e.g., the threat of reaching an agreement with Saudi Arabia to increase oil production or expanding oil extraction in the US) and a “carrot” (withdrawing support for Ukraine and pressuring Kyiv to give up territories controlled by Russia) in his dealings with Putin. In turn, Saudi Arabia could theoretically agree to increase oil production in exchange for Trump’s promise to intensify military pressure on Iran, making this threat quite real.
For Iran, an interesting opportunity to abandon the alliance with Russia might arise if Vice President Kamala Harris wins the election. She represents the more left-wing faction of the Democratic Party, which is more skeptical of the alliance with Israel. As a result, this faction might be potentially more inclined towards a deal with Iran as potential instrument to pressurize Russia. The victory of reformist President Pesezhkian in Iran, following a long period of conservative dominance, also creates such an opportunity. Pesezhkian is more inclined to compromise with the West than many of his predecessors (although he is significantly constrained in his real capabilities by the control of Iran’s actual leader, Ayatollah Khamenei). Under certain conditions, a new Democratic administration in the US might decide that the best way to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue is to return to the nuclear deal that Donald Trump withdrew from. In this case, Iran would have the opportunity to release significant volumes of oil onto global markets, potentially leading to a drop in prices and serious problems for the Russian economy. Unlike the Republicans, the Democrats do not have internal divisions regarding the Ukrainian issue. Therefore, they might very well attempt to use agreements with Iran as a means of pressuring Russia.
Let us try to analyze from the perspective of the “marriage of convenience” logic described above the extent to which Russia might increase its military assistance to Iran. It is unlikely that Russia would be willing to extend its nuclear umbrella over Iran in the event of a major war. It is evident that Moscow would prefer to reserve this “last argument of kings” for serious complications in Ukraine or for the defense of Russian territory itself.
Of course, in theory, Moscow could issue a nuclear ultimatum in support of Iran, similar to Khrushchev’s approach during the Suez Crisis of 1956 (it should be noted that Khrushchev’s ultimatum, which led to the withdrawal of the anti-Nasser coalition troops from Egypt, was possible only because the United States did not support the UK, France, and Israel at that time). However, the threat of nuclear war over distant Iran, especially after Russia refrained from such an ultimatum concerning Ukraine, would seem odd even to the Russian elite itself.
It is more logical to assume that Russia’s support for Iran will be primarily political, accompanied by limited deliveries of advanced weapons, given Russia’s growing need for modern weaponry. However, such deliveries are unlikely to shift the balance of power in the air, even between Israel and Iran, not even mentioning huge disparity between the US and Iran.
According to leaked reports in the press, during a visit to Tehran on August 5th, Russia’s Security Council Secretary Shoigu conveyed Putin’s request to Ayatollah Khamenei to respond cautiously to the elimination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. This aligns well with the “marriage of convenience” logic. It is more advantageous for Russia to use the threat of a major war in the Middle East as leverage in its relations with the US, specifically as a threat and as a means to compel the American leadership to negotiate over Ukraine. If a war in the Middle East were to break out, it would be too late to use such an argument for negotiations with the US.
In 2015, the Russian leadership deployed troops to Syria to give Moscow an instrument to influence Middle Eastern problems. The Kremlin’s goal at the time was to trade what it described as “counterterrorism cooperation” in the Middle East for the West’s withdrawal of support for Ukraine following the start of the conflict in 2014. Now, Russia has the opportunity to wield a much more powerful key to the Middle Eastern conflict through its interaction with Iran. From this perspective, it is beneficial for Russia to supply small quantities of weapons to Iran with one hand while signaling to the Americans with the other, offering to negotiate over Ukraine.
Limited cooperation with Iran is a win-win for the Kremlin. If a major war breaks out in the Middle East, it would lead to a significant diversion of Western resources away from Ukraine. Additionally, it would cause a rise in oil prices, delivering a severe blow to the global economy but providing relief to Russia’s economy. If a war in the Middle East does not occur, Russia will be perceived as a key player without whom the Middle East problem cannot be resolved. Theoretically, Russia could even act as some kind of peacemaker, restraining Iran. Putin already has such experience in successful mediation from 2013 in the case of Syrian chemical weapons under President Obama.
In any scenario, Russia cannot allocate many air defense systems to Iran. Ukraine has started receiving American fighter jets, so Russia needs air defense systems for itself. If a war breaks out between Iran and Israel, many experts believe that Russia will support Iran very cautiously and not on the scale that America supports Israel. For now, Russian supplies can be seen more as a diplomatic gesture, signaling that Moscow is an important player in the Middle East and that the US should negotiate with it (preferably regarding Ukraine). Of course, this policy may change in the future, but today the style of Kremlin’s game seems clear: to use Middle East as an instrument of Putin’s Ukraine policy.
So, the answer to the question “Will Russia Support Iran?” will be, yes, but this support will be very limited and mostly political. It will be also an instrument for improving Kremlin’s position in Russian-Ukrainan conflict, therefore, Russia can quickly reverse it policy if it becomes beneficial from this point of view.
The analysis above is based solely on considerations of the Kremlin’s rational interests. For the most part, Putin has adhered to non-sentimental and even brutal rationality in his actions, including in the Middle East, so this analysis has some validity. Of course, considering that in 2022 the Kremlin’s policy on Ukraine showed an obvious miscalculation (or a deviation from rational policy based on identity or emotions), it is reasonable to consider that the same type of miscalculation or deviation could also occur regarding the Iran issue. Nevertheless, the experience of 2022 should already make the Kremlin more cautious. Therefore, it can be said that going beyond the logic of a “marriage of convenience” in Russia-Iran relations, as described in this article, is theoretically possible, but it does not seem very likely, at least for a year or two.
Prof. Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman (PhD, Dr.Sc.) affiliated research fellow at the PSCR Program, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University. Expert on Central Asia and Afghanistan, Russia’s foreign and security policy, and energy policy. He has previously worked in the Moscow Higher School of Economics, Moscow state institute of international relations, the European University Institute (Italy) and served as a Visiting Scholar at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Germany). A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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Jewish Synagogue, Holocaust Memorial Vandalized in Poland After Politician Denies Holocaust

An antisemitic slur spray-painted on the ruins of a former synagogue in Dukla, Poland. Photo: World Jewish Restitution Organization
Two Jewish sites in Dukla, Poland, were vandalized over the weekend mere days after Polish member of the European Parliament (MEP) Grzegorz Braun claimed gas chambers at the former Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp were fake and repeated an antisemitic blood libel in a live radio interview.
Vandals spray-painted the word “F–k” followed by a Star of David on the ruins of a former synagogue that was destroyed by the Nazis during the Holocaust, and a memorial commemorating Holocaust victims located at the entrance of the Jewish cemetery in Dukla was defaced with a swastika and the word “Palestine,” according to the World Jewish Restitution Organization (WJRO). The memorial honors Jews of Dukla and the surrounding areas who were murdered by Nazis during the Holocaust.
The two Jewish sites in Dukla are cared for by the Foundation for the Preservation of Jewish Heritage in Poland (FODZ), which was established in 2002 by the Union of Jewish Communities in Poland and the WJRO to protect and commemorate Poland’s Jewish heritage sites.
“These hateful acts are not only antisemitic, but they are also attempts to erase Jewish history and desecrate memory,” said WJRO President Gideon Taylor in a released statement on Tuesday. “Polish authorities must take swift and serious action to identify the perpetrators and ensure the protection of Jewish heritage sites in Dukla and across the country.”
“The vandalism of Jewish sites in Dukla—with swastikas and anti-Israel slurs—is not an isolated act,” insisted Jack Simony, director general of the Auschwitz Jewish Center Foundation (AJCF), in a statement to The Algemeiner. The nonprofit focuses on preserving the memory of the Jewish community in Oświęcim (Auschwitz) and maintains the Auschwitz Jewish Center, the last remaining synagogue in town.
“While we cannot say definitively that it [the vandalism] was sparked by Grzegorz Braun’s Holocaust denial, his rhetoric contributes to an atmosphere where hatred is emboldened and truth is under assault,” added Simony. “Braun’s lies are not harmless — they are dangerous. Holocaust denial fuels antisemitism and, too often, violence. This is why Holocaust education matters … because when we fail to confront lies, we invite their consequences. Memory must be defended, not only for the sake of the past, but for the safety of our future.”
On July 10, a ceremony was held commemorating the 84th anniversary of the 1941 Jedwabne massacre, when hundreds of Polish Jews were massacred – mostly by their neighbors – in the northeastern town in German-occupied Poland. The ceremony was attended by dignitaries and faith leaders including Poland’s Chief Rabbi Michael Schudrich and Israeli Deputy Ambassador Bosmat Baruch. Groups of anti-Israel and far-right activists — including MEP Braun and his supporters – tried to disrupt the event by holding banners with antisemitic slogans and blocking the vehicles of the attendees, according to Polish radio.
Hours later, during a live radio broadcast, Braun falsely claimed the Auschwitz gas chambers were “a lie” and the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum was promoting “pseudo-history.” He also claimed that Jewish “ritual murder is a fact.” Polish prosecutors launched an investigation into Braun’s comments, they announced that same day. Under Article 55 of the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), Holocaust denial is a criminal offense in Poland.
The Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum issued a swift condemnation of Braun’s remarks and said it intents to pursue legal action. The Institute of National Remembrance — which is the largest research, educational and archival institution in Poland – also denounced Braun’s remarks, saying there is “well-documented” evidence supporting the existence of gas chambers. His comments were also condemned by the Embassy of Israel in Poland, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski and the US Embassy in Warsaw, which said that his actions “distort history, desecrate memory, or spread antisemitism.” AJCF called on the European Parliament to consider disciplinary measures against Braun, including potential censure or expulsion.
Auschwitz Jewish Center Director Tomek Kuncewicz said Braun’s comments are “an act of violence against truth, against survivors, and against the legacy of our shared humanity.” AJCF Chairman Simon Bergson called the politician’s remarks “blatant and baseless lies,” while Simony described them as “a calculated act of antisemitic incitement” that “must be met with legal consequences and universal moral condemnation.”
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Coalition of 400 Jewish Orgs and Synagogues Urge Teachers Union to Reverse Decision Cutting Ties with ADL

Anti-Defamation League CEO Jonathan Greenblatt. Photo Credit: ADL.
Following a vote by the National Education Association (NEA) on July 6 to end its relationship with the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), 400 Jewish communal groups, education organizations, and religious institutions have come together to call for the influential teachers union to change course.
“We are writing to express our deep concerns about the growing level of antisemitic activity within teachers’ unions, particularly since the Hamas terrorist attacks in Israel on October 7, 2023,” the letter to NEA President Becky Pringle stated. “Passage of New Business Item (NBI) 39 at the National Education Association (NEA) Representative Assembly this past weekend, which shockingly calls for the boycott of the Anti-Defamation League, is just the latest example of open hostility toward Jewish educators, students and families coming from national and local teachers’ unions and their members.”
In addition to the ADL, signatories of the letter included American Jewish Committee (AJC), Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Jewish Federations of North America, #EndJewHatred, American Jewish Congress, B’nai B’rith International, CAMERA (Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting & Analysis), Combat Antisemitism Movement, Democratic Majority for Israel, StandWithUs, Simon Wiesenthal Center, Zioness Movement, and Zionist Organization of America (ZOA).
The group told Pringle that “we have heard directly from NEA members who have shared their experiences ranging from explicit and implicit antisemitism within the union to a broader pattern of insensitivity toward legitimate concerns of Jewish members – including at the recently concluded Representative Assembly. We are also deeply troubled by a broader pattern of union activity over the past 20 months that has targeted or alienated Jewish members and the wider Jewish community.”
The letter to Pringle included an addendum providing examples of objectionable rhetoric. These named such incidents as the Oakland Education Association (OEA) putting out a statement calling for “an end to the occupation of Palestine” and the Massachusetts Teachers Association (MTA) accusing Israel of genocide.
The coalition of 400 organizations urged the NEA to “take immediate action” and suggested such steps as rejecting NBI 39, issuing a “strong condemnation” of antisemitism within the union, drafting a plan to counter ongoing antisemitism in affiliate chapters, and opposing “any effort to use an educator’s support for the existence of Israel as a means to attack their identity.”
ADL CEO and National Director Jonathan Greenblatt wrote on X that “Excluding @ADL’s educational resources from schools is not just an attack on our org, but on the entire Jewish community. We urge the @NEAToday Executive Committee to reverse this biased, fringe effort and reaffirm its commitment to supporting all Jewish students and educators.”
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Zohran Mamdani Won’t Condemn Calls for Violence Against Jews; Why Are Jewish Leaders Supporting Him?
In the wake of Zohran Mamdani’s surge in New York City politics, a disturbing trend has emerged: prominent Jewish leaders are being urged to join “Jews for Zohran,” a newly formed effort to legitimize a candidate whose record and rhetoric are alarmingly out of step with Jewish communal values.
In a city that’s home to the largest Jewish population outside of Israel — and where antisemitic incidents are on the rise — this is a profound mistake.
Mamdani has refused to explicitly condemn the slogan “Globalize the Intifada,” which has been widely understood as a call to violence against Jews. His defenders insist it’s a symbolic plea for Palestinian rights. But nuance offers little comfort when the phrase glorifies violent uprisings, and is routinely chanted alongside calls for Israel’s destruction.
Institutions such as the US Holocaust Memorial Museum and watchdogs like StopAntisemitism.org have made it clear: attempts to sanitize violent language must be firmly rejected.
Mamdani’s vocal support for the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement is equally troubling. BDS does not merely critique Israeli policy; it seeks to economically isolate and politically delegitimize the Jewish state. When a candidate stands against the most visible symbol of Jewish survival — Israel — while brushing off violent slogans as misunderstood metaphors, we must ask what message this sends to our communities.
The answer should be clear. Jewish New Yorkers were the targets of over half the city’s reported hate crimes last year. From Crown Heights to Midtown, visible Jews have been harassed, assaulted, and mocked. Mamdani was flagged by national antisemitism monitors in December for promoting material that mocked Hanukkah. This is not abstract. This is personal, present, and dangerous.
Yes, Mamdani has pledged to increase hate crime funding from $3 million to $26 million. But that’s not enough. The Jewish community — especially now — needs more than budgetary gestures. We require moral clarity, as Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel powerfully stated: “Morally speaking, there is no limit to the concern one must feel for the suffering of human beings, that indifference to evil is worse than evil itself….”
Moral clarity demands more than financial promises, it requires principled rejection of rhetoric that endangers Jews. Belonging isn’t forged by slogans; it’s proven through sustained empathy, shared responsibility, and unwavering commitment to safety.
Calls for Jewish leaders to publicly support Mamdani, including those made to officials like Brad Lander and Rep. Jerry Nadler (D-NY), aim to provide political cover for a candidate whose worldview clashes with core Jewish values. These aren’t harmless endorsements. They’re symbols. And symbols matter.
Endorsing Mamdani sends a troubling signal: that political convenience or progressive branding outweighs communal safety and historical memory. When Jewish leaders align with someone who flirts with the delegitimization of Jewish statehood and refuses to condemn slogans rooted in violence, they are telling our adversaries that our moral lines are negotiable.
New York’s Jewish community has long been a moral compass in American politics. What happens here echoes across the nation. If our leaders can be cajoled into supporting a candidate like Mamdani, what message does that send to Jews in swing districts, smaller cities, and across college campuses? It normalizes equivocation. It emboldens the fringe. It tells the next generation that Jewish dignity is up for debate.
This is about more than Mamdani. It’s about whether Jewish pride and Jewish safety remain non-negotiable pillars of our political participation. Some have argued that this is simply politics as usual — that strategic alliances are part of coalition-building. But the Jewish people know better than most that what begins as a small compromise can metastasize into a much greater danger.
Former Democratic Councilman Rory Lancman said it best: “If ever there was a time to put principle over party, this is it.” He’s right. And that’s why this moment requires Jewish leaders to speak not just as political actors, but as moral stewards.
Jewish leaders are free to engage with any candidate they choose. But engagement is not endorsement. One can listen, challenge, and debate without aligning oneself publicly with a candidate whose positions cross communal red lines. Outreach does not require complicity.
If Jewish political figures join “Jews for Zohran,” they risk helping mainstream dangerous ideologies. They risk fracturing communal unity even further at a time when Jewish communal unity is our best defense. They risk allowing today’s ambiguity to become tomorrow’s regret.
Jewish history teaches us the cost of silence, of appeasement, and of looking away. We cannot afford those mistakes again — not in this city, not in this era; history is beginning to repeat itself and we cannot allow that to happen.
To every Jewish leader now weighing their public stance: choose principle. Choose safety. Choose the kind of moral leadership our tradition demands; reject the logic of “Jews for Zohran.” The stakes are too high — and the message matters.
Samuel J. Abrams is a professor of politics at Sarah Lawrence College and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
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