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Russia Will Likely Support Iran in a Middle East War — But to What Degree?

Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with then-Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi during a meeting in Moscow, Russia, Dec. 7, 2023. Photo: Sputnik/Sergei Bobylev/Pool via REUTERS

Relations between Iran and Russia have significantly expanded since the onset of the full-scale military conflict in Ukraine in February 2022.

Iran’s new president has promised to sign a strategic cooperation agreement with Moscow during the BRICS summit in Russia, scheduled to take place in Kazan from October 22 to 24, 2024. This agreement is expected to replace the 10-year cooperation treaty signed in 2001, which has been extended every five years, most recently in 2021. The new Russian-Iranian agreement will officially establish the “comprehensive strategic nature” of the partnership between Moscow and Tehran, although it will not constitute an official military alliance.

This distinction is crucial, especially given the post-Soviet tradition of not adhering to official military alliances. For example, despite the Collective Security Treaty (1994), Russia refused to deploy troops to southern Kyrgyzstan following the anti-Uzbek pogroms that erupted after the 2010 revolution, and later did not provide military support to Armenia during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020. Similarly, other participants in the Collective Security Treaty (with the notable exception of Belarus and its president, Alexander Lukashenko, albeit with certain reservations) did not support Russia in its conflict with Ukraine.

Talk of a Russian-Iranian military alliance intensified after the Russian Security Council Secretary, former Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, met with Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, and the commander of the Iranian armed forces, Brigadier General Mohammad Bagheri, on August 5. General Bagheri told Shoigu that the relations between their countries are “deep, long-term, and strategic” and will only expand under Iran’s new government.

We are ready for full cooperation with Iran on regional issues,” Shoigu stated. Following this meeting, reports emerged in the press about Russian air defense systems being supplied to Iran.

Given the intense conflict between Iran and Israel, teetering on the brink of full-scale war, a deep analysis of the nuances in the growing closeness between Russia and Iran becomes increasingly relevant. To what extent will Russia be willing to support Iran if it decides to launch a full-scale attack on Israel?

A model for analysis could be the earlier rapprochement between Russia and China, the logic of which as a “marriage of convenience” is well described in Bobo Lo’s renowned work, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics. Bobo Lo argues that the relationship between Russia and China is a pragmatic alliance based on shared interests and benefits rather than deep trust or mutual affinity. On the one hand, this limits the possibility of such relations evolving into a full-scale military alliance like the one that once existed between Stalin and Mao Zedong. On the other hand, it does not provide grounds to predict that the partnership between the Kremlin and China will cease as long as it remains beneficial and no more advantageous alternatives arise.

Let us try to apply a similar logic, as employed by Bobo Lo, to analyze the relationship between Russia and Iran. It will become apparent that the instances of pure benefit that the Russian leadership derives from cooperation with Iran are far fewer than in the case of China, and the opportunities to gain from refraining from a sudden change of position are much greater.

Lack of ideological unity. Despite Russia’s extensive use of left-wing “anti-colonial” and simultaneously right-wing “conservative” rhetoric, which brings modern Russian and Iranian ideologies closer together, there remains a chasm between the Kremlin’s ideology and the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini once described the Soviet Union as the “lesser Satan” compared to the “greater Satan” of the United States. It is unlikely that the conservative Tehran elite perceives the heirs of the Soviet KGB in any other light.

The Kremlin, having long fought against radical Islam in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East, cannot have serious trust in Iranian Islamists. While Russia’s struggle was primarily against Sunni Islamic radicals, with whom Iran itself is in conflict, it is doubtful that a broad segment of the Russian elite wants to delve into the nuances of conflicts between different groups of Islamists who practice similar terrorist tactics. If we look at the comments of Putin’s most sincere ideological supporters, the Z-bloggers, regarding the fighting between Israel and its opponents — allies of Iran — it becomes clear that most of them do not have strong sympathies for either side of the conflict.

Their antisemitic and Islamophobic sentiments clearly compete with each other. The dominant right-wing ideology of Russia today is racist in its essence, and, therefore, all the elements of “anti-colonialism” that Putin tries to add to it look to Russian elite as an ideological trick for foreign consumption. One can find this mood in the paper published by former deputy head of presidential administration Vladislav Surkov, who often in his previous papers predicted Putin’s future policy.

In the paper titled “The birth of the North,” Surkov predicted that Russia in the future will become an organic part of the “Global North” (including Russia, USA and EU), while the idea of the “Global South” is basically unacceptable for Russia. Some experts see this as a description of potential compromise between Putin and Trump, with refusal of an alliance between Russia and Iran being the inevitable price for such a compromise.

Relationships Based on Pure Benefit. Here, the situation is even more complex compared to China. The relationship between Russia and Iran is built on geopolitical, military, and economic benefits. However, in almost all these cases, the benefits are questionable, making the constant search for alternative alliances a realistic possibility for both sides.
Geopolitically, Russia’s key area of interest is now the post-Soviet space, particularly the European direction, with Ukraine at the forefront. This focus does not conflict with Iran’s interests, but neither does it advance them. Therefore, Iran can always exchange Russian support for a compromise with the U.S. (for example, lifting sanctions in exchange for a compromise on its nuclear program) if such an opportunity arises. Iran is focused on advancing its “axis of resistance” project in the Middle East. For Russia, this is useful only as a way to distract the U.S. from Ukraine and other post-Soviet issues. Thus, if the opportunity arises, Russia may trade its support for Iran for a compromise with the West.
Military cooperation has now become the most promising area in Russia-Iran relations. Russia has received drones and drone production technologies from Iran. However, Iran is avoiding supplying certain types of missiles to Russia due to US pressure. Russia may have started supplying air defense systems to Iran, but these deliveries are clearly not very extensive. Deliveries of military aircraft from Russia are limited to training aircraft. Both sides, being involved in military conflicts, simply cannot afford large-scale supplies of modern military equipment, as they need it for themselves.
From an economic perspective, unlike China, which has become a full-fledged alternative to Russia’s previously dominant trade relations with Europe, Iran cannot offer much to Russia. The economies of Russia and Iran are similar, both being heavily focused on fuel and raw materials, leaving them with little to trade. The trade balance is in favor of the more developed Russia. Putin’s Russia has already faced many situations where politically motivated trade expansion led to the accumulation of trade imbalances, debt, and subsequent debt write-offs. It is likely that the same will happen with Iran. A similar pattern is seen in Rosatom’s relations with all its clients, to whom it built nuclear power plants using Russian budget funds, with the expectation of repayment later. Iran refused to repay the debt for the construction of the Bushehr-2 nuclear power plant. In the area of oil smuggling to bypass Western sanctions, Russia and Iran are competitors, mainly vying for the Chinese and, to a lesser extent, the Indian market. The International North-South Transport Corridor, promoted by Russia and Iran, is losing the support of its key participant—India—due to the current geopolitical situation. India initially joined the project in search of partners to counter the Pakistan-China bloc. Now, Russia and Iran are partners of China and its Belt and Road Initiative. The North-South project is not advantageous for China and is not included in the Belt and Road Initiative. China, along with Pakistan, is developing a transport project through the Pakistani port of Gwadar, while the Iranian port of Chabahar, a key point on the North-South route, is a competitor to Gwadar.
Limited Trust: Despite mutual interests, there is significant distrust between Russia and Iran. Iran is well aware of the conflict prevention mechanism in Syria between Russian and Israeli forces. This mechanism allows Israel to carry out airstrikes against pro-Iranian groups in Syria without fearing a direct conflict with Russian forces stationed there. Taking advantage of Russia’s difficult position in the war with Ukraine, Iran has long delayed signing the expanded strategic partnership agreement, constantly introducing new conditions.
The Tactical Nature of the Alliance and Possible Exit Strategies. The relationship between Russia and Iran is characterized as tactical and situational, even though both sides formally call it “strategic.” It evolves and deepens depending on external circumstances, such as Iran’s conflict with Israel and Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. In a tactical alliance, when circumstances change, it is always possible to switch sides. Simply put, Moscow and Tehran are constantly forced to fear that their partner might “betray” them, while simultaneously working on scenarios in which they are prepared to “betray” their partner.

Let us try to analyze the possible exit strategies from the alliance for Russia and Iran. For the Kremlin, the conflict in the Middle East is beneficial as it distracts the West’s attention from Ukraine and could lead to a rise in oil prices. The latter is necessary for Russia in the context of the growing problems in its economy.

Under what conditions might an exit from the alliance with Iran occur? It is evident that such conditions could arise if Donald Trump wins the US presidential election. Trump and his inner circle are quite skeptical about supporting Ukraine. Trump has hinted multiple times that he is willing to resolve the Ukrainian issue with Putin. At the same time, Trump places great importance on addressing Middle Eastern problems and containing Iran. Consequently, Trump and Putin could theoretically attempt to agree on some form of freezing the Ukrainian conflict in exchange for Putin’s withdrawal of support for Iran.

In this scenario, Trump might use both a “stick” (e.g., the threat of reaching an agreement with Saudi Arabia to increase oil production or expanding oil extraction in the US) and a “carrot” (withdrawing support for Ukraine and pressuring Kyiv to give up territories controlled by Russia) in his dealings with Putin. In turn, Saudi Arabia could theoretically agree to increase oil production in exchange for Trump’s promise to intensify military pressure on Iran, making this threat quite real.

For Iran, an interesting opportunity to abandon the alliance with Russia might arise if Vice President Kamala Harris wins the election. She represents the more left-wing faction of the Democratic Party, which is more skeptical of the alliance with Israel. As a result, this faction might be potentially more inclined towards a deal with Iran as potential instrument to pressurize Russia. The victory of reformist President Pesezhkian in Iran, following a long period of conservative dominance, also creates such an opportunity. Pesezhkian is more inclined to compromise with the West than many of his predecessors (although he is significantly constrained in his real capabilities by the control of Iran’s actual leader, Ayatollah Khamenei). Under certain conditions, a new Democratic administration in the US might decide that the best way to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue is to return to the nuclear deal that Donald Trump withdrew from. In this case, Iran would have the opportunity to release significant volumes of oil onto global markets, potentially leading to a drop in prices and serious problems for the Russian economy. Unlike the Republicans, the Democrats do not have internal divisions regarding the Ukrainian issue. Therefore, they might very well attempt to use agreements with Iran as a means of pressuring Russia.

Let us try to analyze from the perspective of the “marriage of convenience” logic described above the extent to which Russia might increase its military assistance to Iran. It is unlikely that Russia would be willing to extend its nuclear umbrella over Iran in the event of a major war. It is evident that Moscow would prefer to reserve this “last argument of kings” for serious complications in Ukraine or for the defense of Russian territory itself.

Of course, in theory, Moscow could issue a nuclear ultimatum in support of Iran, similar to Khrushchev’s approach during the Suez Crisis of 1956 (it should be noted that Khrushchev’s ultimatum, which led to the withdrawal of the anti-Nasser coalition troops from Egypt, was possible only because the United States did not support the UK, France, and Israel at that time). However, the threat of nuclear war over distant Iran, especially after Russia refrained from such an ultimatum concerning Ukraine, would seem odd even to the Russian elite itself.

It is more logical to assume that Russia’s support for Iran will be primarily political, accompanied by limited deliveries of advanced weapons, given Russia’s growing need for modern weaponry. However, such deliveries are unlikely to shift the balance of power in the air, even between Israel and Iran, not even mentioning huge disparity between the US and Iran.

According to leaked reports in the press, during a visit to Tehran on August 5th, Russia’s Security Council Secretary Shoigu conveyed Putin’s request to Ayatollah Khamenei to respond cautiously to the elimination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. This aligns well with the “marriage of convenience” logic. It is more advantageous for Russia to use the threat of a major war in the Middle East as leverage in its relations with the US, specifically as a threat and as a means to compel the American leadership to negotiate over Ukraine. If a war in the Middle East were to break out, it would be too late to use such an argument for negotiations with the US.

In 2015, the Russian leadership deployed troops to Syria to give Moscow an instrument to influence Middle Eastern problems. The Kremlin’s goal at the time was to trade what it described as “counterterrorism cooperation” in the Middle East for the West’s withdrawal of support for Ukraine following the start of the conflict in 2014. Now, Russia has the opportunity to wield a much more powerful key to the Middle Eastern conflict through its interaction with Iran. From this perspective, it is beneficial for Russia to supply small quantities of weapons to Iran with one hand while signaling to the Americans with the other, offering to negotiate over Ukraine.

Limited cooperation with Iran is a win-win for the Kremlin. If a major war breaks out in the Middle East, it would lead to a significant diversion of Western resources away from Ukraine. Additionally, it would cause a rise in oil prices, delivering a severe blow to the global economy but providing relief to Russia’s economy. If a war in the Middle East does not occur, Russia will be perceived as a key player without whom the Middle East problem cannot be resolved. Theoretically, Russia could even act as some kind of peacemaker, restraining Iran. Putin already has such experience in successful mediation from 2013 in the case of Syrian chemical weapons under President Obama.

In any scenario, Russia cannot allocate many air defense systems to Iran. Ukraine has started receiving American fighter jets, so Russia needs air defense systems for itself. If a war breaks out between Iran and Israel, many experts believe that Russia will support Iran very cautiously and not on the scale that America supports Israel. For now, Russian supplies can be seen more as a diplomatic gesture, signaling that Moscow is an important player in the Middle East and that the US should negotiate with it (preferably regarding Ukraine). Of course, this policy may change in the future, but today the style of Kremlin’s game seems clear: to use Middle East as an instrument of Putin’s Ukraine policy.

So, the answer to the question “Will Russia Support Iran?” will be, yes, but this support will be very limited and mostly political. It will be also an instrument for improving Kremlin’s position in Russian-Ukrainan conflict, therefore, Russia can quickly reverse it policy if it becomes beneficial from this point of view.

The analysis above is based solely on considerations of the Kremlin’s rational interests. For the most part, Putin has adhered to non-sentimental and even brutal rationality in his actions, including in the Middle East, so this analysis has some validity. Of course, considering that in 2022 the Kremlin’s policy on Ukraine showed an obvious miscalculation (or a deviation from rational policy based on identity or emotions), it is reasonable to consider that the same type of miscalculation or deviation could also occur regarding the Iran issue. Nevertheless, the experience of 2022 should already make the Kremlin more cautious. Therefore, it can be said that going beyond the logic of a “marriage of convenience” in Russia-Iran relations, as described in this article, is theoretically possible, but it does not seem very likely, at least for a year or two.

Prof. Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman (PhD, Dr.Sc.) affiliated research fellow at the PSCR Program, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University. Expert on Central Asia and Afghanistan, Russia’s foreign and security policy, and energy policy. He has previously worked in the Moscow Higher School of Economics, Moscow state institute of international relations, the European University Institute (Italy) and served as a Visiting Scholar at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Germany). A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post Russia Will Likely Support Iran in a Middle East War — But to What Degree? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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US Says That Israel Accepts Gaza Ceasefire Plan; Hamas Cool to It

A picture released by the Israeli Army says to show Israeli soldiers conducting operations in a location given as Tel Al-Sultan area, Rafah Governorate, Gaza, in this handout image released April 2, 2025. Photo: Israeli Army/Handout via REUTERS

Israel has agreed to a US ceasefire proposal for Gaza, the White House said on Thursday, and Hamas said it was reviewing the plan although its terms did not meet the Palestinian terrorist group’s demands.

As a US-backed system for distributing food aid in the war-torn enclave expanded, Israeli media reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told the families of hostages held in Gaza that Israel had accepted a deal presented by US President Donald Trump’s Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff.

Netanyahu’s office did not confirm the reports, but White House spokeswoman Karoline Leavitt told reporters in Washington that Israel had signed off on the proposal.

She did not detail its contents. But the New York Times quoted an Israeli official familiar with the proposal as saying the initial phase would include a 60-day ceasefire and humanitarian aid flowing through UN-run operations.

Hamas said it was studying the proposal, and senior Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhri told Reuters the group was still discussing it.

But Abu Zuhri said its terms echoed Israel‘s position and do not contain commitments to end the war, withdraw Israeli troops, or admit aid as Hamas has demanded.

Deep differences between Hamas and Israel have stymied previous attempts to restore a ceasefire that broke down in March after only two months.

Israel has insisted that Hamas disarm completely and be dismantled as a military and governing force and that all 58 hostages still held in Gaza must be returned before it will agree to end the war.

Hamas has rejected the demand to give up its weapons and says Israel must pull its troops out of Gaza and commit to ending the war.

Witkoff told reporters on Wednesday that Washington was close to “sending out a new term sheet” about a ceasefire to the two sides in the conflict that has raged since October 2023.

“I have some very good feelings about getting to a long-term resolution, temporary ceasefire and a long-term resolution, a peaceful resolution, of that conflict,” Witkoff said then.

Israel has come under increasing international pressure, with many European countries that have normally been reluctant to criticize it openly demanding an end to the war and a major relief effort.

Israel launched its campaign in Gaza in response to the devastating Hamas attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, that killed some 1,200 people and saw 251 taken hostage into Gaza.

The post US Says That Israel Accepts Gaza Ceasefire Plan; Hamas Cool to It first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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‘A Slap in the Face’: Chicago Venue Cancels Plans to Screen Documentary About Antisemitism for Second Time

Israeli-American rapper Kosha Dillz performs his new song “Bring the family home,” his response to Hamas’s attacks, in front of a Jewish bakery in lower Manhattan, US, Oct. 11, 2023. Photo: REUTERS/Aleksandra Michalska

A Chicago theater that canceled the screening of a documentary about campus antisemitism and then agreed to reschedule a showing has now made the final decision not to screen the film at its venue after facing harassment, it announced on Tuesday.

The Facets Film Forum, which operates the Facets arts theater in Chicago’s Lincoln Park neighborhood, claimed in a statement that Israeli-American Jewish filmmaker and rapper Kosha Dillz and the Chicago Jewish Alliance (CJA) – which helped organize the original screening that was canceled — have allegedly engaged in harassment against the venue, making it “impossible” for the Facets to move forward with a showing of “Bring the Family Home.” The documentary covers the rise of antisemitism on US college campuses after the Hamas terrorist attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. This is the first film directed by Kosha Dillz, whose real name is Rami Even-Esh, and it focuses largely on anti-Israel encampments and sentiments at DePaul University and Northwestern University. Facets is located down the street from DePaul.

A rough cut of “Bring the Family Home” was set to premiere at Facets on May 13, but mere hours before the screening, the venue canceled the event, citing safety and security concerns for its patrons and staff. After facing an abundance of criticism from Kosha Dillz, CJA, and their supporters, Facets agreed to work with the filmmaker to reschedule the screening for later this summer.

“Facets Film Forum respects the First Amendment, its protections of free speech and the right to express views through film,” Facets said in a statement on May 16. “We regret any unintended offense our decision to cancel a privately organized, public film screening caused the filmmaker, those seeking to attend the event, and members of our community who have experienced or witnessed oppression or discrimination in any form.”

However, this week the theater has backtracked on its decision to reschedule the screening, before it even announced a new date for the event.

“Rather than acknowledging the legitimacy of our concerns and decisions, CJA and the filmmaker, and individuals that appear to be their supporters, have engaged in harassing Facets,” the venue claimed. It alleged that supporters of the film were “vilifying” Facets in an email campaign targeting donors, arts groups, and others, and even shared “vicious” posts on social media “attacking Facets.” The posts allegedly included offers for a “bounty to anyone willing to burn down Facets’ building,” which Facets reported to authorities. The venue also claimed that supporters of “Bring the Family Home” recording a conversation with a Facets staff members without consent and then posted it online, sharing personal contact details.

CJA launched an email campaign earlier this month that urged its supporters to reach out to Facets about the cancellation on May 13. CJA claimed the venue called off the event “because of discomfort with Jewish visibility” and called the move “shameful” and “a disgrace.” Facets said on Tuesday that more than 2,500 emails were sent.

“Given these acts, we are ceasing any further discussions with CJA and Mr. Dillz. Facets will not tolerate harassment of its staff from any organization,” the theater said in the statement this week. “Facets will continue to remain committed to our mission and the safety of our staff and guests.”

Facets said that for five decades, it has “provided a safe space for the community to experience a vast variety of film perspectives.” The venue noted that it hosted an event as part of the Chicago Festival of Israeli Cinema’s 20th Anniversary Celebration in March. Earlier this month, the theater also screened “No Other Land,” the Oscar-winning documentary that heavily criticizes Israel’s demolition of a village in the West Bank. “Bring the Family Home” was originally meant to be mentioned on the marquee outside of Facets along with “No Other Land,” said Kosha Dillz.

In its statement, Facets also listed three Jewish or Israel-themed movies that it has screened in the past, including “Come Closer,” “In Between,” and “Zone of Interest.” None of those films depict pro-Israel sentiments or a condemnation of antisemitism like “Bring the Family Home.”

Kosha Dillz told The Algemeiner on Thursday he cannot believe that he has been canceled twice by the same venue, which has not screened his film even once. “I was quite shocked,” he said. “It’s exhausting to deal with this for the second time. How can they cancel a film twice that hasn’t been shown once. To me, that’s just representative of what the Jewish community has to deal with.”

He also denied taking part in the alleged harassment that Facets claimed it faced, including the email campaign and calls online to burn down the venue.

“The 2,500 emails — those are people that aren’t related to me. I don’t know them. Obviously, they know me,” he noted. “They made it seem as if I was the one who rallied people to email them and take away their funding. That’s obviously not true.”

Even now, after Facets made the final decision not to screen “Bring the Family Home,” Kosha Dillz does not support efforts to attack the venue for the move.

“I don’t think bullying people who have gotten bullied makes sense. I don’t think that’s a win-win situation,” he explained. “I don’t believe in people ganging up on them. I just think they were bullied by other bullies.”

Kosha Dillz had multiple Zoom meetings and sent several emails back and forth with leaders at Facet to reschedule a screening of “Bring the Family Home,” hoping to find a new date for the event. Following the decision by Facets this week to call off all efforts for a screening, Kosha Dillz told The Algemeiner that he is upset but will now focus his time and energy on finding a new venue to screen the documentary.

“It’s called selective Jewishness,” he said of the move by Facets. “They are picking which voices they get to hear and they’re letting other people define it for them. I was the one who offered for them to make it good [after the initial cancellation] and they took me up on it and then, you know … it’s kind of a slap in the face. But the first time, shame on them. The second time, shame on me.”

On Wednesday, CJA released a statement on social media in response to Facets decision this week and also the allegations against the Jewish group.

“We objected, respectfully and publicly, to the theater’s sudden about-face. We sent emails. We asked questions. We defended a Jewish voice that refused to conform to the approved script. For that, they accused us of harassment,” CJA said. “If Facets believes in free speech, it must apply to Jews who are visible, assertive, and yes, Zionist. Anything less is not inclusion. It’s performance. We remain proud partners of ‘Bring the Family Home’ and of every Jewish artist who refuses to stay quiet just to stay included.”

CJA also accused Facets of “cultural exclusion” and “soft censorship,” making “endless excuses” and “shifting standards for what qualifies as ‘appropriate’ Jewish expression.”

CJA said “Bring the Family Home” will be shown in Chicago on June 22, but a venue has yet to be secured.

The post ‘A Slap in the Face’: Chicago Venue Cancels Plans to Screen Documentary About Antisemitism for Second Time first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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‘Part of Our Commitment to the Palestinian People’: Anti-Israel Group Vandalizes Jewish-Owned Business in London

Vandals targeted a Jewish-owned real estate business in London on May 28-29, 2025. Photo: Screenshot

A Jewish-owned real estate business in London was vandalized by a radical anti-Israel group overnight on Wednesday into Thursday in an attack that local Jewish leaders called a “traumatic antisemitic targeting.”

Video shows two masked people dressed in all black smashing the windows of the business — which is located in Stamford Hill, a heavily Orthodox Jewish neighborhood — and spraying it with red paint. Pictures in the aftermath of the vandalism show shattered glass and red paint all over the office, and other reports say computers and furniture were also wrecked.

“This should be treated as [an] antisemitic incident without any doubt,” Rabbi Herschel Gluck, president of Jewish security service Shomrim’s branch in Stamford Hill, told the Jewish Chronicle. “[The owners] are visibly Jewish; the people who run the business and this business itself have nothing to do with Israel.”

According to the Chronicle, the authorities were “called as soon as the damage was discovered on Thursday morning and the Metropolitan Police were notified shortly afterwards.”

The Metropolitan Police said in a statement that the investigation is ongoing and that no arrests have been made so far. “This incident is being treated as racially aggravated criminal damage,” the statement continued.

“We understand the concern this may cause members of the Jewish community,” the police noted. “Officers are working with community leaders and patrols have increased across the local area.”

Palestine Action, the group behind the vandalism, took responsibility for it on social media.

“Palestine Action target[s] the London-based landlords of Kent’s Elbit weapons factory, Instro Precision,” the group posted on X. “Instro Precision continues to export targeting gear to Israel, making both the Israeli weapons maker and its landlord, perpetrators of genocide.”

Along with vandalism of the business itself, “Drop Elbit” was also spray-painted on the pavement outside it, referring to Elbit Systems, an Israeli defense firm that is an industry leader.

A spokesperson for the group said the attack was a “part of our commitment to the Palestinian people” because “we will not allow companies on our doorstep to profit from mass murder.” The real estate group, it claimed, is “the [landlord] of a Kent-based Israeli weapons factory which is exporting targeting gear for the Israeli military.”

However, according to Gluck, the attack “is pure antisemitism” because “the people have no connection to Israel at all. They [the vandals] are accusing this company of having a connection to an Israeli arms manufacturer, which is not true.”

The Campaign Against Antisemitism (CAA) responded to the vandalism on X, asking, “Why is Palestine Action still not banned?”

“Palestine Action is a criminal enterprise operating freely in the UK and terrorizing the Jewish community,” it wrote. “It must be banned and its organizers and activists prosecuted.”

This latest vandalism is part of a general spike in antisemitism in the UK.

The UK experienced its second-worst year for antisemitism in 2024, despite recording an 18 percent drop in antisemitic incidents from the previous year’s all-time high, according to a report released in February.

The Community Security Trust (CST), a nonprofit charity that advises Britain’s Jewish community on security matters, released data showing it recorded 3,528 antisemitic incidents for 2024, a drop of 18 percent from the 4,296 in 2023. These numbers compare to 1,662 antisemitic incidents in 2022, 2,261 in 2021, and 1,684 in 2020.

Last year’s total “is a reflection of the sustained levels of antisemitism that have been recorded across the UK since the Hamas terror attack in Israel on Oct. 7, 2023,” CST said of its findings. “CST’s Antisemitic Incidents Report 2023 charted the immediacy and scope of the rise in anti-Jewish hate following that attack, before Israel had set in motion any extensive military response in Gaza.”

The post ‘Part of Our Commitment to the Palestinian People’: Anti-Israel Group Vandalizes Jewish-Owned Business in London first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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