Connect with us

Uncategorized

American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews?

(JTA) — Among Sandra Fox’s most memorable finds during her years mining American archives for materials about Jewish summer camps was a series of letters about the hours before lights-out.

The letters were by counselors who were documenting an unusual window in the day when they stopped supervising campers, leaving the teens instead to their own devices, which sometimes included romance and sexual exploration.

“It was each division talking about how they dealt with that free time before bed in ‘age-appropriate ways,’” Fox recalled about the letters written by counselors at Camp Ramah in Wisconsin, the original iteration of the Conservative movement’s network of summer camps.

“I’ve spoken to Christian people who work at Christian camps and have researched Christian camps. There is no free time before bed,” Fox told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “That’s not a thing if you don’t want kids to hook up. So it was just amazing to find these documents of Camp Ramah leaders really having the conversation explicitly. Most of the romance and sexuality stuff is implicit in the archives.”

The letters are quoted extensively in Fox’s new book, “The Jews of Summer: Summer Camp and Jewish Culture in Postwar America.” Fox, who earned a PhD in history from New York University in 2018 and now teaches and directs the Archive of the American Jewish Left there, tells the story of American Judaism’s most immersive laboratory for constructing identity and contesting values.

Next week, Fox is launching the book with an event at Congregation Beth Elohim in Park Slope, Brooklyn. (Tickets for the Feb. 23 event are available here.) Attendees will be able to tour adult versions of some of the most durable elements of Jewish summer camps, from Israeli dance to Yiddish and Hebrew instruction to Color Wars to Tisha B’Av, the mournful holiday that always falls over the summer.

“I never considered doing a normal book party,” Fox said. “It was always really obvious to me that a book about experiential Jewish education and role play should be celebrated and launched out into the world through experiential education and role play.”

Sandra Fox’s 2023 book “The Jews of Summer,” looks at the history of American Jewish summer camps. (Courtesy of Fox)

We spoke to Fox about her party plans, how Jewish summer camps have changed over time and how they’ve stayed the same, and the cultural history of that before-bed free time.

This interview has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. We’ll be continuing the conversation in a virtual chat through the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research Feb. 27 at 1 p.m.; register here.

Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Given how much Jews like to talk about camp, were you surprised that this book hadn’t already been written?

Sandra Fox: There’s been a lot of fruitful research on the history of various camps, but it’s usually been focused on one camping movement or one camp type. So there are articles about Zionist camps. There are certainly articles out there about the Ramah camps. A lot of camps have produced books — either their alumni associations or a scholar who went to let’s say, Reform movement camps have created essay collections about those camps. And there are also books about Habonim and other Zionist youth movements.

I don’t really know why this is the first stab at this kind of cross-comparison. It might be that people didn’t think there would be so much to compare. I think the overwhelming feeling I get from readers so far, people who preordered and gotten their books early, is that they’re very surprised to hear how similar these camps are. So perhaps it’s that scholars weren’t thinking about Jewish summer camps that came from such diverse standpoints as having something enough in common to write about them all at once.

Also distance from the time period really helps. You can write a book about — and people do write a book about — the ’60s and ’70s and have been for decades, but there’s a certain amount of distance from the period that has allowed me to do this, I think, and maybe it also helps that I’m generationally removed. A lot of the scholars who’ve worked on camps in the postwar period went to camps in the postwar period. It makes a lot of sense that it would be harder to write this sort of sweeping thing perhaps. The fact that I’m a millennial meant that I could write about the postwar period — and also write kind of an epilogue-style chapter that catches us up to the present.

What’s clear is that there’s something amazing about studying summer camp, a completely immersive 24/7 experience that parents send children away for. There’s no better setting for thinking about how adults project their anxieties and desires about the future onto children. There’s also no place better to think about power dynamics and age and generational tension.

I was definitely struck by the “sameyness” of Jewish camps in your accounting. What do you think we can learn from that, either about camps or about us as Jews?

I do want to say that while there’s a lot of sameyness, whenever you do a comparative study, there’s a risk of kind of collapsing all these things and making them seem too similar. What I’m trying to convey is that the camp leaders from a variety of movements took the basic structure of the summer camp as we know it — its daily schedule, its environment, its activities — and it did look similar from camp to camp, at least on that surface level.

If you look at the daily schedules in comparison, they might have a lot of the same features but they’ll be called slightly different things depending on if the camp leans more heavily towards Hebrew, or Yiddish, or English. But the content within those schedules would be rather different. It’s more that the skeletal structure of camp life has a lot of similarities across the board and then the details within each section of the day or the month had a lot of differences.

But I think what it says is that in the postwar period, the anxieties that Jewish leaders had about the future of Judaism are really, really similar and the solution that they found within the summer camp, they were pretty unanimous about. They just then took the model and inserted within it their particular nationalistic, linguistic or religious perspectives. So I think more so than saying anything about American Jewry, it shows kind of how flexible camping is. And that’s not just the Jewish story. Lots of different Americans have embraced summer camping in different ways.

So many people who have gone to camp have a fixed memory of what camp is like, where it’s caught in time, but you argue that camps have actually undergone lots of change. What are the most striking changes you documented, perhaps ones that might have been hard for even insiders to discern as they happened?

First of all, the Israel-centeredness of American Jewish education as we know it today didn’t happen overnight in 1948, for instance. It was a slower process, beyond the Zionist movements where that was already going on, for decades before 1948. Ramah and the Reform camps for instance took their time towards getting to the heavily Zionist-imbued curricula that we know.

There was considerable confusion and ambivalence at first about what to do with Israel: whether to raise an Israeli flag, not because they were anti-Zionist, but because American Jews had been thinking about proving their loyalty to America for many generations. There were some sources that would talk about — what kind of right do American Jews have to raise the Israeli flag when they’re not Israeli? So that kind of Israel-centeredness that is really a feature of camp life today was a slower process than we might think.

It fit camp life really well because broader American camps used Native American symbols, in some ways that are problematic today, to create what we know of as an iconography of camp life. So for Jews, Israel and its iconography, or Palestine and iconography before ’48, provided an alternative set of options that were read as Jewish, but it still took some time to get to where we are now in terms of the Israel focus.

One of the reasons I place emphasis on the Yiddish summer camps is to show that in the early 20th century and the mid-20th century there was more ideological diversity in the Jewish camping sphere, including various forms of Yiddishist groups and socialist groups and communist groups that operated summer camps. Most of them have closed, and their decline is obviously a change that tells a story of how American Jewry changed over the course of the postwar period. Their legacy is important, too: I have made the argument that these camps in a lot of ways modeled the idea of Yiddish as having a future in America.

What about hookup culture? Contemporary discourse about Jewish camps have focused on sex and sexuality there. What did you observe about this in the archives?

I think people think of the hookup culture of Jewish camps today and certainly in my time in the ’90s and 2000s as a permanent feature, and in some ways I found through my research and oral history interviews that that was the case, but it was really interesting to zoom out a little bit and think about how Jewish summer camps changed in terms of sexual romantic culture, in relationship to how America changed with the sexual revolution and the youth culture.

It’s not it’s not useful to think about Jewish hookup culture in a vacuum. It’s happening within America more broadly. And so of course, it’s changed dramatically over time. And one of the things I learned that was so fascinating is that Jewish summer camps were actually their leaders were less concerned in a lot of ways about sexuality at camp in the ’40s and ’50s, than they were in the late ’60s and ’70s. Because earlier premarital sex was pretty rare, at least in the teenage years, so they were not that concerned about what happened after lights out because they kind of assumed whatever was going on was fairly innocent.

In the late 1960s and 1970s, that’s when camps have to actually think about how to balance allowance and control. They want to allow campers to have these relationships, to have their first sexual experiences, and part of that is related to rising rates of intermarriage and wanting to encourage love between Jews, but they also want to control it because there’s a broader societal moment in which the sexuality of teenagers is problematized and their and their sexual culture is more public.

There’s been a real wave of sustained criticism by former campers about the cultures that they experienced, arguing that the camps created an inappropriately sexualized and unsafe space. There’s been a lot of reaction to that and the broader #MeToo moment. I’m curious about what you can speculate about a future where that space is cleaned up, based on your historical research — what is gained and what, potentially, could be lost?

Without being involved in camping today — and I want to really make that disclaimer because I know a lot of change is happening and lot of organizations are involved to talk about this issue better, to train camps and camp leaders and their counselors to not create a pressured environment for camper — I think what the history shows is that this hookup culture did not come about out of nowhere. It was partly related to the broader changes in America and the sexual revolution.

But it was also partly created because camps really needed to have campers’ buy-in, in order to be “successful.” A huge argument of my book is that we think about the power of camps as if camp directors have campers as, like, puppets on strings, and that what they do is what happens in camp life. But actually, campers have changed the everyday texture of life at camp over the course of the decades in so many different ways by resisting various ideas or just not being interested.

So hookup culture is also part of making campers feel like they have freedom at camp and that’s essential. That’s not a side project — that is essential to their ability to get campers to come back. It’s a financial need, and it’s an ideological need. If you make campers feel like they have freedom, then they will feel like they freely took on the ideologies your camp is promoting in a really natural way.

The last part of it is rising rates of intermarriage. As rates of intermarriage rose in the second half of the 20th century, there’s no doubt in my mind from doing the research that the preexisting culture around sexuality at camp and romance at camp got turbo-boosted [to facilitate relationships that could potentially lead to marriage between two Jews]. At that point, the allowance and control that camp leaders were trying to create for many decades leans maybe more heavily towards allowance.

There are positives to camp environments being a place where campers can explore their sexualities. There’s definitely a lot of conversation about the negative effects and those are all very, very real. I know people who went through horrible things at a camp and I also know people who experienced it as a very sex-positive atmosphere. I know people in my age range who were able to discover that they were gay or lesbian at camp in safety in comparison to home, so it’s not black and white at all. I hope that my chapter on romance and sexuality can maybe add some historical nuance to the conversation and give people a sense of how this actually happened. Because it happened for a whole bunch of reasons.

I think there’s a consensus view that camp is one of the most “successful” things the Jews do. But it’s hard to see where lessons from camp or camp culture are being imported to the rest of Jewish life. I’m curious what you see as kind of the lessons that Jewish institutions or Jewish communities have taken from camp — or have they not done that?

Every single public engagement I do about my work has boiled down to the question of, well, does it work? Does camp work? Is it successful? And that’s been a question that a lot of social scientists have been interested in. I don’t want to oversimplify that research, but a lot of the ways that they’ve measured success have been things that are not necessarily a given to all Jews as obviously the right way to be a Jew. So, for instance, in the ’90s and early 2000s, at the very least, a lot of research was about how, you know, “XYZ” camp and youth movement were successfully curbing intermarriage. A lot of them also asked campers and former campers how they feel about Israel, and it’s always if they are supportive of Israel in very normative ways, right, giving money visiting, supporting Israel or lobbying for its behalf — then camps have been successful.

I’m not interested in whether camps were successful by those metrics. I’m interested in how we got to the idea that camp should be successful in those ways in the first place. How did we get to those kinds of normative assumptions of like, this is a good Jew; a good Jew marries a Jew; a good Jew supports Israel, no matter what. So what I wanted to do is zoom out from that question of success and show how camp actually functions.

And then the question of “does it work” is really up to the reader. To people who believe that curbing intermarriage is the most important thing, then camps have been somewhat successful in the sense that people who go to these heavily educational camps are less likely to marry out of the faith.

But I am more interested in what actually happened at camp. And in terms of their legacies, I wanted to show how they changed various aspects of American Jewish life, and religion and politics. So I was really able to find how camping was essential in making kind of an Israel-centered Jewish education the norm. I was also able to draw a line between these Yiddish camps over the ’60s and ’70s that closed in the ’80s and contemporary Yiddish. The question of success is a real tricky and political one in a way that a lot of people have not talked about.

And is camp also fun? Because you’re creating a camp experience for your book launch next week.

Camp is fun — for a lot of people. Camp was not fun for everyone. And so I do want to play with that ambivalence at the party, and acknowledge that and also acknowledge that some people loved camp when they were younger and have mixed feelings about it now.

The party is not really a celebration of Jewish summer camp. People will be drinking and having fun and dancing — but I want them to be thinking while also about what is going on and why. How is Tisha B’Av [the fast day that commemorates the destruction of the ancient Jewish temple in Jerusalem that falls at the height of summer] commemorated at camp, for example?

Or what songs are we singing and what do they mean? I think a lot of people when they’re little kids, they learn songs in these Jewish summer camps that they can’t understand and later they maybe learn Hebrew and go, whoa, we were singing what?! My example from Zionist summer camp is singing “Ein Li Eretz Acheret,” or “I Have No Other Country.” We were in America and we obviously have another country! I don’t think anyone in my youth movement actually believes the words “Ein Li Eretz Acheret” because we live in America and people tend to kind of like living in America and most of them do not move to Israel.

So at the party we’ll be working through the fun of it, and at the same time the confusion of it and the ambivalence of it. I want it to be fun, and I also want it to be something that causes people to think.

—
The post American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews? appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

Continue Reading
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Uncategorized

Herzog calls for crackdown on violent West Bank settlers as olive harvest tensions mount

(JTA) — BUDAPEST, Hungary — Israeli President Isaac Herzog is backing senior Israel Defense Forces commanders in taking decisive action against violent settler attacks in the West Bank, he told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

His comments came a day before Israeli forces detained New York Democratic congressional candidate Brad Lander along with 90 rabbis and activists accompanying Palestinian farmers during the olive harvest.

At a press briefing in Budapest, JTA asked Herzog what action had been taken to curb settler violence following his previous calls for a stronger government response. Herzog pointed to a meeting he held earlier this month with the IDF’s West Bank division commander and other senior officers.

“I looked them in the eye and I gave them full backing to do whatever it takes to stop this terrible phenomenon,” he said.

The goal was to end the settler violence “at its roots,” Herzog said, adding that “major efforts” were underway.

Israeli police arrested 10 suspects following a series of settler attacks over the weekend, including a violent assault on Washington Post photojournalist Heidi Levine. Nine of those suspects were released from custody, Haaretz reported on Wednesday.

IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir ordered the deployment of an additional Border Police company to the West Bank to combat extremist violence. The unit is expected to begin operations in late November.

Herzog had personally called Levine on Saturday to apologize for the attack, which left her with four broken vertebrae and other injuries. “I was morally tormented during Shabbat when I thought about it, and I express deep sorrow and apologize for what you went through,” he told her.

The attacks have drawn condemnation from the U.S. and European governments. On Sunday, the European Union called for Israel to take “full accountability” in preventing further violence against Palestinians, journalists and diplomats.

During his visit Tuesday, Herzog met with Hungarian President András Baka and Prime Minister Péter Magyar, whose government ended its predecessor’s opposition to EU sanctions against extremist Israeli settlers.

Herzog’s visit was the first by a senior Israeli leader since Magyar defeated longtime Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a close ally of Israel and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in April. At a joint appearance, Baka described relations with Israel as “cordial and stable,” while Herzog called Hungary a “friend and an ally.”

Asked later at the press briefing whether he had received a cooler reception than under Orbán, Herzog dismissed the suggestion, describing his meetings with both leaders as “fantastic.”

Pressed on Baka’s reference to the Palestinians, Herzog said the issue had been discussed “very politely” but had not dominated the talks, adding that it was “a perfectly legitimate subject to discuss.”

Herzog called the new prime minister “a brilliant person, a very impressive leader.”

The Hungarian leaders had “opened their hearts” to him, Herzog said, citing the attendance of several senior ministers at a lunch hosted by Magyar among other gestures that he said went beyond diplomatic protocol.

The visit also had personal significance for Herzog, whose father, former Israeli President Chaim Herzog, made the first state visit to Hungary by a sitting Israeli president in 1991, shortly after the restoration of diplomatic relations between the countries.

Herzog also addressed the closing gathering of Voice of the People, his initiative bringing together 150 Jews from Israel and the diaspora. He warned that combating antisemitism would be a “long-range battle” and stressed the need to engage millions of unaffiliated Jews.

“Ask the average Israeli – he has no clue about the diversity of Jewish life,” Herzog said, adding that many Jews in the Diaspora were similarly unfamiliar with Jewish life in Israel.

The post Herzog calls for crackdown on violent West Bank settlers as olive harvest tensions mount appeared first on The Forward.

Continue Reading

Uncategorized

El-Sayed campaign hires Jewish liaison

(JTA) —

DETROIT – Abdul El-Sayed’s campaign for Michigan’s U.S. Senate seat has hired a Jewish liaison in the final weeks of the election season, part of a new push to swing undecided Jewish voters as the contentious race enters its homestretch.

Lenore Goldman is a veteran political consultant with Michigan ties whose work has included One Fair Wage, a national movement to raise the minimum wage that has prompted years of back-and-forth in the Michigan state legislature and courts.

She also consulted on Voters Not Politicians, a 2018 Michigan campaign that successfully passed a ballot measure to create a nonpartisan redistricting commission in the state. She has also consulted for Jewish groups, including the Jewish Community Federation of San Francisco.

Multiple figures close to the campaign confirmed her hire to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency on Wednesday. The El-Sayed campaign did not immediately make Goldman available for comment, but she has already been a presence at some local events staged by Jewish supporters.

News of her hire comes nearly two months after the Democratic candidate’s campaign first told JTA they were interviewing for a Jewish liaison position.

Goldman enters the campaign at a precarious moment for El-Sayed, who has struggled to win over skeptical Jewish voters in his tight race with his Republican opponent, former U.S. Rep. Mike Rogers.

Recent polls show a tight race, with El-Sayed holding a narrow advantage. A Marist poll released Wednesday put him ahead of Rogers, 50% to 48% among likely voters, within the survey’s margin of error.

Jews have bristled at the former county health director’s strong criticism of Israel, including when he stated earlier this week that the country is “not an ally.” They have also objected to his campaign’s prior association with left-wing streamer Hasan Piker, whose remarks about Jews have drawn accusations of antisemitism. El-Sayed has since distanced himself from Piker.

Some Jews have criticized El-Sayed’s initial remarks to this spring’s Temple Israel attack, which he has since apologized for. Rogers called his opponent “anti-Jew” in a JTA interview this week.

A new letter from El-Sayed to Jewish Michiganders is also being circulated as part of an effort to warm relations.

“I care deeply about the threat of antisemitism to our communities, and I am committed to protecting all Michigan Jews against hatred and injustice,” El-Sayed writes in the letter, which was shared on social media.

A spokesperson for the Michigan Democratic Party, which is named as a sponsor in the letter, did not respond to JTA requests for comment by press time. The El-Sayed campaign also did not respond to a request for comment about the letter.

Michigan Democratic U.S. Senate candidate Abdul El-Sayed meets with concerned Jewish voters during the state Jewish Democratic caucus’s “Summer Simcha” event, Birmingham, Mich., Aug. 30, 2026. (Andrew Lapin/JTA)

In the campaign’s final days, Jewish surrogates for El-Sayed are hitting the pavement hard. A new Jewish canvassing initiative led by the progressive voter-mobilization group Seed the Vote hopes to engage voters in an effort to boost support for El-Sayed. Seed The Vote is working with the Jewish advocacy groups Bend the Arc Action and IfNotNow.

Most of the Jewish canvassers have come from out of state. One Jewish Michigander who is canvassing, Ronit Wagman, said the activists have sometimes experienced hostility from Jewish households.

“People just don’t want to put themselves on a limb and open themselves up to name-calling,” Wagman, who lives in the Detroit suburb of Oak Park and has canvassed in the nearby, largely liberal town of Huntington Woods, told JTA. “So I’m not too surprised that local Jews don’t really want to door-knock.”

In her own family, Wagman said she has been an El-Sayed supporter for a while but that her parents “took some convincing” to vote for him.

The argument that worked on them, she said, was pulling back from the candidate’s remarks about Israel and the Temple Israel attack. Instead, she asked them to consider the prospect of how Jews would fare long-term under what she described as continued Republican attacks on “constitutional democracy and civil rights.”

“Ultimately, we talked about how Jews have been able to enjoy so much safety and security in America because of the protections offered to all people by our constitution,” she said. “And when you start to erode that, nobody is safe.”

Conversations like the Wagmans’ could prove the tipping point for a Jewish population that largely considers itself liberal but has often been troubled by El-Sayed. Jewish organizers for him have also staged a series of small-room meet-and-greets with progressive politicians who are either Jewish, or who have close ties to the Jewish community. These figures have made their own pitches for the senate candidate.

One of those surrogates, Jewish Illinois congressional candidate Daniel Biss, spoke at a Detroit private Jewish residence on Monday to about 50 people. Goldman was also present at the event.

Biss was targeted by far-left activists during his own primary this spring, some of whom accused the candidate of being AIPAC-aligned himself. In fact, he is backed by the liberal Zionist lobby J Street and he fended off millions in spending that the pro-Israel group dropped in favor of an opponent.

Yet Biss told JTA he had no qualms about supporting El-Sayed, some of whose followers have targeted Jewish Democrats in the state in similar fashion.

“I don’t think it is ever healthy to associate any leader with the ugliest thing that anyone who supports them does,” Biss told JTA. “I absolutely never saw anything like that from Abdul himself.”

He continued, “It is possible to fight for Jewish safety in America with a variety of different positions on foreign policy. I think if we don’t accept that, we make ourselves vulnerable unnecessarily.”

To the group, he also argued that some Jewish concerns regarding El-Sayed were misplaced, particularly concerns about his language around AIPAC, which spent heavily against El-Sayed in his primary.

The lobbyists also spent heavily against Biss in his own primary, and, according to Biss, are fair game for criticism because they employed pernicious tactics in hiding their ad spending and paying for ads that often obscure their pro-Israel motivations.

“To be a little bit cheeky, I would say you can’t perform an antisemitic trope and then accuse me of antisemitism when I describe the thing you just did,” Biss told the Jewish crowd.

AIPAC announced Wednesday that it would cease endorsing and soliciting donations for its preferred candidates, though its associated super PAC, United Democracy Project, would continue operations.

El-Sayed will campaign in Detroit this weekend with former President Barack Obama. He and Rogers face off in their final scheduled debate tonight.

The post El-Sayed campaign hires Jewish liaison appeared first on The Forward.

Continue Reading

Uncategorized

Why many Israelis are silent on West Bank violence even as it escalates

In the last month, Jewish terrorists in the occupied West Bank boasted on Telegram and in Whatsapp groups that they burned 56 Palestinian vehicles, torched 13 buildings, injured 146 Palestinians, smashed numerous windshields, cut down thousands of olive trees and burned hundreds of dunams of fields and orchards. The tally was accompanied by a video with upbeat music showcasing the violence and injured Palestinians.

This escalation of Jewish terrorism in the West Bank is hardly invisible in Israel. Israeli security data show a sharp rise: Serious incidents of “nationalistic crime” increased 63% in the first half of 2026 compared with the same period a year earlier. Israeli newspapers report attacks, arson and assaults with depressing regularity. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself reportedly described the phenomenon in a closed cabinet discussion as a “metastasizing cancer.”

And yet, as Israel heads toward elections, the scale and severity of this violence have not been matched by serious political attention. Why?

The easiest explanation would be that Israelis approve of it. Some do. There is an ideological minority for whom the answer is straightforward: the land belongs exclusively to the Jewish people, Palestinian claims to it have no legitimacy, and violence that drives Palestinians from contested areas can be understood as serving a national and religious purpose.

But that does not explain the broader silence or caution among the majority of Israelis who don’t share this ideology, including most mainstream political leaders and a growing number of rabbis and settlement figures who have explicitly condemned violence against and theft from Palestinians.

There are three primary reasons why mainstream Israelis who oppose the violence have nevertheless been cautious about making it a central political issue.

The first and perhaps most important reason is distrust. In mainstream Israeli discourse, there is widespread skepticism about the way settler violence is described by international organizations and parts of the media. That skepticism does not amount to denial of the phenomenon itself: a 2026 INSS poll found that 65% of Israelis viewed nationalist violence by Jews as either Jewish terrorism that must be stopped or serious violence requiring prevention. Still, many Israelis believe its scale is vastly inflated, stripped of context and folded into a larger campaign to portray Israel as uniquely monstrous. Palestinians, in this view, are perceived not as isolated civilians but as part of a hostile population, and the international institutions, NGOs and media documenting their victimization are themselves viewed with profound suspicion.

That reaction is not without cause. Israelis have spent three years hearing accusations they experience as grotesquely false, from sweeping charges of genocide to rhetoric questioning whether a Jewish state should exist at all, alongside repeated minimization or erasure of what Israelis endured on October 7. When many accusations really are distorted, it becomes instinctive for Israelis to dismiss all accusations. Suspicion of the accusers thus replaces the need to examine their claims, tragically removing any responsibility for self-reflection or the need to acknowledge wrong-doing.

The second reason is trauma and security. Palestinian terrorism in the West Bank has declined dramatically in recent years. According to IDF figures reported in the Israeli press, attacks fell from roughly 850 in 2023 to 260 in 2024 and about 60 in 2025. The security establishment attributes much of that decline to aggressive Israeli counterterrorism operations and unprecedented freedom of military action in Palestinian cities. But many Israelis draw a broader, less provable conclusion: Palestinian terror has declined because Jewish settlers became more aggressive and Palestinian communities more intimidated.

The implied logic is uncomfortable but powerful — lawlessness is ugly, but perhaps it is also keeping us alive. There is no good evidence that settler violence caused the decline. In fact, senior Israeli officials have argued the opposite: that Jewish rioters divert troops and damage counterterrorism efforts. But elections are shaped by perceptions, not causal studies. For a society still traumatized by Oct. 7, the possibility that confronting Jewish extremists might somehow weaken Jewish security is enough to make many voters reluctant to look too closely.

The third explanation is electoral politics. The Israeli left talks about Jewish terrorism frequently. The Democrats have sent lawmakers and activists to provide “protective presence” for Palestinians under threat. Different Israeli groups, including Rabbis for Human Rights, Bnei Avraham, Reservists Against Terrorism, and others, regularly accompany Palestinian farmers and shepherds; some of their activists have themselves been beaten by settlers. There are also, increasingly, leaders inside the settlement movement who have condemned the violence, issued halachic rulings against it, and demanded enforcement by the state.

But for much of the opposition bloc, making Palestinian victimization a central campaign issue carries a political risk. The opposition is trying to reach beyond its existing base, especially toward softer right-wing voters, while avoiding being cast as “the left.” In that political environment, condemning Jewish terrorism is one thing; centering Palestinian suffering is another. That does not mean opposition leaders are unaware of the problem of settler violence or unwilling to confront it. It means they are reluctant to make wrongdoing against Palestinians  a defining campaign issue.

None of this should excuse the silence. Explaining why Israelis look away is not the same as justifying it. Violence against innocent Palestinians is a moral corruption before it is a diplomatic problem.

The attacks – and the lack of consequences that follow –  corrode Israeli democracy and the rule of law, and undermine the conviction that Jewish power must remain bound by morality and the sanctity of human life. But the growing number of settlers, rabbis, reservists and activists who refuse to look away is also part of the Israeli story. After the election, those voices need to move from the margins toward the center.

The post Why many Israelis are silent on West Bank violence even as it escalates appeared first on The Forward.

Continue Reading

Copyright © 2017 - 2023 Jewish Post & News