The first phase of the ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel is shakily proceeding. Hamas, despite threatening to halt agreed hostage releases, freed three more captives on Saturday, and the IDF will maintain its withdrawal from the Netzerim corridor in central Gaza. All as previously agreed.

Unfortunately, phase 2 — negotiation of a permanent war-ending truce including Hamas’ release of the 65 or so hostages remaining in captivity (after stage 1) — is not going to happen. The Netanyahu government’s preconditions for a permanent truce include not only the release of all hostages, but the disarmament of Gaza and exile of Hamas’ leaders.

Hamas, in turn, even if potentially able to negotiate the release of hundreds more Palestinian security prisoners, is not likely to agree to surrender its armed foothold in Gaza — because Hamas’ fundamentalist Jihadist credo is dedicated to the destruction of Israel, not to the rehabilitation of Gaza and relief for its displaced and distressed masses. That ideological fixation precludes military surrender.

Without a phase 2 truce deal, the picture is gloomy. To implement its original plan to uproot and disarm Hamas, including the 15,000 soldiers Hamas now claims under its command, the IDF would have to reinvade Gaza. There would be prolonged gorilla warfare, with considerable casualties on both sides. There would be collateral civilian casualties and continued dislocation of Gazan civilians. The remaining Israeli hostages will likely die in captivity.  Resumption of hostilities is indeed a dismal prospect.

Some Israeli public voices fault Benjamin Netanyahu for the coming failure of negotiations, citing selfish political motives for prolonging the Israel/Hamas war. Netanyahu knows that if the war ends at this stage, there will be new elections and his reign as prime minister will likely end. This is because his current coalition partners are fixated on a total victory. For these ultra nationalists, this means not only disarmament of Hamas but long-term Israeli presence in the Gaza strip.

Absent the peril facing 65 more hostages, the case for the IDF finishing the uprooting of Hamas might be stronger.

Hamas is an abomination — a radical Jihadist sect viewing Jews as sub-humans to be pursued and killed (according to the 1988 Hamas charter). A long-standing terrorist menace, Hamas, on October 7, 2023, perpetrated the worst disaster in modern Jewish history — an onslaught including mass murder, torture, and kidnapping of children and the elderly.

Hamas’ continuing brutality and dehumanization were illustrated in the pictures of the recently released male hostages — gaunt, debilitated, and abused by 15 months of being held underground and chained. The hundreds of thousands of Israelis living within missile range of Gaza deserve to be free of the terrorist peril that Hamas poses.  Yet liquidating Hamas’ lingering armed menace entails excruciating costs – jeopardizing the lives of remaining hostages and of those IDF soldiers to be re-dispatched to Gaza.

What is the impact of President Donald Trump’s plan to displace the bulk of Gazan residents and to rebuild Gaza in a fashion making it suitable for ultimate American ownership?  The notion of mass, forced transfer of Gazans is delusional. As Shira Efron commented: “Turning Gaza into the ‘Riviera of the Middle East’ is not a serious plan. It is unfeasible politically, with certain rejection by dozens of countries and the Arab states. Who will pay for it? Who will carry it out?  What countries would take Palestinians in? And most important, do Palestinians want to leave?”

The impracticality of the Trump plan is indeed patent. Trump envisioned Jordan and Egypt as the prime recipients of Gaza’s transferred refugees. But both King Abdullah and President el Sisi, along with Saudi Arabia, have expressed opposition to mass transfer. His threat to use foreign aid as leverage is meaningful, but unlikely to work in the face of worldwide condemnation of mass ouster of Palestinian civilians from Gaza. It also gives leverage to those who claimed that Israel’s plan all along was to ethnically cleanse Gaza of Palestinians.

The clearest impact of the Trump displacement plan is to reinforce the resistance of the Netanyahu coalition to any resolution of the Israel/Hamas war, short of total victory. Trump has radically departed from the Biden administration’s position (endorsed by several other past presidents) that the Palestinians in Gaza ought to be part of a two-state solution — forming a demilitarized, sovereign state along with West Bank Palestinians. (Trump has promised a declaration about the status of the West Bank within a short time).

In essence, Trump’s support for a Palestinian-free Gaza undercuts the widespread Israeli public pressure for Netanyahu to promptly negotiate an end to the war against Hamas and the return of all hostages. In the continued absence of a viable “day after” plan for civil administration of Gaza, the Netanyahu coalition can pursue the idea of occupation, if not Jewish settlement, in Gaza.

While the Trump plan is delusional, there is an element of justice buried within it. Trump is right that most of Gaza is now rubble and that neighboring countries have the space to accommodate relocation of many Gazans. Israel has never pushed for forced transfer of Palestinians from disputed territory and such an idea engenders both widespread condemnation and raises serious issues of international law.

But what if some Gazans want to escape the debacle that Hamas has precipitated? Shouldn’t they be allowed to make such a voluntary choice free of intimidation by Hamas? And shouldn’t Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia be subject to pressure to accommodate those Gazans who wish to leave? Arab world intransigence toward any migration of Palestinians is reminiscent of the historic exploitation of Palestinian refugees (from Israel’s 1948 war against invading Arab armies) as a destabilizing force against Israel.

Norman L. Cantor is Emeritus Professor of Law at Rutgers University Law School where he taught for 35 years. He also served as visiting professor at Columbia, Seton Hall, Tel Aviv University, and Hebrew University of Jerusalem law schools. He has published five books, scores of scholarly articles in law journals, and, more recently, numerous blog length commentaries (often on Israel/U.S. relations) in outlets like The Jerusalem Post, The Times of Israel, and The Algemeiner. His personal blog is seekingfairness.wordpress.com. He lives in Tel Aviv and in Hoboken, NJ.

The post The Dismal Status Quo of Gaza: What Can Be Done? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.