Iran’s nuclear program is advancing rapidly. According to the Institute for Science and International Security’s November 21, 2024, report, Iran has enough uranium to further enrich to weapons-grade uranium for 10 nuclear weapons within a month, and for 16 bombs within five months.

Furthermore, Iran could produce 25 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium — the amount required for one bomb – in as little as one week.

These alarming timelines, coupled with Iran’s diminished air defenses and lack of any substantial regional active proxy right now that it can activate against Israel with the exception of the Houthis in Yemen, present a rare strategic window for preemptive action following Israel’s recent military achievements against Hamas and Hezbollah and the fall of the Assad regime.

Delaying action risks that Iran will continue to creep toward the nuclear threshold and potentially take secret breakout action, which would fundamentally alter the region’s balance of power. With its proxy agenda in ruins, Iran’s weakened regime may be tempted to fall back on its nuclear program as an “immortality potion” against external threats.

A nuclear-armed Iran would quickly embark on a program to rebuild its shattered proxies and reconstruct the Iranian ring of fire around Israel while bullying Sunni powers into submission and seeking to destabilize them. A nuclear Iran would likely shield its proxies and allies, especially Hezbollah, under a nuclear umbrella. Striking now would prevent this scenario while Iran’s proxy networks remain severely weakened.

Following significant setbacks to Iran’s air defenses and missile production infrastructure in Israel’s October 26 strikes, Iran is currently extremely vulnerable. Israel achieved near-uncontested aerial supremacy in Iranian skies during the October 26 strikes, demonstrating the feasibility of further operations.

A swift, decisive strike may outpace international responses or potential restrictions from the incoming Trump administration, allowing Israel to maintain operational independence.

On the other hand, a unilateral Israeli strike might trigger prolonged missile exchanges with Iran itself, in a continuation of the long-range firepower exchanges of blows between Tehran and Jerusalem.

In addition, it could be argued that acting without the explicit backing of the United States or other allies may strain diplomatic ties and limit Israel’s ability to mitigate fallout from the strike. Should Iran choose to disrupt the global energy market, the fallout would be even more severe.

The incoming Trump administration, set to assume power on January 20, offers Israel a determined partner for addressing Iran’s nuclear threat. President Trump has historically favored a hardline, maximum pressure stance on Iran, and his administration is likely to pursue aggressive policies, including reimposing maximum pressure sanctions and bolstering military cooperation with Israel.

As such, those arguing to hold off on strikes point out that Trump’s administration may provide diplomatic cover for future Israeli strikes, shielding it from international condemnation and facilitating follow-up measures.

Furthermore, the Trump administration could expedite the delivery of critical military assets that would improve the quality of Israeli strikes, such as F-15IA fighter jets and KC-46A refueling tankers, enhancing Israel’s operational long-range capabilities for sustained action against Iran.

A joint approach with the US would amplify the effectiveness of economic, diplomatic, and military measures against Iran, creating a comprehensive campaign to halt its nuclear ambitions.

With US backing, Israel could deter retaliation from Iran’s proxies, as Tehran would face the prospect of direct US involvement in any escalation.

And yet, delaying action risks Iran’s once again using negotiations as a cover to legitimize its nuclear program and achieve breakout later on as it advances the program to the point where it would be significantly more difficult to neutralize.

Iran’s increasingly advanced centrifuges in operation in Natanz and Fordow make daily progress toward enriching uranium to the 60% level, and it is no major step to go from there to military-grade uranium. By some estimates, Iran is six months away from a crude nuclear device and around 18 months away from an operational nuclear warhead that it can install on a delivery mechanism (missiles).

The Trump administration may initially prioritize diplomatic engagement or prefer to focus on challenges from Russia and China, creating delays or limiting operational scope.

Iran’s current vulnerabilities may diminish over time as it repairs its defenses and missile infrastructure. A delayed strike could face greater resistance and higher operational risks.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has consistently emphasized the centrality and existential nature of Iran’s nuclear threat, warning that failure to address it would exacerbate other security challenges. While recent strikes demonstrated Israel’s operational capabilities, the question of timing remains pivotal.

If Iran’s nuclear advancements continue unchecked, Israel risks facing a fait accompli — a nuclear Iran that begins rebuilding its path toward its ambition of Israel’s collapse by the year 2040, as the infamous clock in Tehran indicates.

At the same time, waiting for American diplomatic and potential military support could lead to a better strike opportunity.

Israel’s choice between striking Iran’s nuclear program before January 20 or waiting for Trump’s second term presents no easy answers. Immediate action offers a chance to neutralize an existential threat while Iran is vulnerable but carries the risks of escalation, isolation, and limited international support. Waiting suggests stronger diplomatic and military backing but risks Iran’s advancing its nuclear capabilities beyond the point of no return.

Israel must weigh these factors carefully. And while the decision must be heavily influenced by intelligence on the real-time status of Iran’s nuclear program, Israeli decision makers must take into account the danger of unknown unknowns when it comes to Iran’s nuclear program.

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane’s Defense Weekly and JNS.org. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

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