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Israeli democracy may not survive a ‘reform’ of its Supreme Court
(JTA) — On Dec. 29, Israel swore in Benjamin Netanyahu’s sixth government. The Likud leader became Israel’s prime minister once more, and one week later, Israel’s long-anticipated judicial counterrevolution began.
In the Knesset Wednesday, newly minted Justice Minister and Netanyahu confidant Yariv Levin unveiled a package of proposed legislation that would alter the balance of power between Israel’s legislature and its Supreme Court.
At the core of this plan is a bill to allow the Knesset to override the Supreme Court. Levin’s proposals — which almost certainly have the immediate support of a Knesset majority, regardless of Levin’s assurances that they would be subject to “thorough debate” — would pave the way for Israel’s new government to pass legislation that curtails rights and undermines the rule of law, dealing a blow to Israeli democracy.
The dire implications of this proposed judicial reform are rooted in key characteristics of the Israeli political system that set it apart from other liberal democracies. Israel has no constitution to determine the balance of power between its various branches of government. In fact, there is no separation between Israel’s executive and legislative branches, given that the government automatically controls a majority in the parliament.
Instead, it has a series of basic laws enacted piecemeal over the course of the state’s history that have a quasi-constitutional status, with the initial intention that they would eventually constitute a de jure constitution.
Through the 1980s, the Knesset passed basic laws that primarily served to define state institutions, such as the country’s legislature and electoral system, capital and military. In the 1990s, there was a paradigm shift with the passage of two basic laws that for the first time concerned individuals’ rights rather than institutions, one on Human Dignity and Liberty (1992) and the other on Freedom of Occupation (1994). These laws enshrined rights to freedom of movement, personal freedom, human dignity and others to all who reside in Israel.
Aharon Barak, the president of Israel’s Supreme Court from 1995 to 2006, argued that these laws constituted a de facto bill of rights, empowering the court to review Knesset legislation and to strike down laws that violate civil liberties, a responsibility not explicitly bestowed upon the court in the basic law pertaining to the judiciary. In 1995, the Supreme Court officially ruled that it could indeed repeal legislation that violates the country’s basic laws, heralding an era of increased judicial activism in Israel in what became known as the “judicial revolution.” The court has struck down 20 laws since, a fairly modest number compared to other democracies.
The judicial revolution of the 1990s shifted the balance of power in Israel’s political system from one of parliamentary sovereignty, in which the Knesset enjoyed ultimate power, to one in which the legislature is restricted from violating the country’s (incomplete) constitution. Israel’s Supreme Court became a check on the legislative branch in a country that lacks other checks and balances and separations of power.
As a result of these characteristics, the Supreme Court currently serves as one of the only checks on the extraordinary power of Israel’s 120-member Knesset — which is why shifting that balance of power would have such a dramatic impact on Israel’s democracy.
Levin’s proposed judicial overhaul includes several elements that would weaken the power and independence of Israel’s Supreme Court. The plan includes forbidding the Supreme Court from deliberating on and striking down basic laws themselves. It would require an unspecified “special majority” of the court to strike down legislation, raising the threshold from where it currently stands.
Levin has also called for altering the composition of the selection committee that appoints top judges to give the government, rather than legal professionals, a majority on the panel. It would allow cabinet ministers to appoint legal advisors to act on their behalf, rather than that of the justice ministry, canceling these advisors’ role as safeguards against government overreach. Should a minister enact a decision that contravenes a basic law, the ministry’s legal advisor would no longer report the violation to the attorney general, and would instead merely offer non-binding legal advice to the minister.
The pièce de résistance is, of course, the override clause that would allow the Knesset to reinstate laws struck down by the Supreme Court by 61 members of Knesset, a simple majority assuming all members are present. The sole restriction on this override would be a provision preventing the Knesset from re-legislating laws struck down unanimously, by all 15 judges, within the same Knesset term.
This plan’s obvious and most immediate result would be the effective annulment of the quasi-constitutional status of Israel’s basic laws. If the Knesset’s power to legislate is no longer bound by basic laws, these de facto constitutional amendments no longer have any teeth. There are no guardrails preventing any Knesset majority from doing as it wishes, including violating basic human rights. The Knesset could pass laws openly curtailing freedom of the press or gender equality, for example, should it choose to do so.
This counterrevolution, in effect, goes further than merely undoing what occurred in the 1990s.
Most crucially, the Knesset that would once again enjoy full parliamentary sovereignty in 2022 is not the Knesset of Israel’s first four decades. Shackling the Supreme Court is essential to the agendas of the new government’s various ultra-right and ultra-religious parties. For example, the haredi Orthodox parties are eager to re-legislate a blanket exemption to the military draft for their community, which the court struck down in 2017 on the grounds that it was discriminatory. They also have their sights on revoking recognition of non-Orthodox conversions for immigrants to Israel, undoing a court decision from 2021.
The far-right, Jewish supremacist parties of Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, meanwhile, see an opportunity to deal a decisive blow to an institution that has long served as a check on the settlement movement. They hope to tie the court’s hands in the face of oncoming legislation to retroactively legalize settlements built on private Palestinian land, which are illegal under Israeli law. But this is only the beginning: Neutering the authority of the court could pave the way for legal discrimination against Israel’s Arab minority, such as Ben-Gvir’s proposal to deport minorities who show insufficient loyalty.
The timing of Levin’s announcement Wednesday could not be more germane. The Knesset recently amended the basic law to legalize the appointment of Aryeh Deri, the Shas party leader who is serving a suspended sentence for tax fraud, as a minister in the new government. The Supreme Court convened Thursday morning to hear petitions against his appointment from those arguing that it is “unreasonable” to rehabilitate Deri given his multiple criminal convictions, a view shared by Israel’s attorney general. Levin’s proposals would bar the court from using this “reasonability” standard.
The Israeli right has long chafed at the power of the Supreme Court, which it accuses of having a left-wing bias. But a judicial overhaul like this has never enjoyed the full support of the government, nor was Netanyahu previously in favor of it. Now, with a uniformly right-wing government and Netanyahu on trial for corruption, the prime minister’s foremost interest is appeasing his political partners and securing their support for future legislation to shield him from prosecution.
In a system where the majority rules, there need to be mechanisms in place to protect the rights of minorities — political, ethnic and religious. Liberal democracy requires respect for the rule of law and human rights. Yariv Levin’s proposals to fully subordinate the Supreme Court to the Knesset will concentrate virtually unchecked power in the hands of a few individuals — government ministers and party leaders within the coalition who effectively control what the Knesset does. That those individuals were elected in free and fair elections is no guarantee that the changes they make will be democratic.
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In new book, Biden says Israel went too far in Gaza, warns its strongest American defenders are disappearing
Former President Joe Biden expressed his regrets over the duration and impact of the Gaza war in a new memoir published Tuesday, and shared his belief that Israelis needed a trusted ally to help restrain their military response.
“I repeatedly sought to restrain the Israelis,” Biden writes in Promise Me, America, adding that “Israel went too far” in the war against Hamas. The former president also doesn’t shy away from harshly rebuking Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s tactics. “Bibi had no qualms about making promises he had no power — or intention — to keep,” Biden writes, using Netnayahu’s nickname.
But the book leaves unanswered why Biden did not publicly share more of his frustrations with Israel, why he waited so long to restrict weapons shipments, and whether he could have pressured Netanyahu earlier and more forcefully to mitigate the devastation in Gaza — central criticisms of his administration’s handling of the war.
Biden, who repeatedly described himself as a lifelong “Zionist,” largely defends his own policy decisions on the war and his personal support for Israel. “I will never regret standing by Israel in the wake of Oct. 7,” he writes. “It was the worst attack on the Jewish people since the Holocaust. And I will never agree with those who say we should stop supplying Israel with the weapons they need to defend and protect themselves.”
Reflecting on growing divisions within the Democratic Party over U.S. support for Israel, Biden warns Israelis that they may not be able to count on the same level of support from future American leaders. “I hope Israel wakes up,” he writes. “The days of American leaders like me —passionate defenders of Israel to the core — are passing.”
Biden, who, at age 83, is battling stage 4 prostate cancer, acknowledges that he belongs to a “different generation” in his historical view of the Jewish state than many younger Americans, including the pro-Palestinian protesters who demonstrated on college campuses.
“These protests often conflated very different historical circumstances. But there was also an edge to them — many of the marchers seemed to believe that they could wish Israel out of existence, simply by chanting slogans about a Palestine that stretched ‘from the river to the sea,’ “ he wrote. “That slogan was more than a little provocative, as it glibly threatened to displace a people who had been displaced so many times in their history.”
Biden’s view of Netanyahu
Biden’s criticism of Netanyahu, the longest-serving Israeli leader, who lost his parliamentary majority in the recent elections, goes beyond his handling of the Gaza war and is strikingly harsher than the approach he took during his decades in public office.
He questions Netanyahu’s honesty, judgment and willingness to put Israel’s long-term interests ahead of his own political survival.
“Bombing Gaza from the air and leaving an ever-rising body count would obviously cause lasting harm to Israel’s reputation, as I warned Bibi many times,” Biden writes, recalling “many heated conversations” about that in the spring of 2024. “At one point, I warned Bibi that the extremists in his cabinet were out of control. I said, ‘Bibi, you promised me your hands were on the steering wheel.’ When he replied that they were, I said, ‘Well, you’re driving into a ditch!’”
Netanyahu, in his own memoir published while he was out of office between 2021 and 2022, claimed that Biden’s criticism reflected growing pressure from his party’s progressive wing.
The two men had known each other for decades. In the early 2000s, Biden signed a photograph of them, with the line: “Bibi, I don’t agree with a damn thing you had to say, but I love you.” But Biden suggests their relationship soured over the years. “There wasn’t a ton of trust,” he writes, “I was also worried about Bibi’s Trump-like tendencies. He could play fast and loose with the truth, and thought nothing of bending democratic institutions to serve his personal needs.”
Those concerns became more serious as the Gaza war continued. The disagreements eventually led Biden to pause a shipment of 200-lb bombs in May 2024, as Israel prepared a major military operation in Rafah. The decision drew criticism from Israel’s supporters, who accused Biden of undermining an ally, while critics argued that he was still doing too little to stop the suffering in Gaza.
Biden’s disappointment with Schumer
Biden’s frustration with longtime allies was not limited to Israel. In another section of the book, he describes feeling personally betrayed by Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer, who visited him at his Delaware home in July 2024 to urge him to withdraw from the presidential race.
Schumer, the highest-ranking Jewish elected official in American history, had been one of Biden’s closest allies in Washington. But following Biden’s catastrophic debate performance against Donald Trump, Schumer joined other senior Democrats who feared that keeping Biden at the top of the ticket would hurt the party’s chances in November.
Biden writes that he did not appreciate the intervention. “Loyalty matters to me,” he writes. “If I give you my word, I stick with you. If I say I’m with you, I’m with you to the end.”
Schumer is now facing a tough leadership challenge of his own, related in part to his stance on Israel, after helping Democrats win back the Senate with a historic gain of at least nine seats in the midterm elections.
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Yiddish educator Asya Schulman to receive ‘Dreaming in Yiddish’ Award
Asya Vaisman, a scholar of Yiddish pedagogy and language acquisition, has been selected as this year’s recipient of the prestigious Adrienne Cooper Dreaming in Yiddish Award. Vaisman is also a Yiddish instructor, singer-songwriter, dance leader and translator of Yiddish poetry.
The ceremony will take place at the Dreaming in Yiddish Award Concert during the Yiddish New York festival — the largest annual Yiddish culture festival in the world — to be held December 26-31 at the 14th Street Y and the adjacent Town & Village Synagogue.
Vaisman is the director of the Yiddish Language Institute and the Steiner Summer Yiddish Program at the Yiddish Book Center in Amherst, Mass., and the lead author of the widely praised book In eynem: The New Yiddish Textbook, which received the 2021 Textbook Excellence Award.
She received her PhD in Yiddish Language and Culture from Harvard University, where she wrote her dissertation on the Yiddish songs and singing practices of contemporary Hasidic women. She has participated in and taught at Klezmer and Yiddish culture festivals around the world.
Now in its eleventh year, Yiddish New York brings together a global community for in-person events in downtown New York, as well as online programming via Zoom. The festival includes concerts, workshops, lectures, films, Yiddish classes, dance parties and intergenerational community events.
The award is named for Adrienne Cooper, a popular Yiddish singer, musician and activist who was integral to the revival of klezmer music. The Dreaming in Yiddish Award supports artists who have contributed to the contemporary Yiddish cultural scene.
To register for the Dreaming in Yiddish concert in person or online, or to find out more about the festival, click here.
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Israel’s opposition will decide the country’s future. Here are their choices.
Israel’s opposition is approaching a choice that could determine not only who governs the country but whether it can address some of the gravest threats to its future.
Gadi Eisenkot, the former military chief seeking to replace Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, can form a government with Arab support or he can make costly concessions to the ultra-Orthodox and form a coalition with them.
Accepting the support of Arab lawmakers breaks a political promise but costs relatively little in policy concessions. Bringing the ultra-Orthodox parties into the government almost certainly sacrifices reforms essential to Israel’s economic and social survival.
Negotiations now underway suggest a possible outcome that is less straightforward than either choice: an Arab-backed government that eventually brings in the ultra-Orthodox on considerably less favorable terms.
The decision rests largely with Avigdor Lieberman — and the outcome may surprise everyone.
The latest developments
To recap, Eisenkot commands 48 seats in the 120-member Knesset. Another 19 belong to Arab parties, an unprecedented number whose support is effectively available without major policy concessions. Together, they would have 67 seats, a comfortable majority. But most of Eisenkot’s prospective coalition partners promised not to form a government dependent on Arab parties. Accepting Arab support would break that promise.
Lieberman, a 68-year-old secular nationalist who broke years ago with Netanyahu, his former boss, has over the past week been pushing hard for negotiating with the 14 lawmakers from the ultra-Orthodox, or Haredi, parties, longtime allies of Netanyahu’s Likud. Controlling seven seats himself, he could deny Eisenkot a majority. But giving in to Haredi demands would compromise another central opposition promise: ending sweeping military draft exemptions for tens of thousands of yeshiva students.
Lieberman, who has been appointed by the Knesset to head its Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, conceded that under his proposals “not everyone will be drafted.” This is a dramatic break with his central election promise.
And the costs of the different broken promises are profoundly different.
The consequences of each choice
The Arab parties are asking for relatively little, principally a crackdown on organized crime and violence in Arab communities. The Haredim want to preserve not only draft exemptions but also government funding for schools that refuse to teach core subjects, subsidies encouraging prolonged religious study, and institutional arrangements that impede economic integration.
These demands threaten Israel’s future.
Only about half of working-age Haredi men are employed, and many Haredi boys receive little instruction in mathematics, English and other subjects essential to participation in a modern economy. The community already constitutes roughly one-sixth of Israel’s population and has exceptionally high birthrates.
Research published by the Bank of Israel found that public expenditure attributable to an average Haredi household approaches 13,000 shekels monthly, including benefits, subsidies and government services.
As the Haredi share of the population grows, preserving this system becomes increasingly unsustainable. The consequences could include higher taxes, declining productivity and an exodus of economically productive Israelis who see no prospect of change.
For years, the hope was that a centrist government freed from Netanyahu’s dependence on the Haredim could finally implement essential reforms. Now a government formed to replace him risks perpetuating precisely the same system.
This would be devastating to those reservist Israelis who have just spent three years of war constantly shuttled from one front to another, being promised that eventually, should the opposition come to power, the burdens will be distributed more evenly. The idea was that Netanyahu – whose right wing has rarely had a Knesset majority with the Haredim – depends on the existing arrangement whereas the opposition does not.
Lieberman’s sudden willingness to abandon his opposition to ultra-Orthodox privileges – one TV anchor described it as “hating the Arabs more than the Haredim” – complicates matters and raises another interesting scenario.
What to watch for
If it turns out that the Haredi price is too high for the opposition to pay, these talks may fall apart. That could happen if, for example, the Haredi parties insist on an “override clause” enabling the Knesset to overturn the expected Supreme Court veto of any deal legalizing the now-informal sweeping draft exemptions for seminary students.
That would mean that unless a deal with the Arabs were revived – or the even less likely option of joining Netanyahu was seriously considered – Israel would be headed toward another round of elections. And in those elections, Lieberman would face the very real prospect of being wiped out – or failing to make the threshold of 3.25 percent of the vote; he won 6 percent on Oct. 27, largely on the strength of his anti-Haredi position.
The prospect of political extinction may focus his mind and make him more amenable to the Arab option.
Eisenkot himself appears prepared to pursue it, possibly forming a 48-member coalition supported from outside by Arab lawmakers.
Such a government would not necessarily be as unstable as Netanyahu claims. Israel’s constructive vote of no confidence requires 61 lawmakers to agree on an alternative government. Netanyahu’s bloc has only 53 seats. Removing Eisenkot through that mechanism would effectively require Arab lawmakers to help reinstall Netanyahu, an exceedingly unlikely prospect.
At least one Arab party, Ra’am, has indicated willingness to meet Eisenkot’s conditions, including recognition of Hamas as a terrorist organization.
And there is a further possibility that could change the entire calculation.
Once Eisenkot demonstrates that he can form a government with Arab support, the Haredim would no longer be indispensable. Their bargaining power would diminish, and they might eventually choose to join the government on much less favorable terms. Shas’s participation in the Rabin government formed in 1992 offers a historical parallel.
That would turn the current negotiations on their head. The opposition could establish a government without agreeing to the Haredim’s most damaging demands, while leaving open the possibility of their eventual participation.
Watch for the moment the Haredi demands become unacceptable to Lieberman. That may be the point at which Israel’s next government finally begins to take shape.
The post Israel’s opposition will decide the country’s future. Here are their choices. appeared first on The Forward.

