Syria’s de facto leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Golani, waits to welcome the senior Ukrainian delegation led by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, after the ousting of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, in Damascus, Syria, Dec. 30, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi

Part One of this article appeared here.

Former UK Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sachs referred in one of his articles to the book Radical Uncertainty by British economists John Kay and Mervin King. The book makes a distinction between risk and uncertainty. Risk can be calculated, but uncertainty cannot. Therefore, in situations of uncertainty, the authors recommend focusing on understanding the situation. This should be accomplished not by calculating probabilities but by observing what is actually happening on the ground with eyes that are open to new perspectives and new threats.

This approach should apply to the current shake-up of the regional system in the Middle East.

The Turkish orientation towards the leadership of al-Julani, leader of the rebels, warrants great concern. Turkish President Erdogan has never hid his ambition to renew the Ottoman Empire. The prospect of an occupation of Damascus by Sunni Muslim forces has an exciting power that could reunify radical Islamic forces to the point of reestablishing an al-Qaeda state in Syria. The third purpose of the IDF’s operations in the region is to focus on these concerns.

Meanwhile, under Erdogan’s leadership, the Kurdish region east of the Euphrates River is under threat of a military attack meant to eliminate it. This will test the ability of the American administration to stand up for its Kurdish allies.

With the collapse of the state order built with the Sykes-Picot Agreements at the end of World War I, an opportunity has arisen to correct an injustice. The international community’s concern for the right to self-determination of minorities has focused over the past century mainly on the Palestinians — but some 30 million Kurds have been trapped for a century without any possibility of a state.

The United States, as a superpower, is facing an unprecedented challenge to its ability to influence emerging trends in the regional chaos that has arisen in Syria.

In all of Israel’s past wars, including the War of Independence, the end of the war was determined by agreements with countries with a recognized identity that existed before the war and continued to exist after it. Now, for the first time, the State of Israel is facing an unknown reality.

Israeli disillusionment in Syria

The collapse of the Assad regime and the trends emerging in Syria in recent weeks required the State of Israel to respond immediately, which entailed abandoning its longstanding security perception of the “villa in the jungle.” In addition to needing to defensively penetrate the expanses of the buffer zone between Israel and Syria, Israel had to assign a special strategic purpose to the effort to maintain Israeli control of the Syrian space in front of the border: to project Israeli military power onto the trends developing in Syria.

This expressed the understanding that if Israel were to take a passive position of simple observation in defending the Golan Heights border line without daring to go beyond the “walls of the villa,” it would not have the appropriate levers to create a position of influence and bargaining to secure Israeli security interests in the emerging system in Syria and Lebanon. Miraculously, the developments in Syria forced Israeli security policy to shatter the barriers of the “villa” perception that had bound it.

A controversy from the beginning

From the beginning of the Zionist enterprise, the Jewish community both openly and covertly struggled with the tension between the two trends — convergence to the borders of the “villa” or integration into the Arab space. This tension was also expressed architecturally. While the settlements of the first aliyah were built along a main axis, such as Kfar Tavor and Yavne’al, in a way that allowed the movement of Arabs and Jews through the colony, the settlements built in the third aliyah and onwards were built off the main road in the form of a closed camp. As a result, with the confrontation of events (especially those of 1936-39, and the activity of Yitzhak Sadeh and Orde Wingate’s field companies), a dispute arose over the question of exiting the fence into the space.

In her book The Sword of the Dove, Anita Shapira describes the way in which Wingate tried to lead his men into active defense activities outside the fence. Wingate’s approach provoked resistance among the kibbutzim of the Jezreel Valley, stemming from this question: where is the line along which it is clear to everyone that they are defending their existence? Is it the fence line or is it beyond it? This debate was not only conducted in the moral dimension. It began as an operational issue. Sadeh’s and Wingate’s concept of defense required engaging in friction in the space outside the fences of the settlements. This was the concept of the guards at the beginning of the formation of the Hebrew defense force. For them, free movement in the space outside the settlements was not only a necessity to fulfill the defense mission but an expression of their desire to integrate into the space in the cultural dimension as well.

Recognizing the need for active regional integration, the State of Israel, under Ben-Gurion’s leadership, turned to proactive activity in areas outside the country’s borders in its early years. While Israel was still under a regime of economic austerity, Israeli delegations operated in African countries in the fields of agriculture and security. In the 1960s, Israeli paratroopers assisted the Iraqi Kurds in fighting against the Iraqi army.

The essence of the perceptual gap

Between the approach that confines itself within the borders of the “villa” and the approach that requires active involvement in the space beyond the borders, there is a deep gap in the perception of reality. The aspiration for confinement is based on the assumption that a country’s security situation can be stabilized by creating a status quo of borders, with each country limiting itself to activity within those borders. Switzerland, for example, succeeded in maintaining a status quo that is perceived as final and permanent within European historical circumstances.

The second approach does not hold with the assumption of the ability to preserve one’s existence in a stable and final status quo. Human reality, certainly in terms of the system of ties between countries, is subject to change and unexpected upheaval. The strategic position of a country is examined in this approach not only by what it manages to stabilize within its sovereign territory, but also by the alliances it maintains with entities in the space and its ability to actively engage in spheres of influence that shape regional trends. This is how Turkey operates in Libya and the Horn of Africa and is the thinking behind its current moves to establish military bases in the heart of Syria. Egypt has recently been involved militarily in Somalia, and Qatar, through its financial capabilities, is operating both in the region and far across the ocean.

The Mossad and its agents have operated and continue to operate with distinction in both close and distant circles outside the State of Israel. However, an overt presence is also required. The trend of Israeli confinement within the borders of the “villa” — with its security and cultural implication — has been revealed as a failure. In this dimension as in others, the Israeli national security concept requires a fundamental update.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen is a senior research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. He served in the IDF for 42 years. He commanded troops in battles with Egypt and Syria. He was formerly a corps commander and commander of the IDF Military Colleges. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post The Future of Syria Is Uncertain; Here’s What Israel Should Be Doing (PART TWO) first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

University Hall at Ohio State University. Photo: OZinOH/Flickr

International Holocaust Remembrance Day, which happens on January 27 every year, is a time when the world commemorates the victims of the Holocaust and reflects on how pure hatred and antisemitism led to this atrocity. It is a time for moments of silence, thoughtful discussions, and a meaningful look at history.

But over at Ohio State University, Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) — a group whose nationwide members have glorified Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel — decided that it was once again time to protest outside of a Jewish institution. At the off-campus Chabad House, on International Holocaust Remembrance Day, about 60 SJP members and their collaborators chanted for “liberation from the Zionist occupation.” They yelled that, “There are war criminals in this building,” referring to the fact that Chabad was hosting two IDF soldiers who were nearly murdered on October 7.

On OSU SJP’s Instagram was a flyer with the names and photos of the IDF soldiers from the Givati Brigade, as well as a blood-splattered IDF logo. Of course, the flyer was filled with egregious lies like, “The Givati Brigade has been a key component of the Zionist occupation since the Nakba of 1948 … Over the years, the Givati Brigade has been involved in repeated invasions of Gaza and the Lebanese border, and since 2000, they have relentlessly targeted and killed Palestinians in Gaza … Tomorrow, these war criminals, directly complicit in the ethnic cleansing and occupation of Palestine, will be on campus.”

In reality, the Chabad event was held on International Holocaust Remembrance Day because the two IDF soldiers were the ones who were targeted on October 7 — and narrowly survived the attack. The soldiers fittingly told their heartbreaking stories of October 7, which was the worst massacre of the Jews since the Holocaust.

Hamas wanted them dead simply because they are Jewish — just like the Nazis did.

One of the soldiers at the event, Maya Desiatnik, was a lookout at the Nahal Oz military base, which oversaw the Israel-Gaza border. When the attack started, she hid in the war room for six hours, while her entire unit suffered a worse fate: Fifteen of her colleagues were murdered and seven were kidnapped. Maya told Ynet News about her terrifying experience: “We could hear terrorists talking, going up to the war room roof, shouting ‘Allahu Akbar.’ They shot at the war room from outside and threw grenades in. When they realized they couldn’t get in, they set it on fire, with all of us inside.”

The other soldier, Saar Arie, was treating a family that had suffered a Hamas ambush. The terrorists burned their home while they were inside.

Maya and Saar are not only survivors — they are heroes. In a disgusting twist of facts, SJP called them war criminals, further victimizing the victims… on International Holocaust Remembrance Day, nonetheless. Showing up to a Jewish family’s home off campus wearing keffiyehs and shouting hateful chants into megaphones on what is supposed to be a solemn day in honor of victims of antisemitism is a new low.

This is not about free speech or peaceful protesting. If it was, then why did SJP at OSU post tips on covering your face and not getting arrested, along with what to do if the police did show up? Their flyer stated, “Do not speak to the cops. That’s what our police liaisons are for,” and “If you are placed under arrest, do not panic! Resisting and running from police can add charges.”

If they were there to peacefully protest, why would they need to publicize these tips?

Sadly, OSU has been a hotbed of antisemitism in the aftermath of October 7. In November of 2023, two Jewish students were verbally and physically assaulted, and in December of that year, people hurled objects at a Jewish fraternity and yelled antisemitic phrases. The genocidal phrase to eradicate Israel, “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free,” has appeared on campus, and the university’s Hillel was vandalized.

None of this has been done to help Palestinians. It is about targeting Jews on campus, and delegitimizing the fact that Israel is, indeed, a Jewish state. Antisemitic individuals and groups may use the word “Zionist,” but it’s interchangeable with the word “Jew.” Otherwise, why would they go after the Hillel and Chabad?

While the US Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights opened a Title VI investigation into OSU last year following all the reports of antisemitism, it’s time to take it a step further: OSU should ban SJP on campus altogether after their stunt last week.

Being hateful towards Jews at OSU is egregious anytime. But doing so after a horrendous massacre of the Jewish people — and then targeting them on International Holocaust Remembrance Day — is even more shocking.

It’s time for OSU to grow a backbone and stamp out Jew hatred on its campus once and for all. When we say, “never again,” it means never again anywhere — not in Israel, not in the US, and certainly not on the OSU campus.  

Lizzy Savetsky works with numerous non-profit and philanthropic movements as an outspoken advocate for Israel and the Jewish people. You can find her on Instagram @lizzysavetsky.

The post On International Holocaust Remembrance Day, SJP at Ohio State University Targets Jews first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attend a ceremony to sign an agreement of comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries, at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, Jan. 17, 2025. Photo: Sputnik/Vyacheslav Prokofyev/Pool via REUTERS

US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu just met in Washington — and not a moment too soon. A team of scientists in Iran is reportedly working to short-cut Tehran’s route to nuclear weapons in case the Iranian leadership orders their complete construction.

Trump and Netanyahu have a narrow window to stop Iran if it opts to build those weapons. The US and Israel must urgently review and revamp their intelligence gathering and sabotage capabilities, while preparing military options to jointly destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities should it sprint for atomic weapons.

According to current and former US officials who spoke to The New York Times on February 3, during the waning months of Joe Biden’s administration, unnamed countries — likely the United States and Israel — gathered intelligence indicating “a secret team of [Iranian] scientists is exploring a faster, if cruder, approach to developing an atomic weapon if Tehran’s leadership decides to race for a bomb.”

These findings track with an Axios report from November quoting a US official who said that Iran had been “conduct[ing] scientific activity that could lay the ground for the production of a nuclear weapon. It was a top secret thing. A small part of the Iranian government knew about this, but most of the Iranian government didn’t.” 

What is this so-called “crude” nuclear device that Iran might seek in a hurry, compared to a regular nuclear weapon?

Such a device, built more quickly, may lack the functionality assurances provided by a lengthier nuclear-weapon assembly time. This assembly process, known as “weaponization,” entails key scientific and engineering work that enables the production of a functioning nuclear bomb that integrates a uranium fissile core, a triggering mechanism, and explosives.

To short-cut its way to nuclear weapons, Tehran may even fuel a crude weapon with highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in lieu of the preferred weapons-grade uranium. While this would make Iran’s nuclear weapons larger and heavier, it would serve the purpose of establishing Tehran as nuclear-armed.

At last count, Iran had enough HEU for almost five nuclear weapons, and enough enriched uranium overall, if enriched further, for at least 16 weapons.

How fast could Iran weaponize its nuclear material?

Tehran could likely construct a crude device within six months of starting, only moving its enriched uranium stocks to a secret site for subsequent enrichment and/or weaponization around the four-month mark. Relocating those stocks would trigger international alarm bells, since the material remains under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Yet unless the United States and Israel detect Tehran near day one of a six-month breakout to the bomb, they may just have weeks to stop Iran after the fuel goes missing.

To target Iran’s nuclear plants militarily, Washington and Jerusalem require exact intelligence about where Iran might be constructing nuclear weapons. A facility located deep underground raises additional obstacles, even for bunker-busting bombs.

If the United States and Israel were unable to stop Tehran, Iran could quickly declare itself a nuclear power, possibly issuing photos to the world and only later conducting a demonstration test.

What’s more, Iran knows well how to build nuclear weapons, having spent nearly three decades — from 1985 on — acquiring and then mastering the technology.

Under Tehran’s late 1990s to mid-2003 nuclear weapons program known as the Amad Plan, the regime set out to construct an initial five nuclear bombs and ready the capability to test them.

However, in 2002, opposition groups and non-governmental organizations detected Iran’s covert nuclear facilities. The possibility that the United States, under the George W. Bush administration, might invade Iran based on Tehran’s efforts to seek weapons of mass destruction — as America had done in neighboring Iraq — likely caused the regime to downsize the Amad Plan’s weaponization activities. 

However, Iran planned to continue progressing some weaponization activities for a rainy day, while openly progressing its production of fuel.

Today, the IAEA has never been able to issue an all-clear that Tehran’s nuclear program is devoted to peaceful uses, as Iran obfuscates and maintains secrecy over past and ongoing activities.

Signs have periodically emerged of an ongoing weaponization effort, but the US intelligence community assessed, until at least July 2024, that Tehran maintained the Amad Plan’s halt. In early 2024, Israel and the United States reportedly acquired intelligence pointing to new Iranian weaponization-related activities.

During an October 2024 strike on Iran in retaliation for a missile attack, Israel destroyed a site known as Taleghan 2, where some of these alleged activities were taking place.

Facing Israel’s decimation of its proxies in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza, lacking the means to defend its air space, and confronting an inability to quickly build new missiles since Jerusalem’s strike, the regime in Iran knows it is more vulnerable than ever — and is likely eager to have a plan to quickly acquire a nuclear deterrent.

Trump and Netanyahu have a historic chance to stop Iran once and for all.

They should immediately evaluate and enhance intelligence gathering and related operations aimed at detecting Iranian efforts to build nuclear weapons. They should ready sabotage operations to stop these efforts. Both countries have used sabotage in the past — namely cyber-attacks, supply chain disruption, and explosives — to successfully disrupt and deter Tehran’s nuclear progress at key facilities.

In addition, the two countries should hold a new round of Juniper Oak military exercises, the last of which were held more than two years ago. These exercises showcase their ability to jointly destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities and could help deter a breakout by the regime before it starts. 

Washington and Jerusalem should also enhance the interoperability of such a mission. In particular, the United States should allow Israel to practice refueling its fighter jets using American KC-46 refueling aircraft while Israel awaits US deliveries of KC-46 refueling aircraft to replace Jerusalem’s aging fleet.

Tehran may be desperate and poised to acquire the ultimate deterrent — a move that successive administrations in Washington and Jerusalem have said they will never tolerate.

 Trump and Netanyahu may soon have to enforce that threat.

Andrea Stricker is a research fellow and deputy director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Follow her on X @StrickerNonpro. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.

The post Iran May Be on the Verge of a Nuclear Weapon; Will Israel and the United States Act? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.