If we’ve learned anything about the reporting from inside Gaza in the past year, it’s that there is virtually no such thing as professional journalism inside the Strip.

On multiple occasions, HonestReporting has exposed Gazan journalists who have disqualified themselves from claiming to be reporting objectively. Some have publicly expressed their antisemitism or blatant anti-Israel bias. Others have been revealed to be active supporters of terrorism, or friends of Hamas.

Media outlets have taken action against several of these exposed journalists, and their bylines can no longer be found on mainstream media reports from Gaza.

But others have continued to report, as media outlets prefer to sweep the issue under the carpe,t hoping that the problem will simply disappear.

But it won’t.

It’s not enough to expose the biased, antisemitic, or terror-supporting journalists. It’s time to expose the six media outlets whose silence has protected 20 biased journalists.

HonestReporting is launching a social media campaign to hold these outlets accountable. We demand they stop letting these “journalists” report on Israel-related issues.

Six major outlets employ 20 journalists tied to bias or even terror groups. Despite clear evidence, accountability is ignored. Over the next few weeks, we’ll expose how they infiltrated newsrooms—why it matters, and what you can do about it.

Stay tuned. pic.twitter.com/BOZ3r4k6Yd

— HonestReporting (@HonestReporting) November 19, 2024

Reuters

The agency still employs eight journalists exposed for infiltrating Israel, expressing biased views, or having unethical ties with Hamas:

• Yasser Qudih: Infiltrated Israel on October 7, and was honored by Hamas. He also won the 2024 Pulitzer prize with Reuters photography staff.
• Doaa Rouqa and Hamuda Hassan: No action taken after they celebrated images of October 7 atrocities.
• Iraq Bureau Chief Timour Azhari: Covers the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, yet demonizes Israel online.
• Suhaib Jadallah Salem, Mohammed Jadallah Salem, Fadi Shanaa, and Ibraheem Abu Mustafa: All received awards from Hamas. But Reuters had no problem with this, or with the terror groups‘ paraphernalia that decorated the Reuters office:

The Associated Press

The wire service still employs seven journalists who either infiltrated Israel or collaborated with terror groups:

• The agency hasn’t taken action against Hatem Ali and Ali Mahmud, who were in exactly the right place on October 7 to capture images of Israelis kidnapped to Gaza:

• Adel Hana, Hatem Moussa, Fatima Shbair, and Khalil Hamra: All participated in official Hamas propaganda events, yet were and are defended by AP. Adel Hana also taught media courses for the Hamas-run Information Office.
• Mohammed Zanaty: A Lebanese cameraman who supported an ally of Hezbollah online, yet AP kept silent on the matter.

AFP

The wire service stood by Mohammed Baba, a photojournalist who participated in a Hamas promo and was honored by the terror group.

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), New York Times (NYT), and CBS News

Zero action has been taken against the following journalists:

• Abeer Ayyoub, WSJ: Shared terrorist propaganda.
• Samar Abu Elouf, NYT: Honored as Hamas “work partner.”
• Yousef Masoud, NYT: Infiltrated Israel on October 7.
• Marwan Al-Ghoul, CBS News: Spoke at an official event of the PFLP, a proscribed terror organization.

These 20 identified journalists have proven they cannot report on Israel objectively. It’s past time for these outlets and journalists to be held accountable.

How You Can Help

Take action now. Demand accountability from Reuters, AP, AFP, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and CBS News: These journalists must no longer be allowed to report on Israel for any respectable publication.

Go to HonestReporting’s dedicated Call Out Complicity page, where you can sign the petition, send emails to editor,s and post our campaign content to social media.

We must get loud.

We must demand action.

HonestReporting is a Jerusalem-based media watchdog with a focus on antisemitism and anti-Israel bias — where a version of this article first appeared.

The post Take Action Now: Help Stop These 6 Media Outlets From Running Biased Stories Against Israel first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

On the night of November 19, 2024, a strike targeted the 1046th Logistics Support Center of the Russian Armed Forces near the city of Karachev in the Bryansk region. The Ukrainian Defense Forces (UDF) used American ATACMS ballistic missiles to carry out this strike, according to media reports.

Washington and Kyiv had not issued any official statements regarding the approval and receipt of such permissions at the time. However, the confirmation of Ukraine receiving the authorization came by November 21.

Another strike followed, targeting a command post near the village of Maryino in the Kursk region. This attack involved at least 10 British subsonic Storm Shadow cruise missiles.

Earlier, media reports suggested that Ukraine had received a “green light” from the US to use long-range missiles, not only for ATACMS but also for Storm Shadow. Even without official statements, it became evident that the reports were accurate — the permissions were granted, and the first strikes on Russian territory had already occurred.

The process of obtaining approval for Ukraine to strike Russian territory was a long and complex diplomatic effort. The Biden administration consistently denied Ukraine this right, citing concerns about escalation. At one point, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin dismissed the idea, with the implausible claim that there were no significant targets worth using ATACMS on within a 300-kilometer radius of Ukraine’s borders.

In reality, there are more than 200 significant targets in that zone, including 16 airfields used by the Russian Aerospace Forces. Striking these targets, according to UDF command, would significantly ease the situation on the battlefield in Ukraine and improve the country’s defensive capabilities. Priorities included ammunition depots, which would disrupt artillery operations; airbases, which would reduce tactical aviation activity; and command centers, which would weaken operational management efficiency.

The strikes in Karachev and Maryino clearly followed this strategic sequence.

Despite the evident benefits of such strikes for Ukraine, the US delayed granting permission, resulting in avoidable losses. Political considerations, rather than military ones, clearly drove the Biden administration’s decision.

From a broader perspective, Ukraine’s military and political leadership operated under the premise that a country facing aggression has the full right to employ all lawful means of defense, including striking enemy territory. When partner nations provide weapons for defense, it should be assumed that these can also be used on the aggressor’s territory. However, for the first time in the history of wars and conflicts, such a restriction was imposed.

This has led to a paradoxical situation where a country receiving weapons for self-defense is constrained in how it can use them. The situation bears resemblance to the Soviet Union’s receipt of Lend-Lease equipment during World War II, and its prohibition from using it beyond its borders.

Thus, using Western-manufactured missiles on Russian territory is a normal practice, while prohibiting their use is an unprecedented anomaly in the history of warfare — one that cannot be explained solely by fears of escalation.

Since 2022, Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated that Russia’s so-called “red lines” are ineffective. Strikes, including ones like the attack on the Kremlin, have not led to escalation or fundamentally changed the nature of the war.

Biden’s “Swan Song”?

On the eve of the US presidential elections, there was speculation in Ukrainian political and media circles that granting Ukraine the right to strike Russia might be President Joe Biden’s “swan song” — a final memorable decision in his career. Opponents of this view argued that such permission would only come from the next US president, whether it would have been Donald Trump or Kamala Harris.

This decision was one of those rare foreign policy moves unlikely to provoke significant opposition from either Democrats or Republicans.

Future Prospects Under Trump

It’s possible that Biden’s outgoing administration made this decision as a preemptive measure to counteract fears of a radical shift in US policy on Eastern Europe under Donald Trump. Biden’s move effectively granted Ukraine carte blanche, not just for ATACMS but potentially for other advanced weaponry.

Future plans call for Ukraine to receive US-made AGM-158 cruise missiles and AGM-154 precision-guided bombs. These systems will also require approval for use deep within Russian territory, a decision that would likely fall to the Trump administration. Additionally, Ukraine seeks the ability to shoot down Russian military aircraft in Russian airspace using Western air defense systems and AIM-120C/D AMRAAM missiles for its F-16 fighter jets. These, too, will require US approval, dependent on how effectively Kyiv establishes communication with Trump.

Another key issue will be the continued supply of long-range ATACMS missiles to Ukraine. Trump might aim to appear as effective as Biden — or even more so — in supporting Ukraine.

Biden’s decision has effectively placed Trump in a politically awkward position with limited room to maneuver. Any attempt to block permissions granted by Biden could politically weaken Trump by making him appear less decisive in comparison to his predecessor. For Ukrainian diplomacy, convincing Trump to grant similar permissions for other long-range missile systems will be a challenging yet critical task.

In the near term, it will be difficult for Trump to reverse permissions already granted by Biden without undermining his own political standing. However, Ukraine’s diplomatic corps will face the formidable challenge of persuading Trump to approve the use of additional advanced weaponry expected to arrive in the short term.

Alexander Kovalenko is amilitary-political analyst of the “Information Resistance” group from Odessa, Ukraine. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post Will Donald Trump Continue to Allow US Weapons to Be Used By Ukraine for Offensive Purposes? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

For Part One of this article, click here.

Scenario 3. The incorporation of elements of Islamic radicalism from criminal subcultures into the country’s political system

The most dangerous scenario for Russia and other countries would be Scenario 3 that foresees the incorporation of elements of Islamic radicalism from criminal subcultures into the country’s political system. Among the trends suggesting the possibility of such a scenario are the following. Since the 1990s, there has been an evident link between Russia’s political and business elite and criminal circles. Currently, there is a notable trend toward the division of key assets among criminal-political groups, particularly those of North Caucasian origin.

The trend toward state conservatism as part of Russia’s modern ideology is leading to de-secularization and strengthening of the connection between Islamic ideology and regional political systems in Russia’s autonomous republics of the North Caucasus. The power structure established in Chechnya under Ramzan Kadyrov, based on political Islam (of a conservative-Sufi nature), is the first example of a stable Islamist regime in the post-Soviet space (experiments with the introduction of Sharia laws in independent Chechnya between the First and Second Chechen Wars lasted a significantly shorter time).

Already, there is a noticeable link between the spread of radical Islam in prisons and among criminal groups, driven by the growing popularity of radical Islam among young people from certain Russian regions and among the most vulnerable migrant groups. Some experts say that there is also growing tendency towards introduction of radical Islamism as the ideology of different criminal groups in Russia and Central Asia. Added to this is the rise in the use of political Islam as a mechanism for integration among power groups at the regional regime level, alongside a trend toward overall instability in Russia.

As a result of all these trends, a situation may quickly emerge, when regional political systems in the North Caucasus, amid a weakening federal center, will begin to rely on support of criminal-Islamist groups. This is logical since the leaders of these groups already use criminal gangs (sometimes with elements of radical Islamic ideology) in the conflicts over property, as the Wildberries case demonstrates.

To understand the reality of such a scenario, one only needs to recall that elements of criminal-Islamist groups were integrated into the official structures of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (specifically, its Armed Forces) between the two Chechen wars. Elements of the practices that developed at that time (including the combination of formal work in security structures with informal criminal activity, particularly informal protection activities) have persisted in a modified form in today’s Chechen Republic. In modern Dagestan and several other national autonomous republics of the North Caucasus, similar processes can be observed along two lines, or trends.

The first trend is the connection between regional elites and organized crime. In this context, two officially documented cases can be mentioned. From 2016 to 2019, Rauf Arashukov was a member of the Federation Council, the upper chamber of the Russian parliament. He was delegated there by the executive authority of Karachay-Cherkessia, a national republic in the North Caucasus. He had also previously served as the head of a district and as the first deputy head of the republic’s government. In 2022, he was convicted of organizing a criminal community and for murder. Another, no less high-profile case is the story of the former mayor of Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan, Said Amirov, who was convicted in 2014 on similar charges.  It is evident that this is only the tip of the iceberg, revealing the connections between regional political systems in the North Caucasus and criminal groups. Based on this, it can be assumed that, in some cases, gangs act as informal (and sometimes even formalized when integrated into official law enforcement agencies) forces relied upon by certain regional elites.

The second trend indicating the real possibility of Scenario 3 is the increasing official Islamic religiosity of regional elites, including within the framework of the conservative ideology that currently dominates in Russia.

Accordingly, it is entirely plausible to hypothetically assume a further convergence of these two developmental trends described above, meaning that regional elites could merge with criminal-Islamist groups.

An example of the merging of the trends described above is the terrorist attack in Dagestan on June 23, 2024. During the attack, a synagogue, two Orthodox churches, and a traffic police checkpoint in Makhachkala and Derbent were targeted. Twenty-one people lost their lives—16 police officers and five civilians, including a 66-year-old Orthodox priest in Derbent—and more than 20 others were injured. It was discovered that three relatives of Magomed Omarov, the head of the Sergokala district in Dagestan, were involved in the attack, including his own son.

Consequently, the influence of radical Islam, with its anti-Western and anti-Semitic tendencies, could expand across all of Russia and may start influence the policy of the federal government. This situation could pose significant threats to Europe and Israel.

The facts described above highlight the need to deepen the study of the links between Jihadism and criminal activity, as well as the study of prison Islam (which, of course, is not solely limited to Islamic radicalism but can also represent prisoners’ legitimate search for meaning, justice and social integration). Two obstacles stand in the way of this endeavor.

One obstacle lies in the politicization of the issue. As a result, experts leaning toward a right-wing discourse tend to focus primarily on counterterrorism and criminal behavior, while academics inclined toward a left-wing discourse may emphasize prisoner rights and religious freedom violations in post-Soviet countries. An accurate assessment of the situation requires a comprehensive approach that integrates both aspects of the issue mentioned above. Today, there are many interesting theoretical and comparative scholarly studies of convergence between criminal and terrorist activities, this approach can be applied also to the case of prison Islam and convergence between criminal and religious extremist activity in Russia and Central Asia.

The second obstacle is the difficulty of accessing both underground criminal-Islamist groups at large (who are not inclined to disseminate information about themselves) and prisoners (since authorities in many post-Soviet countries are not interested in exposing prison conditions due to serious human rights violations within these institutions).

The author is an Affiliated Research Fellow at the PSCR Program, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, PhD (Israel), where a version of this article was first published.

The post How the Radical Islamist Influence in Russian Prisons Can Pose a Threat to Israel and the West (PART TWO) first appeared on Algemeiner.com.