According to a source, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has reportedly announced a decision to fully occupy all of Gaza, including areas where the hostages are located, while reportedly informing the IDF chief of staff that if the decision does not suit him, then he should resign.

Israel has long avoided entering areas where the hostages were located for fear Hamas might kill them, and has also avoided moves that could be interpreted as even a partial occupation of Gaza, for fear of the responsibilities that would entail. (Until now, Israel maintained a legal blockade, but not an occupation, thus leaving Hamas in local control.)

Here’s how the dramatic change came about, the other options Israel had considered, and the dramatic potential and terrifying risks of this new direction.

Last week, hostage negotiations reached an impasse, with apparently no chance of forward progress. Afterwards, Hamas published videos showing Israeli hostages Evyatar David and Rom Broslovski in a state of starvation that resembles victims of the Nazi concentration camps, and tears at the Israeli soul. Meanwhile a massive, global propaganda campaign propagated the false myth that Gaza is experiencing an unprecedented famine, resulting in international pressure on Israel to take actions that would leave Hamas in power, and potentially even create a Palestinian state as an outgrowth of the October 7 massacre.

Here are the options Israel was forced to consider in recent days:

Option 1: End the war and bring home all the hostages, even if it means leaving Hamas in power.

Recent polls show that 74% of Israelis support this option, as echoed in passionate protests every Saturday evening. Yet this polling question refers to an imaginary deal that is not actually “on the table.”

A careful review of news articles and interviews since October 2023, shows that at no time has Hamas offered or agreed to any deal that would release all the hostages. Qatar and Egypt have suggested frameworks to that effect, however Hamas itself (which is the only party that matters) has never proposed, nor agreed to, any such framework.

This “option” is not actually an option at all.

What if such a deal were on the table?

This is a fantasy, but theoretically speaking, if a deal to return all the hostages were on the table, then Israel should take it … if, and only if, the consensus of Israelis are willing to recognize and pay the true price.

What is the true price? History tells us:

In 2011, Israel negotiated the return of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit from Hamas captivity. At the time, Israelis thought the price was the release of over 1,000 Palestinian security prisoners, including terrorists such as future Hamas leader and October 7 mastermind, Yahya Sinwar.

But that was not the real price.

Once Hamas understood how desperately Israel would negotiate for the return of hostages, the terror organization began planning to take more. The price Israel actually paid for the release of one soldier was, in retrospect, 251 additional hostages, 1,200 murders, mass rape, mass torture, mass beheadings, and the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust.

If Israel makes the wrong decisions today, it will invite further such massacres for years to come, not only by Hamas, which is currently weakened, but by the entire Arab world, which is watching events closely. If, and only if, Israelis are willing to risk paying that price, then Israel should make that deal.

This is not an easy (theoretical) choice, but again, such a deal is actually not on the table, so the “dilemma” is a fictional one.

Option 2: Declare sovereignty over parts of Gaza.

Israeli officials have been leaking plans to take parts of Gaza as Israeli territory. The logic is that Hamas’ raison dêtre, its very purpose for existence, relates to conquering and controlling territory.

Hamas is not deterred by loss of infrastructure or lives: to the contrary, the terror group has been planning for years to make that sacrifice: both to slow down IDF operations by manipulating Israeli values and ethics, and also by weaponizing international pressure against Israel. There’s a saying from the world of hi-tech, “it’s not a bug, it’s a feature.” This is true of Hamas’ intentional destruction of its own people and infrastructure.

By contrast, after a ceasefire deal last January that allowed locals to return to their homes in northern Gaza, Palestinians celebrated this return to “their land.” Hamas promised this would be only the first step on the way to conquering their “original homes” throughout Israel. In short: the Palestinian national identity is largely based on conquest and control of territory. Thus, the threat of losing territory should (in theory) motivate Hamas to negotiate.

On the other hand, Israel’s annexation threat has been circulating for about a week now, and if anything, Hamas seems to have become even less flexible, most recently saying it will lay down its arms only upon the establishment of a Palestinian state with full sovereignty and Jerusalem as its capital: this would effectively make October 7 into “Palestine Independence Day.”

Furthermore, regional powers have a history of not wanting sovereignty over Gaza. For example, as part of the peace accords of 1978, Egypt insisted on taking back the Sinai but not Gaza, as the territory’s Palestinian population had become too problematic. The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 was highly controversial, including haunting images of IDF soldiers forcibly removing Israelis from their homes. In retrospect, the disengagement laid the initial groundwork for five wars against Hamas and, eventually, the October 7 massacre. Yet there was a reason for the disengagement: protecting Israeli settlements in Gaza was taking up a disproportionate amount of the IDF’s resources, and killing a tragic number of IDF soldiers, something the majority of Israelis were no longer willing to tolerate at that time.

Whether sovereignty in Gaza is right or wrong at this time, there is no question that it will come at a cost: in both IDF resources and Israeli lives. Perhaps that cost is worth it, but Israelis will still have to pay.

Option 3: The Palestinian Authority takes control of Gaza

Last week, in a historic first, the Arab League condemned Hamas and the October 7 massacre (while also condemning Israel on a number of points), and called for an independent Palestinian state, to be governed by the Palestinian Authority.

This is a non-starter for Israelis: the Palestinian Authority participated in and frequently praises the October 7 massacre, has provided millions of dollars in payments to its perpetrators, and in the past two years, there has been a significant increase in terror attacks originating from areas under Palestinian Authority control.

Even more disturbing than the attacks that occurred is the attacks that haven’t: since October 7, 2023, Israel’s Shin Bet security service has prevented over 1,000 attempted large scale terror attacks out of the areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority, including attempted infiltrations in the style of the October 7 massacre.

In short, a Palestinian Authority government in any region next to Israel is a clear and present danger to Israelis.

Option 4: Military occupation

After nearly two years of fighting, one could be forgiven for assuming that all military options have been exhausted. They have not.

First some historical perspective: dismantling a terror organization takes time. America’s fight against Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden took roughly 10 years, and the war against ISIS took roughly the same. France’s Operation Barkhane against terror groups in the Sahel region of Africa took over eight years, while America’s war against the Taliban took over 25 (and without success). If Israel manages to fulfill its goals in Gaza in roughly two years, that will be, historically speaking, incredibly fast — even though it feels interminable to Israelis.

Yet Israel has a major military weakness in Gaza that is about to change: avoiding the hostages. Israel reportedly knows the location of the hostages, and fearing that Hamas might kill them, has entirely avoided those areas. The unfortunate result has been to create a safe haven for Hamas fighters, and also to preclude any possibility of a rescue operation. Such military action is risky: it will endanger the hostages should Hamas attempt to kill them outright, yet it may also result in their rescue. On the other hand, any delay endangers the lives of the hostages as well: with negotiations at an impasse and recent Hamas videos showing hostages in a dramatically deathly state.

Another danger is that occupation of Gaza requires an investment of IDF resources and risks Israeli lives, just as protecting the Israeli settlements in Gaza prior to 2005.

However, if successful, this operation will reshape the Middle East, provide Israel with much needed security, and turn October 7, 2023, from “Palestine Independence Day” into a cautionary tale for any power that might consider attacking Israel in the future.

Daniel Pomerantz is the CEO of RealityCheck, an organization dedicated to deepening public conversation through robust research studies and public speaking.