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American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews?
(JTA) — Among Sandra Fox’s most memorable finds during her years mining American archives for materials about Jewish summer camps was a series of letters about the hours before lights-out.
The letters were by counselors who were documenting an unusual window in the day when they stopped supervising campers, leaving the teens instead to their own devices, which sometimes included romance and sexual exploration.
“It was each division talking about how they dealt with that free time before bed in ‘age-appropriate ways,’” Fox recalled about the letters written by counselors at Camp Ramah in Wisconsin, the original iteration of the Conservative movement’s network of summer camps.
“I’ve spoken to Christian people who work at Christian camps and have researched Christian camps. There is no free time before bed,” Fox told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “That’s not a thing if you don’t want kids to hook up. So it was just amazing to find these documents of Camp Ramah leaders really having the conversation explicitly. Most of the romance and sexuality stuff is implicit in the archives.”
The letters are quoted extensively in Fox’s new book, “The Jews of Summer: Summer Camp and Jewish Culture in Postwar America.” Fox, who earned a PhD in history from New York University in 2018 and now teaches and directs the Archive of the American Jewish Left there, tells the story of American Judaism’s most immersive laboratory for constructing identity and contesting values.
Next week, Fox is launching the book with an event at Congregation Beth Elohim in Park Slope, Brooklyn. (Tickets for the Feb. 23 event are available here.) Attendees will be able to tour adult versions of some of the most durable elements of Jewish summer camps, from Israeli dance to Yiddish and Hebrew instruction to Color Wars to Tisha B’Av, the mournful holiday that always falls over the summer.
“I never considered doing a normal book party,” Fox said. “It was always really obvious to me that a book about experiential Jewish education and role play should be celebrated and launched out into the world through experiential education and role play.”
Sandra Fox’s 2023 book “The Jews of Summer,” looks at the history of American Jewish summer camps. (Courtesy of Fox)
We spoke to Fox about her party plans, how Jewish summer camps have changed over time and how they’ve stayed the same, and the cultural history of that before-bed free time.
This interview has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. We’ll be continuing the conversation in a virtual chat through the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research Feb. 27 at 1 p.m.; register here.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Given how much Jews like to talk about camp, were you surprised that this book hadn’t already been written?
Sandra Fox: There’s been a lot of fruitful research on the history of various camps, but it’s usually been focused on one camping movement or one camp type. So there are articles about Zionist camps. There are certainly articles out there about the Ramah camps. A lot of camps have produced books — either their alumni associations or a scholar who went to let’s say, Reform movement camps have created essay collections about those camps. And there are also books about Habonim and other Zionist youth movements.
I don’t really know why this is the first stab at this kind of cross-comparison. It might be that people didn’t think there would be so much to compare. I think the overwhelming feeling I get from readers so far, people who preordered and gotten their books early, is that they’re very surprised to hear how similar these camps are. So perhaps it’s that scholars weren’t thinking about Jewish summer camps that came from such diverse standpoints as having something enough in common to write about them all at once.
Also distance from the time period really helps. You can write a book about — and people do write a book about — the ’60s and ’70s and have been for decades, but there’s a certain amount of distance from the period that has allowed me to do this, I think, and maybe it also helps that I’m generationally removed. A lot of the scholars who’ve worked on camps in the postwar period went to camps in the postwar period. It makes a lot of sense that it would be harder to write this sort of sweeping thing perhaps. The fact that I’m a millennial meant that I could write about the postwar period — and also write kind of an epilogue-style chapter that catches us up to the present.
What’s clear is that there’s something amazing about studying summer camp, a completely immersive 24/7 experience that parents send children away for. There’s no better setting for thinking about how adults project their anxieties and desires about the future onto children. There’s also no place better to think about power dynamics and age and generational tension.
I was definitely struck by the “sameyness” of Jewish camps in your accounting. What do you think we can learn from that, either about camps or about us as Jews?
I do want to say that while there’s a lot of sameyness, whenever you do a comparative study, there’s a risk of kind of collapsing all these things and making them seem too similar. What I’m trying to convey is that the camp leaders from a variety of movements took the basic structure of the summer camp as we know it — its daily schedule, its environment, its activities — and it did look similar from camp to camp, at least on that surface level.
If you look at the daily schedules in comparison, they might have a lot of the same features but they’ll be called slightly different things depending on if the camp leans more heavily towards Hebrew, or Yiddish, or English. But the content within those schedules would be rather different. It’s more that the skeletal structure of camp life has a lot of similarities across the board and then the details within each section of the day or the month had a lot of differences.
But I think what it says is that in the postwar period, the anxieties that Jewish leaders had about the future of Judaism are really, really similar and the solution that they found within the summer camp, they were pretty unanimous about. They just then took the model and inserted within it their particular nationalistic, linguistic or religious perspectives. So I think more so than saying anything about American Jewry, it shows kind of how flexible camping is. And that’s not just the Jewish story. Lots of different Americans have embraced summer camping in different ways.
So many people who have gone to camp have a fixed memory of what camp is like, where it’s caught in time, but you argue that camps have actually undergone lots of change. What are the most striking changes you documented, perhaps ones that might have been hard for even insiders to discern as they happened?
First of all, the Israel-centeredness of American Jewish education as we know it today didn’t happen overnight in 1948, for instance. It was a slower process, beyond the Zionist movements where that was already going on, for decades before 1948. Ramah and the Reform camps for instance took their time towards getting to the heavily Zionist-imbued curricula that we know.
There was considerable confusion and ambivalence at first about what to do with Israel: whether to raise an Israeli flag, not because they were anti-Zionist, but because American Jews had been thinking about proving their loyalty to America for many generations. There were some sources that would talk about — what kind of right do American Jews have to raise the Israeli flag when they’re not Israeli? So that kind of Israel-centeredness that is really a feature of camp life today was a slower process than we might think.
It fit camp life really well because broader American camps used Native American symbols, in some ways that are problematic today, to create what we know of as an iconography of camp life. So for Jews, Israel and its iconography, or Palestine and iconography before ’48, provided an alternative set of options that were read as Jewish, but it still took some time to get to where we are now in terms of the Israel focus.
One of the reasons I place emphasis on the Yiddish summer camps is to show that in the early 20th century and the mid-20th century there was more ideological diversity in the Jewish camping sphere, including various forms of Yiddishist groups and socialist groups and communist groups that operated summer camps. Most of them have closed, and their decline is obviously a change that tells a story of how American Jewry changed over the course of the postwar period. Their legacy is important, too: I have made the argument that these camps in a lot of ways modeled the idea of Yiddish as having a future in America.
What about hookup culture? Contemporary discourse about Jewish camps have focused on sex and sexuality there. What did you observe about this in the archives?
I think people think of the hookup culture of Jewish camps today and certainly in my time in the ’90s and 2000s as a permanent feature, and in some ways I found through my research and oral history interviews that that was the case, but it was really interesting to zoom out a little bit and think about how Jewish summer camps changed in terms of sexual romantic culture, in relationship to how America changed with the sexual revolution and the youth culture.
It’s not it’s not useful to think about Jewish hookup culture in a vacuum. It’s happening within America more broadly. And so of course, it’s changed dramatically over time. And one of the things I learned that was so fascinating is that Jewish summer camps were actually their leaders were less concerned in a lot of ways about sexuality at camp in the ’40s and ’50s, than they were in the late ’60s and ’70s. Because earlier premarital sex was pretty rare, at least in the teenage years, so they were not that concerned about what happened after lights out because they kind of assumed whatever was going on was fairly innocent.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, that’s when camps have to actually think about how to balance allowance and control. They want to allow campers to have these relationships, to have their first sexual experiences, and part of that is related to rising rates of intermarriage and wanting to encourage love between Jews, but they also want to control it because there’s a broader societal moment in which the sexuality of teenagers is problematized and their and their sexual culture is more public.
There’s been a real wave of sustained criticism by former campers about the cultures that they experienced, arguing that the camps created an inappropriately sexualized and unsafe space. There’s been a lot of reaction to that and the broader #MeToo moment. I’m curious about what you can speculate about a future where that space is cleaned up, based on your historical research — what is gained and what, potentially, could be lost?
Without being involved in camping today — and I want to really make that disclaimer because I know a lot of change is happening and lot of organizations are involved to talk about this issue better, to train camps and camp leaders and their counselors to not create a pressured environment for camper — I think what the history shows is that this hookup culture did not come about out of nowhere. It was partly related to the broader changes in America and the sexual revolution.
But it was also partly created because camps really needed to have campers’ buy-in, in order to be “successful.” A huge argument of my book is that we think about the power of camps as if camp directors have campers as, like, puppets on strings, and that what they do is what happens in camp life. But actually, campers have changed the everyday texture of life at camp over the course of the decades in so many different ways by resisting various ideas or just not being interested.
So hookup culture is also part of making campers feel like they have freedom at camp and that’s essential. That’s not a side project — that is essential to their ability to get campers to come back. It’s a financial need, and it’s an ideological need. If you make campers feel like they have freedom, then they will feel like they freely took on the ideologies your camp is promoting in a really natural way.
The last part of it is rising rates of intermarriage. As rates of intermarriage rose in the second half of the 20th century, there’s no doubt in my mind from doing the research that the preexisting culture around sexuality at camp and romance at camp got turbo-boosted [to facilitate relationships that could potentially lead to marriage between two Jews]. At that point, the allowance and control that camp leaders were trying to create for many decades leans maybe more heavily towards allowance.
There are positives to camp environments being a place where campers can explore their sexualities. There’s definitely a lot of conversation about the negative effects and those are all very, very real. I know people who went through horrible things at a camp and I also know people who experienced it as a very sex-positive atmosphere. I know people in my age range who were able to discover that they were gay or lesbian at camp in safety in comparison to home, so it’s not black and white at all. I hope that my chapter on romance and sexuality can maybe add some historical nuance to the conversation and give people a sense of how this actually happened. Because it happened for a whole bunch of reasons.
I think there’s a consensus view that camp is one of the most “successful” things the Jews do. But it’s hard to see where lessons from camp or camp culture are being imported to the rest of Jewish life. I’m curious what you see as kind of the lessons that Jewish institutions or Jewish communities have taken from camp — or have they not done that?
Every single public engagement I do about my work has boiled down to the question of, well, does it work? Does camp work? Is it successful? And that’s been a question that a lot of social scientists have been interested in. I don’t want to oversimplify that research, but a lot of the ways that they’ve measured success have been things that are not necessarily a given to all Jews as obviously the right way to be a Jew. So, for instance, in the ’90s and early 2000s, at the very least, a lot of research was about how, you know, “XYZ” camp and youth movement were successfully curbing intermarriage. A lot of them also asked campers and former campers how they feel about Israel, and it’s always if they are supportive of Israel in very normative ways, right, giving money visiting, supporting Israel or lobbying for its behalf — then camps have been successful.
I’m not interested in whether camps were successful by those metrics. I’m interested in how we got to the idea that camp should be successful in those ways in the first place. How did we get to those kinds of normative assumptions of like, this is a good Jew; a good Jew marries a Jew; a good Jew supports Israel, no matter what. So what I wanted to do is zoom out from that question of success and show how camp actually functions.
And then the question of “does it work” is really up to the reader. To people who believe that curbing intermarriage is the most important thing, then camps have been somewhat successful in the sense that people who go to these heavily educational camps are less likely to marry out of the faith.
But I am more interested in what actually happened at camp. And in terms of their legacies, I wanted to show how they changed various aspects of American Jewish life, and religion and politics. So I was really able to find how camping was essential in making kind of an Israel-centered Jewish education the norm. I was also able to draw a line between these Yiddish camps over the ’60s and ’70s that closed in the ’80s and contemporary Yiddish. The question of success is a real tricky and political one in a way that a lot of people have not talked about.
And is camp also fun? Because you’re creating a camp experience for your book launch next week.
Camp is fun — for a lot of people. Camp was not fun for everyone. And so I do want to play with that ambivalence at the party, and acknowledge that and also acknowledge that some people loved camp when they were younger and have mixed feelings about it now.
The party is not really a celebration of Jewish summer camp. People will be drinking and having fun and dancing — but I want them to be thinking while also about what is going on and why. How is Tisha B’Av [the fast day that commemorates the destruction of the ancient Jewish temple in Jerusalem that falls at the height of summer] commemorated at camp, for example?
Or what songs are we singing and what do they mean? I think a lot of people when they’re little kids, they learn songs in these Jewish summer camps that they can’t understand and later they maybe learn Hebrew and go, whoa, we were singing what?! My example from Zionist summer camp is singing “Ein Li Eretz Acheret,” or “I Have No Other Country.” We were in America and we obviously have another country! I don’t think anyone in my youth movement actually believes the words “Ein Li Eretz Acheret” because we live in America and people tend to kind of like living in America and most of them do not move to Israel.
So at the party we’ll be working through the fun of it, and at the same time the confusion of it and the ambivalence of it. I want it to be fun, and I also want it to be something that causes people to think.
—
The post American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews? appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
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Amid revolt against ‘Israel lobby,’ J Street seeks elusive middle ground in primaries
A website and social media posts from “Track AIPAC,” associated with a group called Citizens Against AIPAC Corruption, is targeting members of Congress it hopes to unseat in the upcoming primary season with large dollar figures alongside their photos, declaring them captive of the “pro-Israel lobby.”
Such posts give the impression that the candidates have received significant financial support from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the largest group working to elect candidates who support Israel uncritically — which has made clear this election year that it will not provide support to candidates who even mention conditioning U.S. aid to Israel.
But the Track AIPAC dollar figures in many cases also include contributions from other fundraising committees whose aims are at odds with AIPAC’s, such as J Street, a progressive group that is trying to push Israel to change direction as it carries out a new war alongside the U.S.
It’s just one attempt to lump together all campaign funding groups that recognize Israel’s right to exist and the candidates they support as targets for defeat in this year’s primary elections, no matter how critical they have been of the Israeli government. The tactic is aimed at voters in a party where support for Israel has collapsed, and risks obscuring where candidates stand on crucial questions as voters head to the polls.
Against that backdrop, J Street is holding its line while focusing on its lane in 2026: Endorse only candidates committed to Israel as a Jewish state, but who also advocate changes for the direction of Israel’s government.
“The minimum is the recognition that there must be, and there is an Israel that is the national homeland of the Jewish people,” Jeremy Ben-Ami, J Street’s president, said in a recent interview. “If you don’t want to say that out loud publicly, you won’t be on our list.”
Ben-Ami himself has shifted his position on Israel in recent years. Last August, Ben-Ami wrote that he was “persuaded” by the claim that Israel was committing genocide in Gaza, after rejecting the term throughout most of the nearly two-year military campaign. Earlier in the war, he had described the military’s conduct as a “moral stain on the state of Israel.”
J Street also supported the pair of resolutions introduced by Sen. Bernie Sanders, the Jewish Vermont Independent and longtime critic of U.S. aid to Israel, to block weapons transfers to Israel. A record 27 Senate Democrats — a majority of the caucus — voted in favor. And even before that, J Street urged oversight of U.S. military assistance to Israel.
Where J Street fits in
Founded in 2007, the organization describes itself as a pro-Israel, pro-peace and pro-democracy group that supports a two-state solution and diplomacy to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its federal political action committee, launched in 2009, has gradually expanded its list of endorsees as it seeks to position itself as a bridge between pro-Israel voices and the party’s progressive wing.
This cycle, J Street PAC is backing 133 House and Senate incumbents as well as Democratic challengers running against Republican incumbents. The group has also approved several candidates competing in open Democratic primaries, allowing its donor network to support their campaigns. In one New York race, J Street endorsed the incumbent, Rep. Dan Goldman, and also “approved” his challenger, former New York City Comptroller Brad Lander.
Even the minimal recognition of Israel and support for U.S. defense aid to the Jewish state have increasingly become a political flashpoint in Democratic primaries.
In some competitive races, progressive candidates critical of the U.S.–Israel alliance have gained traction, benefiting from crowded fields or backlash to heavy outside spending. That dynamic has been visible in contests such as the New Jersey special election for a House seat, where progressive candidate Analilia Mejia prevailed after an AIPAC-associated super PAC spent more than $2 million targeting former Democratic Rep. Tom Malinowski, a J Street–approved candidate.
Ahead of next Tuesday’s Illinois primary, another super PAC aligned with AIPAC, Elect Chicago Women, has targeted the frontrunner, Daniel Biss, contributing to the rise in polling of a younger Palestinian-American candidate, Kat Abughazaleh. J Street is backing Biss.
AIPAC has become increasingly controversial among mainstream Democrats for backing pro-Israel Republicans who joined President Donald Trump’s crusade to question the 2020 election results. That opposition deepened during the Gaza war as Democratic voters became more polarized over U.S. policy on Israel. Many congressional candidates, including some Jewish Democrats, have promised not to take contributions from AIPAC. The group has also drawn attacks from white nationalists and some leaders of the MAGA movement.
The test: A future for Israel
Amid the larger conflict, J Street is trying to define a middle ground.
Ben-Ami outlined the organization’s red lines for endorsements during J Street’s annual conference in Washington, D.C., earlier this month, saying the group looks for candidates who acknowledge Israel’s legitimate security needs while avoiding unconditional support for its government. “If you’re in favor of a complete arms embargo against Israel, and you don’t recognize that Israel should be the national homeland of the Jewish people, you won’t come anywhere near our list,” Ben-Ami said.
The strategy reflects a broader shift in progressive politics, where Israel policy and Palestinian rights — once a marginal issue in most congressional races — have become a litmus test for progressive candidates seeking to define themselves against establishment Democrats. Recent polls showed the wider tensions within the Democratic Party, which loomed large in the 2024 presidential election in the wake of the Gaza war — and now opposition to the war in Iran — are likely to shape the midterm elections.
Gallup, which has tracked Americans’ views of Israel for more than two decades, found that sympathy for Palestinians in the decadeslong Middle East conflict has jumped 22 percentage points over the past two years. Only 17% of Democrats now sympathize more with Israel.
J Street’s leaders reject that characterization. Ben-Ami said polling on Israel shouldn’t be a zero-sum choice. He faulted some established pro-Israel organizations for pushing a binary framework that pressures people to pick one side or the other, which he sees as a “self-defeating approach” that has backfired politically. J Street, he said, tries to create space for candidates who acknowledge both the trauma of the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks in Israel and the humanitarian toll of the war in Gaza. Ben-Ami added that many voters hold both views at once and are looking for leaders with clarity on the issue.
For some progressive activists, however, the distinction is: any organization that defends Israel as a Jewish state is increasingly treated as part of the same establishment.
Massively outspent
Also looming over J Street as it tries to reach voters is AIPAC’s vastly bigger bank account.
AIPAC’s super PAC, United Democracy Project, spent $28 million in high-stakes Democratic primaries in 2024. The group has already invested more than $7.3 million of the $78 million it raised in the 2026 election cycle, and its affiliated Illinois group, Elect Chicago Women, has to date spent an additional $5.7 million to defeat Biss in the March 17 primary for the open seat in Illinois’ 9th District.
J Street hasn’t been able to match that scale, even as it framed its efforts as a counterweight to AIPAC spending. J Street raised $3 million for the J Street Action Fund super PAC for spending in competitive House and Senate races.
Ben-Ami said J Street plans to be “very targeted” in deploying its resources to influence key races, particularly contests that could determine control of Congress or where candidates aligned with its positions are facing attacks backed by AIPAC spending.
The Institute for Middle East Understanding Policy Project, a progressive research group, said it plans to spend $2 million in ads this cycle, targeting Republicans over their support for Israel and backing Democrats in favor of blocking weapons to Israel.
Democratic Majority for Israel, a mainstream Democratic-affiliated political action committee, said its budget for the midterms exceeds “seven figures.” Brian Romick, DMFI’s president, said in an interview that his group’s “number one goal” will be to help Democrats take back the House “with a pro-Israel majority.” Its primary spending, he said, will support candidates who’d increase the odds of a Democrat winning the seat.
The post Amid revolt against ‘Israel lobby,’ J Street seeks elusive middle ground in primaries appeared first on The Forward.
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Iran’s Shi’ite Allies Step Up Strikes Despite Weakened Hand
The sky is illuminated as an Iranian missile lands in Israel, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, as seen from Tel Aviv, Israel, March 12, 2026. PhotoL REUTERS/Dylan Martinez
Shi’ite Muslim armed groups in Lebanon and Iraq are stepping up their role in the war with the US and Israel, showing the Iran-backed “Axis of Resistance” can still wage attacks despite damage inflicted on the alliance during the Gaza conflict.
Groups that have long been armed and financed by Iran and loyal to its Shi’ite Islamist rulers are now helping Tehran intensify the war around the region, strikes in recent days show.
Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards on Wednesday launched their first-ever simultaneous rocket barrage on Israel, with the Lebanese terrorist group firing 200 missiles. Israel reported that only two of these hit its territory.
Iraqi Shi’ite militants have also picked up the pace of drone and missile attacks on US interests in Iraq in the last 3-4 days, according to three Iraqi security sources and two sources close to the groups.
One group yet to enter the fray are Tehran’s Houthi allies in Yemen, heavily armed and capable of disrupting maritime navigation around the Arabian peninsula, as shown during the Gaza war when they fired at Red Sea shipping and Israel. Houthi attacks could further disrupt oil markets because Saudi Arabia diverted exports to the Red Sea after Iran shut the Hormuz straits.
Last week, Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi said the group had its “fingers on the trigger” and was ready to act militarily when developments warrant it.
The alliance that Tehran calls the Axis of Resistance suffered major blows after Hamas – one of its key members – attacked Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, igniting a war that decimated the Palestinian terrorist group and pummeled Hezbollah, with Israel killing the Lebanese group‘s leader Hassan Nasrallah. The ripple effects helped topple Bashar al-Assad in Syria, knocking away a pillar of the Axis.
“Iran built the Axis for a moment like this,” said Mohanad Hage Ali of the Carnegie Middle East Center think-tank, describing it as an “existential war” for Iran and Hezbollah, which joined the fight even though its military power remains well below levels seen in 2023.
“If the Iranian regime is destroyed, there would be nothing left” of the Axis, he said.
Israeli military spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Nadav Shoshani said the Hezbollah attack on Wednesday comprised 200 rockets and 20 drones.
“There’s no contradiction between the fact that we heavily, heavily diminished Hezbollah in the last three years, and the fact that they are still a relevant, dangerous force,” he told reporters on Thursday.
A US State Department spokesperson said Washington “unequivocally condemns Iran and Iran-backed terrorist militias’ attacks on diplomatic, military, and civilian infrastructure, in Iraq, including in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region,” and it fully supports “Israel’s right to defend itself against” Hezbollah.
HEZBOLLAH EXECUTES IRANIAN PLAN
Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei thanked “the fighters of the Resistance Front,” according to a statement issued on Thursday and read out by a state TV announcer.
“We consider the countries of the Resistance Front as our best friends,” he said in the statement, the first issued in his name since he was named as leader on Sunday.
Hezbollah, founded by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in 1982, entered the Iran war on March 2, saying it aimed to avenge the killing of Mojtaba’s father, former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, killed on the first day of the war.
Israel has retaliated with a new offensive against the group in Lebanon, just 15 months after the last one, killing more than 600 people, forcing more than 800,000 from their homes.
Hezbollah’s rocket barrage on Wednesday night – its heaviest during this war – was launched at the same time as Iran fired ballistic missiles at Israel, according to the Israeli military and two Lebanese sources familiar with Hezbollah operations.
The Lebanese sources said the coordinated strikes were part of Iran’s plan in the event of a major war, aiming to confuse Israeli air defense systems.
Despite the volleys of rockets, Hezbollah’s attacks have caused relatively little damage so far. Two Israeli soldiers have been killed in Lebanon.
No fatalities have been reported in Israel as a result of Hezbollah rocket attacks.
LOYALIST CORE MOBILIZES IN IRAQ
Hezbollah played a major part in Iran’s regional strategy under the leadership of Nasrallah, the secretary general killed in 2024, backing Shi’ite factions in Iraq, Hamas, and the Houthis.
In Iraq, not all the Iran‑backed armed groups appear to support attacks on US interests. Reuters reported last week that many of the fighters and militia groups the Iranians cultivated in Iraq had not entered the fight.
But analysts and officials say a core group of Tehran‑aligned factions remains active and capable of exerting pressure.
Operating under the umbrella of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, these groups said on Thursday they’d carried out 31 attacks over the past 24 hours using dozens of drones and rockets against what they described as “occupation bases” in Iraq and the region.
Security officials say the militias have also sought to extend pressure to energy projects and oilfields in southern Iraq, where several US companies and US‑linked service firms operate alongside international partners.
Among the claimed attacks, two security sources said two drones hit the southern Majnoon oilfield on Wednesday, where US-based KBR is the operator. No casualties were reported. The attack was corroborated by a field engineer who said there had been five such strikes in less than a week.
On Tuesday a US diplomatic facility near Baghdad International Airport was struck by a drone, according to the US State Department, which said there were no injuries and everyone was accounted for.
Four security sources told Reuters the same site has come under repeated attack and was also hit on Wednesday.
Separately, two drones targeted a US military base near Erbil airport in Iraqi Kurdistan on Wednesday, three Kurdish security sources said.
In northern Iraq, a drone attack struck an oilfield operated by US firm HKN Energy in Iraq’s Kurdistan region on March 5, causing a fire and halting production, two security sources and an oilfield engineer said. The sources said the drones belonged to Iran-backed militias and came from an area they controlled.
Reuters could not independently verify who was behind the attacks.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also claimed responsibility for downing the US military refueling aircraft on Thursday. The US Central Command said the aircraft crashed in an incident that involved another aircraft but was not the result of hostile or friendly fire.
Andreas Krieg, a lecturer at King’s College London’s security studies department, said that while the Axis of Resistance had been degraded since 2023, Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’ite militias, and the Houthis were “very much operational.”
“They still retain capabilities, they still show very strong intent, and they remain well resourced,” he said.
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Six US Service Members Killed in Plane Crash Over Iraq
A US Air Force KC-135 aerial refueling aircraft is seen at Riga International Airport, Latvia, June 6, 2018. Photo: REUTERS/Ints Kalnins
All six crew members aboard a US military KC-135 refueling aircraft that crashed in western Iraq are confirmed to have been killed, the US military said on Friday.
The refueling aircraft crashed in western Iraq on Thursday, in an incident the military said involved another aircraft but was not the result of hostile or friendly fire.
The deaths add to the seven US service members who have already been killed as part of US operations against Iran which began on Feb. 28.
“The circumstances of the incident are under investigation. However, the loss of the aircraft was not due to hostile fire or friendly fire,” a statement from US Central Command said.
Speaking with reporters at the Pentagon on Friday, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said operations against Iran would continue.
“War is hell. War is chaos, and as we saw yesterday with the tragic crash of our KC-135 tanker, bad things can happen,” Hegseth said.
A US official told Reuters that the second aircraft involved in the crash, which landed safely, was also a military refueling aircraft known as the KC-135.
The United States has deployed a large number of aircraft into the Middle East to take part in operations against Iran. The incident highlights the risk of not just operations but also of refueling aircraft in the air.
The KC-135, built by Boeing in the 1950s and early 1960s, has served as the backbone of the US military’s air refueling fleet and is critical to allowing aircraft to carry out missions without having to land.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella group of Iran-backed armed factions, claimed responsibility for downing the US military refueling aircraft.
Reuters reported on Tuesday that as many as 150 US troops have been wounded in the US-Israeli war on Iran. The crash happened the same day two US sailors were injured after the USS Gerald Ford suffered a non-combat-related fire on board.
The first seven US troops were killed when a drone slammed into a US military facility in Port Shuaiba, Kuwait and in another attack in Saudi Arabia.
President Donald Trump and other senior officials have warned the Iran conflict will result in more US military deaths as Tehran retaliates against US and Israeli strikes.