Connect with us

RSS

America Wants to Help, But Is Undermining the War Effort

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu make statements to the media inside The Kirya, which houses the Israeli Ministry of Defense, after their meeting in Tel Aviv, Israel, Oct. 12, 2023. Photo: Jacquelyn Martin/Pool via REUTERS

JNS.org – “We’re determined to help Israel ensure that Oct. 7 never happens again,” US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated last week.

It was not the first time he made this promise. Similar statements were made during his four solidarity visits to Israel since the Oct. 7 massacre. However, concurrently with his statement, under American pressure, the Israeli war cabinet was forced to discuss an increase in fuel deliveries to the Gaza Strip, essentially supplying oxygen to Hamas terrorists fighting our soldiers through terror tunnels.

Soon after Blinken’s declaration, a spokesperson for the State Department announced that the United States would oppose the creation of a buffer zone in the Gaza Strip, thus adding more constraints on Israel’s actions, particularly the options at its disposal when it comes to protecting towns near the border.

There were also US statements that the duration of the war is not unlimited, along with pressure on Israel before the renewal of hostilities in southern Gaza to reduce the intensity of the fighting and increase humanitarian aid.

There is no room to doubt President Joe Biden’s and his officials’ commitment. The administration’s support for Israel is unwavering and deserves much praise. The US has accepted Israel’s right to destroy the military and governance capabilities of Hamas and has provided substantial and vital assistance. But at the same time, the US has been imposing limitations that prevent Israel from achieving these goals without heavy losses.

Moreover, the limitations imposed by the US will undoubtedly prolong the conflict, which is something Washington doesn’t want. The best way to ensure a quick and effective military operation with minimal risk to the uninvolved population is to temporarily relocate this population outside the combat zones. However, there are also objections to this.

The increased pressure on Israel may be related to Biden’s domestic travails ahead of the 2024 elections. It may stem from differences between how Washington sees Gaza and the reality on the ground.

Nevertheless, Israel cannot compromise on achieving its goals while minimizing the burden on its fighters—regardless of how long it takes. This is the message Israel has to drive home when US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan visits in the coming days.

Those who insist on getting answers from the Israeli government over what happens “the day after” are doing so despite knowing full well that there are no good options in Gaza. If there were, they would have presumably been implemented during one of the many opportunities to do so over the years.

There is no obligation to debate between bad alternatives in public during the war itself. Attention should be solely directed towards victory, maintaining internal unity and minimizing the necessary involvement in issues that could stir controversy, whether internally or with our friends overseas.

The way Israel sees it, the question of “the day after” in Gaza is secondary to the more critical goal of the war: reestablishing the deterrence that was shattered on Oct. 7. The endgame of the war must be shaped primarily according to this criterion.

The toppling of the Hamas government, the destruction of its military capabilities, the killing or neutralization of most of its commanders and military units, along with the devastation resulting from all these will serve as pieces of the desired endgame puzzle.

Of course, Israel must not forget the hostages and should not leave them for “the day after.” Israel’s moral obligation towards the hostages and their families requires leaving an open channel for negotiations (preferably through Egypt, not Qatar, whose chief interest is to ensure Hamas survives). It must ensure that a sword is swiftly placed on the necks of Hamas leaders until they understand that the hostages are their responsibility and they must release them.

As the fighting continues, the IDF and the Shin Bet security agency continue to crack down on terrorists in Judea and Samaria. Israel’s political leaders must decide whether to allow Palestinian workers from Judea and Samaria to return to work in Israel, which has been prevented since Oct. 7 except for a relatively small number of positions defined as critical even at this time.

The main argument for allowing them back into Israel is the fear that economic hardship, frustration and unemployment will push them to act against Israel. Another consideration is the impact on the Israeli economy, particularly housing construction. Against these considerations stands the concern over attacks they may perpetrate because they have been inspired by Hamas in Gaza or because they want to avenge the deaths there, especially in light of the images and propaganda broadcast continuously on Al Jazeera.

The successful counterterrorism operations in Judea and Samaria, followed by a not insignificant number of casualties, also add motivation for revenge. The security establishment is fully preoccupied with the fighting in Gaza and the intelligence efforts in Judea and Samaria. Its ability to track terrorist elements and neutralize them in advance is not guaranteed, as we have seen recently in the attacks at the Gush Etzion junction and in Jerusalem.

Today, the public in Israel is vigilant and shows a high degree of awareness regarding any Palestinian in Israel. This contributes to efforts at detection and neutralization. It will not be the same if tens of thousands of Palestinians are allowed into Israel. Another consideration, although not mentioned in setting policy, is the perception of the price Israel exacts.

Hamas in the Gaza Strip gains points in the battle for hearts and minds in Judea and Samaria because it managed to exact the release of terrorists and because it “stood up” to Israel. But Hamas could lose hearts and minds if Palestinians blame the terrorist organization for harming their livelihoods. It seems that, at this stage, the scale leans towards maintaining the current situation and not letting the workers back into Israel. Caution requires us to avoid unnecessary security risks in the short term.

Originally published by Israel Hayom.

The post America Wants to Help, But Is Undermining the War Effort first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

Continue Reading
Click to comment

You must be logged in to post a comment Login

Leave a Reply

RSS

Iran Is Using Foreign Islamic Centers to Spread Terror and Hatred; the World Must Close Them

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei speaks during a meeting with a group of students in Tehran, Iran, Nov. 2, 2022. Photo: Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS

Last month, Germany announced that it would deport Mohammed Mofatteh, the former director of Hamburg’s Shi’a Islamic Center, which local authorities had ordered shut down five weeks earlier for propagating extremism, and for its financial links to Hezbollah.

Mofatteh, according to German authorities, was getting direct orders from the Iranian Supreme Leader’s office about radical public messaging on the current war in Gaza between Israel and Hamas.

Since it banned Hezbollah as a terrorist organization four years ago, Germany has closed six Iranian-linked Islamic Centers and deported some of their officials. In November 2022, Germany expelled the deputy director of the Hamburg Shi’a Islamic Center. In June 2024, the German government ordered the deportation of the director of a Berlin-based center.

Other countries should follow Germany’s approach.

After nearly four decades of virtually unhindered activity, Iranian-backed cultural centers and mosques have proliferated outside the Middle East. They have indoctrinated, radicalized, converted, and mobilized thousands of locals, who, unlike Mofatteh and his colleagues, cannot be deported.

Cases in point: Pro-Iranian centers exist in Italy, Spain, and South Africa. Their directors are, respectively, Italian-born, Spanish-born, and South African-born graduates of Al Mustafa. They peddle pro-Iran and pro-Hezbollah narratives through their centers’ activities.

The main bastions of Iran’s ideological influence beyond its borders are mosques and cultural centers, directly controlled by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, or linked to Al Mustafa International University, an ostensibly academic institution also under Khamenei’s direct control.

The US Department of the Treasury sanctioned Al Mustafa in 2020 for its role in Iran’s propaganda efforts, including support for the training and indoctrination of Shiite militias.

With a budget of more than $100 million a year, directly provided by the Office of the Supreme Leader, Al Mustafa has been able to train tens of thousands of emissaries, who are now deployed overseas to spread the word of Iran’s sponsored Axis of Resistance and recruit locals to the cause of Khomeini’s revolution. Establishing mosques and cultural centers is central to this elaborate, global effort to spread Iran’s revolutionary brand. These institutions pose as places of worship and cultural inquiry. In fact, they are propaganda tools in the ayatollahs’ war against the West.

Beyond Europe, the problem is even more acute. European governments can and should follow Germany’s example, since they rely on robust counter-terrorism legislation and designations of organizations like Hezbollah — albeit, in most cases, just the so-called military wing.

Countries in Latin America and Africa, on the other hand, do not have as strong a legal framework to take similar actions. But Iran’s propaganda networks are very active there.

According to the 2015 annual posture statement of the then-US Southern Command’s leader, General John F. Kelly, Iran had by then established more than 80 centers in the Western Hemisphere. That number has since grown. Moreover, a Middle East Forum 2018 report identified 17 Al Mustafa branches in Africa, alongside dozens of schools and other institutions affiliated with it, and thousands of students and graduates.

Al Mustafa’s propagation model relies on its graduates as force multipliers. Many return to their home countries to open and run new centers, while their alma mater supports their work from regional headquarters headed by Iranian officials. Al Mustafa, for example, has a regional headquarter, headed by its permanent representative, Seyed Mojtaba Hosseini Nejad, in Venezuela and a campus in Johannesburg, run by a South African cleric trained in Iran. Clergy from the various centers routinely meet and coordinate propaganda activities, while emissaries travel to and from Iran regularly.

There are sparse but notable exceptions to the laissez-faire approach of governments that host Iranian centers.

Last April, Brazilian immigration authorities detained Sheikh Ruben Edgardo (aka Suheil) Assaad, a key Iranian propaganda emissary, as he arrived in São Paulo, Brazil, from Doha, Qatar, to attend a Western Hemisphere gathering of Iran and Hezbollah clergy. Brazil’s federal authorities believe Assaad is linked to Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. On that basis, they put Assaad on the next plane to Doha and will no longer grant him entry into the country.

Yet, while Assaad may no longer visit Brazil, there remains a robust cohort of Al Mustafa-trained Shi’a clerics with local citizenship running centers across the region.

Assaad trained many of them, alongside his boss, sheikh Mohsen Rabbani, who is wanted by Argentina’s authorities and Interpol due to his role in the bombing of the AMIA Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires that was destroyed by a suicide car bomb in 1994, leaving 85 people dead and more than 200 wounded.

The problem is even more acute now.

Since October 7, 2023 — when Hamas massacred 1,200 Israelis, triggering a new conflict in the region on behalf of its proxy, Iran — Tehran and its proxies have been leveraging their networks overseas, including their cultural and religious centers, to carry out terror attacks, while whipping up a frenzy of anti-Israel hatred in the public sphere.

Last November, Brazilian authorities foiled a Hezbollah plot to target Jewish institutions in Brasilia, the country’s capital. The point man in the plot, a Hezbollah member with both Syrian and Brazilian citizenships who sought to recruit Brazilian nationals with a criminal background, was instrumental in the recent establishment of an Iranian cultural center in Brasilia and was closely connected to both a prominent Shi’a Brazilian convert and key Iran propagandist, and to a Shi’a cleric who works in a São Paulo Shi’a mosque affiliated with Hezbollah.

In August, a Tajikistan national and graduate of Al Mustafa was arrested in Central Asia, where he was allegedly plotting terror attacks. Other plots have also just emerged in France and Germany, where local Iranian proxies followed a similar modus operandi and sought to recruit criminals to carry out terror attacks.

At this critical juncture, governments must do more: Minimizing the risk of terror attacks requires not only foiling active plots but also nipping in the bud efforts to radicalize and incite captive audiences.

Closing these centers, as Germany did; denying entry to Iranian clerical emissaries, as Brazil did; and monitoring the content of sermons and the dissemination of literature and proselytizing material by Iran-affiliated centers, are all urgently required steps that must be undertaken elsewhere by governments to protect their citizens from Iranian-backed terror.

Western governments have routinely undertaken similar actions in the past, when the threat from Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State was most acute. There is no reason they should not do the same with Iran, its proxies, and the elaborate web of cultural and religious institutions they use to spread Iran’s radical extremism.

Wouldn’t it be better to preempt the next attack, rather than have a government’s leaders commit themselves to renewed vigilance while standing in the smoldering ruins of an Iranian-backed strike?

Emanuele Ottolenghi is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington DC-based non-partisan research institution focusing on national security and foreign policy. Follow him on X @eottolenghi

The post Iran Is Using Foreign Islamic Centers to Spread Terror and Hatred; the World Must Close Them first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

Continue Reading

RSS

More Hezbollah Communications Devices Detonate Across Lebanon as Terror Group Thrown Into Disarray

People gather as smoke rises from a mobile shop in Sidon, Lebanon as Hezbollah communication devices explode across the country on Sept. 18, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Hassan Hankir

More communications devices used by the Iran-backed terrorist organization Hezbollah exploded on Wednesday afternoon across the group’s main stronghold in Beirut and in southern Lebanon.

Lebanon’s health ministry said at least nine people were killed and 300 were wounded in the latest series of device explosions as Hezbollah, which wields significant political and military influence across Lebanon, was thrown into disarray for the second day in a row.

The attack began on Tuesday, when thousands of Hezbollah members were seriously wounded when the pagers they use to communicate exploded. At least 12 people were killed, and more than 2,800 were wounded in the initial round of blasts.

Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani was among those injured by the pager explosions and reportedly lost an eye.

Then on Wednesday, hand-held radios used by Hezbollah detonated. According to eyewitness reports, at least one of the blasts took place during the funerals for some of the terrorists killed the prior day in the first wave of explosions.

Videos shared on social media showed scenes of chaos across Lebanon on both days, with hospitals overflowing with victims and some explosions reportedly taking place in apartments and houses.

A source close to Hezbollah, speaking on condition of anonymity, told AFP that the pagers from Tuesday’s detonations were “sabotaged at the source” before being imported by Hezbollah. Meanwhile, one Hezbollah official told Reuters that the explosions marked the “biggest security breach” in the terrorist group’s history.

The hand-held radios were reportedly purchased by Hezbollah five months ago, around the same time that the pagers were bought.

Hezbollah members in the southern suburbs of Beirut were seen on Wednesday “frantically taking out the batteries of any walkie-talkies on them that had not exploded, tossing the parts in metal barrels around them,” Reuters reported.

The walkie-talkies were said to be part of Hezbollah’s emergency communications systems for use during a conflict with Israel, which borders southern Lebanon.

A Hezbollah official told Reuters that as the attack began, the terrorist group raised its level of military readiness in case it was the beginning of a bigger Israeli offensive by Israel. Meanwhile, Hezbollah leaders, who did not carry the devices, turned to the group’s internal phone network to find out what was happening.

Experts and several media outlets have said that Israeli intelligence was behind the explosions with a sophisticated, long planned operation, although Israel has neither publicly confirmed nor denied responsibility.

“The goal was to convince Hezbollah that it is in its interest to disconnect itself from Hamas and cut a separate deal for ending the fighting with Israel regardless of a ceasefire in Gaza,” an anonymous source told Axios.

Dr. Eyal Pinko, an Israeli cyber and national security expert, similarly said the operation served as a message to Hezbollah, showcasing vulnerabilities in its security apparatus and serving as a form of deterrence.

“It’s saying that, ‘you’re already being penetrated. We know where you are and what you do. Now look what we can do: In one single shot, in less than a second, we can eliminate almost 3,000 terror operatives,’” Pinko said during a briefing with reporters on Tuesday evening.

Despite Israel’s silence on the explosions, senior Lebanese officials have blame the Jewish state. So too has Hezbollah, which said Israel would receive “its fair punishment.”

The Iran-backed terrorist group, which seeks Israel’s destruction, said on Wednesday it had attacked Israeli artillery positions with rockets.

Hezbollah has fired barrages of rockets, missiles, and drones at northern Israel almost daily following the Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas-led Palestinian terrorists on the Jewish state’s southern region. Since then, both sides have been exchanging fire constantly while avoiding a major escalation as war rages in Gaza to the south.

About 80,000 Israelis have been forced to evacuate their homes in northern Israel and flee to other parts of the country amid the unrelenting attacks from Hezbollah.

Israeli leaders have said they seek a diplomatic resolution to the conflict with Hezbollah along the border with Lebanon but are prepared to use large-scale military force if needed to ensure all citizens can safely return to their homes.

On Monday night, Israel’s security cabinet expanded its war goals to include returning the displaced Israelis from the north.

According to some reports, the explosions occurred this week because Israel feared Hezbollah was becoming suspicious and would discover the secret operation.

The post More Hezbollah Communications Devices Detonate Across Lebanon as Terror Group Thrown Into Disarray first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

Continue Reading

RSS

How the International Law Cases Against Israel Could Truly Cripple the IDF

International Criminal Court Prosecutor Karim Khan speaks during an interview with Reuters in The Hague, Netherlands, Feb. 12, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Piroschka van de Wouw

Due to the sheer volume of recent news stories concerning Israel, you may have missed two mostly unnoticed but important developments regarding Israel in the world of international law.

In the International Court of Justice (ICJ), South Africa has been suing Israel for genocide.  I’ve been saying for months that South Africa does not have a case, but that the lawsuit is nonetheless dangerous because South Africa’s  goal is not to win. Instead, its goal is to achieve an “emergency injunction” that would stop Israel’s campaign against Hamas, effectively handing the terror organization a victory.

Such an injunction would not require actually proving the claims against Israel, and so the emergency injunction has always been South Africa’s (and Hamas’) best chance of effectively defeating the IDF.

South Africa has made two unsuccessful attempts to obtain emergency orders, and is now coming up against an October 28 deadline to, at long last, submit their actual evidence of “genocide.”

Last week, South Africa petitioned the ICJ for an extension of several months, apparently because (unsurprisingly) they have not succeeded in finding such evidence.

While this is a small vindication, it is by no means the end of the story. Ihe ICJ is only nominally a “court,” but in reality, functions as a political body. The ICJ’s current President is Nawaf Salam of Lebanon, which is effectively controlled by the Iranian backed Hezbollah terror organization and is actively at war with Israel. The ICJ judges include representatives from countries that have recently demonstrated strongly anti-Israel agendas, such as China and Brazil, as well as South Africa — the very country that’s suing Israel.  Even the US delegate to the court has voted consistently against Israel in recent decisions.

In fact the only judge who has stood both firmly and eloquently in favor of Israel is the court’s Vice President, Julia Sebutinde of Uganda.

So while logic dictates that South Africa should not be able to win a lawsuit without evidence, politics has no such limitations. Israel has been petitioning the United States Congress for support in pressuring the ICJ to drop their case, and so has my organization.

An entirely separate international body is the International Criminal Court (ICC), in which prosecutor Karim Khan has petitioned the court to issue arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, as well as several Hamas leaders (two of whom are now dead).

The court has been deliberating the request since May, and last week, Khan issued a new request that the court issue the arrest warrants “urgently.”

It is not clear why such arrest warrants are now more urgent than before, yet some Israeli sources are concerned that the ICC may be sympathetic to the prosecutor’s request anyway. There is some speculation that this “urgency”  may be designed to preempt Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech to the UN General Assembly later this month.

Much like the emergency orders in the ICJ, these ICC arrest warrants do not actually require proof. Instead, the prosecutor needs to  provide only minimal evidence that his claims are reasonably possible, and he gets to do so “ex parte” — which means alone and without Israel having the opportunity to respond.

Like the ICJ, the ICC is also primarily a political body in the guise of a “court,”  and therefore, sufficiently dramatic claims against Israel, especially when presented “ex parte” and with the right political pressure, may be adequate to persuade the judges.

Why does all of this matter?  Here’s just one example: since the election of the Labor government, the UK has removed its objection to the ICC proceedings, and this month suspended the shipment of certain military items to Israel, in what amounts to essentially a “soft embargo.”  The items in question include important parts for military equipment, such as the F-35 fighter jet, which wear out quickly and need constant replacement. Such parts are manufactured in only a few factories in the entire world and cannot be easily replaced.

Why doesn’t Israel make the parts itself? The factories are so specialized that even if Israel started building one today, it would take years and billions of dollars before production could even begin. Even “Israeli” inventions, such as the Merkava tank, make use of these specialized parts from foreign sources. In short, for the foreseeable future Israel depends on foreign resources to keep the IDF working.

If a relevant international body such as the ICJ were to make a ruling against Israel, instead of seeing a “soft embargo” of some military equipment by some countries, we might see official worldwide embargoes encompassing all equipment.

In as little as several months, as equipment begins to fail, the IDF could run out of working jets, helicopters, tanks, and all of the other tools necessary for the IDF to function as an actual army. Israel would become defenseless, not only against even a weakened Hamas, but also against Iran and all of its various proxies.

This reality relates to may other issues. For example, in the recent debate over whether Israel should abandon the Philadelphi corridor as part of a hostage deal, some IDF generals claim that Israel can simply retake it “at any time.” Yet when IDF generals speak about Israel’s capabilities, they usually refer only to military tactics and strategy, and often overlook the geopolitical forces that could strip the IDF of its capacity to function.

If Israel were to enter an internationally binding agreement (for example over Philadelphi) and then violate it, these kind of embargoes are just one possible consequence.

For this reason, we are keeping a close eye on activities at the ICC, the ICJ, the United Nations, the US Congress, and all the various bodies that have significant influence over Israel’s long term safety, and are actively involved in petitioning those bodies as well.

Daniel Pomerantz is the CEO of RealityCheck, an organization dedicated to deepening public conversation through robust research studies and public speaking.

The post How the International Law Cases Against Israel Could Truly Cripple the IDF first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

Continue Reading

Copyright © 2017 - 2023 Jewish Post & News