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American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews?
(JTA) — Among Sandra Fox’s most memorable finds during her years mining American archives for materials about Jewish summer camps was a series of letters about the hours before lights-out.
The letters were by counselors who were documenting an unusual window in the day when they stopped supervising campers, leaving the teens instead to their own devices, which sometimes included romance and sexual exploration.
“It was each division talking about how they dealt with that free time before bed in ‘age-appropriate ways,’” Fox recalled about the letters written by counselors at Camp Ramah in Wisconsin, the original iteration of the Conservative movement’s network of summer camps.
“I’ve spoken to Christian people who work at Christian camps and have researched Christian camps. There is no free time before bed,” Fox told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “That’s not a thing if you don’t want kids to hook up. So it was just amazing to find these documents of Camp Ramah leaders really having the conversation explicitly. Most of the romance and sexuality stuff is implicit in the archives.”
The letters are quoted extensively in Fox’s new book, “The Jews of Summer: Summer Camp and Jewish Culture in Postwar America.” Fox, who earned a PhD in history from New York University in 2018 and now teaches and directs the Archive of the American Jewish Left there, tells the story of American Judaism’s most immersive laboratory for constructing identity and contesting values.
Next week, Fox is launching the book with an event at Congregation Beth Elohim in Park Slope, Brooklyn. (Tickets for the Feb. 23 event are available here.) Attendees will be able to tour adult versions of some of the most durable elements of Jewish summer camps, from Israeli dance to Yiddish and Hebrew instruction to Color Wars to Tisha B’Av, the mournful holiday that always falls over the summer.
“I never considered doing a normal book party,” Fox said. “It was always really obvious to me that a book about experiential Jewish education and role play should be celebrated and launched out into the world through experiential education and role play.”
Sandra Fox’s 2023 book “The Jews of Summer,” looks at the history of American Jewish summer camps. (Courtesy of Fox)
We spoke to Fox about her party plans, how Jewish summer camps have changed over time and how they’ve stayed the same, and the cultural history of that before-bed free time.
This interview has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. We’ll be continuing the conversation in a virtual chat through the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research Feb. 27 at 1 p.m.; register here.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Given how much Jews like to talk about camp, were you surprised that this book hadn’t already been written?
Sandra Fox: There’s been a lot of fruitful research on the history of various camps, but it’s usually been focused on one camping movement or one camp type. So there are articles about Zionist camps. There are certainly articles out there about the Ramah camps. A lot of camps have produced books — either their alumni associations or a scholar who went to let’s say, Reform movement camps have created essay collections about those camps. And there are also books about Habonim and other Zionist youth movements.
I don’t really know why this is the first stab at this kind of cross-comparison. It might be that people didn’t think there would be so much to compare. I think the overwhelming feeling I get from readers so far, people who preordered and gotten their books early, is that they’re very surprised to hear how similar these camps are. So perhaps it’s that scholars weren’t thinking about Jewish summer camps that came from such diverse standpoints as having something enough in common to write about them all at once.
Also distance from the time period really helps. You can write a book about — and people do write a book about — the ’60s and ’70s and have been for decades, but there’s a certain amount of distance from the period that has allowed me to do this, I think, and maybe it also helps that I’m generationally removed. A lot of the scholars who’ve worked on camps in the postwar period went to camps in the postwar period. It makes a lot of sense that it would be harder to write this sort of sweeping thing perhaps. The fact that I’m a millennial meant that I could write about the postwar period — and also write kind of an epilogue-style chapter that catches us up to the present.
What’s clear is that there’s something amazing about studying summer camp, a completely immersive 24/7 experience that parents send children away for. There’s no better setting for thinking about how adults project their anxieties and desires about the future onto children. There’s also no place better to think about power dynamics and age and generational tension.
I was definitely struck by the “sameyness” of Jewish camps in your accounting. What do you think we can learn from that, either about camps or about us as Jews?
I do want to say that while there’s a lot of sameyness, whenever you do a comparative study, there’s a risk of kind of collapsing all these things and making them seem too similar. What I’m trying to convey is that the camp leaders from a variety of movements took the basic structure of the summer camp as we know it — its daily schedule, its environment, its activities — and it did look similar from camp to camp, at least on that surface level.
If you look at the daily schedules in comparison, they might have a lot of the same features but they’ll be called slightly different things depending on if the camp leans more heavily towards Hebrew, or Yiddish, or English. But the content within those schedules would be rather different. It’s more that the skeletal structure of camp life has a lot of similarities across the board and then the details within each section of the day or the month had a lot of differences.
But I think what it says is that in the postwar period, the anxieties that Jewish leaders had about the future of Judaism are really, really similar and the solution that they found within the summer camp, they were pretty unanimous about. They just then took the model and inserted within it their particular nationalistic, linguistic or religious perspectives. So I think more so than saying anything about American Jewry, it shows kind of how flexible camping is. And that’s not just the Jewish story. Lots of different Americans have embraced summer camping in different ways.
So many people who have gone to camp have a fixed memory of what camp is like, where it’s caught in time, but you argue that camps have actually undergone lots of change. What are the most striking changes you documented, perhaps ones that might have been hard for even insiders to discern as they happened?
First of all, the Israel-centeredness of American Jewish education as we know it today didn’t happen overnight in 1948, for instance. It was a slower process, beyond the Zionist movements where that was already going on, for decades before 1948. Ramah and the Reform camps for instance took their time towards getting to the heavily Zionist-imbued curricula that we know.
There was considerable confusion and ambivalence at first about what to do with Israel: whether to raise an Israeli flag, not because they were anti-Zionist, but because American Jews had been thinking about proving their loyalty to America for many generations. There were some sources that would talk about — what kind of right do American Jews have to raise the Israeli flag when they’re not Israeli? So that kind of Israel-centeredness that is really a feature of camp life today was a slower process than we might think.
It fit camp life really well because broader American camps used Native American symbols, in some ways that are problematic today, to create what we know of as an iconography of camp life. So for Jews, Israel and its iconography, or Palestine and iconography before ’48, provided an alternative set of options that were read as Jewish, but it still took some time to get to where we are now in terms of the Israel focus.
One of the reasons I place emphasis on the Yiddish summer camps is to show that in the early 20th century and the mid-20th century there was more ideological diversity in the Jewish camping sphere, including various forms of Yiddishist groups and socialist groups and communist groups that operated summer camps. Most of them have closed, and their decline is obviously a change that tells a story of how American Jewry changed over the course of the postwar period. Their legacy is important, too: I have made the argument that these camps in a lot of ways modeled the idea of Yiddish as having a future in America.
What about hookup culture? Contemporary discourse about Jewish camps have focused on sex and sexuality there. What did you observe about this in the archives?
I think people think of the hookup culture of Jewish camps today and certainly in my time in the ’90s and 2000s as a permanent feature, and in some ways I found through my research and oral history interviews that that was the case, but it was really interesting to zoom out a little bit and think about how Jewish summer camps changed in terms of sexual romantic culture, in relationship to how America changed with the sexual revolution and the youth culture.
It’s not it’s not useful to think about Jewish hookup culture in a vacuum. It’s happening within America more broadly. And so of course, it’s changed dramatically over time. And one of the things I learned that was so fascinating is that Jewish summer camps were actually their leaders were less concerned in a lot of ways about sexuality at camp in the ’40s and ’50s, than they were in the late ’60s and ’70s. Because earlier premarital sex was pretty rare, at least in the teenage years, so they were not that concerned about what happened after lights out because they kind of assumed whatever was going on was fairly innocent.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, that’s when camps have to actually think about how to balance allowance and control. They want to allow campers to have these relationships, to have their first sexual experiences, and part of that is related to rising rates of intermarriage and wanting to encourage love between Jews, but they also want to control it because there’s a broader societal moment in which the sexuality of teenagers is problematized and their and their sexual culture is more public.
There’s been a real wave of sustained criticism by former campers about the cultures that they experienced, arguing that the camps created an inappropriately sexualized and unsafe space. There’s been a lot of reaction to that and the broader #MeToo moment. I’m curious about what you can speculate about a future where that space is cleaned up, based on your historical research — what is gained and what, potentially, could be lost?
Without being involved in camping today — and I want to really make that disclaimer because I know a lot of change is happening and lot of organizations are involved to talk about this issue better, to train camps and camp leaders and their counselors to not create a pressured environment for camper — I think what the history shows is that this hookup culture did not come about out of nowhere. It was partly related to the broader changes in America and the sexual revolution.
But it was also partly created because camps really needed to have campers’ buy-in, in order to be “successful.” A huge argument of my book is that we think about the power of camps as if camp directors have campers as, like, puppets on strings, and that what they do is what happens in camp life. But actually, campers have changed the everyday texture of life at camp over the course of the decades in so many different ways by resisting various ideas or just not being interested.
So hookup culture is also part of making campers feel like they have freedom at camp and that’s essential. That’s not a side project — that is essential to their ability to get campers to come back. It’s a financial need, and it’s an ideological need. If you make campers feel like they have freedom, then they will feel like they freely took on the ideologies your camp is promoting in a really natural way.
The last part of it is rising rates of intermarriage. As rates of intermarriage rose in the second half of the 20th century, there’s no doubt in my mind from doing the research that the preexisting culture around sexuality at camp and romance at camp got turbo-boosted [to facilitate relationships that could potentially lead to marriage between two Jews]. At that point, the allowance and control that camp leaders were trying to create for many decades leans maybe more heavily towards allowance.
There are positives to camp environments being a place where campers can explore their sexualities. There’s definitely a lot of conversation about the negative effects and those are all very, very real. I know people who went through horrible things at a camp and I also know people who experienced it as a very sex-positive atmosphere. I know people in my age range who were able to discover that they were gay or lesbian at camp in safety in comparison to home, so it’s not black and white at all. I hope that my chapter on romance and sexuality can maybe add some historical nuance to the conversation and give people a sense of how this actually happened. Because it happened for a whole bunch of reasons.
I think there’s a consensus view that camp is one of the most “successful” things the Jews do. But it’s hard to see where lessons from camp or camp culture are being imported to the rest of Jewish life. I’m curious what you see as kind of the lessons that Jewish institutions or Jewish communities have taken from camp — or have they not done that?
Every single public engagement I do about my work has boiled down to the question of, well, does it work? Does camp work? Is it successful? And that’s been a question that a lot of social scientists have been interested in. I don’t want to oversimplify that research, but a lot of the ways that they’ve measured success have been things that are not necessarily a given to all Jews as obviously the right way to be a Jew. So, for instance, in the ’90s and early 2000s, at the very least, a lot of research was about how, you know, “XYZ” camp and youth movement were successfully curbing intermarriage. A lot of them also asked campers and former campers how they feel about Israel, and it’s always if they are supportive of Israel in very normative ways, right, giving money visiting, supporting Israel or lobbying for its behalf — then camps have been successful.
I’m not interested in whether camps were successful by those metrics. I’m interested in how we got to the idea that camp should be successful in those ways in the first place. How did we get to those kinds of normative assumptions of like, this is a good Jew; a good Jew marries a Jew; a good Jew supports Israel, no matter what. So what I wanted to do is zoom out from that question of success and show how camp actually functions.
And then the question of “does it work” is really up to the reader. To people who believe that curbing intermarriage is the most important thing, then camps have been somewhat successful in the sense that people who go to these heavily educational camps are less likely to marry out of the faith.
But I am more interested in what actually happened at camp. And in terms of their legacies, I wanted to show how they changed various aspects of American Jewish life, and religion and politics. So I was really able to find how camping was essential in making kind of an Israel-centered Jewish education the norm. I was also able to draw a line between these Yiddish camps over the ’60s and ’70s that closed in the ’80s and contemporary Yiddish. The question of success is a real tricky and political one in a way that a lot of people have not talked about.
And is camp also fun? Because you’re creating a camp experience for your book launch next week.
Camp is fun — for a lot of people. Camp was not fun for everyone. And so I do want to play with that ambivalence at the party, and acknowledge that and also acknowledge that some people loved camp when they were younger and have mixed feelings about it now.
The party is not really a celebration of Jewish summer camp. People will be drinking and having fun and dancing — but I want them to be thinking while also about what is going on and why. How is Tisha B’Av [the fast day that commemorates the destruction of the ancient Jewish temple in Jerusalem that falls at the height of summer] commemorated at camp, for example?
Or what songs are we singing and what do they mean? I think a lot of people when they’re little kids, they learn songs in these Jewish summer camps that they can’t understand and later they maybe learn Hebrew and go, whoa, we were singing what?! My example from Zionist summer camp is singing “Ein Li Eretz Acheret,” or “I Have No Other Country.” We were in America and we obviously have another country! I don’t think anyone in my youth movement actually believes the words “Ein Li Eretz Acheret” because we live in America and people tend to kind of like living in America and most of them do not move to Israel.
So at the party we’ll be working through the fun of it, and at the same time the confusion of it and the ambivalence of it. I want it to be fun, and I also want it to be something that causes people to think.
—
The post American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews? appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
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Hamas Tightens Grip on Gaza, New Analysis Shows, as Iran War Delays Second Phase of Ceasefire
Hamas fighters on Feb. 22, 2025. Photo: Majdi Fathi via Reuters Connect
As the international community struggles to advance the second phase of an already fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, the Palestinian terrorist group is exploiting the war in Iran to tighten its civilian and security grip on the Gaza Strip and rebuild its military capabilities, according to a new report.
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) — an Israel-based research institute — released a new report this week warning that the US-Israel conflict with Iran and disputes over management of Gaza are delaying the implementation of the second phase of the US-backed ceasefire agreement, under which Hamas was expected to disarm as Israeli forces were set to withdraw from parts of the enclave.
The report also warned that such delays are giving Hamas a window of opportunity to rearm and further tighten its control over Gaza, complicating fragile efforts to move forward with the next stage of the truce.
ITIC’s new assessment shows Hamas has moved to reassert control over parts of the war-torn enclave and consolidate its weakened position by targeting Palestinians it labeled as “lawbreakers and collaborators with Israel.”
With its security control tightening, Hamas’s brutal crackdown has escalated, sparking widespread clashes and violence as the group seeks to seize weapons and eliminate any opposition.
The report further notes that Hamas’s confidence is on the rise across Gaza, visible in the increasingly public presence of armed operatives from both its military wing and security forces, underscoring the group’s tightening hold on the roughly 47 percent of the enclave it controls without an Israeli military presence.
Social media videos widely circulated online show Hamas members brutally beating Palestinians and carrying out public executions of alleged collaborators and rival militia members.
According to ITIC’s newly released report, Hamas is also rebuilding its military capabilities by smuggling arms from Egypt and producing weapons independently, while simultaneously consolidating civilian control through expanded police presence, regulation of markets, and the distribution of financial aid to residents in areas it governs.
Earlier this year, the US-backed plan to end the war in Gaza hit major roadblocks after proposals surfaced that would allow Hamas to retain some small arms — an idea strongly denounced by Israeli officials who insist the Islamist group must fully disarm.
Officials involved in the US-led Board of Peace drafted a plan that would allow Hamas to retain small arms while surrendering longer-range weapons as part of a “phased disarmament” process over several months, with heavy weapons to be “decommissioned immediately.”
However, key details about where the surrendered arms would go and how the process would be enforced remain unclear.
The initial framework also required “personal arms” to be “registered and decommissioned” as a new Palestinian administration takes charge of security in the enclave.
Israel has previously warned that Hamas must fully disarm for the second phase of the ceasefire to move forward, pointing to tens of thousands of rifles and an active network of underground tunnels still under the terrorist group’s control.
If the Palestinian Islamist group does not give up its weapons, Israel has vowed not to withdraw troops from Gaza further or approve any rebuilding efforts, effectively stalling the ceasefire agreement.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) currently occupies about 53 percent of the Strip, with most of the Palestinian population living in the remaining portion of the enclave under Hamas control.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has insisted the country will not accept anything less than the full demilitarization of Gaza, warning that any reconstruction or political transition in the enclave depends on Hamas relinquishing its weapons.
Under US President Donald Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan, phase two would involve deploying an international stabilization force (ISF), beginning large-scale reconstruction, and establishing a Palestinian technocratic committee to oversee the territory’s administration.
According to media reports, the ISF could total around 20,000 troops, though it remains uncertain whether the multinational peacekeeping force will actually help disarm Hamas.
Over the past few weeks, Israel has resumed military operations in the Gaza Strip aimed at forcibly disarming Hamas. The IDF’s previous operations during the last two years of war had been partly limited by efforts to protect Israeli hostages kidnapped by Hamas, the last of whom were released last year as part of the ceasefire.
On Tuesday, Israeli forces announced that several Hamas Nukhba terrorists were eliminated during a strike in central Gaza after troops intercepted the operatives while they were conducting a military training exercise in the area.
IDF forces in the Southern Command remain deployed at key locations in the Gaza Strip, with the army warning it will employ all necessary force to neutralize threats and maintain control across the territory.
This week, the United Nations Security Council met to review progress on the Gaza peace plan and the implementation of phase two, originally adopted in November under the fragile truce between Israel and Hamas.
According to Nickolay Mladenov, the high representative for Gaza on Trump’s Board of Peace, a transitional Palestinian governing body has already been established in the enclave, and a framework agreed upon by the guarantor countries — the US, Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar — has been presented to armed groups, which he said establishes “the principle of one authority, one law, and one weapon.”
“The National Committee exercises authority solely on an interim basis,” Mladenov said during a speech, referring to the transitional Palestinian government that has been established.
“The end state is a reformed Palestinian Authority capable of governing Gaza and the West Bank, and ultimately a pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood,” he continued.
The proposed plan would require all armed groups in Gaza to transfer their arms to a transitional Palestinian governing authority, starting with their larger-scale weapons and monitoring compliance before reconstruction begins, while allowing fighters to gradually return to civilian life.
Mladenov also confirmed that Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and Albania have committed troops to the ISF.
“The people of Gaza want reconstruction, and reconstruction requires the decommissioning of weapons,” he said, describing this link as the framework’s “driving force.”
So far, there is no timeline or clarity on discussions with relevant groups, nor on any potential Israeli military withdrawal.
As of February, Israel was planning to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip to forcibly disarm Hamas, with the IDF is drawing up plans for a renewed major offensive.
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned that Hamas will be disarmed by force if it continues to violate the ceasefire and pose a threat to Israel’s security.
“If Hamas does not disarm in accordance with the agreed framework, we will dismantle it and all of its capabilities,” the Israeli defense chief said this month.
However, with Israel focused on fighting Iran as well as its chief proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon, it appears a new offensive is unlikely to take place in Gaza in the immediate future.
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Sam Altman Shuts Down OpenAI’s Sora, Video Sharing App Notorious for Antisemitic Content
Three videos featured on Sora on March 24, 2026, promoted antisemitic stereotypes and violence against Jews. Photo: Screenshots
In a surprise move that has stunned industry watchers and killed a $1 billion licensing deal with Disney, OpenAI announced it would shutter Sora, the controversial video-generating app which drew condemnation last year for its unwillingness to stop the production and sharing of antisemitic content.
“We’re saying goodbye to the Sora app,” Sora’s X account posted on Tuesday. “To everyone who created with Sora, shared it, and built community around it: thank you. What you made with Sora mattered, and we know this news is disappointing. We’ll share more soon, including timelines for the app and API and details on preserving your work.”
Reflecting the seeming abrupt nature of the decision, OpenAI had published on Monday a “Creating with Sora safely” guide. The company claimed that its product “uses layered defenses to keep the feed safe while leaving room for creativity. At creation, guardrails seek to block unsafe content before it’s made — including sexual material, terrorist propaganda, and self-harm promotion — by checking both prompts and outputs across multiple video frames and audio transcripts.”
The guide stated, “We’ve red teamed to explore novel risks, and we’ve tightened policies relative to image generation given Sora’s greater realism and the addition of motion and audio.”
With the release of the standalone Sora 2 app in September 2025, The Algemeiner and other news organizations documented the antisemitic tropes emerging on the platform with one recurring visual depicting Jews chasing after coins.
Following the announcement of Sora’s shutdown on Tuesday, The Algemeiner reviewed the app’s feed and discovered multiple antisemitic videos within minutes.
The first from user @frankel944 depicts an elaborate 30-second narrative of an older Hassidic Jew with a long beard and traditional religious garb who demands a poor man’s $10,000 savings in exchange for moldy bread and soup. He complies, inspiring the Jewish man to then take the money, fly to Mexico, dance in a sombrero with a mariachi band, and then return to the US to say his prayers at the synagogue.
A second from @davidkline16 features a young man — apparently one of the user’s friends — walking in a synagogue proclaiming that he has been appointed the rabbi and inviting people to come and celebrate. A surreal, fleshy orb with a face floats in the background and starts to interrupt the warm greeting, menacingly yelling “Rapist! Rapist!” One of the recurring jokes that young people had used Sora to do was to transform their friends into Jewish converts.
The third is one of the most chilling as it depicts violence against Jews. User @orituviaabaselo felt compelled to create and share a video featuring a group of eight Hassidic Jewish men sitting at a table, speaking Hebrew, and eating challah in the middle of a dark road at night. Moments later a blue car comes barreling into the group sending them every which way. The clip ends with one of the Jews not concerned for his friends’ injuries, but asking where he can find his hat.
In October, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) published research from its Center on Technology and Society which revealed that among the multiple AI-video generating apps tested, the programs would respond to antisemitic, racist, or other bigoted prompts at least 40 percent of the time. The ADL’s analysts found that, compared to its competitors, Sora “performed the best in terms of content moderation, refusing to generate 60% of the prompts.”
In January, the ADL analyzed multiple large language models and found that OpenAI’s ChatGPT lagged behind Anthropic’s Claude in its ability to detect antisemitism.
Some analysts suspect that this intra-industry rivalry may have played a role in OpenAI’s decision to shut down Sora as part of an effort to focus the company’s resources on core business capabilities. Anthropic was founded in 2021 by former OpenAI staffers dissatisfied with OpenAI CEO Sam Altman’s attitudes toward the dangers of AI. In recent years its Claude large language model has developed hegemony among computer programmers and other technical workers.
The Wall Street Journal reported on Tuesday that OpenAI sought to pivot to focus more on “so-called productivity tools,” a category currently dominated by Anthropic, rather than continuing with the cost-intensive videos.
Farida Khalaf, a business analyst and data engineer who focuses on cybersecurity, wrote Monday on Substack Notes predicting what would happen the next day. “Meta shutdown Metaverse, NEXT will be SORA from open AI,” she wrote.
On March 17, Meta announced its CEO Mark Zuckerberg had chosen to shut down Horizon World, the virtual reality platform which he had previously backed so heavily he chose to change the company’s name in October 2021 from Facebook to Meta.
Khalaf drew the comparison, asking, “Remember the hype surrounding the SORA app release? It seems to be following a similar trajectory, and with costs running higher than its revenue, the sustainability of this model is questionable.”
Forbes estimated in November that Sora was costing OpenAI $15 million a day. “We have been quite amazed by how much our power users want to use sora, and the economics are currently completely unsustainable. we thought 30 free gens/day would be more than enough, but clearly we were wrong!” Sora’s head Bill Peebles wrote on X on Oct. 30, 2025.
In December, Disney had signed a $1 billion agreement with OpenAI to license 200 characters for inclusion in Sora. “As the nascent AI field advances rapidly, we respect OpenAI’s decision to exit the video generation business and to shift its priorities elsewhere,” said a spokesperson for the film company.
On Tuesday, Altman announced his refocused priorities on X.
“AI will help discover new science, such as cures for diseases, which is perhaps the most important way to increase quality of life long-term,” Altman wrote. “AI will also present new threats to society that we have to address. No company can sufficiently mitigate these on their own; we will need a society-wide response to things like novel bio threats, a massive and fast change to the economy, extremely capable models causing complex emergent effects across society, and more.”
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Who is Hasan Piker, the left-wing streamer accused of being an antisemite?
(JTA) — Rep. Brad Schneider, an Illinois Democrat, delivered a forceful condemnation of the popular streamer Hasan Piker on Tuesday, warning his fellow Democrats against embracing figures he says traffic in hate.
“Hasan Piker is an unapologetic antisemite,” Schneider, who chairs the New Democratic Coalition, wrote in a post on X. “Democrats risk losing our credibility to condemn those on the right who traffic in bigotry, antisemitism, & hate when our own Members of Congress & candidates are celebrating or, worse yet, platforming those who espouse hate of any kind.”
While Schneider added in a separate post that he was “proud” that the party welcomes “a broad diversity of opinions and priorities,” he stipulated that the Democratic tent must “reject those who champion ideologies of exclusion and demonization.”
Schneider’s remarks come as the Republican coalition has faced deepening rifts over the vociferously anti-Israel, and increasingly antisemitic, rhetoric emanating from prominent online figures in its movement, including Tucker Carlson and Nick Fuentes.
But as top conservatives wrestle with the growing prominence of far-right voices within the party, an adjacent battle is emerging on the Democratic side, as support for Israel among its base has reached a record-low and political candidates increasingly engage with far-left, anti-Israel voices, including Piker.
Since starting his daily online broadcasts in 2018, Piker, 34, has amassed a devoted online fanbase, including three million followers on the streaming platform Twitch and 1.85 million on YouTube.
As one of the most prominent leftist commentators in the United States, Piker’s streams in recent years have often featured sharp critiques of the Democratic party, Israel and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, positions that have increasingly drawn scrutiny.
Piker has previously referred to Orthodox Jews as “inbred,” compared Israelis to the Ku Klux Klan and defended Hamas, writing in a post on X in January that the terror group is “a thousand times better than the fascist settler colonial apartheid state.”
On one of his shows aired days after Oct. 7, Piker told off a listener who condemned the massacre, saying “Bloodthirsty violent pig dog, suck my d–-k.” In a May 2024 stream, Piker also minimized reports of the prevalence of sexual assault during the Oct. 7 attacks, saying “It doesn’t matter if rape happened on October 7th. It doesn’t change the dynamic for me.”
While speaking at a conference in Qatar last month, Piker said that he had lost viewers in the wake of Oct. 7 for his commentary, explaining, “People were not ready, especially in Western audiences, for someone to say that Israel played a significant role in how Oct. 7 took place.”
In response to a CNN article last month that noted the joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran coincided with Purim, Piker wrote, “This is jewish supremacy. it’s what netenyahu said after oct7” [sic].
Piker’s incendiary commentary has earned him a nomination for “Antisemite of the Year” in 2024 from a watchdog group and drawn the condemnation of Jonathan Greenblatt, the CEO of the Anti-Defamation League. Greenblatt charged the streamer with using his platform to “spread anti-Jewish tropes, amplify propaganda from a designated terrorist group, and promote toxic anti-Zionism.”
In October 2024, Rep. Ritchie Torres of New York, a pro-Israel stalwart in the Democratic party, wrote a letter to Twitch executives in which he called on the platform to “stop popularizing” Piker, who he called the “antisemitic poster child for a systematically antisemitic social media platform.”
Despite the volley of criticism, Piker has dismissed allegations that he is antisemitic.
“These last two years, I’ve been called antisemitic. I abhor antisemitism, and I’ve spent my entire professional media career combating it. I just happen to be anti-Israel, and that makes me a far greater threat than the likes of Nick Fuentes because they know he’s a Nazi,” Piker told Variety last November. “I don’t find kinship with the right because I think there are some on the right that just use Israel as a new opportunity to cut through the noise.”
Piker has also increasingly hosted left-wing politicians on his platform in recent years, drawing derision from critics, including Schneider, who argue that officials risk legitimizing his commentary by appearing alongside him.
Piker has previously interviewed Vermont Independent Sen. Bernie Sanders and New York Democratic Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, California gubernatorial candidate Tom Steyer and New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani. Next month, Piker is slated to appear on campuses alongside Michigan Senate candidate Abdul el-Sayed.
For many politicians, Piker is a conduit to the much-coveted younger voter. Twitch, originally designed for video games, is now widely used for music, creative content and political commentary from hosts like Piker.
The streamer also confirmed earlier this month that California Gov. Gavin Newsom, who is seen as a likely 2028 Democratic presidential candidate, had agreed to sit for an interview with him.
“Gavin newsom is a shrewd operator. while i do not trust him on israel, it is clear that this issue has shifted so much towards the side of truth and justice that even people w 2028 ambitions are leaning into anti israel sentiment,” Piker wrote in a post on X after Newsom appeared to agree with claims that Israel is an “apartheid state” earlier this month. (This week Newsom said he regrets those comments.)
Schnieder is not alone in his calls for fellow Democrats to distance themselves from Piker. Earlier this month, Jonathan Cowan, the president of the centrist Democratic think tank Third Way, wrote an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal calling on Democrats to “draw a line in the sand.”
“Mr. Piker is anti-American, antiwomen, anti-Western and antisemitic. No Democrat should engage with him. All should seek to push him to the fringe, where he belongs,” Cowan wrote.
Many in the party’s progressive wing have taken a sharply different view.
Cameron Kasky, a Jewish Gen-Z progressive who recently dropped his bid in New York’s 12th District race, pushed back on the calls to sideline Piker in post on X, arguing instead that more Democrats should sit down with him.
“Yeah, no sh–t big politicians are talking to Hasan Piker. More of them should be,” Kasky wrote. “God forbid a candidate actually work with new media, which the Right has used to dominate us.”
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
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