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What Comes Next in Gaza? Here Are Some Options — and the Best Solution
An Israeli military convoy moves inside the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, as seen from Israel, June 17, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Discussions about the future of Gaza are being conducted in isolation, without comparative discourse, and the political dimension is causing opinions to harden rather than remain open and flexible.
Thus, for example, the head of the INSS Institute wrote on May 29 that, “An alternative civil address in Gaza [is] the need of the hour” and opened with the words, “There is no time,” while Gabi Siboni from the Mishgav Institute said on May 24 that, “We need to enter the Strip and take control of all humanitarian aid in Gaza.” And so on.
There are several alternatives for the future of Gaza, and in this article I will present five of them. A choice will be made through a comparative discussion of their costs and benefits. Constructive strategic planning creates maximum flexibility for decision makers, and optimal conduct would be to implement close alternatives that all serve Israel’s strategic goals.
Before presenting the options, we must define the Israeli goals and interests according to which they will be examined. I propose that Israel’s goals and interests should be prioritized thus:
Destroying Hamas’s military capability: This is the key strategic need. Israel’s long-term position in the region depends on its delivering the clear message that anyone who carries out a criminal attack like that of October 7 will, at the very least, lose their military capabilities and their ability to harm Israel for a very long time.
Abolition of Hamas control in Gaza: Following on from the first consideration, Israel must strive to ensure that any party — especially a terrorist organization — that carries out murderous attacks against Israel will lose its rule and its leaders will lose their lives. Between the statement that it is impossible to eliminate an idea, especially a radical one, and the statement that the existence of Hamas in any form, including a civilian one, should be protested, there are many shades of possibility, a significant one of which should be the abolition of Hamas control.
Relations with the United States: Every alternative should take into account the strategic need to maintain good relations with the United States over time. This is a complex consideration against the background of American domestic politics. There can be disagreements, even difficult ones, with the American administration, but Israeli insistence on its positions should be part of a healthy relationship between the countries despite occasional extreme asymmetry. An Israel that pleases the Americans time and time again will lose its position in the United States. With that said, however, it is important to respect American global interests and help to promote them.
The return of the abductees: This is an important issue, but as it is not an existential necessity, it does not meet the same level of importance as the previous considerations. The return of the abductees is a matter of moral and value considerations but not strategic ones. The reality is that there is no scope for a comprehensive deal with Hamas because Sinwar’s personal fate depends on his holding the hostages. He will continue to hold them as long as possible until he has another survival option. Efforts to return the abductees through operational means or through local deals should be continued in every way.
The issue of the northern front and dealings with Iran: This consideration is also complex. Hezbollah has said it will not stop firing on the north and will not allow the return of the displaced residents without the cessation of fighting in Gaza. But for Israel, the cessation of fighting in Gaza without the achievement of its objectives against Hamas would represent serious damage to its deterrence against it and against Iran. This is an impasse that can be resolved with either a wider-scale war, which would severely damage Hezbollah’s capabilities; or an informal arrangement that Hassan Nasrallah can present as an achievement or as a “non-cessation” of the fighting while the war in Gaza continues. Because of this impasse, this consideration has been relegated to a relatively low place, though in principle it is more fundamental.
Approaching the moderate regional countries, with an emphasis on Saudi Arabia: The war in Gaza, the escalation with Iran, and the incessant Houthi attacks, only strengthen the region’s understanding of the need to join forces with Israel. While the delay in implementation stems from public opinion and American interests, it seems that it will eventually continue, and Israel’s continued military achievements against Hamas strengthen the likelihood that it will come to fruition. This consideration, therefore, has less influence on the choice between the alternatives.
The issue of Israel’s legitimacy: In this area there is a gap. While in the short and medium term Israel’s legitimacy is under pressure from international institutions, in the long term, the gap — if not the abyss — between the false and politicized accusations against Israel and the actual situation on the ground will be revealed. Although the war is creating negative images, it is one of the “cleanest” wars in history in terms of the proportion of combatants to civilians killed and the amount of humanitarian aid entering Gaza. Therefore, despite the need to continue to fight resolutely and place the blame for the consequences on Hamas, in choosing alternatives, this is a less influential concern.
There are second-order considerations. These include resources (the economic cost of each option); legal (Israel’s obligations towards Gaza within the framework of international law and how they are realized); and social (the impact on each option on national resilience, though in my view this is included in each consideration). It would be better for these considerations to affect the means of carrying out the preferred option and less the actual choice.
Now that the seven main considerations have been defined, the five alternatives can be defined and examined:
The Hamas alternative: In this option, the fighting in Gaza stops and the IDF withdraws from it in exchange for the release of the abductees and the cessation of fighting in the north. A militarily weakened Hamas returns to control the Strip. This option is being promoted by some of the families of abductees and several opposition elements to the government, and the American administration may also support it for internal political reasons. In examining this choice against the balance of considerations, it is clear that while it might achieve the release of the abductees and the cessation of fighting in the north and might be perceived as a good move in terms of relations with the United States, it would substantially harm Israel’s core strategic need to destroy Hamas’s military capacity and abolish its control in Gaza. The notion that this option would lead to a comprehensive solution to the issue of the abductees and the Hezbollah challenge is questionable. It is more likely that the fighting would resume under less favorable conditions for Israel.
The revitalized Palestinian Authority alternative: In parallel with continued military damage to the military capabilities of Hamas and its government, a governmental and security alternative would be built that would include a revitalized Palestinian Authority with the integration of local elements and the backing and involvement of a coalition of Arab and Western countries. This “nation-building” alternative is being promoted by the United States and European countries in apparent collaboration with Arab countries, as well as by elements in Israel who give too much weight to the official American position. This option promotes American and possibly regional considerations (it is too early to say whether the Arab position is real or the artificial product of American pressure), but there is a big question mark over how much it would be able to provide a real answer to the core considerations of harming Hamas and preventing its re-establishment. It also provides no broad response to the issues of the abductees and the challenge in the north.
The military-civilian alternative: In this option, Israel continues to hit the Hamas organization, both in its military capabilities and in its governance, until it is sufficiently weakened to allow local Palestinian elements to replace it on the ground, with considerable regional and international backing. This alternative is being promoted by Prime Minister Netanyahu, and is reflected in key components of the cabinet’s decisions. This option provides a good answer to the core considerations of harming Hamas, and might even be tacitly accepted by the Americans and Arab and international actors. It does not, however, provide a solution to the problems of freeing the abductees and the fighting in the north.
The “chaos” alternative: Here, Israel continues to strike at the Hamas organization, both in its military capabilities and in its governance, and at the same time allows local, regional, and international parties to create governmental alternatives on the ground that may mature into a comprehensive governmental alternative. This option was given expression in the opinion that called (at least at the beginning of the war) for the “Somalization” of Gaza, meaning a kind of supervised, partially independent nation-building. This alternative would allow Israel to define what would not happen, and others to decide what is possible. It provides a good answer to Israel’s core considerations in terms of Hamas, but would be difficult for the Americans and the regional and international actors to digest. It also does not solve the problems of the abductees and the north.
The sovereignty alternative: Israel imposes a total military government on Gaza, applies its full military and security control over the Strip, and perhaps occupies and even annexes parts of it. This option is being promoted by the right wing of the government. While it provides a good answer to the core considerations in terms of Hamas and might even bring gains on the issue of the abductees, it would make relations with the United States as well as other considerations very difficult.
The alternatives for the future of Gaza clearly entail a complex discussion. It is likely possible to move between alternatives and merge them according to developments. As of today, the option that best balances Israel’s considerations is the military-civilian one. The most problematic are the Hamas option and the sovereignty option. It is appropriate and correct to continue a complex comparative discussion on Israel’s considerations and the alternatives to achieve them and to avoid perceptual and political attachment to any one of them.
Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai is a senior researcher at the BESA Center and an expert in national security, strategic planning, and strategic communication. He is a cyber security strategist and a consultant to leading companies in Israel. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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Joy Reid Is Out at MSNBC; How Did She Treat Jewish People and Israel?
Former MSNBC host Joy Reid.
A student of mine once asked if it was more important to be accurate or entertaining in TV journalism. I explained that ethically, it is crucial to be factual, but ratings are important — so on balance, an extremely charismatic person that could make people have an emotional reaction could be more valuable than a boring host who only conveys facts.
TV host Joy Reid is charismatic, and she delivers her comments with a strong cadence and power. It was announced that she will be leaving MSNBC this week. Before the 2024 election, she said that her goal was “to keep Hitler out of the White House,” and on her MSNBC show, she said that the Trump rally at Madison Square Garden mirrored a Nazi rally at MSG in 1939.
But that’s not right. She was correct that some of the language was disturbing — and there were things at the event that were vile and absurd, including calling then Vice President Kamala Harris the anti-Christ. But that does not make it a Nazi rally.
Reid played a clip of Sid Rosenberg, who is Jewish and a radio host, saying at the rally that it was “out of character for me” to speak at a Nazi rally, and her analysis was that Rosenberg “said the quiet part out loud.” Not at all. He was being sarcastic and poking fun at people who called it a Nazi rally.
And Reid has a history of being problematic on Israel.
Karen Bekker of CAMERA, the Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting and Analysis, wrote that Reid’s show on the Monday after the October 7 attack “would have been right at place if it had aired on Iranian state TV”:
Her guests Peter Beinart, Ayman Mohyeldin, Ali Velshi and Lt. General Stephen Twitty ignored Hamas’s dedication to genocidal violence as expressed in its charter and in its leaders’ rhetoric, omitted any mention of offers of Palestinian sovereignty and independence, and sought to imply that the carnage was inevitable due to Israel’s actions – therefore excusing and justifying Hamas’s barbaric attack.
I did not see that episode. On another show, Reid said that she hated the killing of all children, whether it was at a kibbutz or in Gaza. I think all people of good conscience want all children to grow up and live in peace. But Reid was making a moral equivalence between Israeli children who were intentionally massacred by Hamas, and unfortunate cases where children may have been accidental and unintended victims of Israel’s war of defense against Hamas.
Reid had some good moments, saying that if one disagrees with actions by the government of Israel, it would not be logical to take it out on American Jews. She was right to speak out about the tragedy in Gaza, but wrong to put the blame mostly on Israel with very little on Hamas.
But it begs the question: had Harris won instead of Trump, would Reid still have her show? Fox News, which is correctly considered the most pro-Israel cable news network, has Trey Yingst deliver award-worthy reporting — but for some reason he calls Hamas “militants” or “fighters,” which is incorrect, because Hamas is deemed a terrorist organization by the US. Many ignore his mistake, but I don’t and it is noteworthy that most others on the network do call them terrorists.
Accuracy is tough to come by when it comes to Israel, and I hope the lies that are spread by the media and others vilifying Israel won’t be believed. Still, no journalist should fear being punished by being accurate in their criticism, even if controversial.
Do journalists tell people what to care about, or are journalists covering what they know people already care about? Right after October 7, 2023, the general public seemed to care about Israeli hostages, but now, not so much. At the beginning of the Russia invasion of Ukraine, there were flags everywhere, and yet I haven’t heard a word about how many Ukrainian children were kidnapped and if they would all be returned in any possible deal.
We can’t have it all. But I’d like someone who is both accurate and entertaining, or at least will apologize and make a correction when they’re wrong.
Overall, we need to keep an eye on the media — and realize that things are not always as they seem.
The author is a writer based in New York.
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How the Gaza Ceasefire Agreement Highlighted Hamas’ Depravity
People stand next to flags on the day the bodies of deceased Israeli hostages, Oded Lifschitz, Shiri Bibas, and her two children Kfir and Ariel Bibas, who were kidnapped during the deadly Oct. 7, 2023, attack by Hamas, are handed over under the terms of a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, in Tel Aviv, Israel, Feb. 20, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Ammar Awad
The differences between Hamas and Israel can be seen not only in how they fight, but also in how they cease fighting.
More specifically, the terms of the ceasefire agreement, the first stage of which is now ending, are very revealing. All of the possible explanations cast a very negative light on Hamas — and thereby on its supporters.
Hamas was soundly battered during the war that began with its October 7th massacre in Israel. The other inhabitants of Gaza paid a very heavy price for that attack, which the majority of them supported.
While Israel had profoundly degraded Hamas’ capacity by the time of the January 2025 ceasefire, it had not eliminated Hamas and other terrorist groups in Gaza. Furthermore, it had only succeeded in freeing, or retrieving the bodies of, a small proportion of the hostages that Hamas and other Islamist factions in Gaza had taken from Israel.
This undecisive outcome, combined with external pressure to reach a ceasefire agreement, explains why neither party was in a position to dictate terms unilaterally. Nevertheless, the terms were remarkably lopsided in favor of the Palestinians.
Given that Hamas and Gazans bore many more fatalities and the overwhelming majority of the infrastructural damage and internal dislocation, Gaza appears to have had a much greater interest in the ceasefire itself, than did Israel.
Israel’s main incentive was the return of hostages taken on October 7. However, the asymmetry of the agreement is manifest in the number of convicted Palestinian criminals and terrorists released compared to the number of innocent Israeli hostages.
In the first phase of the ceasefire agreement, 33 Israelis (or their bodies) were to be released. In exchange, Israel agreed to release between 1,800 and 1,900 Palestinian prisoners, many of whom were lawfully convicted of crimes including mass murder and terrorism.
What explains such asymmetric terms in favor of the losing side? There are a few possible and overlapping explanations. They all reflect badly on Hamas.
The first possible explanation is that Israeli (and other) hostages in Gaza face much greater threats than do Palestinians in Israeli prisons. The latter are not in a life-threatening situation. They are not liable to execution at any moment. They are not kept on starvation diets, nor housed in unsanitary conditions in humid tunnels without light, or adequate ventilation. They have access to medical care (as Yahya Sinwar, architect of the October 7 attack, himself had when he was an Israeli prisoner).
There have been reports of some Palestinian prisoners being subjected to abuse, but even if those isolated examples did happen, there are important differences. Not least among these is that such abuse is illegal under Israeli law, with disciplinary action being taken at least sometimes. By contrast, abuse is the norm for hostages in Gaza.
However, to the extent that Palestinian prisoners are abused, the asymmetric terms of the agreement suggest a second explanation, namely that Hamas cares less about the welfare of Palestinian prisoners in Israel than Israel cares about hostages in Gaza.
The same is true about the valuing of lives. According to this explanation, Israel values the lives (and even the bodies) of its citizens and residents (of all religions) more than Hamas values the lives of Gazans.
The third possible explanation is that while Israel is a democracy ultimately accountable to an electorate, Hamas, as an authoritarian regime, is not answerable to Gazans. Even if there is some truth to the criticisms that Prime Minister Netanyahu has been unduly influenced by his own interests in weighing up the interests of the hostages relative to the goal of defeating Hamas, he is still inordinately more accountable to Israeli public opinion than Hamas is to Gazan public opinion.
There is nothing surprising in any of these possible explanations. It did not take the October 7 massacre, and the atrocities of that day and the many months since, for us to know that Hamas is indiscriminate in its violence. Instead, these events provided further and more horrifying evidence of what was already known.
We also already knew, from Hamas’s methods of waging war in multiple conflicts with Israel, that it cares very little about Gazan deaths. Indeed, it may attach positive strategic value to those deaths. Similarly, it is — or should be — no surprise that Israel is a democracy, and Hamas a repressive theocratic regime that treats its own citizens viciously.
What is dismaying is how many people, including in Western countries, have failed to draw these conclusions. Despite all the evidence, both in war and in ceasefire, they continue to side with the repressive theocracy of Hamas over the democracy that is desperately defending itself against an enemy that combines a medieval mentality and morality with modern munitions.
David Benatar is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cape Town, and currently Visiting Professor at the Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto.
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Revolting: See the Children and Mother Massacred By Newly Released Terrorist
Revital Ohayon and her two sons, and Noam, of Kibbutz Metzer, who were murdered in 2002.
With tragic poignancy, in the week that Israel is mourning the murder of Shiri Bibas and her two sons, Ariel and Kfir, of Kibbutz Nir Oz, Israel released the terrorist responsible for the murder of Revital Ohayon and her two sons, of Kibbutz Metzer (above).
Terrorist Muhammad Naifeh was convicted of involvement in the murder of 13 Israelis, including Revital and her sons, on their kibbutz in 2002.
Like the images of Shiri Bibas trying to protect her children, Revital was murdered while hovering over her sons, Matan and Noam, trying to protect them.
Last week, the murderer of Revital and her sons — literally moments after being released from prison in exchange for Israeli hostages and still on the terrorists’ bus — already pledged to return to terror in “proud partnership” with Hamas terrorists.
He “saluted” them for successfully releasing the Fatah terrorists. “Thank you for all this sacrifice … We, as Fatah members, are proud of this partnership [with Hamas], which will be better in the coming days than in the past.”
Here are his full, odious remarks:
Released terrorist murderer Muhammad Naifeh: “Me [Muhammad Naifeh], ‘the Frenchman’ [13 life-sentences], Abu Satha [9 life sentences], Mansour Shreim [14 life sentences], Ahmed Abu Khader [11 life sentences; all released terrorists], and everyone, and Abd Al-Karim Aweis [6 life sentences], and the entire leadership of [Fatah’s] Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades [terror wing] and their founders, we salute you [Hamas], and we will be by your side. We are partners of the future, Allah willing.
Thanks to the [Hamas’] Izz A-Din Al-Qassam Brigades. Thank you for all this sacrifice.
The Hamas Movement is a respectable movement, and it exists, and the occupation [i.e., Israel] cannot eliminate Hamas. Hamas is an idea that cannot be eliminated, and it is a main and true partner of the Palestinian national project. We as Fatah members are proud of this partnership, which will be better in the coming days than in the past days, Allah willing.” [emphasis added]
[Quds News Network (Hamas), X (Twitter) account, Feb. 15, 2025]
The identical nature of the Hamas and Fatah cruelty, together with this Fatah terrorist’s hate rant, should be a reckoning for those who still mistakenly differentiate between the Hamas terrorists, whose leaders sit in Qatar, and Fatah terrorists, whose leader sits in Ramallah.
Itamar Marcus is the Founder and Director of Palestinian Media Watch (PMW), where a version of this article originally appeared.
The post Revolting: See the Children and Mother Massacred By Newly Released Terrorist first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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