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American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews?
(JTA) — Among Sandra Fox’s most memorable finds during her years mining American archives for materials about Jewish summer camps was a series of letters about the hours before lights-out.
The letters were by counselors who were documenting an unusual window in the day when they stopped supervising campers, leaving the teens instead to their own devices, which sometimes included romance and sexual exploration.
“It was each division talking about how they dealt with that free time before bed in ‘age-appropriate ways,’” Fox recalled about the letters written by counselors at Camp Ramah in Wisconsin, the original iteration of the Conservative movement’s network of summer camps.
“I’ve spoken to Christian people who work at Christian camps and have researched Christian camps. There is no free time before bed,” Fox told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “That’s not a thing if you don’t want kids to hook up. So it was just amazing to find these documents of Camp Ramah leaders really having the conversation explicitly. Most of the romance and sexuality stuff is implicit in the archives.”
The letters are quoted extensively in Fox’s new book, “The Jews of Summer: Summer Camp and Jewish Culture in Postwar America.” Fox, who earned a PhD in history from New York University in 2018 and now teaches and directs the Archive of the American Jewish Left there, tells the story of American Judaism’s most immersive laboratory for constructing identity and contesting values.
Next week, Fox is launching the book with an event at Congregation Beth Elohim in Park Slope, Brooklyn. (Tickets for the Feb. 23 event are available here.) Attendees will be able to tour adult versions of some of the most durable elements of Jewish summer camps, from Israeli dance to Yiddish and Hebrew instruction to Color Wars to Tisha B’Av, the mournful holiday that always falls over the summer.
“I never considered doing a normal book party,” Fox said. “It was always really obvious to me that a book about experiential Jewish education and role play should be celebrated and launched out into the world through experiential education and role play.”
Sandra Fox’s 2023 book “The Jews of Summer,” looks at the history of American Jewish summer camps. (Courtesy of Fox)
We spoke to Fox about her party plans, how Jewish summer camps have changed over time and how they’ve stayed the same, and the cultural history of that before-bed free time.
This interview has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. We’ll be continuing the conversation in a virtual chat through the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research Feb. 27 at 1 p.m.; register here.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Given how much Jews like to talk about camp, were you surprised that this book hadn’t already been written?
Sandra Fox: There’s been a lot of fruitful research on the history of various camps, but it’s usually been focused on one camping movement or one camp type. So there are articles about Zionist camps. There are certainly articles out there about the Ramah camps. A lot of camps have produced books — either their alumni associations or a scholar who went to let’s say, Reform movement camps have created essay collections about those camps. And there are also books about Habonim and other Zionist youth movements.
I don’t really know why this is the first stab at this kind of cross-comparison. It might be that people didn’t think there would be so much to compare. I think the overwhelming feeling I get from readers so far, people who preordered and gotten their books early, is that they’re very surprised to hear how similar these camps are. So perhaps it’s that scholars weren’t thinking about Jewish summer camps that came from such diverse standpoints as having something enough in common to write about them all at once.
Also distance from the time period really helps. You can write a book about — and people do write a book about — the ’60s and ’70s and have been for decades, but there’s a certain amount of distance from the period that has allowed me to do this, I think, and maybe it also helps that I’m generationally removed. A lot of the scholars who’ve worked on camps in the postwar period went to camps in the postwar period. It makes a lot of sense that it would be harder to write this sort of sweeping thing perhaps. The fact that I’m a millennial meant that I could write about the postwar period — and also write kind of an epilogue-style chapter that catches us up to the present.
What’s clear is that there’s something amazing about studying summer camp, a completely immersive 24/7 experience that parents send children away for. There’s no better setting for thinking about how adults project their anxieties and desires about the future onto children. There’s also no place better to think about power dynamics and age and generational tension.
I was definitely struck by the “sameyness” of Jewish camps in your accounting. What do you think we can learn from that, either about camps or about us as Jews?
I do want to say that while there’s a lot of sameyness, whenever you do a comparative study, there’s a risk of kind of collapsing all these things and making them seem too similar. What I’m trying to convey is that the camp leaders from a variety of movements took the basic structure of the summer camp as we know it — its daily schedule, its environment, its activities — and it did look similar from camp to camp, at least on that surface level.
If you look at the daily schedules in comparison, they might have a lot of the same features but they’ll be called slightly different things depending on if the camp leans more heavily towards Hebrew, or Yiddish, or English. But the content within those schedules would be rather different. It’s more that the skeletal structure of camp life has a lot of similarities across the board and then the details within each section of the day or the month had a lot of differences.
But I think what it says is that in the postwar period, the anxieties that Jewish leaders had about the future of Judaism are really, really similar and the solution that they found within the summer camp, they were pretty unanimous about. They just then took the model and inserted within it their particular nationalistic, linguistic or religious perspectives. So I think more so than saying anything about American Jewry, it shows kind of how flexible camping is. And that’s not just the Jewish story. Lots of different Americans have embraced summer camping in different ways.
So many people who have gone to camp have a fixed memory of what camp is like, where it’s caught in time, but you argue that camps have actually undergone lots of change. What are the most striking changes you documented, perhaps ones that might have been hard for even insiders to discern as they happened?
First of all, the Israel-centeredness of American Jewish education as we know it today didn’t happen overnight in 1948, for instance. It was a slower process, beyond the Zionist movements where that was already going on, for decades before 1948. Ramah and the Reform camps for instance took their time towards getting to the heavily Zionist-imbued curricula that we know.
There was considerable confusion and ambivalence at first about what to do with Israel: whether to raise an Israeli flag, not because they were anti-Zionist, but because American Jews had been thinking about proving their loyalty to America for many generations. There were some sources that would talk about — what kind of right do American Jews have to raise the Israeli flag when they’re not Israeli? So that kind of Israel-centeredness that is really a feature of camp life today was a slower process than we might think.
It fit camp life really well because broader American camps used Native American symbols, in some ways that are problematic today, to create what we know of as an iconography of camp life. So for Jews, Israel and its iconography, or Palestine and iconography before ’48, provided an alternative set of options that were read as Jewish, but it still took some time to get to where we are now in terms of the Israel focus.
One of the reasons I place emphasis on the Yiddish summer camps is to show that in the early 20th century and the mid-20th century there was more ideological diversity in the Jewish camping sphere, including various forms of Yiddishist groups and socialist groups and communist groups that operated summer camps. Most of them have closed, and their decline is obviously a change that tells a story of how American Jewry changed over the course of the postwar period. Their legacy is important, too: I have made the argument that these camps in a lot of ways modeled the idea of Yiddish as having a future in America.
What about hookup culture? Contemporary discourse about Jewish camps have focused on sex and sexuality there. What did you observe about this in the archives?
I think people think of the hookup culture of Jewish camps today and certainly in my time in the ’90s and 2000s as a permanent feature, and in some ways I found through my research and oral history interviews that that was the case, but it was really interesting to zoom out a little bit and think about how Jewish summer camps changed in terms of sexual romantic culture, in relationship to how America changed with the sexual revolution and the youth culture.
It’s not it’s not useful to think about Jewish hookup culture in a vacuum. It’s happening within America more broadly. And so of course, it’s changed dramatically over time. And one of the things I learned that was so fascinating is that Jewish summer camps were actually their leaders were less concerned in a lot of ways about sexuality at camp in the ’40s and ’50s, than they were in the late ’60s and ’70s. Because earlier premarital sex was pretty rare, at least in the teenage years, so they were not that concerned about what happened after lights out because they kind of assumed whatever was going on was fairly innocent.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, that’s when camps have to actually think about how to balance allowance and control. They want to allow campers to have these relationships, to have their first sexual experiences, and part of that is related to rising rates of intermarriage and wanting to encourage love between Jews, but they also want to control it because there’s a broader societal moment in which the sexuality of teenagers is problematized and their and their sexual culture is more public.
There’s been a real wave of sustained criticism by former campers about the cultures that they experienced, arguing that the camps created an inappropriately sexualized and unsafe space. There’s been a lot of reaction to that and the broader #MeToo moment. I’m curious about what you can speculate about a future where that space is cleaned up, based on your historical research — what is gained and what, potentially, could be lost?
Without being involved in camping today — and I want to really make that disclaimer because I know a lot of change is happening and lot of organizations are involved to talk about this issue better, to train camps and camp leaders and their counselors to not create a pressured environment for camper — I think what the history shows is that this hookup culture did not come about out of nowhere. It was partly related to the broader changes in America and the sexual revolution.
But it was also partly created because camps really needed to have campers’ buy-in, in order to be “successful.” A huge argument of my book is that we think about the power of camps as if camp directors have campers as, like, puppets on strings, and that what they do is what happens in camp life. But actually, campers have changed the everyday texture of life at camp over the course of the decades in so many different ways by resisting various ideas or just not being interested.
So hookup culture is also part of making campers feel like they have freedom at camp and that’s essential. That’s not a side project — that is essential to their ability to get campers to come back. It’s a financial need, and it’s an ideological need. If you make campers feel like they have freedom, then they will feel like they freely took on the ideologies your camp is promoting in a really natural way.
The last part of it is rising rates of intermarriage. As rates of intermarriage rose in the second half of the 20th century, there’s no doubt in my mind from doing the research that the preexisting culture around sexuality at camp and romance at camp got turbo-boosted [to facilitate relationships that could potentially lead to marriage between two Jews]. At that point, the allowance and control that camp leaders were trying to create for many decades leans maybe more heavily towards allowance.
There are positives to camp environments being a place where campers can explore their sexualities. There’s definitely a lot of conversation about the negative effects and those are all very, very real. I know people who went through horrible things at a camp and I also know people who experienced it as a very sex-positive atmosphere. I know people in my age range who were able to discover that they were gay or lesbian at camp in safety in comparison to home, so it’s not black and white at all. I hope that my chapter on romance and sexuality can maybe add some historical nuance to the conversation and give people a sense of how this actually happened. Because it happened for a whole bunch of reasons.
I think there’s a consensus view that camp is one of the most “successful” things the Jews do. But it’s hard to see where lessons from camp or camp culture are being imported to the rest of Jewish life. I’m curious what you see as kind of the lessons that Jewish institutions or Jewish communities have taken from camp — or have they not done that?
Every single public engagement I do about my work has boiled down to the question of, well, does it work? Does camp work? Is it successful? And that’s been a question that a lot of social scientists have been interested in. I don’t want to oversimplify that research, but a lot of the ways that they’ve measured success have been things that are not necessarily a given to all Jews as obviously the right way to be a Jew. So, for instance, in the ’90s and early 2000s, at the very least, a lot of research was about how, you know, “XYZ” camp and youth movement were successfully curbing intermarriage. A lot of them also asked campers and former campers how they feel about Israel, and it’s always if they are supportive of Israel in very normative ways, right, giving money visiting, supporting Israel or lobbying for its behalf — then camps have been successful.
I’m not interested in whether camps were successful by those metrics. I’m interested in how we got to the idea that camp should be successful in those ways in the first place. How did we get to those kinds of normative assumptions of like, this is a good Jew; a good Jew marries a Jew; a good Jew supports Israel, no matter what. So what I wanted to do is zoom out from that question of success and show how camp actually functions.
And then the question of “does it work” is really up to the reader. To people who believe that curbing intermarriage is the most important thing, then camps have been somewhat successful in the sense that people who go to these heavily educational camps are less likely to marry out of the faith.
But I am more interested in what actually happened at camp. And in terms of their legacies, I wanted to show how they changed various aspects of American Jewish life, and religion and politics. So I was really able to find how camping was essential in making kind of an Israel-centered Jewish education the norm. I was also able to draw a line between these Yiddish camps over the ’60s and ’70s that closed in the ’80s and contemporary Yiddish. The question of success is a real tricky and political one in a way that a lot of people have not talked about.
And is camp also fun? Because you’re creating a camp experience for your book launch next week.
Camp is fun — for a lot of people. Camp was not fun for everyone. And so I do want to play with that ambivalence at the party, and acknowledge that and also acknowledge that some people loved camp when they were younger and have mixed feelings about it now.
The party is not really a celebration of Jewish summer camp. People will be drinking and having fun and dancing — but I want them to be thinking while also about what is going on and why. How is Tisha B’Av [the fast day that commemorates the destruction of the ancient Jewish temple in Jerusalem that falls at the height of summer] commemorated at camp, for example?
Or what songs are we singing and what do they mean? I think a lot of people when they’re little kids, they learn songs in these Jewish summer camps that they can’t understand and later they maybe learn Hebrew and go, whoa, we were singing what?! My example from Zionist summer camp is singing “Ein Li Eretz Acheret,” or “I Have No Other Country.” We were in America and we obviously have another country! I don’t think anyone in my youth movement actually believes the words “Ein Li Eretz Acheret” because we live in America and people tend to kind of like living in America and most of them do not move to Israel.
So at the party we’ll be working through the fun of it, and at the same time the confusion of it and the ambivalence of it. I want it to be fun, and I also want it to be something that causes people to think.
—
The post American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews? appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
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Germany Flags Surge in Antisemitic Slogans, Extremist Symbols, Hate Speech Under Banner of ‘Palestine Solidarity’
Pro-Palestinian demonstrators during a protest against Israel to mark the 77th anniversary of the “Nakba” or catastrophe, in Berlin, Germany, May 15, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Axel Schmidt
German authorities are stepping up scrutiny of antisemitic slogans, extremist symbols, and online hate speech amid a deteriorating climate of hostility toward Jews and Israelis that officials warn is hardening into a deepening national crisis.
On Tuesday, Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), released new guidance aimed at raising awareness of antisemitism and extremist forms of so-called “Palestine solidarity,” with a particular focus on developments in Berlin.
According to the agency’s newly published report, a growing network of extremist activists has emerged within segments of the pro-Palestinian movement in the German capital, where anti-Israel demonstrations increasingly feature antisemitic slogans, hateful imagery, and incitements to violence.
German officials said these new resources are intended primarily for teachers, educators, and the general public, as part of broader efforts to strengthen democratic resilience and sharpen awareness of more subtle forms of antisemitism.
In a document entitled “Hidden Messages – Antisemitic Codes and Ciphers,” the agency defines antisemitism as “rejecting, hostile or violent attitudes towards Jews or towards people who are perceived as Jewish.”
Among the report’s key findings is that within secular pro-Palestinian extremism, criticism of Israel’s policies and actions is increasingly being generalized onto Jews as a whole, with anger over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict frequently mutating into antisemitic narratives.
The agency also points to a growing use of antisemitic slogans and imagery, noting recurring symbols among extremist pro-Palestinian activists, including the red inverted triangle — used to signal support for Hamas — and the watermelon motif when used to depict the outline of Israel.
It also points to the slogan “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free,” which is widely interpreted as a call for the elimination of the State of Israel.
German officials warned that these dynamics are increasingly serving as “bridge narratives,” drawing together otherwise disparate extremist circles, including the far right, far left, and Islamist movements.
The report further notes that since the Hamas-led invasion of and massacre across southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, segments of Germany’s radical left have drawn closer to what they describe as the “Palestinian liberation struggle.”
Islamist and left-wing extremists are increasingly merging anti-imperialist ideology with entrenched antisemitic narratives in their propaganda around the Israel–Hamas war, including claims of a “genocide in Gaza,” depictions of the Jewish state as a “colonial power,” and labels such as “child murderer.”
Such antisemitic narratives have become a central mobilizing force since the Oct. 7 atrocities, shaping public discourse and being used to justify acts of violence and intimidation.
After more than two years of escalation, German officials warn that the threat to Jewish life has risen dramatically, with antisemitic hate speech surging as extremist actors deliberately exploit the war in Gaza for propaganda.
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Anti-Israel Rep. Thomas Massie Trails in Race as New Kentucky Ad Targets Jewish Donor With Rainbow Star of David
US Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY) leaves a meeting of the House Republican Conference in the US Capitol on Wednesday, June 4, 2025. Photo: Tom Williams/CQ Roll Call/Sipa USA via Reuters Connect
A new poll is signaling growing trouble for US Rep. Thomas Massie in Kentucky’s Republican primary, with Trump-endorsed challenger Ed Gallrein now leading the incumbent congressman 53 percent to 45 percent among likely GOP voters in the state’s 4th Congressional District.
The poll comes as Massie faces intensifying backlash over an advertisement released by a pro-Massie super PAC targeting billionaire Republican donor Paul Singer, a prominent Jewish supporter of pro-Israel causes who has backed efforts to defeat the incumbent.
The ad characterizes Singer as a “pro-trans billionaire” and features a rainbow-colored Star of David behind his image while attacking Gallrein’s allies.
NEW: Take a look at this #KY04 ad called “LGBTQ Mafia” from a PAC affiliated w/ Jan. 6 rioter Derrick Evans.
It depicts Jewish donor Paul Singer with an unexplained rainbow Star of David.
More on this insane, now record-breaking $25 million primary: https://t.co/iT3YN8wYEz pic.twitter.com/0YIRYmaJwL
— Andrew Solender (@AndrewSolender) May 11, 2026
Critics condemned the imagery as antisemitic, arguing it invoked longstanding tropes about Jewish financial influence and used Jewish symbolism in a way designed to inflame cultural resentment. Many social media users accused the ad of crossing a red line at a time when antisemitic incidents in the United States remain elevated following Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, massacre across southern Israel.
The Kentucky ad was paid for by Hold the Line PAC — a group backing Massie that is “focused on Religious Liberty, 2A, and Restoring Election Integrity,” according to its website — not Massie’s official campaign.
The race has drawn national attention, with more than $25 million spent on ads, the most ever in a House primary election, according to AdImpact.
Outside groups have poured millions of dollars into the campaign, Because Kentucky’s 4th District is overwhelmingly Republican, the GOP primary is widely expected to determine who will ultimately hold the seat. According to data sourced from the Federal Election Commission (FEC), Massie has only garnered roughly $70,000 from in-state donors, compared to over $1.1 million from out-of-state, a whopping 94 percent of his total donations.
The latest survey showing Massie trailing was conducted on May 12 by Quantus Insights. It marks one of the clearest signs yet that US President Donald Trump’s endorsement may be reshaping the race in Gallrein’s favor. The Kentucky primary has rapidly evolved into one of the most closely watched Republican intraparty battles of the 2026 election cycle, drawing national attention over divisions surrounding Israel, antisemitism, and ideological loyalty within the GOP.
Massie, a libertarian-leaning Republican known for frequently breaking with party leadership, has a long track-record of voting against sending aid to all foreign countries, including Israel. Although he has received substantial criticism over his voting record, Massie has argued that his positions do not reflect an animus against the Jewish state but are reflective of his staunch fiscal conservatism. He has also condemned Israel’s military operations in Gaza and Lebanon, arguing that the Jewish state has targeted civilian infrastructure and should not receive assistance from the US.
Critics contend his voting record and anti-Israel rhetoric have increasingly isolated him from the Republican mainstream, particularly on issues involving Israel and national security. Skeptics also claim that Massie’s criticisms of Israel are devoid of nuance, oftentimes omitting Hamas’s tendency to use human shields, repurpose civilian infrastructure for military purposes, and intercept trucks intended to distribute food.
The race has become a major test of Trump’s continued influence over Republican primaries. Trump has repeatedly criticized Massie in recent months before formally endorsing Gallrein, framing the contest as a battle between party unity and ideological obstructionism.
“We got to get rid of this loser. This guy is bad,” Trump said at a March rally in Hebron, Kentucky. “He’s disloyal to the Republican Party. He’s disloyal to the people of Kentucky, and most importantly, he is disloyal to the United States of America. And he’s got to be voted out of office as soon as possible.”
Gallrein, a retired Navy SEAL officer, has sought to position himself as a firmly pro-Israel conservative aligned with Trump’s “America First” coalition. His campaign has emphasized strong US-Israel relations, expanded security cooperation, and staunch support for the Jewish state following Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack.
Political analysts say the outcome could reverberate far beyond Kentucky, shaping how Republican lawmakers navigate issues surrounding Israel, antisemitism, and loyalty to Trump heading into the 2026 midterm elections.
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Jewish Teens in France Tell US Ambassador About Enduring Antisemitism in Schools
Members of French Cteen chapters meet with United States Ambassador to France Charles Kushner and his wife Seryl on Monday, May 4, 2026. They discussed their experiences with antisemitism and what keeps them motivated. Photo: US Embassy in France
Nine members of the Chabad youth group CTeen France met last week with US Ambassador to France Charles Kushner to discuss their experiences of antisemitism in the years since Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel, a massacre which left nearly 1,200 people dead and led to a surge in hate crimes targeting Jews around the world.
Following an invitation, the youth aged 14-18 visited the ambassador’s official residence at rue du Faubourg Saint-Honoré in Paris for a two-hour discussion also attended by Kushner’s wife Seryl. Rabbi Mendy Mottal, CTeen’s director, and his wife Chaya also participated.
One member of the group, 18-year-old Younes, declined when offered a letter from the embassy to explain his absence from school. He explained that he did not want anyone at his school to discover he was Jewish, that only his best friend knew the secret of his true identity.
Another student, Salomé, described living 90 minutes south of Paris in Orléans and not knowing any other Jews in her region until the launch of a CTeen group. “All week at school I’m just waiting for the moment when I can see my Jewish friends,” she told the ambassador.
“These are teens who walk into their public school every morning knowing they may be the only Jew in their classroom,” said Rabbi Mendy Kotlarsky, chairman of CTeen International.
Discussing the meeting on X, Kushner wrote, “I love seeing motivated young leaders! CTeen is developing youth across France and focusing, like me, on countering antisemitism by combatting all forms of hatred in our communities.”
The teenagers received a tour of the ambassador’s residence and enjoyed Kosher refreshments before receiving two gifts: a kippah custom-made for the embassy and an embassy medal.
“These are teens regularly experiencing antisemitism on the front line,” Mottal said. “The ambassador was very moved by them and how they spoke. Frankly, so was I.” He described how Kushner “wanted to know what actually happens in the hallways, what they feel when they walk into a classroom knowing they might be the only Jews in the room.”
Kushner stated during the meeting that he intended the gathering to be the start of his collaborations with the CTeen group and that combating antisemitism in France had become a top priority.
“The fact that the ambassador sits with them, listens to their stories, and acknowledges the weight they carry on their shoulders — that means something profound to these young people,” Kotlarsky said.
The students’ fears align with survey responses from Jews in France and Europe. A 2026 Jewish Agency report found 78 percent of French Jews expressed feelings of fear in their country while 43 percent of European Jews surveyed said they experienced antisemitism in the last year either themselves or through a member of their family.
Last year authorities in France documented 1,320 antisemitic incidents recorded nationwide, a fall of 16 percent from the previous year’s high of 1,570. While Jews make up less than one percent of the French population — totaling 500,000 to amount to Europe’s highest Jewish population — they account for 53 percent of hate crime victims. French officials warned that the numbers were certainly undercounts of the actual number of incidents.
Last month, lawmaker Caroline Yadan put forward legislation to expand penalties for antisemitic speech. Dubbed the “Yadan law,” the proposed measure would ban “implicit” justifications of terrorism, advocacy for obliterating any state recognized by France, and comparing Israel to Nazi Germany. The bill’s supporters chose to withdraw the plan on April 16 after determining they were unlikely to succeed.
The centrist party Ensemble pour la République (EPR) blamed the leftist La France Insoumise (LFI) party for allegedly obstructing the bill’s progression.
In March, Dov Maimon, a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute, described the ideological dynamics in local French politics today and the threat they posed against the Jewish people.
“On one side, Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s far-left party, La France Insoumise (LFI), which didn’t hold a single seat on any municipal council, has now entered hundreds of councils and captured real cities for the first time,” Maimon wrote. “On the other side, the far right took approximately 40% of the vote and clinched dozens of mayoral races.”
Maimon warned that “the center seems to have collapsed. According to current polls, Mélenchon has a real chance of reaching that final round as the standard-bearer of the left. His political movement has weaponized hostility toward Israel, and his ties to Islamist networks are well-documented.”
In March, French authorities arrested two brothers alleged to have planned an antisemitic terror attack. Investigators found a semi-automatic firearm, a bottle of acid, and an ISIS flag during a traffic stop.
Kushner is the grandson of Holocaust survivors. His son Jared is US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law and serves as the Special Envoy for Peace where he has acted as a key foreign policy negotiator during the ongoing conflict with the Islamic regime in Iran.
