Hamas attacked several IDF positions in Gaza in the last few days, including with anti-tank missiles, killing (as of the time of writing this) at least two Israeli soldiers and wounding one. Israel responded with strikes on Hamas positions throughout Gaza.

As I described in a prior post, the Gaza “peace agreement” was never truly “peace” but it’s still significant. Here’s how it’s playing out.

• Hamas “denied” attacking IDF positions, but the terror group also claims it had “lost contact” with its operatives in the area. So in effect, Hamas actually admits to the attacks, but essentially claims the Hamas terrorists who carried them out don’t count as the “real” Hamas — whatever that means.
• The IDF responded with strikes on Hamas positions throughout Gaza, without attempting to figure out who is the “real” Hamas and who isn’t. Israel referred to its strikes as “punishment” for violating the ceasefire, but not an actual return to combat.
• As I mentioned, President Trump seemed to accept the Hamas explanation.

So everyone is essentially conveying the same message: that some version of Hamas attacked Israel, but we’re still in a ceasefire: one that includes, well … firing.

Clever phrasing aside, there is actually a meaningful difference between the current limited strikes versus the IDF’s major combat efforts of just a few weeks ago. That difference seems to be leading the parties toward the “Lebanon Model.”

What is the Lebanon Model?

After a series of operations in which the IDF devastated the Hezbollah terror organization late last year, Israel and Lebanon entered a “ceasefire” agreement in November 2024. Under the terms of this “ceasefire” Israel retained the right to continue firing against Hezbollah as necessary.

Why?

Any agreement requires enforcement. After the Israel-Lebanon war of 2006, Israel trusted a UN peacekeeping force called “UNIFIL” to enforce that particular ceasefire.

The result? Under UNIFIL’s watchful “supervision”:

• Hezbollah positioned some 250,000 Iranian controlled rockets and missiles, aimed at Israeli communities;
• Hezbollah developed its “Radwan” force, a special commando unit designed and trained to carry out an October 7 style attack – but on a vastly larger scale; and
• Just since October 7, 2023, Hezbollah fired thousands rockets and missiles on Israelis, displacing some 60,000 residents from their homes, and killing 45 civilians, among them 12 Druze-Israeli children on a soccer field.

This is what UN “peacekeeping” looks like.

Not surprisingly, Israel finally concluded that it may not “out-contract” its security.

Indeed, since the November 2024 ceasefire, Israel has carried out hundreds of strikes against Hezbollah, which are in complete compliance with the terms of the ceasefire agreement.

What is the Gaza model?

This month’s “peace” agreement in Gaza was meant to occur in essentially two phases: first, the return of all Israeli hostages (living and deceased), an Israeli pullback to certain positions (called the “yellow line”), and the release of a massive number of convicted terrorists from Israeli prisons.

The subsequent phases were described in a vague outline, with the details to be negotiated later, including: Hamas disarming, additional Israeli pullback, reconstruction in Gaza, and some kind of international force.

The relevant parties agreed to Phase 1 and on October 13, all 20 living Israeli hostages returned home. Israel fulfilled its part by ceasing combat operations, moving back to the “yellow line” and releasing convicted terrorists from Israeli prisons. Hamas, however, breached the agreement by failing to return the bodies of most deceased hostages, or even to halt its attacks on both IDF soldiers and Gaza’s civilians, as we’ve seen in the last two days.

In effect we remain in a “ceasefire,” but Israel retains the right to continue firing as Hamas continues to breach the deal.

From here there are two major possibilities:

1. Gaza stabilizes, non-Hamas powers begin to take control, and Israel continues limited strikes as necessary, in other words: the Lebanon Model; or
2. The parties return to full combat.

If option #2 comes to pass, there will be one major difference from before: there are no live Israeli hostages in Gaza. Israel now has the capacity to strike Hamas positions without concern for endangering the hostages’ lives, or the need to strike a deal before the hostages die from starvation and abuse.

In other words, this would be a “reboot” of Israel’s previous “Gideon’s Chariot” operation which was meant to take Gaza City and destroy Hamas, except without hostages.

As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated last month from the White House, “This can be done the easy way or it can be done the hard way, but it will be done,” a sentiment President Trump later echoed more bluntly, saying “If Hamas continues to kill people in Gaza, which was not the Deal, we will have no choice but to go in and kill them.”

Daniel Pomerantz is the CEO of RealityCheck, an organization dedicated to deepening public conversation through robust research studies and public speaking.