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American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews?
(JTA) — Among Sandra Fox’s most memorable finds during her years mining American archives for materials about Jewish summer camps was a series of letters about the hours before lights-out.
The letters were by counselors who were documenting an unusual window in the day when they stopped supervising campers, leaving the teens instead to their own devices, which sometimes included romance and sexual exploration.
“It was each division talking about how they dealt with that free time before bed in ‘age-appropriate ways,’” Fox recalled about the letters written by counselors at Camp Ramah in Wisconsin, the original iteration of the Conservative movement’s network of summer camps.
“I’ve spoken to Christian people who work at Christian camps and have researched Christian camps. There is no free time before bed,” Fox told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “That’s not a thing if you don’t want kids to hook up. So it was just amazing to find these documents of Camp Ramah leaders really having the conversation explicitly. Most of the romance and sexuality stuff is implicit in the archives.”
The letters are quoted extensively in Fox’s new book, “The Jews of Summer: Summer Camp and Jewish Culture in Postwar America.” Fox, who earned a PhD in history from New York University in 2018 and now teaches and directs the Archive of the American Jewish Left there, tells the story of American Judaism’s most immersive laboratory for constructing identity and contesting values.
Next week, Fox is launching the book with an event at Congregation Beth Elohim in Park Slope, Brooklyn. (Tickets for the Feb. 23 event are available here.) Attendees will be able to tour adult versions of some of the most durable elements of Jewish summer camps, from Israeli dance to Yiddish and Hebrew instruction to Color Wars to Tisha B’Av, the mournful holiday that always falls over the summer.
“I never considered doing a normal book party,” Fox said. “It was always really obvious to me that a book about experiential Jewish education and role play should be celebrated and launched out into the world through experiential education and role play.”
Sandra Fox’s 2023 book “The Jews of Summer,” looks at the history of American Jewish summer camps. (Courtesy of Fox)
We spoke to Fox about her party plans, how Jewish summer camps have changed over time and how they’ve stayed the same, and the cultural history of that before-bed free time.
This interview has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. We’ll be continuing the conversation in a virtual chat through the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research Feb. 27 at 1 p.m.; register here.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Given how much Jews like to talk about camp, were you surprised that this book hadn’t already been written?
Sandra Fox: There’s been a lot of fruitful research on the history of various camps, but it’s usually been focused on one camping movement or one camp type. So there are articles about Zionist camps. There are certainly articles out there about the Ramah camps. A lot of camps have produced books — either their alumni associations or a scholar who went to let’s say, Reform movement camps have created essay collections about those camps. And there are also books about Habonim and other Zionist youth movements.
I don’t really know why this is the first stab at this kind of cross-comparison. It might be that people didn’t think there would be so much to compare. I think the overwhelming feeling I get from readers so far, people who preordered and gotten their books early, is that they’re very surprised to hear how similar these camps are. So perhaps it’s that scholars weren’t thinking about Jewish summer camps that came from such diverse standpoints as having something enough in common to write about them all at once.
Also distance from the time period really helps. You can write a book about — and people do write a book about — the ’60s and ’70s and have been for decades, but there’s a certain amount of distance from the period that has allowed me to do this, I think, and maybe it also helps that I’m generationally removed. A lot of the scholars who’ve worked on camps in the postwar period went to camps in the postwar period. It makes a lot of sense that it would be harder to write this sort of sweeping thing perhaps. The fact that I’m a millennial meant that I could write about the postwar period — and also write kind of an epilogue-style chapter that catches us up to the present.
What’s clear is that there’s something amazing about studying summer camp, a completely immersive 24/7 experience that parents send children away for. There’s no better setting for thinking about how adults project their anxieties and desires about the future onto children. There’s also no place better to think about power dynamics and age and generational tension.
I was definitely struck by the “sameyness” of Jewish camps in your accounting. What do you think we can learn from that, either about camps or about us as Jews?
I do want to say that while there’s a lot of sameyness, whenever you do a comparative study, there’s a risk of kind of collapsing all these things and making them seem too similar. What I’m trying to convey is that the camp leaders from a variety of movements took the basic structure of the summer camp as we know it — its daily schedule, its environment, its activities — and it did look similar from camp to camp, at least on that surface level.
If you look at the daily schedules in comparison, they might have a lot of the same features but they’ll be called slightly different things depending on if the camp leans more heavily towards Hebrew, or Yiddish, or English. But the content within those schedules would be rather different. It’s more that the skeletal structure of camp life has a lot of similarities across the board and then the details within each section of the day or the month had a lot of differences.
But I think what it says is that in the postwar period, the anxieties that Jewish leaders had about the future of Judaism are really, really similar and the solution that they found within the summer camp, they were pretty unanimous about. They just then took the model and inserted within it their particular nationalistic, linguistic or religious perspectives. So I think more so than saying anything about American Jewry, it shows kind of how flexible camping is. And that’s not just the Jewish story. Lots of different Americans have embraced summer camping in different ways.
So many people who have gone to camp have a fixed memory of what camp is like, where it’s caught in time, but you argue that camps have actually undergone lots of change. What are the most striking changes you documented, perhaps ones that might have been hard for even insiders to discern as they happened?
First of all, the Israel-centeredness of American Jewish education as we know it today didn’t happen overnight in 1948, for instance. It was a slower process, beyond the Zionist movements where that was already going on, for decades before 1948. Ramah and the Reform camps for instance took their time towards getting to the heavily Zionist-imbued curricula that we know.
There was considerable confusion and ambivalence at first about what to do with Israel: whether to raise an Israeli flag, not because they were anti-Zionist, but because American Jews had been thinking about proving their loyalty to America for many generations. There were some sources that would talk about — what kind of right do American Jews have to raise the Israeli flag when they’re not Israeli? So that kind of Israel-centeredness that is really a feature of camp life today was a slower process than we might think.
It fit camp life really well because broader American camps used Native American symbols, in some ways that are problematic today, to create what we know of as an iconography of camp life. So for Jews, Israel and its iconography, or Palestine and iconography before ’48, provided an alternative set of options that were read as Jewish, but it still took some time to get to where we are now in terms of the Israel focus.
One of the reasons I place emphasis on the Yiddish summer camps is to show that in the early 20th century and the mid-20th century there was more ideological diversity in the Jewish camping sphere, including various forms of Yiddishist groups and socialist groups and communist groups that operated summer camps. Most of them have closed, and their decline is obviously a change that tells a story of how American Jewry changed over the course of the postwar period. Their legacy is important, too: I have made the argument that these camps in a lot of ways modeled the idea of Yiddish as having a future in America.
What about hookup culture? Contemporary discourse about Jewish camps have focused on sex and sexuality there. What did you observe about this in the archives?
I think people think of the hookup culture of Jewish camps today and certainly in my time in the ’90s and 2000s as a permanent feature, and in some ways I found through my research and oral history interviews that that was the case, but it was really interesting to zoom out a little bit and think about how Jewish summer camps changed in terms of sexual romantic culture, in relationship to how America changed with the sexual revolution and the youth culture.
It’s not it’s not useful to think about Jewish hookup culture in a vacuum. It’s happening within America more broadly. And so of course, it’s changed dramatically over time. And one of the things I learned that was so fascinating is that Jewish summer camps were actually their leaders were less concerned in a lot of ways about sexuality at camp in the ’40s and ’50s, than they were in the late ’60s and ’70s. Because earlier premarital sex was pretty rare, at least in the teenage years, so they were not that concerned about what happened after lights out because they kind of assumed whatever was going on was fairly innocent.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, that’s when camps have to actually think about how to balance allowance and control. They want to allow campers to have these relationships, to have their first sexual experiences, and part of that is related to rising rates of intermarriage and wanting to encourage love between Jews, but they also want to control it because there’s a broader societal moment in which the sexuality of teenagers is problematized and their and their sexual culture is more public.
There’s been a real wave of sustained criticism by former campers about the cultures that they experienced, arguing that the camps created an inappropriately sexualized and unsafe space. There’s been a lot of reaction to that and the broader #MeToo moment. I’m curious about what you can speculate about a future where that space is cleaned up, based on your historical research — what is gained and what, potentially, could be lost?
Without being involved in camping today — and I want to really make that disclaimer because I know a lot of change is happening and lot of organizations are involved to talk about this issue better, to train camps and camp leaders and their counselors to not create a pressured environment for camper — I think what the history shows is that this hookup culture did not come about out of nowhere. It was partly related to the broader changes in America and the sexual revolution.
But it was also partly created because camps really needed to have campers’ buy-in, in order to be “successful.” A huge argument of my book is that we think about the power of camps as if camp directors have campers as, like, puppets on strings, and that what they do is what happens in camp life. But actually, campers have changed the everyday texture of life at camp over the course of the decades in so many different ways by resisting various ideas or just not being interested.
So hookup culture is also part of making campers feel like they have freedom at camp and that’s essential. That’s not a side project — that is essential to their ability to get campers to come back. It’s a financial need, and it’s an ideological need. If you make campers feel like they have freedom, then they will feel like they freely took on the ideologies your camp is promoting in a really natural way.
The last part of it is rising rates of intermarriage. As rates of intermarriage rose in the second half of the 20th century, there’s no doubt in my mind from doing the research that the preexisting culture around sexuality at camp and romance at camp got turbo-boosted [to facilitate relationships that could potentially lead to marriage between two Jews]. At that point, the allowance and control that camp leaders were trying to create for many decades leans maybe more heavily towards allowance.
There are positives to camp environments being a place where campers can explore their sexualities. There’s definitely a lot of conversation about the negative effects and those are all very, very real. I know people who went through horrible things at a camp and I also know people who experienced it as a very sex-positive atmosphere. I know people in my age range who were able to discover that they were gay or lesbian at camp in safety in comparison to home, so it’s not black and white at all. I hope that my chapter on romance and sexuality can maybe add some historical nuance to the conversation and give people a sense of how this actually happened. Because it happened for a whole bunch of reasons.
I think there’s a consensus view that camp is one of the most “successful” things the Jews do. But it’s hard to see where lessons from camp or camp culture are being imported to the rest of Jewish life. I’m curious what you see as kind of the lessons that Jewish institutions or Jewish communities have taken from camp — or have they not done that?
Every single public engagement I do about my work has boiled down to the question of, well, does it work? Does camp work? Is it successful? And that’s been a question that a lot of social scientists have been interested in. I don’t want to oversimplify that research, but a lot of the ways that they’ve measured success have been things that are not necessarily a given to all Jews as obviously the right way to be a Jew. So, for instance, in the ’90s and early 2000s, at the very least, a lot of research was about how, you know, “XYZ” camp and youth movement were successfully curbing intermarriage. A lot of them also asked campers and former campers how they feel about Israel, and it’s always if they are supportive of Israel in very normative ways, right, giving money visiting, supporting Israel or lobbying for its behalf — then camps have been successful.
I’m not interested in whether camps were successful by those metrics. I’m interested in how we got to the idea that camp should be successful in those ways in the first place. How did we get to those kinds of normative assumptions of like, this is a good Jew; a good Jew marries a Jew; a good Jew supports Israel, no matter what. So what I wanted to do is zoom out from that question of success and show how camp actually functions.
And then the question of “does it work” is really up to the reader. To people who believe that curbing intermarriage is the most important thing, then camps have been somewhat successful in the sense that people who go to these heavily educational camps are less likely to marry out of the faith.
But I am more interested in what actually happened at camp. And in terms of their legacies, I wanted to show how they changed various aspects of American Jewish life, and religion and politics. So I was really able to find how camping was essential in making kind of an Israel-centered Jewish education the norm. I was also able to draw a line between these Yiddish camps over the ’60s and ’70s that closed in the ’80s and contemporary Yiddish. The question of success is a real tricky and political one in a way that a lot of people have not talked about.
And is camp also fun? Because you’re creating a camp experience for your book launch next week.
Camp is fun — for a lot of people. Camp was not fun for everyone. And so I do want to play with that ambivalence at the party, and acknowledge that and also acknowledge that some people loved camp when they were younger and have mixed feelings about it now.
The party is not really a celebration of Jewish summer camp. People will be drinking and having fun and dancing — but I want them to be thinking while also about what is going on and why. How is Tisha B’Av [the fast day that commemorates the destruction of the ancient Jewish temple in Jerusalem that falls at the height of summer] commemorated at camp, for example?
Or what songs are we singing and what do they mean? I think a lot of people when they’re little kids, they learn songs in these Jewish summer camps that they can’t understand and later they maybe learn Hebrew and go, whoa, we were singing what?! My example from Zionist summer camp is singing “Ein Li Eretz Acheret,” or “I Have No Other Country.” We were in America and we obviously have another country! I don’t think anyone in my youth movement actually believes the words “Ein Li Eretz Acheret” because we live in America and people tend to kind of like living in America and most of them do not move to Israel.
So at the party we’ll be working through the fun of it, and at the same time the confusion of it and the ambivalence of it. I want it to be fun, and I also want it to be something that causes people to think.
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The post American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews? appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
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Milei Reaffirms Unwavering Support for Israel Ahead of Independence Day Visit
Argentine President Javier Milei speaks at the 12th annual Algemeiner J100 Gala on March 9, 2026, in New York City.
Argentine President Javier Milei has once again voiced his unwavering support for Israel ahead of a diplomatic visit beginning this weekend, during which he will take part in Independence Day celebrations and light a ceremonial torch.
In an interview with Israel’s Channel 14 on Thursday, Milei offered unequivocal support for Israel amid its ongoing war with Iran, describing the Islamist regime in Tehran as “an enemy to the West.”
“I defend Israel and the Jewish people because it is a just cause,” the Argentine leader said. “Israel stands as the fortress of the West. Turning your back on it would mean turning your back on a legacy that has produced one of the greatest civilizational achievements in history.”
“Rejecting Israel’s legacy to humanity means destroying everything that has made Western civilization great,” he continued.
Milei also praised both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump, calling them “exceptional leaders,” amid what he described as a fight for democracy, freedom, and the very foundations of modern civilization.
“Beyond the threat of developing nuclear capabilities, Iran exports and finances terrorism around the world. It is not only an enemy of Israel, but of the entire West,” the Argentine leader said. “If we fail to understand the danger posed by this theocratic regime, we are jeopardizing our very existence.”
He also criticized the international community for what he portrayed as a lack of support for Washington and Jerusalem during the conflict, warning that such hesitation reflects a broader failure to confront rising global threats.
“They are cowards who are afraid to confront them. If you want peace, you must be prepared for war,” he said. “If we fail to understand that and refuse to face those who seek to destroy our existence, we will ultimately become victims anyway.”
In his third diplomatic visit to the Jewish state, Milei will arrive on Sunday to take part in Israel’s Independence Day celebrations, scheduled to run from April 19 to 22.
He will become the first foreign head of state to light a torch as part of the official Independence Day ceremony.
During his trip, Milei will also receive a series of honors, including the Presidential Medal of Honor from Israeli President Isaac Herzog and an honorary doctorate, in recognition of what Israeli officials describe as his exceptional contribution to Israel and humanity.
“Milei has demonstrated unwavering support for Israel on the international stage, stood alongside the families of Gaza hostages, and expressed a deep connection to the Jewish people and its heritage,” the Israeli president said in a statement announcing the decision, calling Argentina a “key ally.”
The Argentine leader “represents bold leadership and has pursued a clear, unequivocal policy of standing with the State of Israel as an ardent Zionist,” he continued.
During his visit, Milei will also meet with Netanyahu, and some reports suggest discussions could advance his earlier pledge to move Argentina’s embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
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Israeli Defense Chief Says Hezbollah Will Be Disarmed, Terror Group Vows Continued ‘Resistance’ as Truce Begins
Smoke rises following an airstrike in Lebanon, as seen from Israeli side of the border, April 11, 2026. Photo: REUTERS/Amir Cohen
As a newly agreed ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon took effect, Israel’s defense minister warned on Friday that Hezbollah will ultimately be disarmed and Israeli forces will not withdraw from Lebanese territory, vowing the campaign will continue until the threat to Israel’s northern communities is fully eliminated.
During a press conference, Israel Katz said the military campaign had entered a temporary “freeze” phase under a 10-day ceasefire framework. However, he stressed that Israel’s operational objectives on the ground remain unfinished and the maneuver is far from complete.
“The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] will continue to hold all positions it has cleared and taken inside Lebanon,” the Israeli defense chief said. “The ground operation and nationwide strikes against Hezbollah have achieved significant gains, but the mission is not yet complete.”
“Disarming Hezbollah — whether through military force or political pressure — was and remains the central objective of the campaign to which we are committed,” he continued. “Significant political leverage has now also been created, with the direct involvement of US President [Donald Trump] and increased pressure on the Lebanese government to advance that goal.”
Katz’s remarks came shortly after the Iran-back Lebanese terrorist group issued a defiant statement rejecting the ceasefire and any prospect of direct negotiations with Jerusalem, while vowing its forces would continue resisting Israeli troops.
“Our fighters will keep their hands on the trigger, preparing for the enemy’s betrayal and violation of its commitments. We will remain loyal to the alliance until our last breath, and our flag will not fall,” the statement read.
“The presence of Israeli forces on Lebanese territory gives Lebanon and the Lebanese people the right to resist,” it continued.
Meanwhile, residents across southern Lebanon, Beirut, and other parts of the country began making their way back home as the ceasefire took effect, with social media footage showing reconstruction work already underway on infrastructure damaged during the war.
However, Israel has warned Lebanese citizens against returning to their homes at this stage, with officials saying that Hezbollah could try to exploit the situation to reestablish its terrorist infrastructure under civilian cover.
“With the ceasefire agreement taking effect, the IDF will continue to hold its positions in southern Lebanon in light of Hezbollah’s terrorist activity,” Col. Avichai Edraei, the IDF spokesperson in Arabic, said in a statement.
“Until further notice, you are asked not to move south of the Litani River,” he continued. “If the fire resumes, those who return to the security zone will be forced to evacuate in order to allow the mission to be completed.”
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also signaled that Israel does not intend to withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory, saying the military is establishing what he described as a “thickened security zone” along the border area.
“That’s where we are – and we’re not leaving,” the Israeli leader said in a video statement issued on Thursday.
Netanyahu also said the opportunity for a ceasefire emerged only after what he described as a dramatic shift in Lebanon’s strategic balance of power since the start of the war.
He pointed to major blows to Hezbollah’s military capabilities, including the killing of its longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah in 2024 and the subsequent destruction of large weapons stockpiles, saying these developments led to calls from Lebanese officials for direct peace talks for the first time in decades.
With negotiations now underway toward a longer-term arrangement, Netanyahu said Israel’s position rests on two core demands: the full disarmament of Hezbollah and a “sustainable” security-based peace framework.
For its part, Hezbollah insisted any agreement must include a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory and adherence to a reciprocal “quiet for quiet”” arrangement — terms Israel has rejected.
Netanyahu also warned that Hezbollah, which openly seeks Israel’s destruction, still retains a significant rocket arsenal, saying neutralizing that threat will remain a central component of the ongoing security and political process.
According to a report by The Wall Street Journal, nearly half of the roughly 8,000 rockets fired by Hezbollah during the war were launched from the southern Litani River region — an area that, under previous agreements, was supposed to be fully demilitarized.
The newly agreed ceasefire, which took effect Thursday-Friday at midnight, establishes a fixed 10-day window intended “to allow for good-faith negotiations toward a permanent security and peace agreement.”
As part of direct mediation efforts from Washington, Trump invited Netanyahu and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun to White House talks aimed at advancing a broader settlement framework.
According to the US Department of State, the Lebanese government pledged to take “significant steps” to prevent Hezbollah from launching further attacks against Israeli targets.
“Both countries recognize the challenge posed by armed groups that violate Lebanon’s sovereignty and threaten regional stability … The only forces authorized to bear arms in Lebanon will be Lebanese government forces,” an official statement from the meeting said.
“Israel will retain its right to take all necessary measures for self-defense, at any time, against planned, immediate or sustained attacks,” it continued.
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Despite Winning New Jersey Special Election, Anti-Israel Candidate Underperforms in Heavily Jewish Town
Analilia Mejia, Democratic candidate for New Jersey’s 11th Congressional District, speaks to guests after winning the election in Montclair, New Jersey, US, April 16, 2026. Photo: REUTERS/Eduardo Munoz
In Thursday night’s US congressional election in the 11th district of New Jersey, Jewish voters seemed to defect from the Democratic nominee in massive numbers, potentially foreshadowing a significant shift in Jewish voting patterns.
Analilia Mejia, a progressive activist known for her sharp condemnations of Israel, comfortably won the special congressional election in New Jersey in the deep-blue district by a margin of 60 percent to 40 percent.
Despite defeating her Republican opponent by 20 points, however, pundits pointed out that Mejia underperformed expectations and that Democrats hemorrhaged support among heavily Jewish communities.
In Livingston, New Jersey, a town with a significant Jewish population, Mejia barely eked out a 51-49 majority over Joe Hathaway, a staggering sea-change from recent elections. The deep-blue town voted for Democratic Gov. Mikie Sherrill and Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris by margins of 0.5 and 12 points, respectively. Taking into account party registration, the town has seen a shift to the political right by over 50 percent since 2024.
Though Mejia won Thursday’s race by a comfortable margin, experts pointed out that the progressive insurgent underperformed throughout the affluent suburban district. When taking into account party registration patterns, Mejia underperformed in Millburn by 23 points, North Caldwell by 10 points, South Orange by 7 points, and West Caldwell by 6 points, among others.
Spectators suggested that Mejia’s impressive margin of victory could be attributed to anti-Trump sentiment and massive turnout among Democrats and depressed turnout from Republicans.
Mejia’s positions on Israel, once considered fringe within the party, are increasingly becoming more mainstream, particularly in elections dominated by liberal voters. Her rhetoric on Israel, which critics say is one-sided and inflammatory, has drawn backlash from moderates and pro-Israel Democrats.
The outcome raises fresh questions about the party’s direction heading into national elections. While progressives see momentum, others worry candidates like Mejia could alienate Jewish and moderate voters while complicating efforts to maintain a broad electoral coalition. Her victory is likely to deepen internal party tensions, especially as debates over Israel grow more polarized and politically charged.
Mejia has said Israel’s actions in Gaza amount to “genocide,” a position that put her well to the left of many mainstream Democrats. She has aligned herself with calls for stronger conditions, or outright opposition, to US military support for Israel, reflecting the broader progressive wing’s push to reassess the traditional US-Israel relationship. She has also aimed sharp criticism toward the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the preeminent pro-Israel lobbying group in the US, calling the organization “horrendous” and accusing it of dividing the Democratic Party.
A progressive organizer with a record of criticizing Israeli government actions, Mejia benefited from a coalition of younger voters, activists, and highly engaged ideological blocs. Her win is consistent with recent polling trends showing a generational divide within the party, with younger Democrats expressing more skepticism toward Israel than older cohorts.
Mejia’s struggles in heavily Jewish and moderate areas of the district could forecast a split between the Democratic Party and what has been historically one of its most reliable voting blocs.
Since Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, massacre across southern Israel launched the Gaza war, the Democratic Paty’s rhetoric toward Israel has become increasingly hostile. Progressive Democrats, such as Reps. Ilhan Omar (MN) and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (NY), have accused Israel of committing “genocide” in Gaza.
This past week, approximately 80 percent of Democratic senators voted to halt military aid transfers to Israel, citing poor humanitarian conditions in Gaza and dismay over the US-Israeli war with Iran.
