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Russia Will Likely Support Iran in a Middle East War — But to What Degree?
Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with then-Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi during a meeting in Moscow, Russia, Dec. 7, 2023. Photo: Sputnik/Sergei Bobylev/Pool via REUTERS
Relations between Iran and Russia have significantly expanded since the onset of the full-scale military conflict in Ukraine in February 2022.
Iran’s new president has promised to sign a strategic cooperation agreement with Moscow during the BRICS summit in Russia, scheduled to take place in Kazan from October 22 to 24, 2024. This agreement is expected to replace the 10-year cooperation treaty signed in 2001, which has been extended every five years, most recently in 2021. The new Russian-Iranian agreement will officially establish the “comprehensive strategic nature” of the partnership between Moscow and Tehran, although it will not constitute an official military alliance.
This distinction is crucial, especially given the post-Soviet tradition of not adhering to official military alliances. For example, despite the Collective Security Treaty (1994), Russia refused to deploy troops to southern Kyrgyzstan following the anti-Uzbek pogroms that erupted after the 2010 revolution, and later did not provide military support to Armenia during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020. Similarly, other participants in the Collective Security Treaty (with the notable exception of Belarus and its president, Alexander Lukashenko, albeit with certain reservations) did not support Russia in its conflict with Ukraine.
Talk of a Russian-Iranian military alliance intensified after the Russian Security Council Secretary, former Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, met with Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, and the commander of the Iranian armed forces, Brigadier General Mohammad Bagheri, on August 5. General Bagheri told Shoigu that the relations between their countries are “deep, long-term, and strategic” and will only expand under Iran’s new government.
“We are ready for full cooperation with Iran on regional issues,” Shoigu stated. Following this meeting, reports emerged in the press about Russian air defense systems being supplied to Iran.
Given the intense conflict between Iran and Israel, teetering on the brink of full-scale war, a deep analysis of the nuances in the growing closeness between Russia and Iran becomes increasingly relevant. To what extent will Russia be willing to support Iran if it decides to launch a full-scale attack on Israel?
A model for analysis could be the earlier rapprochement between Russia and China, the logic of which as a “marriage of convenience” is well described in Bobo Lo’s renowned work, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics. Bobo Lo argues that the relationship between Russia and China is a pragmatic alliance based on shared interests and benefits rather than deep trust or mutual affinity. On the one hand, this limits the possibility of such relations evolving into a full-scale military alliance like the one that once existed between Stalin and Mao Zedong. On the other hand, it does not provide grounds to predict that the partnership between the Kremlin and China will cease as long as it remains beneficial and no more advantageous alternatives arise.
Let us try to apply a similar logic, as employed by Bobo Lo, to analyze the relationship between Russia and Iran. It will become apparent that the instances of pure benefit that the Russian leadership derives from cooperation with Iran are far fewer than in the case of China, and the opportunities to gain from refraining from a sudden change of position are much greater.
Lack of ideological unity. Despite Russia’s extensive use of left-wing “anti-colonial” and simultaneously right-wing “conservative” rhetoric, which brings modern Russian and Iranian ideologies closer together, there remains a chasm between the Kremlin’s ideology and the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini once described the Soviet Union as the “lesser Satan” compared to the “greater Satan” of the United States. It is unlikely that the conservative Tehran elite perceives the heirs of the Soviet KGB in any other light.
The Kremlin, having long fought against radical Islam in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East, cannot have serious trust in Iranian Islamists. While Russia’s struggle was primarily against Sunni Islamic radicals, with whom Iran itself is in conflict, it is doubtful that a broad segment of the Russian elite wants to delve into the nuances of conflicts between different groups of Islamists who practice similar terrorist tactics. If we look at the comments of Putin’s most sincere ideological supporters, the Z-bloggers, regarding the fighting between Israel and its opponents — allies of Iran — it becomes clear that most of them do not have strong sympathies for either side of the conflict.
Their antisemitic and Islamophobic sentiments clearly compete with each other. The dominant right-wing ideology of Russia today is racist in its essence, and, therefore, all the elements of “anti-colonialism” that Putin tries to add to it look to Russian elite as an ideological trick for foreign consumption. One can find this mood in the paper published by former deputy head of presidential administration Vladislav Surkov, who often in his previous papers predicted Putin’s future policy.
In the paper titled “The birth of the North,” Surkov predicted that Russia in the future will become an organic part of the “Global North” (including Russia, USA and EU), while the idea of the “Global South” is basically unacceptable for Russia. Some experts see this as a description of potential compromise between Putin and Trump, with refusal of an alliance between Russia and Iran being the inevitable price for such a compromise.
Relationships Based on Pure Benefit. Here, the situation is even more complex compared to China. The relationship between Russia and Iran is built on geopolitical, military, and economic benefits. However, in almost all these cases, the benefits are questionable, making the constant search for alternative alliances a realistic possibility for both sides.
Geopolitically, Russia’s key area of interest is now the post-Soviet space, particularly the European direction, with Ukraine at the forefront. This focus does not conflict with Iran’s interests, but neither does it advance them. Therefore, Iran can always exchange Russian support for a compromise with the U.S. (for example, lifting sanctions in exchange for a compromise on its nuclear program) if such an opportunity arises. Iran is focused on advancing its “axis of resistance” project in the Middle East. For Russia, this is useful only as a way to distract the U.S. from Ukraine and other post-Soviet issues. Thus, if the opportunity arises, Russia may trade its support for Iran for a compromise with the West.
Military cooperation has now become the most promising area in Russia-Iran relations. Russia has received drones and drone production technologies from Iran. However, Iran is avoiding supplying certain types of missiles to Russia due to US pressure. Russia may have started supplying air defense systems to Iran, but these deliveries are clearly not very extensive. Deliveries of military aircraft from Russia are limited to training aircraft. Both sides, being involved in military conflicts, simply cannot afford large-scale supplies of modern military equipment, as they need it for themselves.
From an economic perspective, unlike China, which has become a full-fledged alternative to Russia’s previously dominant trade relations with Europe, Iran cannot offer much to Russia. The economies of Russia and Iran are similar, both being heavily focused on fuel and raw materials, leaving them with little to trade. The trade balance is in favor of the more developed Russia. Putin’s Russia has already faced many situations where politically motivated trade expansion led to the accumulation of trade imbalances, debt, and subsequent debt write-offs. It is likely that the same will happen with Iran. A similar pattern is seen in Rosatom’s relations with all its clients, to whom it built nuclear power plants using Russian budget funds, with the expectation of repayment later. Iran refused to repay the debt for the construction of the Bushehr-2 nuclear power plant. In the area of oil smuggling to bypass Western sanctions, Russia and Iran are competitors, mainly vying for the Chinese and, to a lesser extent, the Indian market. The International North-South Transport Corridor, promoted by Russia and Iran, is losing the support of its key participant—India—due to the current geopolitical situation. India initially joined the project in search of partners to counter the Pakistan-China bloc. Now, Russia and Iran are partners of China and its Belt and Road Initiative. The North-South project is not advantageous for China and is not included in the Belt and Road Initiative. China, along with Pakistan, is developing a transport project through the Pakistani port of Gwadar, while the Iranian port of Chabahar, a key point on the North-South route, is a competitor to Gwadar.
Limited Trust: Despite mutual interests, there is significant distrust between Russia and Iran. Iran is well aware of the conflict prevention mechanism in Syria between Russian and Israeli forces. This mechanism allows Israel to carry out airstrikes against pro-Iranian groups in Syria without fearing a direct conflict with Russian forces stationed there. Taking advantage of Russia’s difficult position in the war with Ukraine, Iran has long delayed signing the expanded strategic partnership agreement, constantly introducing new conditions.
The Tactical Nature of the Alliance and Possible Exit Strategies. The relationship between Russia and Iran is characterized as tactical and situational, even though both sides formally call it “strategic.” It evolves and deepens depending on external circumstances, such as Iran’s conflict with Israel and Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. In a tactical alliance, when circumstances change, it is always possible to switch sides. Simply put, Moscow and Tehran are constantly forced to fear that their partner might “betray” them, while simultaneously working on scenarios in which they are prepared to “betray” their partner.
Let us try to analyze the possible exit strategies from the alliance for Russia and Iran. For the Kremlin, the conflict in the Middle East is beneficial as it distracts the West’s attention from Ukraine and could lead to a rise in oil prices. The latter is necessary for Russia in the context of the growing problems in its economy.
Under what conditions might an exit from the alliance with Iran occur? It is evident that such conditions could arise if Donald Trump wins the US presidential election. Trump and his inner circle are quite skeptical about supporting Ukraine. Trump has hinted multiple times that he is willing to resolve the Ukrainian issue with Putin. At the same time, Trump places great importance on addressing Middle Eastern problems and containing Iran. Consequently, Trump and Putin could theoretically attempt to agree on some form of freezing the Ukrainian conflict in exchange for Putin’s withdrawal of support for Iran.
In this scenario, Trump might use both a “stick” (e.g., the threat of reaching an agreement with Saudi Arabia to increase oil production or expanding oil extraction in the US) and a “carrot” (withdrawing support for Ukraine and pressuring Kyiv to give up territories controlled by Russia) in his dealings with Putin. In turn, Saudi Arabia could theoretically agree to increase oil production in exchange for Trump’s promise to intensify military pressure on Iran, making this threat quite real.
For Iran, an interesting opportunity to abandon the alliance with Russia might arise if Vice President Kamala Harris wins the election. She represents the more left-wing faction of the Democratic Party, which is more skeptical of the alliance with Israel. As a result, this faction might be potentially more inclined towards a deal with Iran as potential instrument to pressurize Russia. The victory of reformist President Pesezhkian in Iran, following a long period of conservative dominance, also creates such an opportunity. Pesezhkian is more inclined to compromise with the West than many of his predecessors (although he is significantly constrained in his real capabilities by the control of Iran’s actual leader, Ayatollah Khamenei). Under certain conditions, a new Democratic administration in the US might decide that the best way to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue is to return to the nuclear deal that Donald Trump withdrew from. In this case, Iran would have the opportunity to release significant volumes of oil onto global markets, potentially leading to a drop in prices and serious problems for the Russian economy. Unlike the Republicans, the Democrats do not have internal divisions regarding the Ukrainian issue. Therefore, they might very well attempt to use agreements with Iran as a means of pressuring Russia.
Let us try to analyze from the perspective of the “marriage of convenience” logic described above the extent to which Russia might increase its military assistance to Iran. It is unlikely that Russia would be willing to extend its nuclear umbrella over Iran in the event of a major war. It is evident that Moscow would prefer to reserve this “last argument of kings” for serious complications in Ukraine or for the defense of Russian territory itself.
Of course, in theory, Moscow could issue a nuclear ultimatum in support of Iran, similar to Khrushchev’s approach during the Suez Crisis of 1956 (it should be noted that Khrushchev’s ultimatum, which led to the withdrawal of the anti-Nasser coalition troops from Egypt, was possible only because the United States did not support the UK, France, and Israel at that time). However, the threat of nuclear war over distant Iran, especially after Russia refrained from such an ultimatum concerning Ukraine, would seem odd even to the Russian elite itself.
It is more logical to assume that Russia’s support for Iran will be primarily political, accompanied by limited deliveries of advanced weapons, given Russia’s growing need for modern weaponry. However, such deliveries are unlikely to shift the balance of power in the air, even between Israel and Iran, not even mentioning huge disparity between the US and Iran.
According to leaked reports in the press, during a visit to Tehran on August 5th, Russia’s Security Council Secretary Shoigu conveyed Putin’s request to Ayatollah Khamenei to respond cautiously to the elimination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. This aligns well with the “marriage of convenience” logic. It is more advantageous for Russia to use the threat of a major war in the Middle East as leverage in its relations with the US, specifically as a threat and as a means to compel the American leadership to negotiate over Ukraine. If a war in the Middle East were to break out, it would be too late to use such an argument for negotiations with the US.
In 2015, the Russian leadership deployed troops to Syria to give Moscow an instrument to influence Middle Eastern problems. The Kremlin’s goal at the time was to trade what it described as “counterterrorism cooperation” in the Middle East for the West’s withdrawal of support for Ukraine following the start of the conflict in 2014. Now, Russia has the opportunity to wield a much more powerful key to the Middle Eastern conflict through its interaction with Iran. From this perspective, it is beneficial for Russia to supply small quantities of weapons to Iran with one hand while signaling to the Americans with the other, offering to negotiate over Ukraine.
Limited cooperation with Iran is a win-win for the Kremlin. If a major war breaks out in the Middle East, it would lead to a significant diversion of Western resources away from Ukraine. Additionally, it would cause a rise in oil prices, delivering a severe blow to the global economy but providing relief to Russia’s economy. If a war in the Middle East does not occur, Russia will be perceived as a key player without whom the Middle East problem cannot be resolved. Theoretically, Russia could even act as some kind of peacemaker, restraining Iran. Putin already has such experience in successful mediation from 2013 in the case of Syrian chemical weapons under President Obama.
In any scenario, Russia cannot allocate many air defense systems to Iran. Ukraine has started receiving American fighter jets, so Russia needs air defense systems for itself. If a war breaks out between Iran and Israel, many experts believe that Russia will support Iran very cautiously and not on the scale that America supports Israel. For now, Russian supplies can be seen more as a diplomatic gesture, signaling that Moscow is an important player in the Middle East and that the US should negotiate with it (preferably regarding Ukraine). Of course, this policy may change in the future, but today the style of Kremlin’s game seems clear: to use Middle East as an instrument of Putin’s Ukraine policy.
So, the answer to the question “Will Russia Support Iran?” will be, yes, but this support will be very limited and mostly political. It will be also an instrument for improving Kremlin’s position in Russian-Ukrainan conflict, therefore, Russia can quickly reverse it policy if it becomes beneficial from this point of view.
The analysis above is based solely on considerations of the Kremlin’s rational interests. For the most part, Putin has adhered to non-sentimental and even brutal rationality in his actions, including in the Middle East, so this analysis has some validity. Of course, considering that in 2022 the Kremlin’s policy on Ukraine showed an obvious miscalculation (or a deviation from rational policy based on identity or emotions), it is reasonable to consider that the same type of miscalculation or deviation could also occur regarding the Iran issue. Nevertheless, the experience of 2022 should already make the Kremlin more cautious. Therefore, it can be said that going beyond the logic of a “marriage of convenience” in Russia-Iran relations, as described in this article, is theoretically possible, but it does not seem very likely, at least for a year or two.
Prof. Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman (PhD, Dr.Sc.) affiliated research fellow at the PSCR Program, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University. Expert on Central Asia and Afghanistan, Russia’s foreign and security policy, and energy policy. He has previously worked in the Moscow Higher School of Economics, Moscow state institute of international relations, the European University Institute (Italy) and served as a Visiting Scholar at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Germany). A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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Turkey Has Become ‘the Central Nerve Center for Hamas Abroad’
Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaks during a joint statement to the media in Baghdad, Iraq, April 22, 2024. Photo: AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/Pool via REUTERS
JNS.org – A Hamas terror cell in Nablus that received instructions and funding from the organization’s overseas headquarters in Turkey was dismantled by Israeli security forces in recent weeks in what observers say is part of a broader pattern of Turkey serving as a permissive hub for Hamas’s terror operations.
According to a joint statement by the Israel Police and the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) issued on March 25, “a terror cell from Nablus was thwarted, which acted under the guidance and funding of Hamas headquarters in Turkey to carry out shooting and explosive device attacks.” The statement added that “an M-16 rifle and tens of thousands of dollars in cash were handed over during the investigation.”
Six suspects from Nablus were arrested between January and February in a joint operation by the Shin Bet, the Israel Police Central Unit of the Judea and Samaria District and the Israel Defense Forces.
The investigation revealed that the suspects had received approximately $40,000 from Hamas in Turkey to carry out shooting and bombing attacks against Israeli security forces and other targets in Judea and Samaria.
The Shin Bet stated that “the investigation revealed that the cell operated under direct guidance from the Hamas terror organization in Turkey,” and that “significant evidence was gathered which not only thwarted the planned attacks but also enabled the indictment of all involved.”
One of the suspects led security forces to a hidden roadside bomb buried near a key junction in Samaria. The large metal container filled with explosives was destroyed in a controlled demolition by police sappers.
Col. (res.) Michael Milshtein, head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University and former head of IDF Military Intelligence’s Department for Palestinian Affairs, told JNS on Wednesday, “Turkey at this stage constitutes one of Hamas’s most important operational hubs abroad.”
Milshtein noted that “in Lebanon, there’s been a decline [of Hamas activities] since the war—and Hezbollah is angry at Hamas for trying to heat up the border with rocket fire. In Syria, there is still rebuilding [of Hamas] after Assad’s fall, but it remains limited. As a result, Turkey has become a central nerve center.”
Milshtein added that Istanbul is home to Zaher Jabarin, the successor of Saleh al-Arouri, the late Hamas deputy political bureau chief [eliminated in an airstrike in Beirut on Jan. 2, 2024] who was responsible for Hamas’s Judea and Samaria operations across a variety of fields. “Most operations in Judea and Samaria—especially military ones—are promoted from there,” said Milshtein.
He added, “I assess carefully that Hamas finds it very convenient to operate in Turkey. There’s freedom of action, though not the same intense support as from Iran or Hezbollah. As long as they don’t establish military bases like in Syria, they are allowed to work freely, and of course, it is known that their focus is on promoting terrorism.”
Milshtein said there had been several reports indicating that “it’s not just a free hand, but also training, mainly in intelligence and commando fields, by Turkish security elements.” And, he stressed, “Turkey is a central NATO member.”
Under Jabarin, the core of Hamas’s Judea and Samaria command is run by operatives deported as part of the 2011 Shalit prisoner exchange.
“A minority are in Qatar and Gaza—where a number of senior headquarters operatives were eliminated during the war—but the core is in Turkey, led by Mousa Dudin,” said Milshtein.
A number of these terrorists were involved in attacks such as orchestrating the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in 2014. Milshtein said that this network also continues to explore “breakthrough moves like undermining the Palestinian Authority’s hold on the West Bank,” a strategic vision led by Arouri until his elimination.
Regarding potential counteraction, Milshtein said, “The question of operating against the headquarters in Turkey is very complex, similar to operating against Hamas figures in Qatar. Against those in Lebanon or Syria, there has been no problem, but any assassinations, even quiet ones, in an arena like Turkey would mean friction with Erdoğan, especially now that Ankara is more deeply involved in Syria.”
He concluded, “I assume that as with Arouri and Haniyeh, there would be a theoretical possibility to act against Hamas operatives from Turkey if and when they leave the country for a more convenient arena, such as Iran or Lebanon.”
Michael Barak, senior researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) and a specialist on radical Islamist and jihadist movements, told JNS on Tuesday, “Turkey is a base for the Muslim Brotherhood. There are networks there that help Hamas with funding, support, religious rulings, and logistics. Turkey has become a reception point for Brotherhood members.”
Barak confirmed that “a Hamas headquarters still exists there—in Istanbul and Ankara—and it is integrated into educational institutions, including universities.”
He cited the example of Professor Sami Al-Arian, a Palestinian Islamic Jihad financier in the 1990s who was deported from the United States and now operates from a university-affiliated think tank in Ankara. “There he hosts Hamas figures,” Barak said. “Al-Arian maintains ties with Hamas, runs webinars with them on Zoom, and manages Brotherhood-Hamas links, including in India.”
Barak emphasized: “All of these Muslim Brotherhood assets in Turkey assist Hamas—whether through dawa [Islamic outreach], financing, or religious rulings.”
He added that Turkey has become “a reception point for Muslim Brotherhood figures from Libya, Iraq, and Yemen.”
On March 30, during a Ramadan prayer service, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared, “May Allah, for the sake of his name … destroy and devastate Zionist Israel.”
He also prayed for “mercy upon the martyrs” of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and wished a “speedy recovery” to their wounded terrorists.
Erdoğan has intensified his anti-Israel rhetoric since the Oct. 7 Hamas massacre in southern Israel, comparing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Adolf Hitler and asserting that “Turkey is a country that speaks openly with Hamas leaders and firmly backs them.” Throughout the conflict, Erdoğan has met openly with Hamas officials and even threatened military action against Israel, according to the Washington D.C.-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Tyler Stapleton, director of congressional relations at FDD, warned, “Erdoğan’s call for the destruction of Israel should force the United States to begin an escalatory ladder of responses to hold Turkey’s leadership accountable.” He said the US should reassess arms sales to Turkey, warning that “Turkey’s ability to purchase advanced fighter aircraft like the F-35 should trigger congressional review.” He added that Washington “should continue to outline restrictions on foreign military financing and the exclusion of Turkey from NATO exercises” as initial steps to address Erdoğan’s hostility against Israel.
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Half a Matzah
Rabbi Yosef Rice packs handmade matzah into 425 Passover packages at the Palm Beach Synagogue Tuesday March 23, 2021 in Palm Beach. MEGHAN McCARTHY/Palm Beach Daily NewsPbn 032321 Passover 07
JNS.org – Passover is around the corner, and I will be so presumptuous as to suggest that you may have opened your favorite Haggadah to have a look and start preparing for the big seder night.
Seder means “order.” And one of the items in the order of the seder agenda is yachatz. Well, what is yachatz?
It’s one of the first things we do on seder night, even before anyone says the “Ma Nishtanah.” We break the middle matzah of the three matzahs on our seder plates. The larger part is put away for the afikomen and the smaller part remains inside the seder plate throughout the recital of the Haggadah, until we say the blessing of “Hamotzi.”
This is true lechem oni, the bread of poverty. Not only is it matzah; it is plain flour and water with no flavoring whatsoever—just a flat, tasteless wafer but broken as well. Back in Egypt, the slaves were fed the simplest, cheapest food. Bread of affliction, prisoners’ bread, what the most miserable pauper might be able to afford, a mere morsel rather than a proper meal. And now that it’s been broken, it is a morsel of a morsel.
It’s bad enough that the Jews were forced to eat a matzah, but now they are eating a broken matzah.
Rabbi Shlomo Riskin has pointed out that, seeing as the custom is to show the broken matzah during the recital of the Haggadah, and therefore, we say all of maggid, virtually the entire Haggadah, over half a matzah. And he makes a very powerful conclusion.
The whole Haggadah over half a matzah. And isn’t life just like that?
There is always something eluding us. For some, it may be health, for others wealth or success, nachas or happiness in general. Somehow, as much as we achieve in life, there is always something more that we want that keeps slipping out of our grasp.
Isn’t it so true … our whole life is but half a matzah.
Our Sages taught, “No person dies having achieved even half of his ambitions and desires.”
“Really?” you may say. Aren’t there many individuals who have achieved everything they set out to achieve? I know a couple of guys who seem to fit the description of “the man who has everything.” Just have a look at the Forbes list of billionaires.
The answer is yes, there are such people. The problem is that as soon as they achieve one ambition, they have broader horizons, and new and bigger ambitions. With each success, our ambitions develop further.
Elon Musk is currently the world’s richest man. He’s made enough money to look after his great-, great-, great-grandchildren and their great-grandchildren, too! So, he needed a new challenge. Now his challenge is to balance the United States’ budget. (That may be harder than becoming the world’s richest man!)
The rabbis put it simply.“If a man has $100, he wants $200. And if he gets $200, he then wants $400.” And so it goes on and on.
Take the lottery. When we are in the fantasy stage of winning, we are prepared to give a big percentage of our winnings away to charity, and family and friends. “Master of the Universe, if you help me buy the winning ticket, I promise to give 20% to tzedakah. I will renovate the synagogue, refurbish the seats—just tell me and I’ll get it done. But once you do win (you should be so lucky!), and it is no longer make-believe Monopoly money but cash in your pocket. And suddenly, it’s not that easy to give away.
Take the story of Harry, the guy who won $50 million. His family heard about the win before he did, and they were worried he might have a heart attack when he heard the news. So, they called his doctor to come and give him the good news. This way, if Harry went into shock or had a coronary, the doctor would be there with a remedy on the spot to administer an antidote.
In comes the doctor and says, “Harry, my friend, what would you say if I told you that you just won the state lottery? 50 million smackers?” And Harry replies, “Doc, you’ve been so good to me all these years. If I won the lottery, I would give you half!”
And the doctor dropped dead of a heart attack!
It’s easy to give it away when you don’t have it. But when you do have it, it’s not so easy. When it’s yours, you don’t give half away so quickly.
The truth is that we do go through life with only half a matzah; we never seem to get to the full one. While many of our dreams and aspirations do materialize to one extent or another, there is always something that remains frustratingly, mysteriously, almost hauntingly elusive.
But let me ask you. Just because we can’t have it all, do we desist from acquiring as much as we can? Do we say it’s either all or nothing? Or do we settle for as much as we can acquire? Do we turn down a deal that will make us a profit, even if it doesn’t make us instant millionaires?
The Kotzker Rebbe was renowned for his sharp wit and wisdom. He once asked his disciples, “What is the enemy of good?” One said that the enemy of good is bad. Another suggested that it must be evil. But the Rebbe said “wrong” to all their answers.
“Do you really want to know what the enemy of good is? I will tell you,” he said. “The enemy of good is excellence.” The Kotzker Rebbe explained that many people strive for excellence, but because they cannot achieve excellence, they stop trying altogether.
How many of us never achieved success in any given field of endeavor because it just wasn’t right, the conditions were not suitable or because “if I can’t do it right, I’d rather not do it at all.” So, what happened? Nothing. While we were waiting for the perfect opportunity, every other opportunity passed us by, and we were left with nothing.
“All or nothing” sounds very idealistic and principled. But it is not practical. When we say “All or nothing,” we usually wind up with nothing.
The seder reminds us that if the whole Haggadah can be recited over a broken matzah, then there is nothing wrong with half a matzah. If “half a loaf is better than no loaf,” then half a matzah is better than no matzah.
Yes, says the Kotzker, the greatest enemy of good is not evil, but excellence. And the unrealistic demand for perfection … or nothing.
So, take half a matzah. Take the broken morsel. It doesn’t have to be the end, the ultimate. But it can be a beginning and a good beginning.
Say kiddush. Put on tefillin. Light the Shabbat candles. Come to the shiur (a class on Jewish learning), even if you won’t become a rabbi. Do the deal, even if it isn’t the mother of all deals. And get married, even if he or she isn’t the fulfillment of every single fantasy. Don’t make the mistake of saying “All or nothing.” You don’t have to settle for second best; just start somewhere, even if it is only a morsel of a morsel.
Yes, we recite the whole Haggadah on half a matzah. And we can live our whole life on half a matzah. And it can still be very satisfying indeed.
I wish you Passover seders that satisfy, physically and spiritually. Chag Kasher v’Sameach!
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J Street’s Dishonest, Anti-Israel, Anti-Peace, Anti-Democracy Manifesto
J Street president Jeremy Ben-Ami addressing the 2019 J Street National Conference. Photo: J Street via Flickr.
JNS.org – Since its founding, J Street has established itself as a far-left extremist organization that represents only a sliver of American Jewry. However, it attracts disproportionate media attention because it serves as a “man bites dog” story—Jews who oppose Israel. J Street published a 10-point manifesto to rationalize its positions, but its raison d’être can be summarized in a single sentence: To lobby the US government to impose the views of a small group residing far from Israel, who neither participate in its elections nor contribute their children to its military, upon the people of Israel, who alone bear the consequences of these misguided policies.
J Street’s manifesto opens by graciously acknowledging that “Israel is the national homeland of the Jewish people,” but it quickly distorts history. It fails to mention that, beginning with the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the international community recognized the Jewish people’s right to a national home in Palestine. Nor does it acknowledge that two-thirds of the land originally designated for the Jewish homeland was unilaterally excised to create Jordan.
The root of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the atrocities of Oct. 7, 2023, stems from the Islamist desire to eradicate the Jewish people—a goal first championed in the 1920s by Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Hitler-collaborating Mufti of Jerusalem. By 1947, Palestinians had already rejected multiple statehood offers, including the 1937 Peel Plan, the 1939 British White Paper and the 1947 U.N. partition plan. Instead of negotiating, Arab nations launched a war intended to annihilate Israel, not create a Palestinian state. The outcome of the war was the 19-year occupation of the West Bank by Jordan and of Gaza by Egypt. During that period, there were no demands by the Palestinians, the United Nations, human-rights organizations, campus activists or anyone else to end the occupation and create a Palestinian state. J Street conveniently ignores the repeated Palestinian refusals of autonomy in 1979 and statehood offers in 2000 and 2008.
Contrary to its assertion, Palestine was never the national home of the Palestinian people. The Jewish people trace their indigeneity to the Land of Israel to their exile from Egypt. If it had not been for foreign conquerors, Israel would be more than 3,000 years old. Still, Jews have been sovereign in their homeland altogether for more than 500 years. Arabs did not arrive in what the Romans first called Palaestina until the seventh-century Muslim conquest, and “Palestine” was never an independent state. In the early 20th century, Palestinian nationalism was not driven by a desire for independence but by the aspiration to become part of Greater Syria.
J Street claims that most American Jews support a Palestinian state. However, a May 2024 poll found that only 12% supported a state with no conditions, while just 25% would accept one that is demilitarized and accepts Israel as a Jewish state. What Americans think is irrelevant anyway. Neither Israelis nor Palestinians want a Palestinian state.
- A February 2025 survey by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs found that 75% of Israeli Jews opposed a Palestinian state.
- A 2024 PSR survey reported that 57% of Palestinians opposed a two-state solution, while 48% supported violent “armed struggle.”
Despite these facts, J Street insists that the two-state solution is the only way forward and that granting Palestinians independence is essential to guarantee Israelis’ safety. However, history has disproven this notion. Israel gave up land in the Oslo Accords and got suicide bombings; it withdrew from Gaza and got missile attacks culminating in the horrors of Oct. 7. Palestinian Islamists reject any Jewish presence, and the “secular” Palestinian Authority is committed to the destruction of Israel in stages.
J Street insists peace requires “statesmanship, diplomacy and compromise,” three characteristics totally absent from Palestinian society. It also overlooks that their vision would require the politically unacceptable evacuation of 100,000 or more Israelis from their homes.
J Street speciously claims that the “occupation” prevents its “acceptance.” This is demonstrably false. Israel has relations with 159 out of the 193 U.N. member states. Regionally, the Arab-Israeli conflict is over. Israel has formal relations with Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates.
J Street claims Israel’s policies threaten bipartisan support in the United States, yet Congress overwhelmingly backs Israel. Efforts to condition foreign aid, supported by J Street, were rejected.
J Street insists that American Jews can be “pro-Israel” while criticizing the Israeli government. However, Israelis have no obligation to listen to those who don’t live with the consequences. J Street lobbies the US government to coerce Israel’s democratically elected leaders, which is neither democratic nor pro-Israel.
J Street ignores that Israel was ready to withdraw from captured territories in exchange for peace after 1967, only to be met with the Arab League’s “Three No’s”: no peace, no recognition and no negotiations. The 2009 Fatah conference reiterated this stance: no recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and no end to armed struggle.
In yet another omission, J Street says that Israel’s “occupation” was supposed to be temporary, forgetting that U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, the basis for all peace talks, tied Israeli withdrawal to the Arab states ending their belligerency. Israel was not obligated to give up all the territory it captured but still withdrew from roughly 94%. The Palestinians were not mentioned and given no political rights.
J Street criticizes Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, but says nothing about the repression of Palestinian rights by Hamas and the Palestinian Authority.
During the Obama administration, most Jews disagreed with his call to halt settlement construction. In 2019, only 25% supported dismantling all settlements; 41% supported dismantling some, while 28% opposed dismantling any. Meanwhile, a December 2024 poll found that only 29% of Israeli Jews opposed annexation, while 40% supported it.
The manifesto calls for “The 23-State Solution.” This is interesting because opponents of Palestinian statehood have long pointed out that since there are already 22 Arab states, there is no reason for a 23rd. Many people also note that Jordan is both geographically and demographically a Palestinian state. Yet another fact is that most Palestinians live in what was historically Palestine.
J Street falsely equates the “historical and emotional ties” to the land of Palestinians and Jews. They argue that adding another Arab state will lead to Israel’s acceptance by its adversaries and global recognition. The former, however, cannot be placated, and the latter has already been achieved.
The fact that all the peace agreements with Israel were made without concessions to the Palestinians proves that they are unnecessary. The Abraham Accords succeeded because the UAE and Bahrain were fed up with Palestinian intransigence and decided to put their interests first. J Street argues that Saudi Arabia will be different; however, the Saudis will likely follow the example of the others who normalized ties with Israel and bypassed the Palestinians—provided they get what they want from the United States.
J Street backs a return to the disastrous Iran nuclear deal and advocates a “diplomacy-first approach,” oblivious to the fruitless negotiations pursued by the Biden administration that allowed Iran to advance to the point it has the uranium to build multiple weapons.
Point eight reminds us that J Street added pro-democracy to its tagline. The problem is that it doesn’t support democracy unless the outcome suits its needs. The group rejects the democratic process in Israel because it disagrees with the representatives chosen by the people. The group also claims to support bipartisanship, yet it exclusively funds Democrats, including those who are openly hostile to Israel.
Regarding combating antisemitism, J Street defends antisemitic rhetoric under the guise of “criticism of Israel.” It falsely claims that right-wing groups exaggerate campus antisemitism while Jewish students face unprecedented harassment almost exclusively from the left. They mention “longstanding allies,” but not the fact that many turned on and often expelled Jewish students while endorsing Hamas. J Street defends radical groups that glorify terrorism, opposes anti-boycott legislation and objects to effective methods for motivating administrators to protect Jewish students.
Like other demonizers of Israel, J Street speciously attacks the internationally recognized (including the United States) definition of antisemitism proffered by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance for conflating criticism of Israel with antisemitism by ignoring its explicit declaration: “Criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.”
In its final catchall point that “everything else also matters,” J Street argues Jewish voters are not hawkish single-issue Israel voters. True, Jews don’t rank Israel high among the issues that determine their vote, and yet they consistently vote for pro-Israel candidates and oppose those who are anti-Israel.
The manifesto complains about “powerful and well-funded” lobbies, meaning AIPAC, which have those traits because they represent the bulk of the pro-Israel community. After years of being the largest “pro-Israel” PAC and filling Democratic candidates’ coffers, their funding is now dwarfed by AIPAC’s bipartisan support.
Reflecting its anti-democratic agenda, J Street denigrates “hawkish” voters, meaning conservative and Orthodox Jews who, in the last election, overwhelmingly favored Donald Trump in part or whole because of his positions on Israel. Kamala Harris, meanwhile, received the lowest percentage of the Jewish vote of any Democrat since Michael Dukakis, partly due to President Joe Biden’s policy toward Israel.
J Street pretends to represent Jewish interests, but its actions tell a different story. It supports policies that endanger Israel, disregards the will of Israelis and Arabs, and undermines Israel’s democracy.
The post J Street’s Dishonest, Anti-Israel, Anti-Peace, Anti-Democracy Manifesto first appeared on Algemeiner.com.