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Israeli democracy may not survive a ‘reform’ of its Supreme Court

(JTA) — On Dec. 29, Israel swore in Benjamin Netanyahu’s sixth government. The Likud leader became Israel’s prime minister once more, and one week later, Israel’s long-anticipated judicial counterrevolution began.

In the Knesset Wednesday, newly minted Justice Minister and Netanyahu confidant Yariv Levin unveiled a package of proposed legislation that would alter the balance of power between Israel’s legislature and its Supreme Court.

At the core of this plan is a bill to allow the Knesset to override the Supreme Court. Levin’s proposals — which almost certainly have the immediate support of a Knesset majority, regardless of Levin’s assurances that they would be subject to “thorough debate” — would pave the way for Israel’s new government to pass legislation that curtails rights and undermines the rule of law, dealing a blow to Israeli democracy.

The dire implications of this proposed judicial reform are rooted in key characteristics of the Israeli political system that set it apart from other liberal democracies. Israel has no constitution to determine the balance of power between its various branches of government. In fact, there is no separation between Israel’s executive and legislative branches, given that the government automatically controls a majority in the parliament. 

Instead, it has a series of basic laws enacted piecemeal over the course of the state’s history that have a quasi-constitutional status, with the initial intention that they would eventually constitute a de jure constitution. 

Through the 1980s, the Knesset passed basic laws that primarily served to define state institutions, such as the country’s legislature and electoral system, capital and military. In the 1990s, there was a paradigm shift with the passage of two basic laws that for the first time concerned individuals’ rights rather than institutions, one on Human Dignity and Liberty (1992) and the other on Freedom of Occupation (1994). These laws enshrined rights to freedom of movement, personal freedom, human dignity and others to all who reside in Israel. 

Aharon Barak, the president of Israel’s Supreme Court from 1995 to 2006, argued that these laws constituted a de facto bill of rights, empowering the court to review Knesset legislation and to strike down laws that violate civil liberties, a responsibility not explicitly bestowed upon the court in the basic law pertaining to the judiciary. In 1995, the Supreme Court officially ruled that it could indeed repeal legislation that violates the country’s basic laws, heralding an era of increased judicial activism in Israel in what became known as the “judicial revolution.” The court has struck down 20 laws since, a fairly modest number compared to other democracies.

The judicial revolution of the 1990s shifted the balance of power in Israel’s political system from one of parliamentary sovereignty, in which the Knesset enjoyed ultimate power, to one in which the legislature is restricted from violating the country’s (incomplete) constitution. Israel’s Supreme Court became a check on the legislative branch in a country that lacks other checks and balances and separations of power.

As a result of these characteristics, the Supreme Court currently serves as one of the only checks on the extraordinary power of Israel’s 120-member Knesset — which is why shifting that balance of power would have such a dramatic impact on Israel’s democracy.

Levin’s proposed judicial overhaul includes several elements that would weaken the power and independence of Israel’s Supreme Court. The plan includes forbidding the Supreme Court from deliberating on and striking down basic laws themselves. It would require an unspecified “special majority” of the court to strike down legislation, raising the threshold from where it currently stands. 

Levin has also called for altering the composition of the selection committee that appoints top judges to give the government, rather than legal professionals, a majority on the panel. It would allow cabinet ministers to appoint legal advisors to act on their behalf, rather than that of the justice ministry, canceling these advisors’ role as safeguards against government overreach. Should a minister enact a decision that contravenes a basic law, the ministry’s legal advisor would no longer report the violation to the attorney general, and would instead merely offer non-binding legal advice to the minister. 

The pièce de résistance is, of course, the override clause that would allow the Knesset to reinstate laws struck down by the Supreme Court by 61 members of Knesset, a simple majority assuming all members are present. The sole restriction on this override would be a provision preventing the Knesset from re-legislating laws struck down unanimously, by all 15 judges, within the same Knesset term. 

This plan’s obvious and most immediate result would be the effective annulment of the quasi-constitutional status of Israel’s basic laws. If the Knesset’s power to legislate is no longer bound by basic laws, these de facto constitutional amendments no longer have any teeth. There are no guardrails preventing any Knesset majority from doing as it wishes, including violating basic human rights. The Knesset could pass laws openly curtailing freedom of the press or gender equality, for example, should it choose to do so.

This counterrevolution, in effect, goes further than merely undoing what occurred in the 1990s.

Most crucially, the Knesset that would once again enjoy full parliamentary sovereignty in 2022 is not the Knesset of Israel’s first four decades. Shackling the Supreme Court is essential to the agendas of the new government’s various ultra-right and ultra-religious parties. For example, the haredi Orthodox parties are eager to re-legislate a blanket exemption to the military draft for their community, which the court struck down in 2017 on the grounds that it was discriminatory. They also have their sights on revoking recognition of non-Orthodox conversions for immigrants to Israel, undoing a court decision from 2021

The far-right, Jewish supremacist parties of Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, meanwhile, see an opportunity to deal a decisive blow to an institution that has long served as a check on the settlement movement. They hope to tie the court’s hands in the face of oncoming legislation to retroactively legalize settlements built on private Palestinian land, which are illegal under Israeli law. But this is only the beginning: Neutering the authority of the court could pave the way for legal discrimination against Israel’s Arab minority, such as Ben-Gvir’s proposal to deport minorities who show insufficient loyalty. 

The timing of Levin’s announcement Wednesday could not be more germane. The Knesset recently amended the basic law to legalize the appointment of Aryeh Deri, the Shas party leader who is serving a suspended sentence for tax fraud, as a minister in the new government. The Supreme Court convened Thursday morning to hear petitions against his appointment from those arguing that it is “unreasonable” to rehabilitate Deri given his multiple criminal convictions, a view shared by Israel’s attorney general. Levin’s proposals would bar the court from using this “reasonability” standard. 

The Israeli right has long chafed at the power of the Supreme Court, which it accuses of having a left-wing bias. But a judicial overhaul like this has never enjoyed the full support of the government, nor was Netanyahu previously in favor of it. Now, with a uniformly right-wing government and Netanyahu on trial for corruption, the prime minister’s foremost interest is appeasing his political partners and securing their support for future legislation to shield him from prosecution.

In a system where the majority rules, there need to be mechanisms in place to protect the rights of minorities — political, ethnic and religious. Liberal democracy requires respect for the rule of law and human rights. Yariv Levin’s proposals to fully subordinate the Supreme Court to the Knesset will concentrate virtually unchecked power in the hands of a few individuals — government ministers and party leaders within the coalition who effectively control what the Knesset does. That those individuals were elected in free and fair elections is no guarantee that the changes they make will be democratic. 


The post Israeli democracy may not survive a ‘reform’ of its Supreme Court appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

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Not Stupidity — Something Worse: Why the ‘Israel Controls America’ Myth Keeps Spreading

US President Joe Biden and Democratic presidential candidate and US Vice President Kamala Harris react onstage at the Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Chicago, Illinois, US, Aug. 19, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque

In a recent post, Donald Trump took aim at Tucker Carlson, Megyn Kelly, Candace Owens, and Joe Kent, calling them “low IQ” and “losers,” and asking — between Carlson and Kent — “who is dumber?”

It was vintage Trump: blunt, theatrical, and calibrated to dominate a news cycle with a single line. He has long relied on that instinct — to compress a dispute into something sharp enough to stick. But beneath the spectacle sits a more serious issue.

The problem is not intelligence. Many of these figures are clearly relatively smart. The problem is that they — along with a growing chorus of voices on the political left such as Ana Kasparian, Cenk Uygur, and Mehdi Hasan — continue to advance a claim that collapses under minimal scrutiny. Strip away the stylistic differences, the accents, and the partisan framing, and the argument is identical: “Israel controls the United States,” or in its updated form, “Benjamin Netanyahu controls Donald Trump.”

That claim has resurfaced repeatedly over the years, sometimes dressed in more sophisticated language, sometimes stated outright. What makes its latest iteration notable is not merely its persistence, but where it is now being voiced.

This weekend, Kamala Harris, speaking at a Democratic fundraiser in Detroit, said that Donald Trump had been “pulled into this war” by Benjamin Netanyahu. That phrasing carries a clear implication: that the president of the United States — the commander-in-chief of the most powerful military in the world — is not acting independently but is being maneuvered into conflict by a foreign (Jewish) leader.

When this idea circulates on the fringes, it is dismissed. When amplified by pundits chasing attention, it’s often ignored. But when it’s echoed, even cautiously, by a former vice president and major presidential candidate, it crosses a different threshold. At that point, the claim can no longer be dismissed as noise. It has been normalized.

This is not a new idea. It is one of the oldest political accusations in circulation, and it is remarkably easy to test against reality. Only last week, Trump effectively dictated that Israel must accept a temporary ceasefire with Hezbollah — an outcome widely opposed within Israel, where many believe the campaign should be completed and remain skeptical that the Lebanese state will ever disarm Hezbollah. If Israel were directing American policy, that outcome would not occur.

Historically, the “Israel controls America” claim has appeared in different ideological forms but with identical substance. On the far-right, figures such as David Duke have advanced it explicitly. On the far-left, figures like Cynthia McKinney have repackaged it in political language. The wording changes, but the core allegation remains the same: that American power is not sovereign, but subject to external — specifically Jewish — control, echoing Henry Ford and his “International Jew” conspiracy theories of the 1920s and 1930s.

The argument collapses as soon as one examines scale and structure. The United States is a $27 trillion economy with unmatched global reach across military, financial, technological, and diplomatic domains. It maintains a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and leads a network of alliances that spans continents. Israel’s economy, by contrast, is approximately $700 billion. Its military is highly capable, but it is not a global force. It does not control sea lanes, command multinational coalitions, or set the terms of global finance. The disparity is not marginal; it is foundational.

This asymmetry is not unique. The United States maintains deep strategic relationships with many smaller allies such as South Korea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. In fact, the United States fought a war to liberate Kuwait in 1991, sustaining approximately 150 American combat fatalities in the process. Yet, almost no one claims Kuwait controls Washington, or that Saudi Arabia dictates US foreign policy. Only one small ally is routinely described in those terms.

The historical record reinforces the absurdity of this Israel “controls” America trope.

In 1956, despite repeated attacks on Israel from the Sinai and Egypt-controlled Gaza, Dwight D. Eisenhower forced Israel to withdraw from Sinai following the Suez Crisis; Israel complied. In 1982, Ronald Reagan pressured Israel to halt operations in Beirut, facilitating the evacuation of Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership to Tunisia. In 1991, George H. W. Bush asked Israel not to respond to Iraqi Scud missile attacks to help preserve the US-led coalition; Israel absorbed 39 Scud strikes, 13 deaths, and stood down.

In 2015, Barack Obama advanced the Iran nuclear deal despite sustained Israeli opposition. Under Joe Biden, Israeli operations in Rafah were delayed for months under US pressure despite Israeli hostages being held there and its centrality to Hamas’ military infrastructure.

More recently, on June 24, 2025, as a Trump-negotiated ceasefire was taking effect, Iran launched multiple ballistic missiles at Beersheba, killing four Israelis. Israel prepared a large retaliatory strike. Trump intervened and effectively ordered Israel to turn its planes around.

This is what an unequal alliance looks like: coordination, pressure, and at times outright constraint. It is not a relationship where the far smaller country exercises “control.”

So why does the claim persist? Not because it is analytically persuasive — but because it is emotionally effective. Political narratives built on grievance often prefer simple explanations to complex realities.

It is easier to attribute outcomes to hidden manipulation than to acknowledge the interplay of strategic interests, risks, and constraints that define foreign policy decision-making.

There is also a deeper historical layer. For centuries, European political culture absorbed and transmitted variations of the same vile accusation: that Jews operate behind the scenes, exercising covert and pernicious influence over institutions and leaders.

So, when modern commentators repackage that idea — whether in the language of “influence,” “lobbying,” or outright “control” — it does not enter a neutral environment. It lands on fertile soil, reinforcing a long-established and familiar narrative.

Since World War II, the claim hasn’t changed — only its migration from the margins into the mainstream. And once it crosses that threshold, it stops being rhetoric and starts shaping behavior.

As it did in Germany after World War I, if a significant number of people come to believe that their government has been captured, that their leaders are not acting independently but are controlled by a nefarious external force, the range of conclusions and actions they will justify or rationalize expands dramatically. History offers no shortage of examples of where that logic can lead.

Trump attempted to reduce this to a punchline. But this is not a matter of tone. It is a warning sign. And this time, it is coming from closer to the political center than it has in a very long time.

Micha Danzig is an attorney, former IDF soldier, and former NYPD officer. He writes widely on Israel, Zionism, antisemitism, and Jewish history. He serves on the board of Herut North America.

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War or No War, India Stands With Israel

FILE PHOTO: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi addresses the nation during Independence Day celebrations at the historic Red Fort in New Delhi, August 15, 2020. Photo: REUTERS/Adnan Abidi/File Photo

In today’s global climate, Israel is a country many are expected to avoid. Turn on the international media — from CNN, to European and Indian broadcasters — and one narrative dominates: Israel as aggressor and pariah, Israel as a place defined by war, or worse, apartheid. Add to this the open hostility of regimes like the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey, and a growing hostility among Western leaders, such as Italian Prime Minister Meloni suspending defense cooperation.

The message is clear: Stay away from Israel.

And yet, in the midst of missile fire, media hostility, and geopolitical pressure — they came anyway.

A group of Indian workers, recruited through an Indian manpower agency, chose not to be deterred. Their arrival in Israel a few days ago is more than a labor story. It is a quiet but powerful act of defiance against a global narrative increasingly detached from reality. When I received photos of the team from the Israel-Jordan border, proudly waving the Indian and Israeli flags, my heart was happy.

Their journey was anything but straightforward.

After receiving their visas, these men and women left their jobs in India, stepping into uncertainty. Then came the cancelled flights, closed routes, and more than a month of waiting as airlines suspended operations to Israel. Many may have reconsidered at this juncture.

They did not.

Instead, they flew to Amman, waited again, and then endured long hours of land travel and layered security checks on both sides of the Jordanian-Israeli border before finally entering Israel.

Since the October 7 attacks, Israel has faced an acute labor shortage, especially in sectors such as construction, caregiving, and general services, which were once filled by Palestinian workers. India, with its vast labor pool and long history of global migration, is uniquely positioned to help fill this gap. Following Prime Minister Modi’s historic visit in February, just before the Iran-Israel/US conflict escalated, Israel and India strengthened ties through key Memoranda of Understanding in defense, technology, agriculture, research, and labor.

One visible outcome is the arrival of Indian workers who choose to come to Israel, to see and experience the country for themselves despite the weight of propaganda, fear, and misinformation.

They also came after weeks of watching missile barrages over Israeli cities on their television screens. They came despite a steady stream of coverage portraying Israel as unsafe, unstable, and morally suspect. They came knowing that public opinion in parts of India, influenced by global narratives, has grown more critical of Israel.

I recently interviewed an Indian caregiver documenting life under Iranian missile fire — daily fear, resilience, and routine. Her videos have gone viral in India. Alongside support, she also faces hostility from those echoing distorted narratives, but equally sparks curiosity and a deeper desire to understand Israel.

Together with others working to strengthen Israel-India relations, I recently shared a reel on Instagram about Indian workers arriving via Jordan. The response has been overwhelming from both sides: messages from India expressing support and genuine interest in a country often misunderstood, and Israelis warmly welcoming the new arrivals.

What we are seeing is the rise of a people-to-people alliance. One that is less visible, less celebrated, but potentially more enduring. An alliance that is built on shared values: resilience, pragmatism, and the instinct to move forward despite adversity.

At a time when parts of the international community are distancing themselves from Israel, the arrival of these workers offers another perspective on alliance.

If Israel is wise, it will recognize this as an opportunity to invest in these relationships, amplify these voices, and allow a narrative to emerge not from above, but from those who have seen the country firsthand.

At a moment when the nation is misrepresented, and misunderstood, the decision of these workers from India to come to work in Israel carries meaning beyond economics.

In difficult times, we know who stands with us.

Paushali Lass is an Indian-German intercultural and geopolitical consultant, who focuses on building bridges between Israel, India, and Germany.

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What Lessons Will North Korea Take From the War Against Iran?

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un visit the Vostochny Сosmodrome in the far eastern Amur region, Russia, Sept. 13, 2023. Photo: Sputnik/Mikhail Metzel/Kremlin via REUTERS

Operation Epic Fury/Roaring Lion provided North Korea with a host of important insights about its own political and military position. Pyongyang is likely to draw several conclusions from Iran’s experience about its ability to withstand a similar attack, and to take steps to prepare for such a scenario. These conclusions stem from the following matters.

Nuclear Weapons as a Deterrent 

The airstrikes on Iran by the American and Israeli air forces demonstrated the failure of both Tehran and Iran’s proxies to deter them. Over a period of many years, Iran spent billions of dollars on militant proxy forces in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Gaza, and Yemen. These proxies were meant to constitute an expanded deterrence layer that would prevent an attack on the Iranian homeland. The proxies had the capacity to attack Israel, US allies, and US interests in the region, and that capacity was meant to serve as a shield that would deter Iran’s enemies from launching an attack on Iran itself. This effort proved a failure, as Iran was attacked despite the proxies’ deterrence capabilities.

Kim Jong-un’s main conclusion from Iran’s failure to deter the US and Israel is likely this: that the decision by Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il to develop nuclear weapons was wise, as it provided North Korea with a sufficiently powerful deterrent against attack.

The war with Iran will strengthen Kim Jong-un’s statement that the nuclear issue is no longer up for negotiation.

The Failure of Russia and China to Assist Iran

Iran expected Moscow and Beijing to react more strenuously to the US and Israeli attacks on the Iranian homeland. They did not expect them to start a global war against US forces, but they did expect them to take a more active role than they did. Had they done so, Iran would have had more capacity to balance the pressure being exerted upon it by Trump.

North Korea’s extended deterrence is similarly built on its relations with Moscow and Beijing. Their lack of military or other active support for Iran raised questions about the degree of support North Korea might receive should it be attacked by the US.

Pyongyang will likely strengthen its Juche ideology to prepare itself in the event of very limited support from its allies. North Korea is selling ammunition to Russia and has deployed North Korean soldiers to assist Russia in its war on Ukraine, but should bear in mind that the Ukraine war will limit Russia’s ability to assist Pyongyang in the event that war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula.

The Use of Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean Weapons

Iran built up a substantial military arsenal over the years to deter Israel and the United States and prepare itself for war. That arsenal consisted of Iranian, Russian, Chinese, and North Korean military equipment. Much of that equipment was destroyed during the 12-day war with Israel and the US in June 2025, but Iran had sufficient time to rebuild that capacity before the 2026 conflict erupted. Iran’s reconstituted air defense systems failed to stop the US and Israeli air forces from achieving aerial superiority. Its missiles and drones, however, were able to cause damage to Israel, US bases in the Gulf, and US allies in the region despite the American and Israeli attempts to destroy the launchers and intercept the armaments.

North Korea understands that the US and its allies have military superiority in specific fields like aerial superiority and missile defense. That is why North Korea’s deterrent shield is built on nuclear weapons. North Korea spends more than 20% of its GNP on defense, but knows it can’t compete with Washington’s military might in terms of conventional deterrence. Pyongyang develops and manufactures less expensive military equipment in part to deter the US, but also to sell to allies. This equipment includes drones, sold to Russia and Iran, that can attack US and South Korean forces; artillery along the DMZ and missiles that threaten Seoul; and middle-range missiles that can target US bases in the region.

The Failure of Iranian Intelligence

The penetrability of Iranian intelligence is one of Pyongyang’s biggest concerns. The loopholes that allowed US and Israeli military forces to attack with such precision are one of the biggest threats to the security of North Korea. Should US, South Korean, and Japanese counterintelligence gain access to the location of Kim Jong-un and his political and military milieu, they would be able to eliminate the North Korean chain of command. To avert this threat, Pyongyang is likely to increase its control over Internet access. It will also likely expand its cybersecurity efforts to prepare for the new cyber battlefield.

Vulnerability of the Chain of Command

The surprise blitz on the first day of the war, during which the US and Israeli air forces wiped out Iran’s civilian and military leadership, demonstrated the vulnerability of Iran’s political and military leadership. The attack raised serious questions in Tehran about how US and Israeli intelligence had managed to penetrate its security shield. It also showed how defenseless Iran was against the special bombs used in the attack.

The attack on the Iranian leadership appeared to justify North Korean paranoia over the years. Their biggest fear has long been that Washington will consider pursuing regime change by attacking the head of state. These concerns were raised during the Kim Jong-il era, when Pyongyang believed Washington had such a plan in mind. After the killing of the Iranian leadership, these concerns were raised once again under Kim Jong-un.

While Iran was able to choose new political leaders, the North Korean leadership is centralized under Kim. Decentralizing his control might be seen as a potential threat to his leadership. His successors include Kim Ju-ae (his daughter) and Kim Yo-jong (his sister). An attack on the ruling family, as occurred in Iran, would threaten North Korea’s stability. North Korean political and military institutions are not built to choose alternative leadership. The US and Israeli surprise attack on the Iranian leadership was a wake-up call for the North Korean leadership to reevaluate its traditional leadership policy.

North Korea’s Role in Iran’s Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons

The end of the war with Iran might raise the question of whether Tehran should change its policy from that of a threshold nuclear state to that of a nuclear state to prevent another attack on its soil. Will Iran develop its own nuclear bomb and incur severe economic sanctions and/or new military attacks on its nuclear facilities, or will it acquire a nuclear bomb from one of its allies? If the latter, North Korea is a possible choice.

North Korea and Iran have cooperated over the years on the development of unconventional weapons. One example was the Dier al-Zor nuclear project in Syria. Would it serve North Korea’s interests to sell nuclear bombs to Iran now? While doing so would boost North Korea’s foreign income, it also might lead to harsher sanctions imposed upon it by Washington. But the capture of Venezuelan president Maduro and the attack on Iran show that President Trump is unpredictable. Kim Jong-un can’t be sure that Trump will not perceive the sale of nuclear bombs to Iran as sufficiently worrisome to order either an attack on North Korea or the elimination of the ruling dynasty.

Kim Jong-un could use the potential sale of nuclear bombs to Iran as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Trump in an attempt to convince him to lift the sanctions — but he might find himself facing a Trump who believes he can use his country’s military capabilities to pursue regime change in North Korea.

Dr. Alon Levkowitz is a senior lecturer in Asian Studies at Bar-Ilan University and a senior research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. A different version of this article was published by The BESA Center.

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