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American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews?
(JTA) — Among Sandra Fox’s most memorable finds during her years mining American archives for materials about Jewish summer camps was a series of letters about the hours before lights-out.
The letters were by counselors who were documenting an unusual window in the day when they stopped supervising campers, leaving the teens instead to their own devices, which sometimes included romance and sexual exploration.
“It was each division talking about how they dealt with that free time before bed in ‘age-appropriate ways,’” Fox recalled about the letters written by counselors at Camp Ramah in Wisconsin, the original iteration of the Conservative movement’s network of summer camps.
“I’ve spoken to Christian people who work at Christian camps and have researched Christian camps. There is no free time before bed,” Fox told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “That’s not a thing if you don’t want kids to hook up. So it was just amazing to find these documents of Camp Ramah leaders really having the conversation explicitly. Most of the romance and sexuality stuff is implicit in the archives.”
The letters are quoted extensively in Fox’s new book, “The Jews of Summer: Summer Camp and Jewish Culture in Postwar America.” Fox, who earned a PhD in history from New York University in 2018 and now teaches and directs the Archive of the American Jewish Left there, tells the story of American Judaism’s most immersive laboratory for constructing identity and contesting values.
Next week, Fox is launching the book with an event at Congregation Beth Elohim in Park Slope, Brooklyn. (Tickets for the Feb. 23 event are available here.) Attendees will be able to tour adult versions of some of the most durable elements of Jewish summer camps, from Israeli dance to Yiddish and Hebrew instruction to Color Wars to Tisha B’Av, the mournful holiday that always falls over the summer.
“I never considered doing a normal book party,” Fox said. “It was always really obvious to me that a book about experiential Jewish education and role play should be celebrated and launched out into the world through experiential education and role play.”
Sandra Fox’s 2023 book “The Jews of Summer,” looks at the history of American Jewish summer camps. (Courtesy of Fox)
We spoke to Fox about her party plans, how Jewish summer camps have changed over time and how they’ve stayed the same, and the cultural history of that before-bed free time.
This interview has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. We’ll be continuing the conversation in a virtual chat through the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research Feb. 27 at 1 p.m.; register here.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Given how much Jews like to talk about camp, were you surprised that this book hadn’t already been written?
Sandra Fox: There’s been a lot of fruitful research on the history of various camps, but it’s usually been focused on one camping movement or one camp type. So there are articles about Zionist camps. There are certainly articles out there about the Ramah camps. A lot of camps have produced books — either their alumni associations or a scholar who went to let’s say, Reform movement camps have created essay collections about those camps. And there are also books about Habonim and other Zionist youth movements.
I don’t really know why this is the first stab at this kind of cross-comparison. It might be that people didn’t think there would be so much to compare. I think the overwhelming feeling I get from readers so far, people who preordered and gotten their books early, is that they’re very surprised to hear how similar these camps are. So perhaps it’s that scholars weren’t thinking about Jewish summer camps that came from such diverse standpoints as having something enough in common to write about them all at once.
Also distance from the time period really helps. You can write a book about — and people do write a book about — the ’60s and ’70s and have been for decades, but there’s a certain amount of distance from the period that has allowed me to do this, I think, and maybe it also helps that I’m generationally removed. A lot of the scholars who’ve worked on camps in the postwar period went to camps in the postwar period. It makes a lot of sense that it would be harder to write this sort of sweeping thing perhaps. The fact that I’m a millennial meant that I could write about the postwar period — and also write kind of an epilogue-style chapter that catches us up to the present.
What’s clear is that there’s something amazing about studying summer camp, a completely immersive 24/7 experience that parents send children away for. There’s no better setting for thinking about how adults project their anxieties and desires about the future onto children. There’s also no place better to think about power dynamics and age and generational tension.
I was definitely struck by the “sameyness” of Jewish camps in your accounting. What do you think we can learn from that, either about camps or about us as Jews?
I do want to say that while there’s a lot of sameyness, whenever you do a comparative study, there’s a risk of kind of collapsing all these things and making them seem too similar. What I’m trying to convey is that the camp leaders from a variety of movements took the basic structure of the summer camp as we know it — its daily schedule, its environment, its activities — and it did look similar from camp to camp, at least on that surface level.
If you look at the daily schedules in comparison, they might have a lot of the same features but they’ll be called slightly different things depending on if the camp leans more heavily towards Hebrew, or Yiddish, or English. But the content within those schedules would be rather different. It’s more that the skeletal structure of camp life has a lot of similarities across the board and then the details within each section of the day or the month had a lot of differences.
But I think what it says is that in the postwar period, the anxieties that Jewish leaders had about the future of Judaism are really, really similar and the solution that they found within the summer camp, they were pretty unanimous about. They just then took the model and inserted within it their particular nationalistic, linguistic or religious perspectives. So I think more so than saying anything about American Jewry, it shows kind of how flexible camping is. And that’s not just the Jewish story. Lots of different Americans have embraced summer camping in different ways.
So many people who have gone to camp have a fixed memory of what camp is like, where it’s caught in time, but you argue that camps have actually undergone lots of change. What are the most striking changes you documented, perhaps ones that might have been hard for even insiders to discern as they happened?
First of all, the Israel-centeredness of American Jewish education as we know it today didn’t happen overnight in 1948, for instance. It was a slower process, beyond the Zionist movements where that was already going on, for decades before 1948. Ramah and the Reform camps for instance took their time towards getting to the heavily Zionist-imbued curricula that we know.
There was considerable confusion and ambivalence at first about what to do with Israel: whether to raise an Israeli flag, not because they were anti-Zionist, but because American Jews had been thinking about proving their loyalty to America for many generations. There were some sources that would talk about — what kind of right do American Jews have to raise the Israeli flag when they’re not Israeli? So that kind of Israel-centeredness that is really a feature of camp life today was a slower process than we might think.
It fit camp life really well because broader American camps used Native American symbols, in some ways that are problematic today, to create what we know of as an iconography of camp life. So for Jews, Israel and its iconography, or Palestine and iconography before ’48, provided an alternative set of options that were read as Jewish, but it still took some time to get to where we are now in terms of the Israel focus.
One of the reasons I place emphasis on the Yiddish summer camps is to show that in the early 20th century and the mid-20th century there was more ideological diversity in the Jewish camping sphere, including various forms of Yiddishist groups and socialist groups and communist groups that operated summer camps. Most of them have closed, and their decline is obviously a change that tells a story of how American Jewry changed over the course of the postwar period. Their legacy is important, too: I have made the argument that these camps in a lot of ways modeled the idea of Yiddish as having a future in America.
What about hookup culture? Contemporary discourse about Jewish camps have focused on sex and sexuality there. What did you observe about this in the archives?
I think people think of the hookup culture of Jewish camps today and certainly in my time in the ’90s and 2000s as a permanent feature, and in some ways I found through my research and oral history interviews that that was the case, but it was really interesting to zoom out a little bit and think about how Jewish summer camps changed in terms of sexual romantic culture, in relationship to how America changed with the sexual revolution and the youth culture.
It’s not it’s not useful to think about Jewish hookup culture in a vacuum. It’s happening within America more broadly. And so of course, it’s changed dramatically over time. And one of the things I learned that was so fascinating is that Jewish summer camps were actually their leaders were less concerned in a lot of ways about sexuality at camp in the ’40s and ’50s, than they were in the late ’60s and ’70s. Because earlier premarital sex was pretty rare, at least in the teenage years, so they were not that concerned about what happened after lights out because they kind of assumed whatever was going on was fairly innocent.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, that’s when camps have to actually think about how to balance allowance and control. They want to allow campers to have these relationships, to have their first sexual experiences, and part of that is related to rising rates of intermarriage and wanting to encourage love between Jews, but they also want to control it because there’s a broader societal moment in which the sexuality of teenagers is problematized and their and their sexual culture is more public.
There’s been a real wave of sustained criticism by former campers about the cultures that they experienced, arguing that the camps created an inappropriately sexualized and unsafe space. There’s been a lot of reaction to that and the broader #MeToo moment. I’m curious about what you can speculate about a future where that space is cleaned up, based on your historical research — what is gained and what, potentially, could be lost?
Without being involved in camping today — and I want to really make that disclaimer because I know a lot of change is happening and lot of organizations are involved to talk about this issue better, to train camps and camp leaders and their counselors to not create a pressured environment for camper — I think what the history shows is that this hookup culture did not come about out of nowhere. It was partly related to the broader changes in America and the sexual revolution.
But it was also partly created because camps really needed to have campers’ buy-in, in order to be “successful.” A huge argument of my book is that we think about the power of camps as if camp directors have campers as, like, puppets on strings, and that what they do is what happens in camp life. But actually, campers have changed the everyday texture of life at camp over the course of the decades in so many different ways by resisting various ideas or just not being interested.
So hookup culture is also part of making campers feel like they have freedom at camp and that’s essential. That’s not a side project — that is essential to their ability to get campers to come back. It’s a financial need, and it’s an ideological need. If you make campers feel like they have freedom, then they will feel like they freely took on the ideologies your camp is promoting in a really natural way.
The last part of it is rising rates of intermarriage. As rates of intermarriage rose in the second half of the 20th century, there’s no doubt in my mind from doing the research that the preexisting culture around sexuality at camp and romance at camp got turbo-boosted [to facilitate relationships that could potentially lead to marriage between two Jews]. At that point, the allowance and control that camp leaders were trying to create for many decades leans maybe more heavily towards allowance.
There are positives to camp environments being a place where campers can explore their sexualities. There’s definitely a lot of conversation about the negative effects and those are all very, very real. I know people who went through horrible things at a camp and I also know people who experienced it as a very sex-positive atmosphere. I know people in my age range who were able to discover that they were gay or lesbian at camp in safety in comparison to home, so it’s not black and white at all. I hope that my chapter on romance and sexuality can maybe add some historical nuance to the conversation and give people a sense of how this actually happened. Because it happened for a whole bunch of reasons.
I think there’s a consensus view that camp is one of the most “successful” things the Jews do. But it’s hard to see where lessons from camp or camp culture are being imported to the rest of Jewish life. I’m curious what you see as kind of the lessons that Jewish institutions or Jewish communities have taken from camp — or have they not done that?
Every single public engagement I do about my work has boiled down to the question of, well, does it work? Does camp work? Is it successful? And that’s been a question that a lot of social scientists have been interested in. I don’t want to oversimplify that research, but a lot of the ways that they’ve measured success have been things that are not necessarily a given to all Jews as obviously the right way to be a Jew. So, for instance, in the ’90s and early 2000s, at the very least, a lot of research was about how, you know, “XYZ” camp and youth movement were successfully curbing intermarriage. A lot of them also asked campers and former campers how they feel about Israel, and it’s always if they are supportive of Israel in very normative ways, right, giving money visiting, supporting Israel or lobbying for its behalf — then camps have been successful.
I’m not interested in whether camps were successful by those metrics. I’m interested in how we got to the idea that camp should be successful in those ways in the first place. How did we get to those kinds of normative assumptions of like, this is a good Jew; a good Jew marries a Jew; a good Jew supports Israel, no matter what. So what I wanted to do is zoom out from that question of success and show how camp actually functions.
And then the question of “does it work” is really up to the reader. To people who believe that curbing intermarriage is the most important thing, then camps have been somewhat successful in the sense that people who go to these heavily educational camps are less likely to marry out of the faith.
But I am more interested in what actually happened at camp. And in terms of their legacies, I wanted to show how they changed various aspects of American Jewish life, and religion and politics. So I was really able to find how camping was essential in making kind of an Israel-centered Jewish education the norm. I was also able to draw a line between these Yiddish camps over the ’60s and ’70s that closed in the ’80s and contemporary Yiddish. The question of success is a real tricky and political one in a way that a lot of people have not talked about.
And is camp also fun? Because you’re creating a camp experience for your book launch next week.
Camp is fun — for a lot of people. Camp was not fun for everyone. And so I do want to play with that ambivalence at the party, and acknowledge that and also acknowledge that some people loved camp when they were younger and have mixed feelings about it now.
The party is not really a celebration of Jewish summer camp. People will be drinking and having fun and dancing — but I want them to be thinking while also about what is going on and why. How is Tisha B’Av [the fast day that commemorates the destruction of the ancient Jewish temple in Jerusalem that falls at the height of summer] commemorated at camp, for example?
Or what songs are we singing and what do they mean? I think a lot of people when they’re little kids, they learn songs in these Jewish summer camps that they can’t understand and later they maybe learn Hebrew and go, whoa, we were singing what?! My example from Zionist summer camp is singing “Ein Li Eretz Acheret,” or “I Have No Other Country.” We were in America and we obviously have another country! I don’t think anyone in my youth movement actually believes the words “Ein Li Eretz Acheret” because we live in America and people tend to kind of like living in America and most of them do not move to Israel.
So at the party we’ll be working through the fun of it, and at the same time the confusion of it and the ambivalence of it. I want it to be fun, and I also want it to be something that causes people to think.
—
The post American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews? appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
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How Israel’s Shift from ‘Deliberate Ambiguity’ to ‘Selective Disclosure’ Could Prevent a Nuclear War
A satellite image shows un‑buried tunnel entrances at Isfahan nuclear complex, in Isfahan, Iran, Nov. 11, 2024. Photo: Vantor/Handout via REUTERS
Though it might seem counter-intuitive, Israel needs specific enhancements to its strategic deterrence posture. Among other things, these necessary enhancements center on nuclear doctrine and strategy. Most urgently, Jerusalem should plan for an incremental but defined end to “deliberate nuclear ambiguity.”
Why should this argument be taken seriously? Hasn’t Iran’s nuclear potential been degraded or eliminated by Operations “Epic Fury” and “Roaring Lion”? During any future war with Iran, wouldn’t Israel already be in firm position to maintain “escalation dominance?”
Gathering the correct answers is more complex than first meets the eye.
Though a non-nuclear Iran would risk greater harms than would Israel in any future war, the more powerful Jewish State could still suffer the grievous consequences of (1) Iranian CBW (chemical-biological) or radiological attacks; and (2) Iran-spurred operational misunderstandings/policy miscalculations.
Iran could also call upon nuclear allies (most plausibly North Korea) to act as witting nuclear proxies, and on sub-state terror groups to inflict various force-multiplying costs. These groups (e.g., Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthi) would likely include both Sunni and Shiite surrogates.
For Israel, there will be derivative strategic issues. Prima facie, the direct Israel-American war against Shiite Iran has strengthened some Sunni state adversaries in the region. To wit, now there will be more compelling reason to expect nuclear moves by Turkey, Egypt, and/or Saudi Arabia. Correspondingly, certain predictable actions by China or Pakistan would further undermine Israel’s core national security.
What should Israel do? A comprehensive remedy would include calibrated policy shifts from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” (Amimut in Hebrew) to “selective nuclear disclosure.” Though nuclear ambiguity has managed to “work” thus far, it will not work indefinitely.
At times, strategic truth must emerge through paradox. For Jerusalem, the greatest risk of catastrophic deterrence failure may lie in the prospect of Israeli nuclear threats that are “too destructive.” Oddly but plausibly, nuclear threat credibility could sometime vary inversely with nuclear threat destructiveness.
To be suitably deterred, an enemy state would require continuing assurances that Israel’s nuclear weapons were effectively invulnerable and “penetration-capable.” This second expectation would mean that Israel’s nuclear weapons not only appear protected from adversarial first-strikes, but are also able to “punch through” enemy active defenses.
Adversarial judgments concerning Israel’s ultimate willingness to engage with nuclear weapons would depend on acquiring certain foreknowledge of these weapons and their operational capabilities. Enemy perceptions of mega-destructive, high-yield Israeli nuclear weapons could undermine the credibility of Israel’s nuclear deterrent. Bringing a measured end to “deliberate nuclear ambiguity,” on the other hand, would offer a promising corrective for Israel’s ultimate and existential vulnerability. In principle, at least, if an enemy state should ever appear willing to share its nuclear military assets with a surrogate terrorist group, Jerusalem would then need to prepare for nuclear deterrence of sub-state adversaries.
The main point of any shift from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure” would be to signal that Israel’s “bomb” capability lies safely beyond enemy reach and could punish all levels of enemy aggression. By removing the bomb from its metaphoric “basement,” Israel could best enhance its overall strategic deterrence. A properly-calculated end to “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” would underscore Israel’s willingness to use measured nuclear forces in reprisal for both first-strike and retaliatory attacks. Also, a defined shift from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure” would best convince Iran or any other non-nuclear enemy state of Israel’s willingness to use calibrated nuclear force against a non–nuclear aggressor.
What about the so-called “Samson Option?” While generally misunderstood, this option could support Israel’s unrelieved task of strategic dissuasion. For Jerusalem, the reinforcing benefits of “Samson” would lie not in any supposed eagerness to “die with the Philistines,” but in its presumptive deterrent advantages. These expected advantages would lie at the “high end” of Israel’s deterrence options and serve any ultimate requirement of “escalation dominance.”
In assessing optimal levels of “selective nuclear disclosure,” Israel ought to continuously bear in mind that the country’s strategic nuclear objective must always be deterrence ex ante, not revenge ex post. If, however, nuclear weapons should ever be introduced into an escalating conflict with Iran or another enemy state, one form or another of actual nuclear war fighting would ensue. At that chaotic tipping point, Israel’s deterrence objective would need to shift from nuclear war avoidance to nuclear war termination.
Conceptually, if Israel were the only nuclear belligerent in a still-impending conflict, it would find itself in an “asymmetrical nuclear war.” If Israel’s foe were also nuclear, Jerusalem would then be engaged in a “symmetrical nuclear war.” Significantly, even in a “symmetrical” conflict, there would remain detectable inequalities of military power. To best support “escalation dominance” amid such destabilizing inequalities, Israel would benefit from prior policy shifts to “selective nuclear disclosure.” For authoritative decision-makers in Jerusalem, there could be no more important step toward national survival.
Prof. Louis René Beres was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) and is the author of many books and scholarly articles dealing with international law, nuclear strategy, nuclear war, and terrorism. In Israel, Prof. Beres was Chair of Project Daniel (PM Sharon). His 12th and latest book is Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016; 2nd ed., 2018). Professor Beres was born in Zurich at the end of World War II.
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Palestinian Authority TV Promises Israel ‘Will Pass’ and Cease to Exist
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas holds a leadership meeting in Ramallah, in the West Bank, April 23, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Mohammed Torokman
Having just celebrated 78 years of independence, Israel has proven it is here to stay.
But the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Palestinians in general are adamantly claiming Israel’s status is temporary, while dreaming and hoping for its demise.
“There is no room for two identities,” a host on PA’s official TV channel stated, predicting that Israelis/Jews are “the ones who will pass”:
Official PA TV host:“The Israeli occupation … is taking control of the holy city [Jerusalem] and the Islamic and Christian holy sites in it.
But in this land, there is no room for two identities: [It is] either us or us. We are the ones who will remain and they are the ones who will pass.” [emphasis added]
[Official PA TV, Palestine This Morning, March 29, 2026]
A Palestinian researcher similarly taught viewers that Jews “are transient in this land” and that Palestinians are “the true owners”:
Palestinian affairs researcher Muna Abu Hamdiyeh: “We are talking about the Ibrahimi Mosque [i.e., Cave of the Patriarchs] — the Judaization of the site.
The Palestinian understands that [the Jews] are transient in this land.
Everything that the archaeological delegations that have visited Palestine and the Ibrahimi Mosque have presented has proven that the occupation has no connection, no existence and no roots in this land …
As part of our role as those who research the Palestinian cause, history, or archaeology, we must clarify this situation to the Palestinians: We are the true owners of this land, and therefore [we] must not abandon it, no matter what… [The Palestinian] completely understands that he has suffered from violence and aggression [only] because he owns something that the other –who is transient in this place — wants to take from him.” [emphasis added]
[Official PA TV, March 16, 2026]
Another Palestinian academic also envisioned Israel’s downfall, stating at a cultural meeting in Paris that the Palestinians “will win and all of Palestine will be liberated”:
Palestinian researcher Muzna Al-Shihabi: “When we see all the people who came here today just to … hear about Palestine and know better what is happening [in Palestine], this is proof that — honestly, it gives us great hope that in the end we will win and all of Palestine will be liberated.” [emphasis added]
[Official PA TV News, Feb. 2, 2026]
Manifesting the Palestinian narrative in numerous ways, on at least two separate occasions, PA TV broadcast the following “poet” from Gaza predicting the end of Israel’s “colonial rule” just as other colonial rulers have been defeated:
Gazan poet Adel Al-Ramadi:
“Do not believe that the land will not return
How much has this land been occupied!
How much defilement?
How many soldiers have trodden upon it!
So where are the soldiers?
Where is the rule of the Greeks over us?
Where is the rule of the Tatars?
Where is the rule of the Romans?
Where is the rule of the Persians?
Where is the rule of the Crusaders?
Where is the rule of the English?
Where are the soldiers?
One day you will grow up and ask:
Where is the rule of the Jews?” [emphasis added]
[Official PA TV, Dec. 7, 2025, and April 5, 2026]
PA TV chose to rebroadcast a documentary from 2021 with the conclusion that Israel “will disappear”:
Official PA TV narrator: “Immediately after the [Israeli] occupation of Jerusalem in 1967 and until this day, they have not stopped making attempts to Judaize the place and take control of it, aiming to destroy the Al-Aqsa Mosque to build the alleged Temple in its place …
This speaking stone is like a person and a place at the same time. Its age is many times greater than the age of the occupation state [i.e., Israel]. The Al-Aqsa Mosque will remain here, the eternal capital Jerusalem will remain here, and the occupation will disappear!” [emphasis added]
Images are shown of Palestinians waving Palestinian flags on the Temple Mount.
[Official PA TV, broadcast of 2021 documentary film “The Speaking Stone,” March 20, 2026]
A released murderer also joined the choir, telling “heroic” imprisoned terrorists that Allah will “liberate the land”:
Released terrorist murderer Shadi Abu Shakhdam: “My message to our heroic prisoners [i.e., terrorists] behind bars: Just as Allah showed us mercy and granted us freedom, Allah willing the time and moment will come when He will show mercy to our brothers and grant them freedom.
Allah willing, there will be freedom with the liberation of both the land and the people.” [emphasis added]
[Official PA TV, Giants of Endurance, March 21, 2026]
As Palestinian Media Watch recently reported, there are many more examples of how the PA dreams of Israel’s demise.
World leaders must finally acknowledge this deeply entrenched destructive vision that the PA embraces, and oppose giving the PA any role in the future of the region.
The author is the Founder and Director of Palestinian Media Watch, where a version of this article first appeared.
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What it means for Jews when Trump administration officials misquote the Bible
(JTA) — The Bible is back in the news.
In a Pentagon prayer service on April 15, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth quoted what was seemingly meant to be a verse from the ancient Hebrew prophet Ezekiel, but was in fact from the Gospel of Tarantino, as Stephen Colbert quipped.
In response, Sean Parnell, chief Pentagon spokesman, released a statement on X noting that the homage to the auteur’s 1994 film “Pulp Fiction” was intentional. Hegseth had “shared a custom prayer … which was obviously inspired by dialogue in ‘Pulp Fiction.’”
Two days later, the New York Times suggested that President Donald Trump was likely participating in “America Reads the Bible,” a marathon reading of scripture to take place in Washington, D.C.’s Museum of the Bible, as a means to repair his relationship with Catholics after he publicly sparred with the pope over the Iran war and deleted a tweet depicting himself as Jesus Christ.
“President Trump has a complicated relationship with the Bible,” the paper noted. “He has often called it his favorite book, has posed with it for photographers outside a church and has sold his own edition for $60. But he has also struggled to name a favorite passage or even pick a favorite Testament between the two.”
At the event on April 21, Trump read a passage from 2 Chronicles, in which God promises to heal the land if its people “humble themselves, pray, and seek My favor.”
As a scholar specializing in the influence of the Hebrew Bible and Jewish ideas on American history, I can attest that the habit of American leaders citing chapter and verse (accurate or not) is as old as the United States itself. In fact, it dates back to the Pilgrims. It has been a powerful and effective means of cultivating covenantal community. Americans who cited scripture have forged a country unique in world history in the religious freedom it has offered to all its citizens, not the least of which to us Jews, the original biblically bound people.
The America ethos of fighting for freedom and liberty, drawn from the story of the Children of Israel millennia ago, to this day shapes how the United States operates both internally and on the world stage.
Reflecting on the harsh and uncertain early days of Plymouth Colony, William Bradford, who signed the Mayflower Compact and would serve as the territory’s governor for roughly three decades, paraphrased the Exodus story and Moses’ final speech in Deuteronomy. Arriving in the New World, he said, his fellow Pilgrims could only see:
a hideous and desolate wilderness, full of wild beasts and wild men — and what multitudes there might be of them they knew not. Neither could they, as it were, go up to the top of Pisgah to view from this wilderness a more goodly country to feed their hopes; for which way soever they turned their eyes (save upward to the heavens) they could have little solace or content in respect of any outward objects.
In the first half of this excerpt from his journal, Bradford was alluding to the Israelites’ escape from Egypt into the rough wilderness in which they would wander for 40 years. And then he referenced the mountaintop on the precipice of the Promised Land, Pisgah, on which Moses stood as his people were about to complete their arduous journey as described in the last of the Five Books of Moses. To Bradford, scripture was a source of strength and solace during communally challenging times.
Ten years later, the Puritan leader John Winthrop would describe in similarly Hebraic lens how if Massachusetts Bay Colony’s residents will do right in the eyes of the Lord, “We shall find that the God of Israel is among us, when 10 of us shall be able to resist a thousand of our enemies… For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us.”
Winthrop was misquoting of Leviticus 26:8: “Five of you shall give chase to a hundred, and a hundred of you shall give chase to ten thousand.” However, the details were less important than the sense of divine mission that was powering the Pilgrims’ and the Puritan’s project.
Later, the American Founders also possessed a powerful attachment to the Bible, even if the details were sometimes hazy.
John Adams, in 1776, after hearing a sermon paralleling the Patriot cause to Israel’s fight against Pharaoh’s tyranny, ruminated: “Is it not a Saying of Moses, ‘who am I, that I should go in and out before this great People’?” It actually was not a saying of Moses. Adams was conflating Moses’ “Who am I that I should go to Pharaoh…” speech in Exodus 3:11 with a a request by a much later Jewish ruler, King Solomon that God “give me now wisdom and knowledge to go out and come in before this people” (2 Chronicles 1:10).
A year earlier, the equally-enamored-with-
Abraham Lincoln, perhaps the country’s most biblically literate president ever, often weaved scripture into his seminal addresses, from “four score and seven years ago,” which was likely borrowed from a rabbinic sermon citing a verse in Psalms, to a purposeful paraphrase of Exodus 19:5 when, on Feb. 21, 1861, he referred to Americans writ large as the Lord’s “almost chosen people.”
It hasn’t only been political leaders, of course, who rephrase the Word in an effort to encourage Americans to live up to their highest ideals. Martin Luther King Jr. made reference to that same mountaintop as Bradford in the civil rights leader’s final speech on April 3, 1968 in Memphis. He rousingly reassured his audience that:
We’ve got some difficult days ahead. But it really doesn’t matter with me now, because I’ve been to the mountaintop… I just want to do God’s will. And He’s allowed me to go up to the mountain. And I’ve looked over. And I’ve seen the Promised Land. I may not get there with you. But I want you to know tonight, that we, as a people, will get to the promised land!
Citing (and mis-citing) scripture, then, is a longstanding and worthy American tradition.
Some Jews might feel excluded by Jesus and New Testament texts being invoked in a nonsectarian context by public leaders, and verses can be abused as opposed to correctly interpreted. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of looking to the Bible to shape the soul of America has served a largely positive purpose. A religious civic space is full of happier, healthier people who give more charity, have more children and forge a strong sense of community.
Regardless of one’s party or views on those in power today, then, quoting the Bible in the American public sphere has long characterized the American experiment. On the whole, it has been largely good for the American collective character and good for the Jews. Occasionally, these quotes might be imperfect, but they reflect a worthy national will: the desire to see through the long march towards liberty and justice for all.
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
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