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American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews?

(JTA) — Among Sandra Fox’s most memorable finds during her years mining American archives for materials about Jewish summer camps was a series of letters about the hours before lights-out.

The letters were by counselors who were documenting an unusual window in the day when they stopped supervising campers, leaving the teens instead to their own devices, which sometimes included romance and sexual exploration.

“It was each division talking about how they dealt with that free time before bed in ‘age-appropriate ways,’” Fox recalled about the letters written by counselors at Camp Ramah in Wisconsin, the original iteration of the Conservative movement’s network of summer camps.

“I’ve spoken to Christian people who work at Christian camps and have researched Christian camps. There is no free time before bed,” Fox told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “That’s not a thing if you don’t want kids to hook up. So it was just amazing to find these documents of Camp Ramah leaders really having the conversation explicitly. Most of the romance and sexuality stuff is implicit in the archives.”

The letters are quoted extensively in Fox’s new book, “The Jews of Summer: Summer Camp and Jewish Culture in Postwar America.” Fox, who earned a PhD in history from New York University in 2018 and now teaches and directs the Archive of the American Jewish Left there, tells the story of American Judaism’s most immersive laboratory for constructing identity and contesting values.

Next week, Fox is launching the book with an event at Congregation Beth Elohim in Park Slope, Brooklyn. (Tickets for the Feb. 23 event are available here.) Attendees will be able to tour adult versions of some of the most durable elements of Jewish summer camps, from Israeli dance to Yiddish and Hebrew instruction to Color Wars to Tisha B’Av, the mournful holiday that always falls over the summer.

“I never considered doing a normal book party,” Fox said. “It was always really obvious to me that a book about experiential Jewish education and role play should be celebrated and launched out into the world through experiential education and role play.”

Sandra Fox’s 2023 book “The Jews of Summer,” looks at the history of American Jewish summer camps. (Courtesy of Fox)

We spoke to Fox about her party plans, how Jewish summer camps have changed over time and how they’ve stayed the same, and the cultural history of that before-bed free time.

This interview has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. We’ll be continuing the conversation in a virtual chat through the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research Feb. 27 at 1 p.m.; register here.

Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Given how much Jews like to talk about camp, were you surprised that this book hadn’t already been written?

Sandra Fox: There’s been a lot of fruitful research on the history of various camps, but it’s usually been focused on one camping movement or one camp type. So there are articles about Zionist camps. There are certainly articles out there about the Ramah camps. A lot of camps have produced books — either their alumni associations or a scholar who went to let’s say, Reform movement camps have created essay collections about those camps. And there are also books about Habonim and other Zionist youth movements.

I don’t really know why this is the first stab at this kind of cross-comparison. It might be that people didn’t think there would be so much to compare. I think the overwhelming feeling I get from readers so far, people who preordered and gotten their books early, is that they’re very surprised to hear how similar these camps are. So perhaps it’s that scholars weren’t thinking about Jewish summer camps that came from such diverse standpoints as having something enough in common to write about them all at once.

Also distance from the time period really helps. You can write a book about — and people do write a book about — the ’60s and ’70s and have been for decades, but there’s a certain amount of distance from the period that has allowed me to do this, I think, and maybe it also helps that I’m generationally removed. A lot of the scholars who’ve worked on camps in the postwar period went to camps in the postwar period. It makes a lot of sense that it would be harder to write this sort of sweeping thing perhaps. The fact that I’m a millennial meant that I could write about the postwar period — and also write kind of an epilogue-style chapter that catches us up to the present.

What’s clear is that there’s something amazing about studying summer camp, a completely immersive 24/7 experience that parents send children away for. There’s no better setting for thinking about how adults project their anxieties and desires about the future onto children. There’s also no place better to think about power dynamics and age and generational tension.

I was definitely struck by the “sameyness” of Jewish camps in your accounting. What do you think we can learn from that, either about camps or about us as Jews?

I do want to say that while there’s a lot of sameyness, whenever you do a comparative study, there’s a risk of kind of collapsing all these things and making them seem too similar. What I’m trying to convey is that the camp leaders from a variety of movements took the basic structure of the summer camp as we know it — its daily schedule, its environment, its activities — and it did look similar from camp to camp, at least on that surface level.

If you look at the daily schedules in comparison, they might have a lot of the same features but they’ll be called slightly different things depending on if the camp leans more heavily towards Hebrew, or Yiddish, or English. But the content within those schedules would be rather different. It’s more that the skeletal structure of camp life has a lot of similarities across the board and then the details within each section of the day or the month had a lot of differences.

But I think what it says is that in the postwar period, the anxieties that Jewish leaders had about the future of Judaism are really, really similar and the solution that they found within the summer camp, they were pretty unanimous about. They just then took the model and inserted within it their particular nationalistic, linguistic or religious perspectives. So I think more so than saying anything about American Jewry, it shows kind of how flexible camping is. And that’s not just the Jewish story. Lots of different Americans have embraced summer camping in different ways.

So many people who have gone to camp have a fixed memory of what camp is like, where it’s caught in time, but you argue that camps have actually undergone lots of change. What are the most striking changes you documented, perhaps ones that might have been hard for even insiders to discern as they happened?

First of all, the Israel-centeredness of American Jewish education as we know it today didn’t happen overnight in 1948, for instance. It was a slower process, beyond the Zionist movements where that was already going on, for decades before 1948. Ramah and the Reform camps for instance took their time towards getting to the heavily Zionist-imbued curricula that we know.

There was considerable confusion and ambivalence at first about what to do with Israel: whether to raise an Israeli flag, not because they were anti-Zionist, but because American Jews had been thinking about proving their loyalty to America for many generations. There were some sources that would talk about — what kind of right do American Jews have to raise the Israeli flag when they’re not Israeli? So that kind of Israel-centeredness that is really a feature of camp life today was a slower process than we might think.

It fit camp life really well because broader American camps used Native American symbols, in some ways that are problematic today, to create what we know of as an iconography of camp life. So for Jews, Israel and its iconography, or Palestine and iconography before ’48, provided an alternative set of options that were read as Jewish, but it still took some time to get to where we are now in terms of the Israel focus.

One of the reasons I place emphasis on the Yiddish summer camps is to show that in the early 20th century and the mid-20th century there was more ideological diversity in the Jewish camping sphere, including various forms of Yiddishist groups and socialist groups and communist groups that operated summer camps. Most of them have closed, and their decline is obviously a change that tells a story of how American Jewry changed over the course of the postwar period. Their legacy is important, too: I have made the argument that these camps in a lot of ways modeled the idea of Yiddish as having a future in America.

What about hookup culture? Contemporary discourse about Jewish camps have focused on sex and sexuality there. What did you observe about this in the archives?

I think people think of the hookup culture of Jewish camps today and certainly in my time in the ’90s and 2000s as a permanent feature, and in some ways I found through my research and oral history interviews that that was the case, but it was really interesting to zoom out a little bit and think about how Jewish summer camps changed in terms of sexual romantic culture, in relationship to how America changed with the sexual revolution and the youth culture.

It’s not it’s not useful to think about Jewish hookup culture in a vacuum. It’s happening within America more broadly. And so of course, it’s changed dramatically over time. And one of the things I learned that was so fascinating is that Jewish summer camps were actually their leaders were less concerned in a lot of ways about sexuality at camp in the ’40s and ’50s, than they were in the late ’60s and ’70s. Because earlier premarital sex was pretty rare, at least in the teenage years, so they were not that concerned about what happened after lights out because they kind of assumed whatever was going on was fairly innocent.

In the late 1960s and 1970s, that’s when camps have to actually think about how to balance allowance and control. They want to allow campers to have these relationships, to have their first sexual experiences, and part of that is related to rising rates of intermarriage and wanting to encourage love between Jews, but they also want to control it because there’s a broader societal moment in which the sexuality of teenagers is problematized and their and their sexual culture is more public.

There’s been a real wave of sustained criticism by former campers about the cultures that they experienced, arguing that the camps created an inappropriately sexualized and unsafe space. There’s been a lot of reaction to that and the broader #MeToo moment. I’m curious about what you can speculate about a future where that space is cleaned up, based on your historical research — what is gained and what, potentially, could be lost?

Without being involved in camping today — and I want to really make that disclaimer because I know a lot of change is happening and lot of organizations are involved to talk about this issue better, to train camps and camp leaders and their counselors to not create a pressured environment for camper — I think what the history shows is that this hookup culture did not come about out of nowhere. It was partly related to the broader changes in America and the sexual revolution.

But it was also partly created because camps really needed to have campers’ buy-in, in order to be “successful.” A huge argument of my book is that we think about the power of camps as if camp directors have campers as, like, puppets on strings, and that what they do is what happens in camp life. But actually, campers have changed the everyday texture of life at camp over the course of the decades in so many different ways by resisting various ideas or just not being interested.

So hookup culture is also part of making campers feel like they have freedom at camp and that’s essential. That’s not a side project — that is essential to their ability to get campers to come back. It’s a financial need, and it’s an ideological need. If you make campers feel like they have freedom, then they will feel like they freely took on the ideologies your camp is promoting in a really natural way.

The last part of it is rising rates of intermarriage. As rates of intermarriage rose in the second half of the 20th century, there’s no doubt in my mind from doing the research that the preexisting culture around sexuality at camp and romance at camp got turbo-boosted [to facilitate relationships that could potentially lead to marriage between two Jews]. At that point, the allowance and control that camp leaders were trying to create for many decades leans maybe more heavily towards allowance.

There are positives to camp environments being a place where campers can explore their sexualities. There’s definitely a lot of conversation about the negative effects and those are all very, very real. I know people who went through horrible things at a camp and I also know people who experienced it as a very sex-positive atmosphere. I know people in my age range who were able to discover that they were gay or lesbian at camp in safety in comparison to home, so it’s not black and white at all. I hope that my chapter on romance and sexuality can maybe add some historical nuance to the conversation and give people a sense of how this actually happened. Because it happened for a whole bunch of reasons.

I think there’s a consensus view that camp is one of the most “successful” things the Jews do. But it’s hard to see where lessons from camp or camp culture are being imported to the rest of Jewish life. I’m curious what you see as kind of the lessons that Jewish institutions or Jewish communities have taken from camp — or have they not done that?

Every single public engagement I do about my work has boiled down to the question of, well, does it work? Does camp work? Is it successful? And that’s been a question that a lot of social scientists have been interested in. I don’t want to oversimplify that research, but a lot of the ways that they’ve measured success have been things that are not necessarily a given to all Jews as obviously the right way to be a Jew. So, for instance, in the ’90s and early 2000s, at the very least, a lot of research was about how, you know, “XYZ” camp and youth movement were successfully curbing intermarriage. A lot of them also asked campers and former campers how they feel about Israel, and it’s always if they are supportive of Israel in very normative ways, right, giving money visiting, supporting Israel or lobbying for its behalf — then camps have been successful.

I’m not interested in whether camps were successful by those metrics. I’m interested in how we got to the idea that camp should be successful in those ways in the first place. How did we get to those kinds of normative assumptions of like, this is a good Jew; a good Jew marries a Jew; a good Jew supports Israel, no matter what. So what I wanted to do is zoom out from that question of success and show how camp actually functions.

And then the question of “does it work” is really up to the reader. To people who believe that curbing intermarriage is the most important thing, then camps have been somewhat successful in the sense that people who go to these heavily educational camps are less likely to marry out of the faith.

But I am more interested in what actually happened at camp. And in terms of their legacies, I wanted to show how they changed various aspects of American Jewish life, and religion and politics. So I was really able to find how camping was essential in making kind of an Israel-centered Jewish education the norm. I was also able to draw a line between these Yiddish camps over the ’60s and ’70s that closed in the ’80s and contemporary Yiddish. The question of success is a real tricky and political one in a way that a lot of people have not talked about.

And is camp also fun? Because you’re creating a camp experience for your book launch next week.

Camp is fun — for a lot of people. Camp was not fun for everyone. And so I do want to play with that ambivalence at the party, and acknowledge that and also acknowledge that some people loved camp when they were younger and have mixed feelings about it now.

The party is not really a celebration of Jewish summer camp. People will be drinking and having fun and dancing — but I want them to be thinking while also about what is going on and why. How is Tisha B’Av [the fast day that commemorates the destruction of the ancient Jewish temple in Jerusalem that falls at the height of summer] commemorated at camp, for example?

Or what songs are we singing and what do they mean? I think a lot of people when they’re little kids, they learn songs in these Jewish summer camps that they can’t understand and later they maybe learn Hebrew and go, whoa, we were singing what?! My example from Zionist summer camp is singing “Ein Li Eretz Acheret,” or “I Have No Other Country.” We were in America and we obviously have another country! I don’t think anyone in my youth movement actually believes the words “Ein Li Eretz Acheret” because we live in America and people tend to kind of like living in America and most of them do not move to Israel.

So at the party we’ll be working through the fun of it, and at the same time the confusion of it and the ambivalence of it. I want it to be fun, and I also want it to be something that causes people to think.


The post American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews? appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

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Trump Says No ‘Definitive’ Agreement With Netanyahu, US Talks With Iran to Continue

US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reach to shake hands at a joint press conference in the State Dining Room at the White House in Washington, DC, US, Sept. 29, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

President Donald Trump said after talks with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Wednesday they reached no “definitive” agreement on how to move forward with Iran but he insisted negotiations with Tehran would continue to see if a deal can be achieved.

Netanyahu, who had been expected to press Trump to widen diplomacy with Iran beyond its nuclear program to include limits on its missile arsenal, stressed that Israel’s security interests must be taken into account but offered no sign that the president made the commitments he sought.

In their seventh meeting since Trump returned to office last year, Netanyahu – whose visit was more muted than usual and closed to the press – was looking to influence the next round of US discussions with Iran following nuclear negotiations held in Oman last Friday.

The two leaders spoke behind closed doors for more than two and a half hours in what Trump described as a “very good meeting” but said no major decisions were made and stopped short of publicly accepting Netanyahu’s entreaties.

Trump has threatened strikes on Iran if no agreement is reached, while Tehran has vowed to retaliate, stoking fears of a wider war as the US amasses forces in the Middle East. He has repeatedly voiced support for a secure Israel, a longstanding US ally and arch-foe of Iran.

In media interviews on Tuesday, Trump reiterated his blunt warning to Iran, while saying he believes Tehran wants a deal.

“There was nothing definitive reached other than I insisted that negotiations with Iran continue to see whether or not a Deal can be consummated,” Trump said in a social media post after the meeting with Netanyahu. “If it can, I let the Prime Minister know that will be a preference.”

“If it cannot, we will just have to see what the outcome will be,” Trump added, noting that the last time Iran decided against an agreement the US struck its nuclear sites last June.

TRUMP SAYS NO TO IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MISSILES

Trump told Fox Business in an interview broadcast on Tuesday that a good deal with Iran would mean “no nuclear weapons, no missiles,” without elaborating. He also told Axios he was considering sending a second aircraft carrier strike group as part of a major US buildup near Iran.

Israel fears that the US might pursue a narrow nuclear deal that does not include restrictions on Iran‘s ballistic missile program or an end to Iranian support for armed proxies such as Hamas and Hezbollah, according to people familiar with the matter. Israeli officials have urged the US not to trust Iran‘s promises.

Iran has rejected such demands and says the Oman talks focused only on nuclear issues.

“The Prime Minister emphasized the security needs of the State of Israel in the context of the negotiations, and the two agreed to continue their close coordination and tight contact,” Netanyahu’s office said in a statement after Wednesday’s talks.

The two leaders had also been expected to talk about potential military action if diplomacy with Iran fails, one source said.

Iran has said it is prepared to discuss curbs on its nuclear program in exchange for lifting sanctions but has ruled out linking the issue to missiles.

“The Islamic Republic’s missile capabilities are non-negotiable,” Ali Shamkhani, an adviser to Iran‘s supreme leader, said on Wednesday.

Netanyahu’s arrival at the White House was lower-key than usual. The two leaders were shown shaking hands in a photo released by the Israeli Embassy. But unlike previous Netanyahu visits with Trump, a press pool was not allowed into the Oval Office. It was not immediately known why he received such low-profile treatment.

GAZA ON THE AGENDA

Also on the agenda was Gaza, with Trump looking to push ahead with a ceasefire agreement he helped to broker. Progress on his 20-point plan to end the war and rebuild the shattered Palestinian enclave has stalled, with major gaps over steps such as Hamas disarming as Israeli troops withdraw in phases.

“We discussed the tremendous progress being made in Gaza, and the Region in general,” Trump said after the meeting.

Netanyahu’s visit, originally scheduled for Feb. 18, was brought forward amid renewed US engagement with Iran. Both sides at last week’s Oman meeting said the negotiations were positive and further talks were expected soon.

Trump has been vague about broadening the negotiations. He was quoted as telling Axios on Tuesday that it was a “no-brainer” for any deal to cover Iran‘s nuclear program, but that he also thought it possible to address its missile stockpiles.

Iran says its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes, while the US and Israel have accused it of past efforts to develop nuclear weapons.

During a 12-day war last June, Israel heavily damaged Iran‘s air defenses and missile arsenal. Two Israeli officials say there are signs Iran is working to restore those capabilities.

Trump threatened last month to intervene militarily during a bloody crackdown on anti-government protests in Iran, but ultimately held off.

ISRAEL WARY OF A WEAKENED IRAN REBUILDING

Tehran’s regional influence has been weakened by Israel’s June attack, losses suffered by its proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq, and the ousting of its ally, former Syrian President Bashar al‑Assad.

But Israel is wary of its adversaries rebuilding after the multifront war triggered by Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, assault on southern Israel.

While Trump and Netanyahu have mostly been in sync and the US remains Israel’s main arms supplier, they appear to be at odds on another key issue.

Part of Trump’s Gaza plan holds out the prospect for eventual Palestinian statehood – which Netanyahu and his coalition have resisted.

Netanyahu’s security cabinet on Sunday authorized steps that would make it easier for Israeli settlers in the West Bank to buy land while granting Israel broader powers in what the Palestinians see as part of a future state.

The decision drew international condemnation, and Trump on Tuesday reiterated his opposition to West Bank annexation.

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Gaza Peace Plan Stalls Amid Reports of US Allowing Hamas to Keep Some Arms, Israel Readying New Offensive

Israeli military vehicles drive past destruction in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border in southern Israel, Jan. 21, 2026. Photo: REUTERS/Amir Cohen

The US-backed plan to end the war in Gaza appears to have hit major roadblocks, with Hamas reportedly being allowed to keep some small arms and Israel readying its military for a new offensive to disarm the Palestinian terrorist group.

According to a New York Times report, officials involved in the US-led Board of Peace have drafted a plan that would let Hamas retain small arms while giving up longer-range weapons, a move Israeli officials warn would let the terrorist group maintain its grip on Gaza.

The compromise could further strain the already fragile ceasefire, under which further Israeli military withdrawals from Gaza are tied to Hamas’s disarmament.

The draft plan reportedly calls for a “phased disarmament” of Hamas over several months, with heavy weapons “decommissioned immediately.” However, details remain unclear on where surrendered arms would go or how the plan would actually be enforced.

The initial framework would also require “personal arms” to be “registered and decommissioned” as a new Palestinian administration takes charge of security in the war-torn enclave.

Israel has previously warned that Hamas must fully disarm for the second phase of the ceasefire to move forward, pointing to tens of thousands of rifles and an active network of underground tunnels still under the Islamist group’s control.

If the Palestinian terrorist group does not give up its weapons, Israel has vowed not to withdraw troops from Gaza or approve any rebuilding efforts, effectively stalling the ceasefire agreement.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) currently occupy 53 percent of the Strip, with most of the Palestinian population living in the remaining portion of the enclave under Hamas control.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has insisted the country will not accept anything less than the full demilitarization of Gaza, pledging to prevent Hamas from carrying out another attack like its Oct. 7, 2023, invasion of and massacre across southern Israel. The attack, in which Hamas-led Palestinian terrorists killed 1,200 people, kidnapped 251 hostages, and perpetrated rampant sexual violence, launched the war in Gaza, where Hamas had total governing control before Israel’s military campaign.

Under US President Donald Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan, phase two would involve deploying an international stabilization force (ISF), beginning large-scale reconstruction, and establishing a Palestinian technocratic committee to oversee the territory’s administration.

According to media reports, the ISF could total around 20,000 troops, though it remains uncertain whether the multinational peacekeeping force will actually help disarm Hamas. Indonesia, one of the contributing members, announced this week that it could provide up to 8,000 soldiers.

Hamas has repeatedly rejected disarmament, with senior official Khaled Meshal most recently suggesting that the group has never agreed to surrender its weapons.

“As long as there’s an occupation, there’s resistance,” Meshal said during the Al Jazeera Forum in Doha on Sunday.

Amid rising tensions, Israel is planning to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip to forcibly disarm Hamas, with the Times of Israel reporting that the IDF is drawing up plans for a renewed major offensive.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned that Hamas will be disarmed by force if it continues to violate the ceasefire and pose a threat to Israel’s security.

“If Hamas does not disarm in accordance with the agreed framework, we will dismantle it and all of its capabilities,” the Israeli defense chief said this month.

Since the ceasefire took effect last year, both sides have accused each other of violations. This month, Israeli officials said that Hamas “has violated the agreement and focused its efforts on restoring its military capabilities.”

If Israel undertakes a renewed offensive, it could be far more intense than the IDF’s previous operations in Gaza over the past two years of conflict, which were constrained by efforts to protect the hostages.

Israeli officials have insisted that Hamas terrorists will continue fighting as long as they have access to weapons.

Last week, the IDF announced that a Hamas terrorist responsible for a deadly 2004 double suicide bombing, which killed 16 Israeli civilians and wounded over 100, was killed in an Israeli airstrike in the Gaza Strip.

The operation was part of a series of targeted strikes against terrorist operatives, carried out in response to an attack by gunmen on Israeli troops in the northern Gaza Strip, during which a reservist officer was seriously wounded.

Captured in 2004 and sentenced to prison, Basel Himouni was later released and exiled to Gaza in a 2011 deal, in which Israel exchanged 1,027 terror prisoners for captive IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.

According to the IDF, since his release, Himouni “returned to recruiting attackers and directing terrorist activity.”

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Spanish Authorities Question Steel Workers Over Alleged Israeli Arms Sales, Sparking Outrage

Containers are seen in the Port of Vigo, Spain, March 13, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Nacho Doce

Spanish authorities on Tuesday raided a steel factory near Bilbao, northern Spain, questioning staff over suspected violations of the country’s arms embargo on Israel – a move that has sparked outrage among local Jewish leaders and government officials, who denounced it as blatant intimidation.

According to the Spanish news outlet El Debate, police in Basauri – a town in Spain’s northern Basque Country – questioned staff at Sidenor Group, a steel manufacturer and trader, as part of a criminal investigation into alleged illegal arms sales to Israel.

José Antonio Jainaga, president of Sidenor, is accused of “smuggling and aiding in crimes against humanity or genocide by selling unauthorized batches of steel to Israel Military Industries,” according to the report.

However, Jainaga denied “any irregularity in the sales of steel to Israel” in testimony last year, asserting that the steel produced by Sidenor and exported to Israel was not “among the products subject to special control” by the Spanish government. 

The Action and Communication on the Middle East (ACOM) group, a leading pro-Israel organization in Spain, strongly condemned the government’s latest actions as part of a “pattern of political pressure on economic actors for ideological reasons” and an “authoritarian drift and threat to democratic standards.”

“What should have been an administrative compliance process is increasingly perceived as a show of force by a government that has strayed from the standards of transparency, proportionality, and legal certainty promoted by the European Union,” ACOM wrote in a post on X.

“The combination of state intervention with a political climate that tolerates — and sometimes encourages — aggressive activism against Israel and its partners creates a scenario in which civil liberties and the legal security of companies and citizens are steadily eroded,” the statement read.

ACOM also accused Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez of turning the country into one of Europe’s most hostile toward Israel, alleging the move was meant to divert attention from corruption scandals within his Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party and from recent electoral setbacks.

Since the start of the war in Gaza, Spain has launched a fierce anti-Israel campaign aimed at undermining and isolating the Jewish state on the international stage.

In September, the Spanish government passed a law to take “urgent measures to stop the genocide in Gaza,” banning trade in defense material and dual-use products from Israel, as well as imports and advertising of products originating from Israeli settlements.

More recently, Spanish officials also announced a ban on imports from hundreds of Israeli communities in the West Bank, eastern Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. 

Among all European Union members, Spain is the second country to take such action, following Slovenia — one of the bloc’s smallest economies — which became the first EU member to ban Israeli products in August, and potentially to be joined by Ireland, where parliament is currently working on a similar measure.

As a major trading partner, Israel exports roughly $850 million in goods to Spain each year — about half the value of Spanish exports to Israel — with products from the West Bank and the Golan making up only a small fraction of those shipments, according to the Israel Export Institute.

Last year, the Spanish government also announced it would bar entry to individuals involved in what it called a “genocide against Palestinians” and block Israel-bound ships and aircraft carrying weapons from Spanish ports and airspace.

Spain has also canceled a €700 million ($825 million) deal for Israeli-designed rocket launchers, as the government conducts a broader review to systematically phase out Israeli weapons and technology from its armed forces.

Amid this increasingly hostile stance toward the Jewish state, the Sánchez administration is facing mounting pressure from the country’s political leaders and the Jewish community, who accuse the government of stoking antisemitic hostility.

In December, Spanish authorities granted Airbus, the European aerospace and defense company, exceptional permission to produce aircraft and drones using Israeli technology at its Spanish plants – a move that reflects growing pressure from companies and domestic interests against the government’s push for trade sanctions on Israel over the war in Gaza.

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