Uncategorized
Israeli democracy may not survive a ‘reform’ of its Supreme Court
(JTA) — On Dec. 29, Israel swore in Benjamin Netanyahu’s sixth government. The Likud leader became Israel’s prime minister once more, and one week later, Israel’s long-anticipated judicial counterrevolution began.
In the Knesset Wednesday, newly minted Justice Minister and Netanyahu confidant Yariv Levin unveiled a package of proposed legislation that would alter the balance of power between Israel’s legislature and its Supreme Court.
At the core of this plan is a bill to allow the Knesset to override the Supreme Court. Levin’s proposals — which almost certainly have the immediate support of a Knesset majority, regardless of Levin’s assurances that they would be subject to “thorough debate” — would pave the way for Israel’s new government to pass legislation that curtails rights and undermines the rule of law, dealing a blow to Israeli democracy.
The dire implications of this proposed judicial reform are rooted in key characteristics of the Israeli political system that set it apart from other liberal democracies. Israel has no constitution to determine the balance of power between its various branches of government. In fact, there is no separation between Israel’s executive and legislative branches, given that the government automatically controls a majority in the parliament.
Instead, it has a series of basic laws enacted piecemeal over the course of the state’s history that have a quasi-constitutional status, with the initial intention that they would eventually constitute a de jure constitution.
Through the 1980s, the Knesset passed basic laws that primarily served to define state institutions, such as the country’s legislature and electoral system, capital and military. In the 1990s, there was a paradigm shift with the passage of two basic laws that for the first time concerned individuals’ rights rather than institutions, one on Human Dignity and Liberty (1992) and the other on Freedom of Occupation (1994). These laws enshrined rights to freedom of movement, personal freedom, human dignity and others to all who reside in Israel.
Aharon Barak, the president of Israel’s Supreme Court from 1995 to 2006, argued that these laws constituted a de facto bill of rights, empowering the court to review Knesset legislation and to strike down laws that violate civil liberties, a responsibility not explicitly bestowed upon the court in the basic law pertaining to the judiciary. In 1995, the Supreme Court officially ruled that it could indeed repeal legislation that violates the country’s basic laws, heralding an era of increased judicial activism in Israel in what became known as the “judicial revolution.” The court has struck down 20 laws since, a fairly modest number compared to other democracies.
The judicial revolution of the 1990s shifted the balance of power in Israel’s political system from one of parliamentary sovereignty, in which the Knesset enjoyed ultimate power, to one in which the legislature is restricted from violating the country’s (incomplete) constitution. Israel’s Supreme Court became a check on the legislative branch in a country that lacks other checks and balances and separations of power.
As a result of these characteristics, the Supreme Court currently serves as one of the only checks on the extraordinary power of Israel’s 120-member Knesset — which is why shifting that balance of power would have such a dramatic impact on Israel’s democracy.
Levin’s proposed judicial overhaul includes several elements that would weaken the power and independence of Israel’s Supreme Court. The plan includes forbidding the Supreme Court from deliberating on and striking down basic laws themselves. It would require an unspecified “special majority” of the court to strike down legislation, raising the threshold from where it currently stands.
Levin has also called for altering the composition of the selection committee that appoints top judges to give the government, rather than legal professionals, a majority on the panel. It would allow cabinet ministers to appoint legal advisors to act on their behalf, rather than that of the justice ministry, canceling these advisors’ role as safeguards against government overreach. Should a minister enact a decision that contravenes a basic law, the ministry’s legal advisor would no longer report the violation to the attorney general, and would instead merely offer non-binding legal advice to the minister.
The pièce de résistance is, of course, the override clause that would allow the Knesset to reinstate laws struck down by the Supreme Court by 61 members of Knesset, a simple majority assuming all members are present. The sole restriction on this override would be a provision preventing the Knesset from re-legislating laws struck down unanimously, by all 15 judges, within the same Knesset term.
This plan’s obvious and most immediate result would be the effective annulment of the quasi-constitutional status of Israel’s basic laws. If the Knesset’s power to legislate is no longer bound by basic laws, these de facto constitutional amendments no longer have any teeth. There are no guardrails preventing any Knesset majority from doing as it wishes, including violating basic human rights. The Knesset could pass laws openly curtailing freedom of the press or gender equality, for example, should it choose to do so.
This counterrevolution, in effect, goes further than merely undoing what occurred in the 1990s.
Most crucially, the Knesset that would once again enjoy full parliamentary sovereignty in 2022 is not the Knesset of Israel’s first four decades. Shackling the Supreme Court is essential to the agendas of the new government’s various ultra-right and ultra-religious parties. For example, the haredi Orthodox parties are eager to re-legislate a blanket exemption to the military draft for their community, which the court struck down in 2017 on the grounds that it was discriminatory. They also have their sights on revoking recognition of non-Orthodox conversions for immigrants to Israel, undoing a court decision from 2021.
The far-right, Jewish supremacist parties of Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, meanwhile, see an opportunity to deal a decisive blow to an institution that has long served as a check on the settlement movement. They hope to tie the court’s hands in the face of oncoming legislation to retroactively legalize settlements built on private Palestinian land, which are illegal under Israeli law. But this is only the beginning: Neutering the authority of the court could pave the way for legal discrimination against Israel’s Arab minority, such as Ben-Gvir’s proposal to deport minorities who show insufficient loyalty.
The timing of Levin’s announcement Wednesday could not be more germane. The Knesset recently amended the basic law to legalize the appointment of Aryeh Deri, the Shas party leader who is serving a suspended sentence for tax fraud, as a minister in the new government. The Supreme Court convened Thursday morning to hear petitions against his appointment from those arguing that it is “unreasonable” to rehabilitate Deri given his multiple criminal convictions, a view shared by Israel’s attorney general. Levin’s proposals would bar the court from using this “reasonability” standard.
The Israeli right has long chafed at the power of the Supreme Court, which it accuses of having a left-wing bias. But a judicial overhaul like this has never enjoyed the full support of the government, nor was Netanyahu previously in favor of it. Now, with a uniformly right-wing government and Netanyahu on trial for corruption, the prime minister’s foremost interest is appeasing his political partners and securing their support for future legislation to shield him from prosecution.
In a system where the majority rules, there need to be mechanisms in place to protect the rights of minorities — political, ethnic and religious. Liberal democracy requires respect for the rule of law and human rights. Yariv Levin’s proposals to fully subordinate the Supreme Court to the Knesset will concentrate virtually unchecked power in the hands of a few individuals — government ministers and party leaders within the coalition who effectively control what the Knesset does. That those individuals were elected in free and fair elections is no guarantee that the changes they make will be democratic.
—
The post Israeli democracy may not survive a ‘reform’ of its Supreme Court appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
Uncategorized
What sort of Yiddish do Yiddishists speak today?
Ask the question: “What sort of Yiddish do Yiddishists speak?” and a jokester might respond: “Well, these days they speak English.”
But let’s consider the Yiddishists who really do speak it in order to preserve it as a living language, because they see it as a treasured part of the Ashkenazi cultural heritage.
Their purpose is different than the Hasidim who speak the language as a way of preserving their religious lifestyle and traditional Jewish values.
Linguist Emma Breslow recently defended her dissertation about the way that Yiddishists speak the language. She interviewed 30 Yiddish speakers at the annual week-long Yiddish immersion retreat Yiddish Vokh and also met with Yiddish speakers from New York, Boston and Montreal.
When she asked people whether they considered themselves Yiddishists, most said no. Perhaps the words Yiddishism and Yiddishist sound rather old-fashioned today. Since Breslow couldn’t find a label that speakers could agree on, she uses the phrase “minority-context Yiddish community” in her study. This category, she writes, also includes former Hasidim who occasionally participate in Yiddishist gatherings.
One surprise in her dissertation is the diversity in this community’s Yiddish. An outsider might assume that all Yiddishists speak the same but that isn’t so: some adhere to Standard Yiddish — the literary standard established by the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research and used in most Yiddish language courses today. Others use the Polish or Ukrainian Yiddish dialect or switch dialects. Sometimes they would say gut (good) and other times — git; sometimes zogn (to say) and other times — zugn.
When Breslow asked people their opinion of Standard Yiddish she mainly received negative answers, although some acknowledged that Standard Yiddish could be useful for learning the language, since the spelling closely matches the pronunciation.
Some interviewees made unexpected comments about Standard Yiddish, as in “Nobody speaks that,” even if, being at the Yiddish Vokh, they might have earlier chatted with Standard Yiddish speakers, and even heard children speak it as a native language. Her dissertation discusses this feeling they have that Standard Yiddish lacks authenticity — maybe precisely because so few people speak it from birth.
The minority-context Yiddish community consists of several groups: a) native speakers — those who speak Yiddish well from home; b) heritage speakers — those who heard it as children, but don’t speak it well; c) students and others who studied the language as adults, and d) former Hasidim, who now live in the larger secular world. Each group speaks differently, but there are interesting points of comparison.
Among her subjects, the former Hasidim speak so-called Hasidic Yiddish — a dialect that linguists have been researching intensely in recent years. Students mostly speak a sort of Standard Yiddish, which they learned from their teachers. All of the Yiddish speakers often exhibited a certain influence or interference from English; no surprise, considering that Hasidim — the largest group of Yiddish speakers today by far — mix English words into their Yiddish too.
Breslow’s quotations include interesting examples of code-switching — when speakers go back and forth between languages. Some of the younger speakers use the word like as a discourse marker in their Yiddish just as in their English.
A second topic of Breslow’s investigation is the articulation of the Yiddish letter reysh, which is similar to the R sound. In the older dialects there were two sorts of reysh: the throat (uvular) reysh, like in French or Modern Hebrew, and the tongue-tip (apical) reysh, as in Russian or Spanish. In addition to those two pronunciations, today’s Yiddishists also use the English-style (retroflex) reysh. Interestingly, linguist Uriel Weinreich, who authored the textbook, cautioned in the preface that students should not use the American reysh.
The grammar of the Yiddishists is also worth examining. Although many have taken courses teaching the grammar of Standard Yiddish, they don’t necessarily follow the rules. That shouldn’t come as a surprise, since even authentic Yiddish speakers of previous generations spoke in dialects that differed considerably from the way Yiddish was written in books and in the press. That’s why there’s no reason to criticize Hasidim for “ruining the grammar,” as many non-Hasidic Yiddish speakers do, since Yiddish speakers have been “ruining” the proper grammar for centuries.
The post What sort of Yiddish do Yiddishists speak today? appeared first on The Forward.
Uncategorized
Argentina rabbi: What can can learn from losing the World Cup?
דעם פֿאַרגאַנגענעם זונטיק, גלײַך נאָכן סוף פֿונעם וועלט־בעכער טורניי 2026 האָב איך אָנגערופֿן אַ גוטן פֿרײַנד אין אַרגענטינע, כּדי צו הערן ווי עס גייט אים.
איך בין ממש צעבראָכן — האָט ער געזאָגט — פֿאַרוואָס האָט דער אויבערשטער דאָס געטאָן?!
האָב איך אים געענטפֿערט: — איך בין נישט דעם אויבערשטנס בוכהאַלטער, און זיכער נישט זײַן אַדוואָקאַט. איך ווייס נישט פֿאַרוואָס ער טוט וואָס ער טוט, און פֿאַרוואָס ער טוט נישט וואָס ער טוט נישט. איך מיין אַז די וויכטיקסטע פֿראַגע איז נישט: „פֿאַרוואָס איז דאָס געשען“? נאָר גיכער: „וואָס איצט? וואָס קענען מיר זיך דערפֿון לערנען?“
האָט ער מיך געפֿרעגט, וואָס איך האַלט איז דער מוסה־השׂכּל. האָב איך אים געפֿרעגט צי ער געדענקט די מעשׂה פֿון יונה.
— אַוודאי. דער פֿיש האָט אים אײַנגעשלונגען.
ריכטיק — האָב איך געזאָגט — אָבער דאָס איז בלויז דער ערשטער טייל פֿון דער מעשׂה. נאָך דעם וואָס יונה האָט אין נינווה איבערגעגעבן די נבֿואה, מיט וועלכער דער אויבערשטער האָט אים געשיקט, איז ער אַרויס פֿון שטאָט און זיך אַוועקגעזעצט צו זען וואָס עס וועט ווערן.
דער אויבערשטער האָט דעמאָלט געמאַכט אויפֿוואַקסן אַ קיקיון, וואָס האָט אים געגעבן שאָטן, און יונה האָט זיך זייער געפֿרייט. אָבער אויף מאָרגן האָט דער אויבערשטער געשיקט אַ וואָרעם, וואָס האָט פֿאַרדאָרבן דעם קיקיון, און דער בוים איז פֿאַרטריקנט געוואָרן.
ווען די זון האָט שטאַרק געברענט, האָט יונה געליטן פֿון דער היץ און איז געוואָרן גאָר פֿאַרצווייפֿלט. האָט אים דער אויבערשטער געפֿרעגט: טרויערסטו איבערן קיקיון?
און יונה האָט געענטפֿערט: יאָ, ביז צום טויט.
האָט דער אויבערשטער געזאָגט: דו באַדויערסט אַ קיקיון, וואָס דו האָסט נישט פֿאַרפֿלאַנצט און נישט אויפֿגעהאָדעוועט. אין איין נאַכט איז ער אויפֿגעקומען, און אין איין נאַכט איז ער פֿאַרגאַנגען.
און זאָל איך דען נישט רחמנות האָבן אויף דער גרויסער שטאָט נינווה, וווּ עס וווינען מער פֿון צוועלף טויזנט מענטשן?“…
די מעשׂה שטעלט אונדז פֿאָר אַ פּשוטע אָבער טיפֿע פֿראַגע: וואָס פֿאַרדינט טאַקע אונדזער גרעסטע זאָרג?
און דאָ קומען מיר צוריק צום וועלט־בעכער. עס איז גאָר פֿאַרשטענדלעך, אַז אַן אַרגענטינער זאָל זײַן אַנטוישט ווען זײַן מאַנשאַפֿט פֿאַרשפּילט. ספּאָרט רופֿט אַרויס שטאַרקע געפֿילן, און דאָס איז דווקא איינע פֿון די סיבות, פֿאַרוואָס מענטשן האָבן עס אַזוי ליב.
— דײַן טרויער איז נישט קיין חסרון — האָב איך אים געזאָגט — פֿאַרקערט. עס ווײַזט, אַז דו ביסט אַ מענטש מיט געפֿיל. און געפֿיל איז אַ טײַערע מידה.
אָבער ווען די ערשטע אַנטוישונג הייבט שוין אָן זיך אָפּצושוואַכן, איז כּדאַי זיך צו פֿרעגן: וואָס נאָך אין לעבן פֿאַרדינט אַזאַ מאָס פֿון דײַן איבערגעגעבנקייט?
באַטראַכט נאָר אַ מאָמענט. דו האָסט נישט געקענט ברענגען דעם נצחון, און דו האָסט אויך נישט גורם געווען די מפּלה. און דאָך האָט דער רעזולטאַט, וואָס איז בכלל נישט געווען אין דײַנע הענט, אַזוי שטאַרק באַווירקט דײַנע געפֿילן.
אפֿשר וואָלט זיך געלוינט אַרײַנצולייגן די זעלבע עמאָציאָנעלע ענערגיע אין אַן אַנדער מין „פֿאַרמעסט“ — אין אַזאַ, וווּ דײַנע באַשלוסן און דײַנע מעשׂים קענען טאַקע מאַכן אַן אמתן חילוק.
וואָס פֿאַר אַ פֿאַרמעסט מיין איך? דאָ קומט אַרײַן אַן אויסערגעוויינטלעכע הוראה פֿונעם רמב״ם.
דער רמב״ם שרײַבט, אַז יעדער מענטש דאַרף שטענדיק זען זיך אַליין און די גאַנצע וועלט ווי פּונקט באַלאַנצירט צווישן זכות און חובֿה.
איין מצווה. איין גוט וואָרט. איין מעשׂה פֿון חסד. אַפֿילו איין גוטער געדאַנק.
יעדער איינער פֿון זיי קען איבערוועגן די גאַנצע וואָג לטובֿה — נישט נאָר פֿאַר זיך אַליין, נאָר פֿאַר דער גאַנצער וועלט.
מיר טראַכטן אָפֿט: וואָס מאַכט אויס וואָס איך׳ל טאָן? איך בין דאָך בלויז איין מענטש צווישן אַכט ביליאָן? דער רמב״ם בעט אונדז צו קוקן אויף דער וועלט מיט אַנדערע אויגן:
שטעל זיך פֿאָר אַ וואָג. אויף איין זײַט שטייען פֿיר ביליאָן מענטשן. אויף דער צווייטער זײַט — נאָך פֿיר ביליאָן. די וואָג איז פּונקט באַלאַנצירט. איצט שטעל זיך פֿאָר, אַז דו טרעטסט צו און באַשליסט אויף וועלכער זײַט זיך צו שטעלן. אין יענער רגע ווערט דײַן באַשלוס דער באַשליסנדיקער. דו ביסט דער וואָס האָט איבערגעוואָגן די גאַנצע וואָג.
אויב דאָס קלינגט צו אַבסטראַקט, לאָמיר זיך אומקערן צום וועלט־בעכער.
דער גאַנצער טורניר — נאָך וואָכן פֿון שפּילן, צענדליקער נאַציאָנאַלע מאַנשפֿאַטן און הונדערטער שפּילער — איז דער סוף באַשלאָסן געוואָרן דורך איין איינציקן מאָמענט.
איין שפּילער. איין גאָל. אַזוי איז אויך אין דער רוחניותדיקער וועלט.
דער גרויסער געראַנגל צווישן גוטס און שלעכטס, וואָס באַגלייט די גאַנצע געשיכטע פֿון דער מענטשהייט, קען אויסזען ווי עפּעס צו גרויס, כּדי אַ יחיד זאָל קענען אײַנווירקן דערויף.
אָבער אויב די וואָג איז טאַקע באַלאַנצירט, ווי דער רמב״ם באַשרײַבט, קען דער גאַנצער סוף־רעזולטאַט אָפּהענגען פֿון איין מענטש. פֿון איין מצווה. פֿון איין גוט וואָרט. פֿון איין גוטן געדאַנק.
און יענער מענטש קען זײַן דווקא דו אַליין. מיט דעם באַשלוס וואָס ליגט הײַנט אין דײַנע הענט.
עס איז דאָ נאָך אַן ענין, וואָס דער וועלט־בעכער קען אונדז לערנען. די נבֿיאים באַשרײַבן אַ צײַט, ווען די וועלט וועט דערגרייכן איר אמתן ציל. דעמאָלט וועט דער משיח קומען און ברענגען אַן עפּאָכע פֿון שלום, גערעכטיקייט און אַלגעמיינער דערקענונג פֿון גאָט.
קען מען זיך פֿרעגן: ווי אַזוי איז עס מעגלעך, אַז איין מענטש זאָל אינספּירירן די גאַנצע וועלט?
אָבער טראַכט צוריק וועגן דעם וואָס מיר האָבן פּונקט איצט מיטגעזען. ביליאָנען מענטשן האָבן אין איין אויגנבליק זיך צוגעקוקט אויף איין מענטש: ליאָנעל מעסי.
פֿאַר אַ קורצן מאָמענט איז ער געוואָרן דער צענטער פֿונעם אויפֿמערק פֿון ביליאָנען מענטשן!
אויב דאָס איז מעגלעך אין דער וועלט פֿון ספּאָרט, איז עס נאָך מער פֿאַרשטענדלעך, אַז עס וועט קומען אַ טאָג, ווען די גאַנצע מענטשהייט וועט זיך ווענדן צו אַ פֿירער, וועמענס כּוח וועט נישט ליגן אין זײַנע פֿיס, נאָר אין זײַן רוח.
משיח וועט נישט פֿאַראייניקן מענטשן אַרום אַ פּילקע. ער וועט פֿאַראייניקן זיי אַרום אמת. אַרום גוטסקייט. אַרום גערעכטיקייט. אַרום שלום. און אַרום דער ידיעה פֿון ג-טליכקייט.
איך האָב דעמאָלט צוגעגעבן מיט ַא שמייכל: „ס׳איז דאָ אַ טשיקאַווער צופֿאַל. דער נאָמען Messi קלינגט ַא ביסל ענלעך צו Messiah.
אַוודאי איז דאָס בלויז אַ לשון־צופֿאַל. אָבער אַ מאָל קען אַ קליינע צופֿעליקייט דינען ווי אַ בריק צו אַ גרעסערן געדאַנק. און דער געדאַנק איז פּשוט:
אויב די גאַנצע וועלט קען זיך פֿאַראייניקן אַרום אַ פֿוסבאָל־פֿינאַל, אויב ביליאָנען מענטשן קענען זיך טיילן די זעלבע האָפֿענונג, די זעלבע שפּאַנונג און די זעלבע באַגײַסטערונג, דערמאָנט דאָס אונדז, אַז די מענטשהייט איז פֿעיִק זיך צו פֿאַראייניקן.
די פֿראַגע איז נאָר: אַרום וואָס?
די נבֿיאים זעען פֿאָרויס א טאָג, ווען די וועלט וועט זיך פֿאַראייניקן נישט אַרום קיין שפּיל, נאָר אַרום אַ ציל. נישט אַרום אַ געווינער, נאָר אַרום אמת. נישט אַרום אַ גאָל, נאָר אַרום דעם אויבערשטן.
און ביז עס קומט יענער טאָג, האָט יעדער איינער פֿון אונדז זײַן אייגענע ראָלע. מיר דאַרפֿן נישט וואַרטן אויף אַ פֿולן סטאַדיאָן. מיר דאַרפֿן נישט וואַרטן אויף אַ וועלט־פֿינאַל. און מיר דאַרפֿן זיכער נישט וואַרטן ביז אַלע אַנדערע וועלן טאָן וואָס זיי דאַרפֿן טאָן.
די געלעגנהייט ליגט פֿאַר אונדז יעדן טאָג. יעדער באַשלוס. יעדער גוט וואָרט. יעדע מצוה. יעדער אַקט פֿון חסד. זיי אַלע זײַנען מער באַטײַטנדיק, ווי מיר שטעלן זיך פֿאָר.
אפֿשר וועלן מיר קיינמאָל נישט וויסן, ווי ווײַט די השפּעה פֿון אַן איינציקער מעשׂה האָט זיך פֿאַרשפּרייט. אָבער לויט דעם רמב״ם דאַרפֿן מיר לעבן מיט דעם באַוווּסטזײַן, אַז עס איז זייער מעגלעך, אַז דווקא יענע מעשׂה האָט איבערגעווויגן די גאַנצע וואָג.
מיר קענען אפֿשר נישט באַשליסן ווער עס זאָל געווינען דעם וועלט־בעכער. אָבער מיר קענען יעדן טאָג באַשליסן וואָס פֿאַר אַ וועלט מיר העלפֿן בויען.
אויב יעדער פֿון אונדז וועט טאָן זײַן טייל, וועלן מיר אַלע צוזאַמען העלפֿן ברענגען דעם טאָג, ווען די וועלט וועט דערגרייכן איר אמתן נצחון — די גאולה האמתית והשלימה, מיט ביאת משיח צדקנו במהרה בימינו, ממש.
The post Argentina rabbi: What can can learn from losing the World Cup? appeared first on The Forward.
Uncategorized
Trump’s messy new deal with Saudi Arabia shows how far Israel has fallen
The American decision to sign a deal granting Saudi Arabia a pathway toward a civilian nuclear program is a terrible development for Israel — not just because Riyadh could one day turn nuclear infrastructure developed with the United States into a weapons capability.
The agreement reflects the collapse of Israeli strategy under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu since the Hamas attack of Oct. 7, 2023; the erosion of Israel’s influence in the U.S.; and Israel’s descent toward the status of a pariah state.
A day after the deal was announced, Trump — seemingly rattled by the flood of criticism that ensued — said it was dependent on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords. But he did not clarify what aspect of the Accords he meant; there’s no indication that such a requirement is included in the already-signed deal; and Riyadh has made clear that it will do no such thing until there is concrete progress toward a Palestinian state, which is a fantastical notion under the current Israeli government.
For years, nuclear cooperation represented one of Washington’s greatest sources of leverage over Saudi Arabia. It was long believed that prospect would be used to anchor some kind of pact involving normalization with Israel, binding nuclear safeguards, a regional defense architecture and a united front against Iran. Under such an arrangement, Israel would have established formal relations with the Arab world’s most influential power, and gained both a central role in a new regional security system and enforceable Saudi commitments against pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Washington has now at least begun giving Riyadh the prize — no matter what Trump says, amending the deal post-facto will be at best extraordinarily difficult — without Israel receiving any of the benefits.
That dire truth is the outcome of nearly three years in which Israel has confused military brilliance with strategy, and abandoned almost all public diplomacy as its status in the world plummeted.
No one can deny the extraordinary capabilities displayed by Israel’s armed forces and intelligence services since the Oct. 7 massacre. Hezbollah absorbed devastating blows. Iranian military assets suffered setbacks. Hamas lost thousands of fighters and much of its military infrastructure.
But a sense of true strategy is needed to convert military achievement to political outcomes. Strategy can strengthen alliances, expand legitimacy and leave a country in a stronger geopolitical position than the one in which it entered a conflict.
That seems to be completely beyond Netanyahu’s ability.
In the months immediately following Oct. 7, Israel possessed something extraordinarily rare: overwhelming international legitimacy. Hamas had committed an atrocity that horrified much of the democratic world. Moderate Arab governments viewed Hamas as a dangerous extension of the same Islamist forces that threatened their own stability. Former President Joe Biden’s administration recognized that extraordinary alignment, and sought to build upon it, working toward an ambitious regional framework.
In the early months of war, Hamas faced near-unanimous global pressure to hand over Gaza to a reformed Palestinian Authority, backed by moderate Arab governments. Arab states appeared ready to help marginalize Hamas politically and financially, and make life uncomfortable for its leaders.
For a moment, it was easy to see a path forward in which Saudi Arabia would normalize relations with Israel, with other countries following. A U.S.-led regional alliance facing Iran might integrate Israel into the Middle East more deeply than was ever previously imaginable.
That framework offered Israel the chance to translate the trauma of Oct. 7 into a strategic transformation of the region. Instead, Netanyahu chose an open-ended war whose nebulously defined goals were not achievable by military means alone, amid a reasonable and growing suspicion in the public and around the world that he was doing so to preserve his hold on power.
Every few weeks Israelis heard that Hamas stood on the verge of collapse. Each extension of the war was presented as the last before “complete victory” — which Netanyahu kept claiming was “a step” away. Victory remained perpetually on the horizon as Israel’s international standing collapsed.
Now, Netanyahu is wanted at the Hague. Diplomatic isolation has deepened and economic pressure mounted as boycott movements — including many informal ones — expanded.
And critically, American public opinion has shifted sharply, particularly among younger Americans, threatening the bipartisan foundation upon which Israel’s relationship with Washington has rested for generations.
Recent credible polls show that more Americans now sympathize with Palestinians than with Israelis.
Israelis think this happened because of a propaganda campaign against them on social media, because of antisemitism in Europe, or because of hostile journalists. That is partly true but mostly wrong. These shifts are mostly a result of the posture of the Israeli government.
The reality is that Israel killed tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians, accepted that toll with remarkably little public reflection or regret, and relied on the trauma of Oct. 7 to justify it. Around the world, that proved politically devastating. It is especially absurd considering that Israel paid this extraordinary price without achieving its central objective of removing Hamas from Gaza — which was foreseeable and infuriating.
Things might change if the opposition comes to power in October. The idiotic demonization of the Palestinian Authority might end. Jewish terrorism in the West Bank might be stamped out. Settlement construction beyond the fence line, and certainly illegal outposts, might stop.
Israel might again at least be trying to find a solution to the festering Palestinian issue — or at least prefer to lower the flames. That might, in the long term, bring Saudi Arabia back to the table.
But the U.S, has stopped waiting. That the Saudi deal was signed at all, no matter what Trump says now, suggests that Washington is now basically indifferent to the loss of leverage for a deal favoring Israel.
How to resolve the muddle Trump has made? The key: the agreement appears to not include the possibility of enrichment on Saudi soil, but just general assistance to create a program for nuclear energy. So Trump will be able to say that enrichment must await Saudi normalization with Israel. But Saudi Arabia will still be able to claim the symbolic victory of entering into nuclear collaboration with the U.S.
And so, the regional architecture envisioned in the first months after Oct. 7 has vanished because of the forever-wars Netanyahu has pursued — which also resulted in the deaths of dozens of hostages and more than 1,000 soldiers, badly damaged Israel’s economy, and left the country’s international standing in shambles.
And the strategic alliance between Israel and the U.S. — without which Israel’s very existence will be in danger — is falling apart in front of our eyes, not because of Trump but because we are losing the American people.
This is what you get when you are all brawn and no brain, and all tactics and no strategy.
That realization should define Israel’s coming election far more even than arguments over judicial reform or the Haredi draft. Those who have led Israel into this disaster deserve to be punished. Not just removed from power, but decisively repudiated. They have become a danger to the Zionist project itself.
The post Trump’s messy new deal with Saudi Arabia shows how far Israel has fallen appeared first on The Forward.
