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American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews?
(JTA) — Among Sandra Fox’s most memorable finds during her years mining American archives for materials about Jewish summer camps was a series of letters about the hours before lights-out.
The letters were by counselors who were documenting an unusual window in the day when they stopped supervising campers, leaving the teens instead to their own devices, which sometimes included romance and sexual exploration.
“It was each division talking about how they dealt with that free time before bed in ‘age-appropriate ways,’” Fox recalled about the letters written by counselors at Camp Ramah in Wisconsin, the original iteration of the Conservative movement’s network of summer camps.
“I’ve spoken to Christian people who work at Christian camps and have researched Christian camps. There is no free time before bed,” Fox told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “That’s not a thing if you don’t want kids to hook up. So it was just amazing to find these documents of Camp Ramah leaders really having the conversation explicitly. Most of the romance and sexuality stuff is implicit in the archives.”
The letters are quoted extensively in Fox’s new book, “The Jews of Summer: Summer Camp and Jewish Culture in Postwar America.” Fox, who earned a PhD in history from New York University in 2018 and now teaches and directs the Archive of the American Jewish Left there, tells the story of American Judaism’s most immersive laboratory for constructing identity and contesting values.
Next week, Fox is launching the book with an event at Congregation Beth Elohim in Park Slope, Brooklyn. (Tickets for the Feb. 23 event are available here.) Attendees will be able to tour adult versions of some of the most durable elements of Jewish summer camps, from Israeli dance to Yiddish and Hebrew instruction to Color Wars to Tisha B’Av, the mournful holiday that always falls over the summer.
“I never considered doing a normal book party,” Fox said. “It was always really obvious to me that a book about experiential Jewish education and role play should be celebrated and launched out into the world through experiential education and role play.”
Sandra Fox’s 2023 book “The Jews of Summer,” looks at the history of American Jewish summer camps. (Courtesy of Fox)
We spoke to Fox about her party plans, how Jewish summer camps have changed over time and how they’ve stayed the same, and the cultural history of that before-bed free time.
This interview has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. We’ll be continuing the conversation in a virtual chat through the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research Feb. 27 at 1 p.m.; register here.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Given how much Jews like to talk about camp, were you surprised that this book hadn’t already been written?
Sandra Fox: There’s been a lot of fruitful research on the history of various camps, but it’s usually been focused on one camping movement or one camp type. So there are articles about Zionist camps. There are certainly articles out there about the Ramah camps. A lot of camps have produced books — either their alumni associations or a scholar who went to let’s say, Reform movement camps have created essay collections about those camps. And there are also books about Habonim and other Zionist youth movements.
I don’t really know why this is the first stab at this kind of cross-comparison. It might be that people didn’t think there would be so much to compare. I think the overwhelming feeling I get from readers so far, people who preordered and gotten their books early, is that they’re very surprised to hear how similar these camps are. So perhaps it’s that scholars weren’t thinking about Jewish summer camps that came from such diverse standpoints as having something enough in common to write about them all at once.
Also distance from the time period really helps. You can write a book about — and people do write a book about — the ’60s and ’70s and have been for decades, but there’s a certain amount of distance from the period that has allowed me to do this, I think, and maybe it also helps that I’m generationally removed. A lot of the scholars who’ve worked on camps in the postwar period went to camps in the postwar period. It makes a lot of sense that it would be harder to write this sort of sweeping thing perhaps. The fact that I’m a millennial meant that I could write about the postwar period — and also write kind of an epilogue-style chapter that catches us up to the present.
What’s clear is that there’s something amazing about studying summer camp, a completely immersive 24/7 experience that parents send children away for. There’s no better setting for thinking about how adults project their anxieties and desires about the future onto children. There’s also no place better to think about power dynamics and age and generational tension.
I was definitely struck by the “sameyness” of Jewish camps in your accounting. What do you think we can learn from that, either about camps or about us as Jews?
I do want to say that while there’s a lot of sameyness, whenever you do a comparative study, there’s a risk of kind of collapsing all these things and making them seem too similar. What I’m trying to convey is that the camp leaders from a variety of movements took the basic structure of the summer camp as we know it — its daily schedule, its environment, its activities — and it did look similar from camp to camp, at least on that surface level.
If you look at the daily schedules in comparison, they might have a lot of the same features but they’ll be called slightly different things depending on if the camp leans more heavily towards Hebrew, or Yiddish, or English. But the content within those schedules would be rather different. It’s more that the skeletal structure of camp life has a lot of similarities across the board and then the details within each section of the day or the month had a lot of differences.
But I think what it says is that in the postwar period, the anxieties that Jewish leaders had about the future of Judaism are really, really similar and the solution that they found within the summer camp, they were pretty unanimous about. They just then took the model and inserted within it their particular nationalistic, linguistic or religious perspectives. So I think more so than saying anything about American Jewry, it shows kind of how flexible camping is. And that’s not just the Jewish story. Lots of different Americans have embraced summer camping in different ways.
So many people who have gone to camp have a fixed memory of what camp is like, where it’s caught in time, but you argue that camps have actually undergone lots of change. What are the most striking changes you documented, perhaps ones that might have been hard for even insiders to discern as they happened?
First of all, the Israel-centeredness of American Jewish education as we know it today didn’t happen overnight in 1948, for instance. It was a slower process, beyond the Zionist movements where that was already going on, for decades before 1948. Ramah and the Reform camps for instance took their time towards getting to the heavily Zionist-imbued curricula that we know.
There was considerable confusion and ambivalence at first about what to do with Israel: whether to raise an Israeli flag, not because they were anti-Zionist, but because American Jews had been thinking about proving their loyalty to America for many generations. There were some sources that would talk about — what kind of right do American Jews have to raise the Israeli flag when they’re not Israeli? So that kind of Israel-centeredness that is really a feature of camp life today was a slower process than we might think.
It fit camp life really well because broader American camps used Native American symbols, in some ways that are problematic today, to create what we know of as an iconography of camp life. So for Jews, Israel and its iconography, or Palestine and iconography before ’48, provided an alternative set of options that were read as Jewish, but it still took some time to get to where we are now in terms of the Israel focus.
One of the reasons I place emphasis on the Yiddish summer camps is to show that in the early 20th century and the mid-20th century there was more ideological diversity in the Jewish camping sphere, including various forms of Yiddishist groups and socialist groups and communist groups that operated summer camps. Most of them have closed, and their decline is obviously a change that tells a story of how American Jewry changed over the course of the postwar period. Their legacy is important, too: I have made the argument that these camps in a lot of ways modeled the idea of Yiddish as having a future in America.
What about hookup culture? Contemporary discourse about Jewish camps have focused on sex and sexuality there. What did you observe about this in the archives?
I think people think of the hookup culture of Jewish camps today and certainly in my time in the ’90s and 2000s as a permanent feature, and in some ways I found through my research and oral history interviews that that was the case, but it was really interesting to zoom out a little bit and think about how Jewish summer camps changed in terms of sexual romantic culture, in relationship to how America changed with the sexual revolution and the youth culture.
It’s not it’s not useful to think about Jewish hookup culture in a vacuum. It’s happening within America more broadly. And so of course, it’s changed dramatically over time. And one of the things I learned that was so fascinating is that Jewish summer camps were actually their leaders were less concerned in a lot of ways about sexuality at camp in the ’40s and ’50s, than they were in the late ’60s and ’70s. Because earlier premarital sex was pretty rare, at least in the teenage years, so they were not that concerned about what happened after lights out because they kind of assumed whatever was going on was fairly innocent.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, that’s when camps have to actually think about how to balance allowance and control. They want to allow campers to have these relationships, to have their first sexual experiences, and part of that is related to rising rates of intermarriage and wanting to encourage love between Jews, but they also want to control it because there’s a broader societal moment in which the sexuality of teenagers is problematized and their and their sexual culture is more public.
There’s been a real wave of sustained criticism by former campers about the cultures that they experienced, arguing that the camps created an inappropriately sexualized and unsafe space. There’s been a lot of reaction to that and the broader #MeToo moment. I’m curious about what you can speculate about a future where that space is cleaned up, based on your historical research — what is gained and what, potentially, could be lost?
Without being involved in camping today — and I want to really make that disclaimer because I know a lot of change is happening and lot of organizations are involved to talk about this issue better, to train camps and camp leaders and their counselors to not create a pressured environment for camper — I think what the history shows is that this hookup culture did not come about out of nowhere. It was partly related to the broader changes in America and the sexual revolution.
But it was also partly created because camps really needed to have campers’ buy-in, in order to be “successful.” A huge argument of my book is that we think about the power of camps as if camp directors have campers as, like, puppets on strings, and that what they do is what happens in camp life. But actually, campers have changed the everyday texture of life at camp over the course of the decades in so many different ways by resisting various ideas or just not being interested.
So hookup culture is also part of making campers feel like they have freedom at camp and that’s essential. That’s not a side project — that is essential to their ability to get campers to come back. It’s a financial need, and it’s an ideological need. If you make campers feel like they have freedom, then they will feel like they freely took on the ideologies your camp is promoting in a really natural way.
The last part of it is rising rates of intermarriage. As rates of intermarriage rose in the second half of the 20th century, there’s no doubt in my mind from doing the research that the preexisting culture around sexuality at camp and romance at camp got turbo-boosted [to facilitate relationships that could potentially lead to marriage between two Jews]. At that point, the allowance and control that camp leaders were trying to create for many decades leans maybe more heavily towards allowance.
There are positives to camp environments being a place where campers can explore their sexualities. There’s definitely a lot of conversation about the negative effects and those are all very, very real. I know people who went through horrible things at a camp and I also know people who experienced it as a very sex-positive atmosphere. I know people in my age range who were able to discover that they were gay or lesbian at camp in safety in comparison to home, so it’s not black and white at all. I hope that my chapter on romance and sexuality can maybe add some historical nuance to the conversation and give people a sense of how this actually happened. Because it happened for a whole bunch of reasons.
I think there’s a consensus view that camp is one of the most “successful” things the Jews do. But it’s hard to see where lessons from camp or camp culture are being imported to the rest of Jewish life. I’m curious what you see as kind of the lessons that Jewish institutions or Jewish communities have taken from camp — or have they not done that?
Every single public engagement I do about my work has boiled down to the question of, well, does it work? Does camp work? Is it successful? And that’s been a question that a lot of social scientists have been interested in. I don’t want to oversimplify that research, but a lot of the ways that they’ve measured success have been things that are not necessarily a given to all Jews as obviously the right way to be a Jew. So, for instance, in the ’90s and early 2000s, at the very least, a lot of research was about how, you know, “XYZ” camp and youth movement were successfully curbing intermarriage. A lot of them also asked campers and former campers how they feel about Israel, and it’s always if they are supportive of Israel in very normative ways, right, giving money visiting, supporting Israel or lobbying for its behalf — then camps have been successful.
I’m not interested in whether camps were successful by those metrics. I’m interested in how we got to the idea that camp should be successful in those ways in the first place. How did we get to those kinds of normative assumptions of like, this is a good Jew; a good Jew marries a Jew; a good Jew supports Israel, no matter what. So what I wanted to do is zoom out from that question of success and show how camp actually functions.
And then the question of “does it work” is really up to the reader. To people who believe that curbing intermarriage is the most important thing, then camps have been somewhat successful in the sense that people who go to these heavily educational camps are less likely to marry out of the faith.
But I am more interested in what actually happened at camp. And in terms of their legacies, I wanted to show how they changed various aspects of American Jewish life, and religion and politics. So I was really able to find how camping was essential in making kind of an Israel-centered Jewish education the norm. I was also able to draw a line between these Yiddish camps over the ’60s and ’70s that closed in the ’80s and contemporary Yiddish. The question of success is a real tricky and political one in a way that a lot of people have not talked about.
And is camp also fun? Because you’re creating a camp experience for your book launch next week.
Camp is fun — for a lot of people. Camp was not fun for everyone. And so I do want to play with that ambivalence at the party, and acknowledge that and also acknowledge that some people loved camp when they were younger and have mixed feelings about it now.
The party is not really a celebration of Jewish summer camp. People will be drinking and having fun and dancing — but I want them to be thinking while also about what is going on and why. How is Tisha B’Av [the fast day that commemorates the destruction of the ancient Jewish temple in Jerusalem that falls at the height of summer] commemorated at camp, for example?
Or what songs are we singing and what do they mean? I think a lot of people when they’re little kids, they learn songs in these Jewish summer camps that they can’t understand and later they maybe learn Hebrew and go, whoa, we were singing what?! My example from Zionist summer camp is singing “Ein Li Eretz Acheret,” or “I Have No Other Country.” We were in America and we obviously have another country! I don’t think anyone in my youth movement actually believes the words “Ein Li Eretz Acheret” because we live in America and people tend to kind of like living in America and most of them do not move to Israel.
So at the party we’ll be working through the fun of it, and at the same time the confusion of it and the ambivalence of it. I want it to be fun, and I also want it to be something that causes people to think.
—
The post American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews? appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
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Hamas Continues to Reject Disarmament as Fragile US-Backed Gaza Peace Plan Faces Hurdles
Palestinians walk among piles of rubble and damaged buildings in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip, Nov. 24, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Ramadan Abed
As the US-backed Gaza peace plan falters amid mutual accusations of ceasefire violations, Hamas continues to refuse to disarm in accordance with the agreement, insisting that any decisions about the terrorist group’s weapons should be resolved through “internal Palestinian dialogue.”
In an interview published Wednesday with Saudi media outlet Al-Arabiya, Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem said that any move toward disarmament “is connected to internal consensus, and is also tied to a real political process that leads to an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.”
The senior terrorist figure also said Hamas has “fully committed to everything required in the first stage in order to open the way for transitioning to the second stage, which Israel continues to obstruct.”
Last week, the United Nations Security Council formally backed US President Donald Trump’s Gaza peace plan — which went into effect last month — calling for an interim technocratic Palestinian government in the war-torn enclave, overseen by an international “board of peace” and supported by an International Stabilization Force (ISF) for at least two years.
Under Trump’s plan, the ISF — comprising troops from multiple participating countries — will oversee the Gaza ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, train local security forces, secure Gaza’s borders with Israel and Egypt, and protect civilians while maintaining humanitarian corridors.
In addition, the ISF would seemingly be expected to take on the responsibility of disarming Hamas — a key component of Trump’s peace plan to end the war in Gaza which the Palestinian terrorist group has repeatedly rejected.
Earlier this week, Hamas leader and chief negotiator Khalil al-Hayya said that the group’s disarmament remains under discussion, emphasizing that the issue “is tied to the end of the Israeli occupation.”
Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups have not only consistently refused to give up their weapons but also rejected key elements of Trump’s plan — including the ISF, which they have threatened to treat as a “foreign occupying force” and actively fight it.
Hamas officials rejected any “foreign guardianship” over Gaza and vowed to oppose any attempts to disarm “the Palestinian resistance.”
“Assigning the international force tasks and roles inside the Gaza Strip, including disarming the resistance, strips it of its neutrality and turns it into a party to the conflict in favor of the occupation,” the terrorist group said in a statement.
In his Wednesday interview, Qassem emphasized that Hamas’s senior delegation visit to Cairo this week reflects the group’s seriousness, signaling its intent to move forward and lay the groundwork for the next stage.
According to Qassem, Hamas has been meeting with Qatari, Turkish, and Egyptian mediators, as well as with Palestinian factions, “to consult and engage in dialogue, and to reach agreed-upon national political understandings.”
Turkey and Qatar, both longtime backers of Hamas, have been trying to expand their roles in Gaza’s reconstruction and post-war efforts, which experts have warned could potentially strengthen Hamas’s terrorist infrastructure.
Israeli officials have repeatedly rejected any Turkish or Qatari involvement in post-war Gaza.
Under phase one of Trump’s peace plan, Hamas released the remaining 20 living hostages still held in Gaza, along with the remains of most of the 28 others who died in captivity, while Israel freed 2,000 Palestinian prisoners, including several hundred convicted terrorists.
Two deceased hostages – an Israeli and a Thai national – still remain in Gaza who were kidnapped during Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, invasion of and massacre across southern Israel.
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Crypto’s Role in Iran’s Global Terrorism Exposed by New Lawsuit Against Binance
The logo of cryptocurrency exchange Binance. Illustration: Reuters/Dado Ruvic
Cryptocurrency has come under increasing scrutiny for its alleged role in subverting the United States’ sanctions against Iranian state-sponsored terrorism, with the world’s top platform receiving an unwanted spotlight this week.
On Monday, lawyers in North Dakota sued Binance, the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, and its CEO, Changpeng Zhao, alleging the company had facilitated more than $1 billion in funding to designated terrorist groups backed by the Islamic regime in Iran. The US federal lawsuit was filed on behalf of victims of Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, invasion of and massacre across southern Israel.
The suit represents the latest instance of cryptocurrency allegedly playing a role in Iran’s efforts to destroy the Jewish state. Leaders of Iran and its network of terrorist groups named in the complaint, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), routinely declare their goal of wiping Israel off the map.
Israel has previously clashed with Binance in its counter-terrorism efforts. In May 2023, the Jewish state seized nearly 200 accounts on the platform linked to Islamist groups, including ISIS. In November 2022, researchers at Nobitex said that since 2018, Binance had processed $7.8 billion through Iran-linked accounts.
This week’s suit adds further evidence of the recurring link between Iranian terrorism and cryptocurrency, identifying the high profit potential for those willing to attempt to dodge US sanctions against terror financing.
Binance has declined to discuss the lawsuit but told Reuters that “we comply fully with internationally recognized sanctions laws.”
Jonathan Missner, the attorney who represents the Oct. 7 victims and their families named as plaintiffs in the suit, said that Binance’s alleged facilitating of payments to terror groups “was not a compliance” but rather “a business model.”
“Our investigation shows that Binance built systems designed to evade oversight, using its off-chain network and weak controls to move enormous sums for sanctioned groups,” he said in a statement.
The lawsuit states that “by knowingly moving and concealing the movement of hundreds of millions of dollars for Hamas, the IRGC [Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps], Hezbollah, and PIJ, Defendants Binance Holdings Limited, Changpeng Zhao, and Guangying ‘Heina’ Chen provided pervasive and systemic assistance to these terrorist organizations.”
Chen is described in the suit as a co-founder of Binance and “de facto CFO.” The lawsuit charges that Zhao and Chen “materially contributed to the Oct. 7 attacks and to subsequent terrorist attacks perpetrated by Hamas, Hezbollah, and PIJ.”
One of the plaintiffs named in the suit is Eyal Balva, whose son Omer died in combat following the Oct. 7 atrocities while serving in the Israel Defense Forces. “Binance’s platform moved the money that helped fund the violence that destroyed our family,” he said.
Zhao and Binance — the world’s largest crypto trading platform with $300 billion in daily trades and more than 280 million users — have previously faced penalties for criminality. As part of a 2023 settlement agreement with the US Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Binance paid $4.3 billion in fines and restitution. Zhao was previously convicted of money laundering and served four months imprisonment. US President Donald Trump pardoned Zhao, with analysts noting the decision came following a sizable investment by Binance into the Trump family Crypto exchange platform World Liberty Financial.
The lawsuit also notes a money laundering scheme involving transferring gold from Venezuela to Iran to overcome American sanctions, and that Binance “pitched itself to terrorist organizations, narcotics traffickers, and tax evaders as beyond the reach of any single country’s laws or regulations.”
On Wednesday, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi put out a statement condemning the possibility of potential US military action against Venezuela, labeling the Trump administration’s posture a “bullying approach.”
The filing against Binance comes in a year in which Australian authorities have highlighted the alleged role of cryptocurrency in directing antisemitic hate crimes in Melbourne and Sydney, prompting the expulsion of Iran’s ambassador in August.
Australian Security Intelligence Organization (Asio) chief Mike Burgess said that his team had found connections “between the alleged crimes and the commanders in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC.”
He added, “They’re just using cut-outs, including people who are criminals and members of organized crime gangs to do their bidding or direct their bidding.”
Cryptocurrency has long functioned as a tool of Iran to evade US sanctions. The high energy costs from the so-called “mining” of cryptocurrency — powerful computers must run complex programs in order to generate additional tokens for trading — has put a strain on Iran’s electrical system. Mohammad Allahdad, Iran’s deputy director of power generation, said that the business practice “represents around 5 percent of total electricity consumption” and “it accounts for up to 20 percent of the current power deficit.”
Allahdad also warned that the heat from crypto mining devices was “intense” and could cause fires. “We’ve had multiple reports from fire departments about fires linked to mining rigs, some of which spread to neighboring homes,” he noted.
Now is potentially the worst time for fires in Iran, given a persistent devastating drought and ongoing government mismanagement of the water system. The situation has reached the point that Iran’s president said last week that the country had “no choice” but to evacuate and move the capital Tehran.
“The truth is, we have no choice left — relocating the capital is now a necessity,” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said in a speech.
The US State Department recently noted that Iran has provided Lebanese Hezbollah with more than $100 million each month this year. Critics of the regime have pointed out that funds spent in the war effort to destroy Israel could have gone toward improving infrastructure to better support the civilian population. Analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted that one-third of the water supply to Tehran is lost through leaks and theft.
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Mamdani Draws Fury After Naming Activist Booted From Women’s March for Antisemitism to Transition Team
Tamika Mallory at the Wilmington Public Library in Wilmington, Delaware, Sept. 19, 2024. Photo: Saquan Stimpson/Cal Sport Media/Sipa USA via Reuters Connect
Tamika Mallory, the former Women’s March co-chair who was forced out of the organization amid allegations of antisemitism, has been appointed to New York City mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani’s transition team, according to newly released staffing lists.
Mallory was selected to serve on the Committee on Community Safety, one of several advisory bodies shaping the incoming mayoral administration’s approach to policing, public safety, and community relations. Her appointment has already drawn sharp criticism from Jewish communal organizations, which say the decision raises serious concerns at a time of rising antisemitic incidents across the city.
Mamdani himself has also faced allegations of antisemitism, and his electoral victory earlier this month raised alarm bells among Jewish New Yorkers, many of whom expressed concern about their future with an ardent anti-Israel activist in office.
Mallory resigned from the Women’s March leadership in 2019 after extensive reporting said that she and other senior figures had allowed antisemitic rhetoric to permeate the organization. A widely discussed investigative article at the time claimed Mallory referenced conspiracy theories portraying Jews as exploiters of black and brown communities and echoed false claims linking Jewish financiers to the transatlantic slave trade.
She denied making the statements but continued to face criticism for her longstanding praise of Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan, who has repeatedly made antisemitic remarks such as comparing Jews to termites, describing Judaism as a “dirty religion,” calling the Jewish people “Satan,” publicly questioned the Holocaust, sharing anti-Israel conspiracy theories, and blamed Jews for pedophilia and sex trafficking. Mallory called Farrakhan “the greatest of all time because of what he’s done in black communities.”
Transition team members typically serve in an advisory capacity, though their recommendations often help shape early policy direction.
The Anti-Defamation League (ADL), a prominent Jewish civil rights organization, condemned the new appointment, arguing that Mallory is “simply the wrong choice” to join the Mamdani transition team, citing her “highly insensitive remarks about Jews and money.”
Mamdani, a far-left democratic socialist who has made anti-Israel activism a cornerstone of his young political career, has filled several transition committees with progressive activists, criminal-justice reform advocates, and academics associated with police abolition movements. His Community Safety Committee includes multiple figures known for their opposition to traditional law-enforcement models.
Jewish and allied leaders said the decision to include Mallory reinforces fears that the incoming administration may sideline concerns about antisemitism.
“New Yorkers are shocked to learn that Zohran Mandani has appointed Tamika Mallory to his team. Mallory is a notorious trafficker of Jew-hatred in America, a defender for Louis Farrakhan’s vicious vitriol against Jews,” The Lawfare Project, which provides legal services to victims of antisemitism, posted on social media. “We must be vigilant and carefully scrutinize who Mamdani appoints to key positions and, more importantly, what they do once in office. Protecting Jewish civil rights means taking action whenever they are violated.”
Mallory’s appointment isn’t the only one to draw concern due to allegations of antisemitism.
For example, Hassaan Chaudhary, an adviser to Mamdani who describes himself as the political director for the mayor-elect’s transition team, once used the word “Jew” as a slur. In 2012, he wrote Jew hoga tera baap,” which means in English, “Jew will be your father.” He also referred to Israel as a “cancer which will be eliminated very soon.”
The appointments come as New York City has seen a major spike in anti-Jewish hate crimes over the last two years, following the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, invasion of and massacre across southern Israel. According to police data, Jews were targeted in the majority of hate crimes perpetrated in the city last year. Meanwhile, pro-Hamas activists have held raucous — and sometimes violent — protests on the city’s college campuses, oftentimes causing Jewish students to fear for their safety.
Mamdani, a far-left democratic socialist and anti-Zionist, is an avid supporter of boycotting all Israeli-tied entities who has been widely accused of promoting antisemitic rhetoric. He has repeatedly accused Israel of “apartheid” and “genocide”; refused to recognize the country’s right to exist as a Jewish state; and refused to explicitly condemn the phrase “globalize the intifada,” which has been associated with calls for violence against Jews and Israelis worldwide.
A recently released Sienna Research Institute poll revealed that a whopping 72 percent of Jewish New Yorkers believe that Mamdani will be “bad” for the city. A mere 18 percent hold a favorable view of Mamdani. Conversely, 67 percent view him unfavorably.
