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American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews?
(JTA) — Among Sandra Fox’s most memorable finds during her years mining American archives for materials about Jewish summer camps was a series of letters about the hours before lights-out.
The letters were by counselors who were documenting an unusual window in the day when they stopped supervising campers, leaving the teens instead to their own devices, which sometimes included romance and sexual exploration.
“It was each division talking about how they dealt with that free time before bed in ‘age-appropriate ways,’” Fox recalled about the letters written by counselors at Camp Ramah in Wisconsin, the original iteration of the Conservative movement’s network of summer camps.
“I’ve spoken to Christian people who work at Christian camps and have researched Christian camps. There is no free time before bed,” Fox told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “That’s not a thing if you don’t want kids to hook up. So it was just amazing to find these documents of Camp Ramah leaders really having the conversation explicitly. Most of the romance and sexuality stuff is implicit in the archives.”
The letters are quoted extensively in Fox’s new book, “The Jews of Summer: Summer Camp and Jewish Culture in Postwar America.” Fox, who earned a PhD in history from New York University in 2018 and now teaches and directs the Archive of the American Jewish Left there, tells the story of American Judaism’s most immersive laboratory for constructing identity and contesting values.
Next week, Fox is launching the book with an event at Congregation Beth Elohim in Park Slope, Brooklyn. (Tickets for the Feb. 23 event are available here.) Attendees will be able to tour adult versions of some of the most durable elements of Jewish summer camps, from Israeli dance to Yiddish and Hebrew instruction to Color Wars to Tisha B’Av, the mournful holiday that always falls over the summer.
“I never considered doing a normal book party,” Fox said. “It was always really obvious to me that a book about experiential Jewish education and role play should be celebrated and launched out into the world through experiential education and role play.”
Sandra Fox’s 2023 book “The Jews of Summer,” looks at the history of American Jewish summer camps. (Courtesy of Fox)
We spoke to Fox about her party plans, how Jewish summer camps have changed over time and how they’ve stayed the same, and the cultural history of that before-bed free time.
This interview has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. We’ll be continuing the conversation in a virtual chat through the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research Feb. 27 at 1 p.m.; register here.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Given how much Jews like to talk about camp, were you surprised that this book hadn’t already been written?
Sandra Fox: There’s been a lot of fruitful research on the history of various camps, but it’s usually been focused on one camping movement or one camp type. So there are articles about Zionist camps. There are certainly articles out there about the Ramah camps. A lot of camps have produced books — either their alumni associations or a scholar who went to let’s say, Reform movement camps have created essay collections about those camps. And there are also books about Habonim and other Zionist youth movements.
I don’t really know why this is the first stab at this kind of cross-comparison. It might be that people didn’t think there would be so much to compare. I think the overwhelming feeling I get from readers so far, people who preordered and gotten their books early, is that they’re very surprised to hear how similar these camps are. So perhaps it’s that scholars weren’t thinking about Jewish summer camps that came from such diverse standpoints as having something enough in common to write about them all at once.
Also distance from the time period really helps. You can write a book about — and people do write a book about — the ’60s and ’70s and have been for decades, but there’s a certain amount of distance from the period that has allowed me to do this, I think, and maybe it also helps that I’m generationally removed. A lot of the scholars who’ve worked on camps in the postwar period went to camps in the postwar period. It makes a lot of sense that it would be harder to write this sort of sweeping thing perhaps. The fact that I’m a millennial meant that I could write about the postwar period — and also write kind of an epilogue-style chapter that catches us up to the present.
What’s clear is that there’s something amazing about studying summer camp, a completely immersive 24/7 experience that parents send children away for. There’s no better setting for thinking about how adults project their anxieties and desires about the future onto children. There’s also no place better to think about power dynamics and age and generational tension.
I was definitely struck by the “sameyness” of Jewish camps in your accounting. What do you think we can learn from that, either about camps or about us as Jews?
I do want to say that while there’s a lot of sameyness, whenever you do a comparative study, there’s a risk of kind of collapsing all these things and making them seem too similar. What I’m trying to convey is that the camp leaders from a variety of movements took the basic structure of the summer camp as we know it — its daily schedule, its environment, its activities — and it did look similar from camp to camp, at least on that surface level.
If you look at the daily schedules in comparison, they might have a lot of the same features but they’ll be called slightly different things depending on if the camp leans more heavily towards Hebrew, or Yiddish, or English. But the content within those schedules would be rather different. It’s more that the skeletal structure of camp life has a lot of similarities across the board and then the details within each section of the day or the month had a lot of differences.
But I think what it says is that in the postwar period, the anxieties that Jewish leaders had about the future of Judaism are really, really similar and the solution that they found within the summer camp, they were pretty unanimous about. They just then took the model and inserted within it their particular nationalistic, linguistic or religious perspectives. So I think more so than saying anything about American Jewry, it shows kind of how flexible camping is. And that’s not just the Jewish story. Lots of different Americans have embraced summer camping in different ways.
So many people who have gone to camp have a fixed memory of what camp is like, where it’s caught in time, but you argue that camps have actually undergone lots of change. What are the most striking changes you documented, perhaps ones that might have been hard for even insiders to discern as they happened?
First of all, the Israel-centeredness of American Jewish education as we know it today didn’t happen overnight in 1948, for instance. It was a slower process, beyond the Zionist movements where that was already going on, for decades before 1948. Ramah and the Reform camps for instance took their time towards getting to the heavily Zionist-imbued curricula that we know.
There was considerable confusion and ambivalence at first about what to do with Israel: whether to raise an Israeli flag, not because they were anti-Zionist, but because American Jews had been thinking about proving their loyalty to America for many generations. There were some sources that would talk about — what kind of right do American Jews have to raise the Israeli flag when they’re not Israeli? So that kind of Israel-centeredness that is really a feature of camp life today was a slower process than we might think.
It fit camp life really well because broader American camps used Native American symbols, in some ways that are problematic today, to create what we know of as an iconography of camp life. So for Jews, Israel and its iconography, or Palestine and iconography before ’48, provided an alternative set of options that were read as Jewish, but it still took some time to get to where we are now in terms of the Israel focus.
One of the reasons I place emphasis on the Yiddish summer camps is to show that in the early 20th century and the mid-20th century there was more ideological diversity in the Jewish camping sphere, including various forms of Yiddishist groups and socialist groups and communist groups that operated summer camps. Most of them have closed, and their decline is obviously a change that tells a story of how American Jewry changed over the course of the postwar period. Their legacy is important, too: I have made the argument that these camps in a lot of ways modeled the idea of Yiddish as having a future in America.
What about hookup culture? Contemporary discourse about Jewish camps have focused on sex and sexuality there. What did you observe about this in the archives?
I think people think of the hookup culture of Jewish camps today and certainly in my time in the ’90s and 2000s as a permanent feature, and in some ways I found through my research and oral history interviews that that was the case, but it was really interesting to zoom out a little bit and think about how Jewish summer camps changed in terms of sexual romantic culture, in relationship to how America changed with the sexual revolution and the youth culture.
It’s not it’s not useful to think about Jewish hookup culture in a vacuum. It’s happening within America more broadly. And so of course, it’s changed dramatically over time. And one of the things I learned that was so fascinating is that Jewish summer camps were actually their leaders were less concerned in a lot of ways about sexuality at camp in the ’40s and ’50s, than they were in the late ’60s and ’70s. Because earlier premarital sex was pretty rare, at least in the teenage years, so they were not that concerned about what happened after lights out because they kind of assumed whatever was going on was fairly innocent.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, that’s when camps have to actually think about how to balance allowance and control. They want to allow campers to have these relationships, to have their first sexual experiences, and part of that is related to rising rates of intermarriage and wanting to encourage love between Jews, but they also want to control it because there’s a broader societal moment in which the sexuality of teenagers is problematized and their and their sexual culture is more public.
There’s been a real wave of sustained criticism by former campers about the cultures that they experienced, arguing that the camps created an inappropriately sexualized and unsafe space. There’s been a lot of reaction to that and the broader #MeToo moment. I’m curious about what you can speculate about a future where that space is cleaned up, based on your historical research — what is gained and what, potentially, could be lost?
Without being involved in camping today — and I want to really make that disclaimer because I know a lot of change is happening and lot of organizations are involved to talk about this issue better, to train camps and camp leaders and their counselors to not create a pressured environment for camper — I think what the history shows is that this hookup culture did not come about out of nowhere. It was partly related to the broader changes in America and the sexual revolution.
But it was also partly created because camps really needed to have campers’ buy-in, in order to be “successful.” A huge argument of my book is that we think about the power of camps as if camp directors have campers as, like, puppets on strings, and that what they do is what happens in camp life. But actually, campers have changed the everyday texture of life at camp over the course of the decades in so many different ways by resisting various ideas or just not being interested.
So hookup culture is also part of making campers feel like they have freedom at camp and that’s essential. That’s not a side project — that is essential to their ability to get campers to come back. It’s a financial need, and it’s an ideological need. If you make campers feel like they have freedom, then they will feel like they freely took on the ideologies your camp is promoting in a really natural way.
The last part of it is rising rates of intermarriage. As rates of intermarriage rose in the second half of the 20th century, there’s no doubt in my mind from doing the research that the preexisting culture around sexuality at camp and romance at camp got turbo-boosted [to facilitate relationships that could potentially lead to marriage between two Jews]. At that point, the allowance and control that camp leaders were trying to create for many decades leans maybe more heavily towards allowance.
There are positives to camp environments being a place where campers can explore their sexualities. There’s definitely a lot of conversation about the negative effects and those are all very, very real. I know people who went through horrible things at a camp and I also know people who experienced it as a very sex-positive atmosphere. I know people in my age range who were able to discover that they were gay or lesbian at camp in safety in comparison to home, so it’s not black and white at all. I hope that my chapter on romance and sexuality can maybe add some historical nuance to the conversation and give people a sense of how this actually happened. Because it happened for a whole bunch of reasons.
I think there’s a consensus view that camp is one of the most “successful” things the Jews do. But it’s hard to see where lessons from camp or camp culture are being imported to the rest of Jewish life. I’m curious what you see as kind of the lessons that Jewish institutions or Jewish communities have taken from camp — or have they not done that?
Every single public engagement I do about my work has boiled down to the question of, well, does it work? Does camp work? Is it successful? And that’s been a question that a lot of social scientists have been interested in. I don’t want to oversimplify that research, but a lot of the ways that they’ve measured success have been things that are not necessarily a given to all Jews as obviously the right way to be a Jew. So, for instance, in the ’90s and early 2000s, at the very least, a lot of research was about how, you know, “XYZ” camp and youth movement were successfully curbing intermarriage. A lot of them also asked campers and former campers how they feel about Israel, and it’s always if they are supportive of Israel in very normative ways, right, giving money visiting, supporting Israel or lobbying for its behalf — then camps have been successful.
I’m not interested in whether camps were successful by those metrics. I’m interested in how we got to the idea that camp should be successful in those ways in the first place. How did we get to those kinds of normative assumptions of like, this is a good Jew; a good Jew marries a Jew; a good Jew supports Israel, no matter what. So what I wanted to do is zoom out from that question of success and show how camp actually functions.
And then the question of “does it work” is really up to the reader. To people who believe that curbing intermarriage is the most important thing, then camps have been somewhat successful in the sense that people who go to these heavily educational camps are less likely to marry out of the faith.
But I am more interested in what actually happened at camp. And in terms of their legacies, I wanted to show how they changed various aspects of American Jewish life, and religion and politics. So I was really able to find how camping was essential in making kind of an Israel-centered Jewish education the norm. I was also able to draw a line between these Yiddish camps over the ’60s and ’70s that closed in the ’80s and contemporary Yiddish. The question of success is a real tricky and political one in a way that a lot of people have not talked about.
And is camp also fun? Because you’re creating a camp experience for your book launch next week.
Camp is fun — for a lot of people. Camp was not fun for everyone. And so I do want to play with that ambivalence at the party, and acknowledge that and also acknowledge that some people loved camp when they were younger and have mixed feelings about it now.
The party is not really a celebration of Jewish summer camp. People will be drinking and having fun and dancing — but I want them to be thinking while also about what is going on and why. How is Tisha B’Av [the fast day that commemorates the destruction of the ancient Jewish temple in Jerusalem that falls at the height of summer] commemorated at camp, for example?
Or what songs are we singing and what do they mean? I think a lot of people when they’re little kids, they learn songs in these Jewish summer camps that they can’t understand and later they maybe learn Hebrew and go, whoa, we were singing what?! My example from Zionist summer camp is singing “Ein Li Eretz Acheret,” or “I Have No Other Country.” We were in America and we obviously have another country! I don’t think anyone in my youth movement actually believes the words “Ein Li Eretz Acheret” because we live in America and people tend to kind of like living in America and most of them do not move to Israel.
So at the party we’ll be working through the fun of it, and at the same time the confusion of it and the ambivalence of it. I want it to be fun, and I also want it to be something that causes people to think.
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The post American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews? appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
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Israel’s supreme court says Arab parties can run in Oct. 27 election
(JTA) — TEL AVIV – Israel’s Supreme Court ruling upholding the right of Arab parties to run in the Oct. 27 election could make it more difficult for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to form a new coalition after the election.
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled on Friday that the Joint Arab List and Ra’am, the two Arab-led political lists competing in Israel’s elections, could run. The ruling overturned a decision by the Central Elections Committee, a largely political body in which parties in Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition hold a majority of the seats, which had voted last month to bar the lists from running.
“The court found that the materials submitted to the Central Elections Committee did not meet the standards established in the case law for disqualifying a list of candidates,” the court said in its ruling, which did not include extensive reasoning.
The decision restored the parties that traditionally represent Israel’s more than 2 million Arab citizens and in doing so helped the opposition block. Now a wide constituency that rejects working with Netanyahu will have a reason to head to the polls rather than stay home.
Most polls have shown that the opposition bloc would need to include the parliamentary seats held by the Ra’am party, led by MK Mansour Abbas, in order to gain the lead over Netanyahu’s coalition. Unlike Ra’am, the Joint Arab List has never sat in an Israeli coalition and there is no expectation that it would join with Zionist Jewish-led parties to do so.
The court also took a number of other steps regarding the upcoming election. It overturned the committee’s decision to disqualify Ofer Cassif, a Jewish lawmaker running as part of the Joint List. In Cassif’s case, the decision was made by a 7-2 majority.
The Supreme Court justices said they “strongly condemn the outrageous statements and actions by Cassif that evoke revulsion.” At the same time, they ruled that “these statements or actions do not meet the stringent tests established” for disqualifying a candidate.
According to the petition seeking Cassif’s disqualification, he had legitimized Palestinian violence during the war, referred to those seeking to attack Israeli soldiers as “freedom fighters” and taken actions against Israel in international legal forums.
The most significant development, however, came in the case of Sami Abu Shehadeh, the leader of Balad, one of the parties that make up the Joint List.
During a Thursday hearing, the Supreme Court took the unusual step of indicating to Abu Shehadeh that a majority of the justices were inclined to disqualify him and recommended that he withdraw his candidacy.
Following internal consultations, Balad announced that Abu Shehadeh would withdraw his candidacy, rendering the court’s expected ruling on his disqualification moot.
“Sami Abu Shehadeh did not retract his positions and did not flee the struggle. Only after the court itself announced its intention to uphold the disqualification did he decide to withdraw his candidacy,” Balad said in an official statement.
A central part of the case against Abu Shehadeh focused on an article he published on Oct. 8, 2023, one day after Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack, in which the terror organization killed 1,200 people in Israel and took another 251 hostage.
In the article, Abu Shehadeh described the Oct. 7 events as an “important historic event” and suggested that lessons could be learned from how Hamas had managed to surprise Israel and carry out its invasion. His comments were cited as evidence that he supports armed struggle against Israel, one of the grounds on which candidates can be disqualified under Israeli law.
In its ruling, the Supreme Court said there was “a consensus that the things said by Mr. Abu Shehadeh are painful, outrageous and revolting.” The decision to disqualify Abu Shehadeh was also supported by the Democrats, Israel’s most left-wing Zionist party.
During the Supreme Court hearing, Abu Shehadeh acknowledged that “this paragraph was not written correctly.” He said, “I have never supported violence in my life,” and said that he knows victims of the Oct. 7 attack.
Balad said Abu Shehadeh would continue to lead the party’s political activities even without serving in the Knesset.
The Joint List sharply criticized the court’s handling of the case. In a statement, the list said that “the heart of the matter” was “preventing an Arab political leader from running in the elections and infringing on our public’s right to choose its representatives.”
The list accused the court of acting “following a campaign of incitement and political persecution led by the fascist and Kahanist right, joined by the leaders of the Zionist opposition parties.”
“The court must bear responsibility for its disgraceful decision before our public and before public opinion in Israel and around the world, for providing judicial cover for political exclusion. This ruling is another link in the chain of persecution of our public.”
Right-wing Israeli politicians also criticized the court for declining to issue a ruling formally disqualifying Abu Shehadeh rather than merely pressing him to withdraw.
National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, an ultranationalist member of Netanyahu’s government, called the court’s proposal “too merciful” and said it “harms the democracy of the State of Israel.”
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
The post Israel’s supreme court says Arab parties can run in Oct. 27 election appeared first on The Forward.
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A town in the Alps that rescued Jews from the Nazis
על-פּי צופֿאַל האָב איך הײַיאָר פֿאַרבראַכט עטלעכע טעג אין די פֿראַנצייזישע אַלפּן-בערג. די בילעטן זײַנען נישט געווען אַזוי טײַער, און „בוקינג“ האָט רעקאָמענדירט אַ דאָרף נישט ווײַט פֿון ניצע (ניס).
דאָס דאָרף, סאַן-מאַרטען-וועזובי , איז פֿאַרשפּרייט אויף אַ באַרג אין דרום-פֿראַנקרײַך, און די קאָלירפֿולע הײַזער גיבן אָנצוהערן, אַז עס געפֿינט זיך נישט ווײַט פֿון דער איטאַליענישער גרענעץ. אין מיטן דעם דאָרף איז פֿאַראַן אַ טײַך, און אַלץ איז מלא-חן, פֿול מיט סאָסנע־ביימער און רײַפֿע טרויבן. אויף אַזעלכע ערטער זאָגט מײַן מאַמע: „מײַן באָבע האָט אויך נישט געהערט פֿון דעם.“
אָבער עס ווײַזט זיך אויס אַז מײַן באָבע וואָלט יאָ געקאָנט הערן פֿון סאַן-מאַרטען-וועזובי. שוין אינעם ערשטן טאָג האָב איך געפֿונען דאָרטן אַ ייִדיש פּינטעלע, און דווקא גאָר אַ וויכטיקס. די וועגווײַזערין פֿון דאָרף, אַן סיווירין, האָט אונדז דערציילט אַז אין דער צײַט פֿונעם צווייטן וועלטקריג איז סאַן-מאַרטען-וועזובי געווען כּמעט אַ יאָר לאַנג אַ מקום-מיקלט פֿאַר מער ווי 1,200 ייִדן.
צווישן די ייִדן זײַנען געווען פּליטים פֿון דײַטשלאַנד, פּוילן, האָלאַנד און בעלגיע, וואָס זײַנען אַנטלאָפֿן צו דער „זאָן ליברע“ – דעם פֿרײַען געביט, ד״ה דרום־פֿראַנקרײַך, וואָס איז אין די ערשטע צוויי יאָר פֿון דער מלחמה געבליבן פֿרײַ פֿון די נאַציס. אויך מײַן באָבע פֿייגע, צוזאַמען מיט דער משפּחה, האָט פּראָבירט אַנטלויפֿן פֿון בעלגיע קיין דרום־פֿראַנקרײַך, אָבער צוליב פֿאַרשיידענע סיבות איז עס נישט געלונגען, און די משפּחה איז געבליבן אין אַנטווערפּן.
אין נאָוועמבער 1942 זײַנען די דײַטשן אַרײַן אינעם „פֿרײַען געביט“, און זייערע אַליִירטער, די איטאַליענער, האָבן אָקופּירט די דרום-מזרחדיקע געביטן פֿון פֿראַנקרײַך. פֿאַר די ייִדן איז עס דווקא געווען אַ גוטע בשׂורה. כאָטש די איטאַליענער האָבן געפֿירט זייערע אייגענע „ראַסע-געזעצן“, האָבן די ייִדן אין איטאַליע — און דערווײַל אויך אין דרום-פֿראַנקרײַך — געקאָנט לעבן; און לעבן איז גאָר נישט געווען קיין קלייניקייט אין סוף 1942, בשעת ס׳רובֿ ייִדן פֿון אייראָפּע האָבן די דײַטשן שוין דערמאָרדעט.
אַ דאַנק די באַמיִונגען פֿון אַנדזשעלאָ דאָנאַטי, אַן איטאַליענישן ייִד וואָס האָט געוווינט אין ניצע, האָבן די איטאַליענער מסכּים געווען צו שאַפֿן אין סאַן-מאַרטען-וועזובי אַ צענטער פֿאַר ייִדישע פּליטים, וווּ זיי זאָלן קאָנען לעבן כּמעט אַ נאָרמאַל לעבן. אַזוי זײַנען אָנגעקומען אין דאָרף מער ווי 1,200 ייִדן. פֿאַר דער מלחמה האָט דאָ געוווינט נאָר איין ייִדישע משפּחה — די משפּחה לעווין-דריזדאָ, און מיט אַ מאָל איז עס געוואָרן ממש אַ ייִדיש שטעטל.
אין מיטן דער מלחמה, צווישן די אַלפּן-בערג און די וועלדער, האָבן ייִדן פֿון אָנהייב 1943 זיך געלערנט, געדאַוונט, געאַרבעט, געשאַפֿן יוגנט- און ספּאָרט-אָרגאַניזאַציעס, און אַפֿילו חתונה געהאַט. די אײַנוווינער, די פֿראַנצויזן, האָבן זיי בדרך-כּלל פֿרײַנדלעך אויפֿגענומען, און אַ סך האָבן זיי געגעבן עסן און געהאָלפֿן אויף אַנדערע אופֿנים — אַ זעלנטקייט, און נישט נאָר אין פֿראַנקרײַך.
אין אָנהייב סעפּטמבער 1943, נאָך דעם ווי די איטאַליענער האָבן קאַפּיטולירט, איז אָבער געקומען אַ סוף צו דעם גן-עדן. די דײַטשן זײַנען אַרײַן אין איטאַליע, און אין אַ פּאָר טעג אַרום זײַנען זיי אָנגעקומען אויך אין סאַן-מאַרטען-וועזובי. ווען די ייִדן האָבן דערהערט די נײַעס זײַנען אַ סך פֿון זיי, מיט דער הילף פֿון די אָרטיקע, אַנטלאָפֿן אין די בערג, מיט דער כּוונה צו גנבֿענען די גרענעץ קיין איטאַליע. די טעג זײַנען געווען קאַלטע און רעגנדיקע, און יציאת-סאַן-מאַרטען-וועזובי איז געוואָרן שווער אָן אַ שיעור (אויך פֿאַר מיר, ווי אַ טוריסט, איז דאָס קלעטערן געווען כּמעט אוממעגלעך).
אין איטאַליע האָבן הונדערטער ייִדן געפֿונען נײַע באַהעלטענישן, אָבער אַ סך האָבן די דײַטשן דאָרטן געכאַפּט. צוזאַמען מיט ייִדן וואָס זײַנען געבליבן אין דאָרף — מסתּמא אַלטע לײַט און קינדער — האָט מען זיי דעפּאָרטירט קיין דראַנסי, לעבן פּאַריז, און פֿון דאָרטן קיין אוישוויץ.
אָבער אויך דעמאָלט זײַנען צענדליקער ייִדן געבליבן אין סאַן-מאַרטען-וועזובי, און אָרטיקע מענטשן האָבן זיי באַהאַלטן אין פֿאַרשיידענע ערטער. פֿאַרשטייט זיך, נישט אַלע אין דאָרף האָבן זיי געהאָלפֿן, אָבער ס׳רובֿ אײַנוויינערס, וואָס האָבן געוווּסט וואָס קומט פֿאָר, האָבן דאָס קיינעם נישט אויסגעזאָגט. נאָר איין ייִד האָט מען געמסרט — דעם ייִד וואָס האָט געוווינט דאָ פֿאַר דער מלחמה.
מיט דער צײַט האָט „יד־ושם“ אַנערקענט צען אָרטיקע מענטשן, וואָס האָבן געראַטעוועט ייִדן ווי „חסידי-אומות-העולם“.
אויב איר האָט גאָרנישט געהערט פֿון דעם העראָיִשן, באַשיידענעם דאָרף זײַנט איר נישט די איינציקע. אַפֿילו אין סאַן-מאַרטען-וועזובי האָט מען יאָרן לאַנג נישט גערעדט וועגן די געשעענישן במשך פֿון דער צווייטער וועלט־מלחמה. „עס זײַנען געווען די וואָס האָבן געהאָלפֿן און די וואָס האָבן קאָלאַבאָרירט, און אַלע האָבן געדאַרפֿט לעבן אין איינעם נאָכן קריג“, האָט דערקלערט די וועגווײַזערין, אַן סיווירין. „אָבער איין טאָג האָט אַ יונגע פֿרוי געהערט, ווי די אַלטע לײַט ריידן צווישן זיך וועגן ׳די באַהאַלטענע ייִדן׳, און די פּאַנדאָרע-קעסטל האָט זיך צעעפֿנט.“
פֿון דעמאָלט אָן שטאָלצירן די איינווינערס פון סאַן-מאַרטען-וועזובי מיט דעם וואָס די מענטשן פֿון זייער שטעטל האָבן געהאָלפֿן ראַטעווען ייִדן בעת דער מלחמה. אין יעדן פֿראַנצייזישן דאָרף שטייט אַ דענקמאָל לזכר די געפֿאַלענע במשך פֿון די צוויי וועלט־מלחמות (און אויך אַנדערע קריגן). לעבן דעם גרויסן דענקמאָל אין סאַן-מאַרטען-וועזובי שטייען הײַנט דרײַ גרויסע דענקמעלער: איינער לזכר די אומגעקומענע ייִדן; אַ צווייטער אין אָנדענק פֿון די „חסידי-אומות-העולם“, און אַ דריטער וואָס דערציילט די גאַנצע געשיכטע.
הײַנט קאָן מען לייענען וועגן דער פּרשה אין פֿאַרשיידענע ביכער: איין ביכל אויף פֿראַנצייזיש, וואָס סאַן-מאַרטען-וועזובי האָט אַרויסגעגעבן: „די ייִדן און ‘צדיקים’ פֿון סאַן-מאַרטען-וועזובי“; אַ בוך אויף ענגליש: „די חורבן־אָדיסייעס: די ייִדן פֿון סאַן־מאַרטען־וועזובי און זייער פּליטה דורך פֿראַנקרײַך און איטאַליע“, און אויך אַ ראָמאַן אויפֿן סמך פֿון יענעם קאַפּיטל געשיכטע.
סאַן-מאַרטען-וועזובי שטאָלצירט מיט נאָך עפּעס. אינעם גרויסן קלויסטער פֿון דאָרף שטייט אַ הייליקע סטאַטוע פֿון דער מאַדאָנע, אַ הילצערנע סטאַטוע וואָס די אָרטיקע הייליקן שוין הונדערטער יאָרן. לכּבֿוד דער אַלטער מאַדאָנע מאַרשירן זיי יעדעס יאָר אין אַ גרויסן פּאַראַד צו די בערג, על-פּי דער טראַדיציע איז איר מקור. אין גײַסט פֿון יענער טראַדיציע האָבן די אײַנוויינערס פֿון סאַן-מאַרטען-וועזובי, מיט בערך 10 יאָר צוריק, באַשלאָסן אײַנצופֿירן אַ נײַע טראַדיציע: יעדן 3טן סעפּטעמבער מאַרשירן זיי לכּבֿוד די ייִדן וואָס זײַנען אַנטלאָפֿן אין די בערג, ביז דעם באַרגפּאַס אויף דער גרענעץ מיט איטאַליע. דאָרטן, לעבן דעם טאָוול לזכר די ייִדן, דערמאָנען זיי די אומגעקומענע און די וואָס זײַנען ניצול געוואָרן אַ דאַנק די אַמאָליקע אײַנווינערס פֿון סאַן-מאַרטען-וועזובי. אויך די קינדער אָדער אייניקלעך פֿון די געראַטעווטע ייִדן נעמען צו מאָל אַן אָנטייל אין די פּראָצעסיעס.
אויפֿן טאָוול שטייט געשריבן, אויף איטאַליעניש און פֿראַנצייזיש: „דורך דעם באַרגפּאַס, אין סעפּטעמבער 1943, זײַנען דורכגעגאַנגען הונדערטער ייִדן פֿון גאַנץ אייראָפּע, וואָס האָבן געזוכט מיטלען זיך צו ראַטעווען פֿון די אַנטיסעמיטישע רדיפֿות.“
און גלײַך נאָך דעם בײַט זיך דער טאָן פֿון די ווערטער אויף אַ גאָר רירנדיקן אופֿן: „דו, וואָס דו גייסט דאָ אין דער פֿרײַ, דאַרפֿסט געדענקען אַז דאָס קאָן געשען ווען מע לאָזט נישט אַלע מענטשן געניסן פֿון די זעלבע רעכט.“
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Democratic socialists scored big primary wins. But that’s not the whole story.
(JTA) — A string of U.S. House primary successes for democratic socialists, most of whom are sharp Israel critics, was hailed as a major shift in party politics over the course of the summer. But now that the primaries have concluded, a full picture of the results shows that the group’s victories were concentrated in House races in the deepest-blue districts, while few politicians have scored wins in Senate races.
During the primary season, candidates backed by the Democratic Socialists of America won seven out of the 25 U.S. House primaries in which they competed, securing two wins in Michigan, one in Colorado, three in New York and one in Pennsylvania, according to the DSA’s vote tracker. However, these wins have all occurred in Democratic strongholds: New York City, Detroit, Denver and Philadelphia.
“It’s a little bit dangerous to overinterpret a handful of elections compared to all the others,” Elaine Kamarck, a senior fellow in governance at the Brookings Institution, told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “Calling the DSA the new big kid on the block is a little bit premature.”
In addition to the seven DSA primary winners, another DSA candidate who ran in a California nonpartisan primary advanced to a U.S. House runoff against a Democratic incumbent in November. Two additional democratic socialists, from Kansas and New Hampshire, withdrew before their respective House primaries.
Of the DSA’s 18 House primary losses, seven occurred in deep-blue areas – demonstrating that even in the country’s most progressive pockets, democratic socialists often weren’t popular. These defeats notably included one in St. Louis, where incumbent Wesley Bell trounced DSA firebrand and anti-AIPAC crusader Cori Bush.
Granted, the DSA victories are still unprecedented in a country where socialism has long been anathema. The candidates might have only succeeded in deeply Democratic districts – but that means they are all but assured victory on Election Day. Taken together, they’ll constitute a larger contingent in Congress than ever before.
Many of the DSA candidates made Israel and its supporters central issues during their campaigns, and there’s little doubt that their presence will tilt the Democratic caucus in the Congress further away from Israel.
The DSA’s official stance on Israel includes an end to the country’s “colonization and occupation of all Arab lands,” the “self-determination of the Palestinian people” and the cessation of “U.S. complicity in Israel’s genocide and apartheid.” Although the DSA has won fewer races than it has lost, the victories would more than triple the group’s presence in the U.S. House, with five newcomers in addition to Reps. Rashida Tlaib of Michigan and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York.
Jeff Robbins, a Boston-based attorney and former Democratic Senate staffer, said that supporters of Israel should be concerned by the wins, even if they don’t constitute a wave.
Robbins, who also served as a delegate to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights under former president Bill Clinton, warned that if anti-Israel DSA politicians keep racking up wins, Democratic strategists will discourage candidates from supporting Israel’s response to Hamas after the Oct. 7 attacks.
Recommending any action to the contrary, he argued, will result in “the quickest campaign you’ve ever seen.”
“It will be over before you can say ‘the Golan Heights’,” Robbins quipped.
And yet, although the media spotlight has shone on the DSA’s standout victories, establishment candidates have secured more wins at the ballot box from a numerical perspective. In addition, democratic socialists have focused more on the House than the Senate, where they would need to appeal to broader statewide electorates to win seats.
One major exception to that rule is Florida DSA member Angie Nixon, who pulled off a stunning primary victory in a state that Trump won by about 13 percentage points in 2024. But she didn’t join the DSA until shortly before the election and she didn’t get its endorsement.
Another DSA Senate candidate, Gregory Levy of Ohio, will be running in the November general election as an Independent.
But the three other staunchly progressive Senate candidates who will be on the Democratic ballot in November – in Maine, Michigan and Minnesota – don’t define themselves as democratic socialists. While many are still highly critical of Israel, they have differences with DSA and are more interested in making sure they appeal to the more politically diverse populations they will face statewide. They face close races where swing voters who don’t identify strongly with either party are likely to make the difference.
For instance, though many of Abdul El-Sayed’s positions are similar to DSA policies, last month he told The Wall Street Journal that he is “not technically or practically DSA” and that he doesn’t oppose capitalism. At the same time, he has earned the support of many democratic socialist politicians, including Vermont independent Sen. Bernie Sanders.
Kamarck observed that Michigan, which has a huge Arab-American population, remains the nerve center of the Democratic Party’s pro-Palestinian movement. Yet although polls forecast a landslide victory for El-Sayed, who sharply criticized Israel throughout his primary campaign, she termed his victory in early August as “a squeaker.”
“It was a one-point race,” she said. “What that says is that this is not finished.”
Haile Soifer, CEO of the Jewish Democratic Council of America, said in a statement at the time that although her group was disappointed in El-Sayed’s victory, his “razor-thin margin isn’t the resounding win for the far-left that was predicted.”
An Economist model issued shortly after El-Sayed’s victory predicted that the Democratic Party’s chances of winning in November fell to 48% following the primary. But a Marist poll published on Wednesday gave El-Sayed a seven-point lead over Republican Mike Rogers, with a 3.8% margin of error.
Meanwhile, post-primary predictions showed that Minnesota’s Peggy Flanagan would secure an easy victory in her blue state’s Senate race. However, a new KSTP/SurveyUSA poll found that her five-point lead over Republican Michele Tafoya had narrowed to a statistical tie. Like many party progressives, Flanagan has accused Israel of committing genocide in Gaza.
As for Maine’s Jackson, the progressive was trailing Republican Sen. Susan Collins, a five-term incumbent, by 3 points, with a 3.1% margin of error, according to an AARP poll released on Thursday.
Nixon in Florida was 11 points behind Republican Sen. Ashley Moody, with a 4% margin of error, a Stetson University from late last month poll found. On the other hand, St. Pete Polls placed the candidates in a dead heat just the week before, giving Moody just a 0.3-point edge, with a 3.2% margin of error.
In a testament to the growing power of the DSA – even in a red state – Moody reportedly told Fox News Radio this week that she is “seeing way-too-close-for comfort polls in many Republican Senate races.”
And in an email blast sent the same day, according to Florida Politics, Moody warned that “the polls have been all over the place.”
“Some have us up. Two have us tied,” she wrote. “We’re in the final stretch, where everything we do, and your support, really matters.”
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
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