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As religious affairs minister, Matan Kahana tried to bring Israelis closer to Judaism — by reducing religious laws

Matan Kahana was an F-16 fighter pilot in the Israeli Air Force, so he’s not one to back down from a difficult mission. When he entered politics and served as Israel’s minister of religious services in Naftali Bennett’s coalition government, Kahana gave himself a politically perilous assignment: to loosen the grip of haredi Orthodox rabbis on Israeli religious life. He pushed for significant reforms within Israel’s religious institutions and kashrut certifications and appointed women to religious councils. The Israeli press called his actions “revolutionary.” Now a Knesset member for Benny Gantz’s National Unity party, Kahana said he will fight to temper the far right and keep his reforms intact.

In our interview, Kahana talks about his own religious background, why he chose to take on a mission of reform, and how Israelis and the diaspora can find common ground.

The perception that the Orthodox have a hold on Israeli life is one of the most significant points of contention between Israel and Diaspora Jews. Is that starting to change?

Most of the Jews in Israel are Orthodox. Even the secular Jews in Israel are Orthodox. As we say here, “The synagogues that we are not going to are Orthodox synagogues.” Take me, for example. I never met a Reform Jew until I joined politics, and the first time I met a Conservative was after I was released from the army at the age of 46. All this influences the relationship between Israel and the Diaspora. We have to work together with the Jews in the Diaspora to find solutions to this to this issue. The hardest thing is the conversion issue because we don’t accept non-Orthodox conversions. Even when I was the minister of religious affairs, and I was a very revolutionary one, I made a lot of reforms in these religion-and-state issues. But we have to find a solution so we will not tear the relationship between Jews in Israel and Jews in the Diaspora. It’s very important that we continue to be am echad — one people.

The Times of Israel called you an Orthodox revolutionary. It sounds like that’s a term you embrace. What is it about your background or your personality that makes you want to take these established institutions and reform them?

That’s a very good question. The thing is, I have two legs. Of course, my right leg is an observant Jew that observes halacha and the living God and tries to do all the mitzvot. But my other leg is where I spent all of my adult life with the most secular people in Israel — the pilots in the Israeli Air Force. So, I thought that a person like me could bring a solution to these rifts. You can’t force anyone to believe in God. And you can’t force anyone to be a religious Jew. And I believe that if we do as much as we can to reduce forcing people, they will come by themselves. This is what I tried to do, to reduce religious laws, and hopefully, they will try to be more and more close to Judaism.

You’re a relative newcomer to politics. As you know, Israeli politics is a rough business. What have you learned so far?

I learned that it’s totally different from what I knew in the air force and in the army, where there is competition, but everyone wants you to succeed. In politics, everyone wants you to fail, and they will be happy to see you fail. Everything in politics comes with a price. If you and I want the same thing, but you want it a bit more than me, it will cost you.

What are your priorities now as a member of the Knesset?

I will fight to preserve some of the changes that I made. And I hope that they will not erase everything. I’m very afraid about what they are going to do when the opposition is very weak, and the coalition is very strong. I will have to make sure that things are going in the right direction. In every field that they will deal with — in security, the law, religion and state, economics, everything — we should watch them and see that they’re going the right way. Even in the field of connection to the Diaspora Jews, I am very afraid that it’s not going to be very simple.

The Z3 conference is focused on fostering a sense of Jewish unity. What do you think are the biggest obstacles to unity between Israel and the diaspora?

I will start with the relationship between the Orthodox Jews in Israel and Reform and Conservative Jews in the Diaspora. In my days as the minister of religious affairs, at least I had some conversations with non-Orthodox Jews in the Diaspora. When I was visiting the United States, I visited Reform synagogues. Maybe I didn’t deliver all that they wanted, but they knew that I would always listen to them. I am not so sure that the next minister of religious affairs will want to meet them at all. 

Let’s say we put you in charge tomorrow. What is the ideal relationship between synagogue and state? How would you set things up?

What’s happening is that extremists from both sides have been influencing what’s happening in Israel. The ultra-Orthodox are telling us how we should act and, on the other side, there are also secular extremists that will not accept any kind of agreement. So, if the normal people in the middle of this political mess gather together and say, “We want some agreements,” everyone will give a little bit. Each side will compromise a little bit—not fulfill all our dreams, but we will be able to live together in harmony.


The post As religious affairs minister, Matan Kahana tried to bring Israelis closer to Judaism — by reducing religious laws appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

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Not Stupidity — Something Worse: Why the ‘Israel Controls America’ Myth Keeps Spreading

US President Joe Biden and Democratic presidential candidate and US Vice President Kamala Harris react onstage at the Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Chicago, Illinois, US, Aug. 19, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque

In a recent post, Donald Trump took aim at Tucker Carlson, Megyn Kelly, Candace Owens, and Joe Kent, calling them “low IQ” and “losers,” and asking — between Carlson and Kent — “who is dumber?”

It was vintage Trump: blunt, theatrical, and calibrated to dominate a news cycle with a single line. He has long relied on that instinct — to compress a dispute into something sharp enough to stick. But beneath the spectacle sits a more serious issue.

The problem is not intelligence. Many of these figures are clearly relatively smart. The problem is that they — along with a growing chorus of voices on the political left such as Ana Kasparian, Cenk Uygur, and Mehdi Hasan — continue to advance a claim that collapses under minimal scrutiny. Strip away the stylistic differences, the accents, and the partisan framing, and the argument is identical: “Israel controls the United States,” or in its updated form, “Benjamin Netanyahu controls Donald Trump.”

That claim has resurfaced repeatedly over the years, sometimes dressed in more sophisticated language, sometimes stated outright. What makes its latest iteration notable is not merely its persistence, but where it is now being voiced.

This weekend, Kamala Harris, speaking at a Democratic fundraiser in Detroit, said that Donald Trump had been “pulled into this war” by Benjamin Netanyahu. That phrasing carries a clear implication: that the president of the United States — the commander-in-chief of the most powerful military in the world — is not acting independently but is being maneuvered into conflict by a foreign (Jewish) leader.

When this idea circulates on the fringes, it is dismissed. When amplified by pundits chasing attention, it’s often ignored. But when it’s echoed, even cautiously, by a former vice president and major presidential candidate, it crosses a different threshold. At that point, the claim can no longer be dismissed as noise. It has been normalized.

This is not a new idea. It is one of the oldest political accusations in circulation, and it is remarkably easy to test against reality. Only last week, Trump effectively dictated that Israel must accept a temporary ceasefire with Hezbollah — an outcome widely opposed within Israel, where many believe the campaign should be completed and remain skeptical that the Lebanese state will ever disarm Hezbollah. If Israel were directing American policy, that outcome would not occur.

Historically, the “Israel controls America” claim has appeared in different ideological forms but with identical substance. On the far-right, figures such as David Duke have advanced it explicitly. On the far-left, figures like Cynthia McKinney have repackaged it in political language. The wording changes, but the core allegation remains the same: that American power is not sovereign, but subject to external — specifically Jewish — control, echoing Henry Ford and his “International Jew” conspiracy theories of the 1920s and 1930s.

The argument collapses as soon as one examines scale and structure. The United States is a $27 trillion economy with unmatched global reach across military, financial, technological, and diplomatic domains. It maintains a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and leads a network of alliances that spans continents. Israel’s economy, by contrast, is approximately $700 billion. Its military is highly capable, but it is not a global force. It does not control sea lanes, command multinational coalitions, or set the terms of global finance. The disparity is not marginal; it is foundational.

This asymmetry is not unique. The United States maintains deep strategic relationships with many smaller allies such as South Korea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. In fact, the United States fought a war to liberate Kuwait in 1991, sustaining approximately 150 American combat fatalities in the process. Yet, almost no one claims Kuwait controls Washington, or that Saudi Arabia dictates US foreign policy. Only one small ally is routinely described in those terms.

The historical record reinforces the absurdity of this Israel “controls” America trope.

In 1956, despite repeated attacks on Israel from the Sinai and Egypt-controlled Gaza, Dwight D. Eisenhower forced Israel to withdraw from Sinai following the Suez Crisis; Israel complied. In 1982, Ronald Reagan pressured Israel to halt operations in Beirut, facilitating the evacuation of Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership to Tunisia. In 1991, George H. W. Bush asked Israel not to respond to Iraqi Scud missile attacks to help preserve the US-led coalition; Israel absorbed 39 Scud strikes, 13 deaths, and stood down.

In 2015, Barack Obama advanced the Iran nuclear deal despite sustained Israeli opposition. Under Joe Biden, Israeli operations in Rafah were delayed for months under US pressure despite Israeli hostages being held there and its centrality to Hamas’ military infrastructure.

More recently, on June 24, 2025, as a Trump-negotiated ceasefire was taking effect, Iran launched multiple ballistic missiles at Beersheba, killing four Israelis. Israel prepared a large retaliatory strike. Trump intervened and effectively ordered Israel to turn its planes around.

This is what an unequal alliance looks like: coordination, pressure, and at times outright constraint. It is not a relationship where the far smaller country exercises “control.”

So why does the claim persist? Not because it is analytically persuasive — but because it is emotionally effective. Political narratives built on grievance often prefer simple explanations to complex realities.

It is easier to attribute outcomes to hidden manipulation than to acknowledge the interplay of strategic interests, risks, and constraints that define foreign policy decision-making.

There is also a deeper historical layer. For centuries, European political culture absorbed and transmitted variations of the same vile accusation: that Jews operate behind the scenes, exercising covert and pernicious influence over institutions and leaders.

So, when modern commentators repackage that idea — whether in the language of “influence,” “lobbying,” or outright “control” — it does not enter a neutral environment. It lands on fertile soil, reinforcing a long-established and familiar narrative.

Since World War II, the claim hasn’t changed — only its migration from the margins into the mainstream. And once it crosses that threshold, it stops being rhetoric and starts shaping behavior.

As it did in Germany after World War I, if a significant number of people come to believe that their government has been captured, that their leaders are not acting independently but are controlled by a nefarious external force, the range of conclusions and actions they will justify or rationalize expands dramatically. History offers no shortage of examples of where that logic can lead.

Trump attempted to reduce this to a punchline. But this is not a matter of tone. It is a warning sign. And this time, it is coming from closer to the political center than it has in a very long time.

Micha Danzig is an attorney, former IDF soldier, and former NYPD officer. He writes widely on Israel, Zionism, antisemitism, and Jewish history. He serves on the board of Herut North America.

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War or No War, India Stands With Israel

FILE PHOTO: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi addresses the nation during Independence Day celebrations at the historic Red Fort in New Delhi, August 15, 2020. Photo: REUTERS/Adnan Abidi/File Photo

In today’s global climate, Israel is a country many are expected to avoid. Turn on the international media — from CNN, to European and Indian broadcasters — and one narrative dominates: Israel as aggressor and pariah, Israel as a place defined by war, or worse, apartheid. Add to this the open hostility of regimes like the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey, and a growing hostility among Western leaders, such as Italian Prime Minister Meloni suspending defense cooperation.

The message is clear: Stay away from Israel.

And yet, in the midst of missile fire, media hostility, and geopolitical pressure — they came anyway.

A group of Indian workers, recruited through an Indian manpower agency, chose not to be deterred. Their arrival in Israel a few days ago is more than a labor story. It is a quiet but powerful act of defiance against a global narrative increasingly detached from reality. When I received photos of the team from the Israel-Jordan border, proudly waving the Indian and Israeli flags, my heart was happy.

Their journey was anything but straightforward.

After receiving their visas, these men and women left their jobs in India, stepping into uncertainty. Then came the cancelled flights, closed routes, and more than a month of waiting as airlines suspended operations to Israel. Many may have reconsidered at this juncture.

They did not.

Instead, they flew to Amman, waited again, and then endured long hours of land travel and layered security checks on both sides of the Jordanian-Israeli border before finally entering Israel.

Since the October 7 attacks, Israel has faced an acute labor shortage, especially in sectors such as construction, caregiving, and general services, which were once filled by Palestinian workers. India, with its vast labor pool and long history of global migration, is uniquely positioned to help fill this gap. Following Prime Minister Modi’s historic visit in February, just before the Iran-Israel/US conflict escalated, Israel and India strengthened ties through key Memoranda of Understanding in defense, technology, agriculture, research, and labor.

One visible outcome is the arrival of Indian workers who choose to come to Israel, to see and experience the country for themselves despite the weight of propaganda, fear, and misinformation.

They also came after weeks of watching missile barrages over Israeli cities on their television screens. They came despite a steady stream of coverage portraying Israel as unsafe, unstable, and morally suspect. They came knowing that public opinion in parts of India, influenced by global narratives, has grown more critical of Israel.

I recently interviewed an Indian caregiver documenting life under Iranian missile fire — daily fear, resilience, and routine. Her videos have gone viral in India. Alongside support, she also faces hostility from those echoing distorted narratives, but equally sparks curiosity and a deeper desire to understand Israel.

Together with others working to strengthen Israel-India relations, I recently shared a reel on Instagram about Indian workers arriving via Jordan. The response has been overwhelming from both sides: messages from India expressing support and genuine interest in a country often misunderstood, and Israelis warmly welcoming the new arrivals.

What we are seeing is the rise of a people-to-people alliance. One that is less visible, less celebrated, but potentially more enduring. An alliance that is built on shared values: resilience, pragmatism, and the instinct to move forward despite adversity.

At a time when parts of the international community are distancing themselves from Israel, the arrival of these workers offers another perspective on alliance.

If Israel is wise, it will recognize this as an opportunity to invest in these relationships, amplify these voices, and allow a narrative to emerge not from above, but from those who have seen the country firsthand.

At a moment when the nation is misrepresented, and misunderstood, the decision of these workers from India to come to work in Israel carries meaning beyond economics.

In difficult times, we know who stands with us.

Paushali Lass is an Indian-German intercultural and geopolitical consultant, who focuses on building bridges between Israel, India, and Germany.

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What Lessons Will North Korea Take From the War Against Iran?

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un visit the Vostochny Сosmodrome in the far eastern Amur region, Russia, Sept. 13, 2023. Photo: Sputnik/Mikhail Metzel/Kremlin via REUTERS

Operation Epic Fury/Roaring Lion provided North Korea with a host of important insights about its own political and military position. Pyongyang is likely to draw several conclusions from Iran’s experience about its ability to withstand a similar attack, and to take steps to prepare for such a scenario. These conclusions stem from the following matters.

Nuclear Weapons as a Deterrent 

The airstrikes on Iran by the American and Israeli air forces demonstrated the failure of both Tehran and Iran’s proxies to deter them. Over a period of many years, Iran spent billions of dollars on militant proxy forces in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Gaza, and Yemen. These proxies were meant to constitute an expanded deterrence layer that would prevent an attack on the Iranian homeland. The proxies had the capacity to attack Israel, US allies, and US interests in the region, and that capacity was meant to serve as a shield that would deter Iran’s enemies from launching an attack on Iran itself. This effort proved a failure, as Iran was attacked despite the proxies’ deterrence capabilities.

Kim Jong-un’s main conclusion from Iran’s failure to deter the US and Israel is likely this: that the decision by Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il to develop nuclear weapons was wise, as it provided North Korea with a sufficiently powerful deterrent against attack.

The war with Iran will strengthen Kim Jong-un’s statement that the nuclear issue is no longer up for negotiation.

The Failure of Russia and China to Assist Iran

Iran expected Moscow and Beijing to react more strenuously to the US and Israeli attacks on the Iranian homeland. They did not expect them to start a global war against US forces, but they did expect them to take a more active role than they did. Had they done so, Iran would have had more capacity to balance the pressure being exerted upon it by Trump.

North Korea’s extended deterrence is similarly built on its relations with Moscow and Beijing. Their lack of military or other active support for Iran raised questions about the degree of support North Korea might receive should it be attacked by the US.

Pyongyang will likely strengthen its Juche ideology to prepare itself in the event of very limited support from its allies. North Korea is selling ammunition to Russia and has deployed North Korean soldiers to assist Russia in its war on Ukraine, but should bear in mind that the Ukraine war will limit Russia’s ability to assist Pyongyang in the event that war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula.

The Use of Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean Weapons

Iran built up a substantial military arsenal over the years to deter Israel and the United States and prepare itself for war. That arsenal consisted of Iranian, Russian, Chinese, and North Korean military equipment. Much of that equipment was destroyed during the 12-day war with Israel and the US in June 2025, but Iran had sufficient time to rebuild that capacity before the 2026 conflict erupted. Iran’s reconstituted air defense systems failed to stop the US and Israeli air forces from achieving aerial superiority. Its missiles and drones, however, were able to cause damage to Israel, US bases in the Gulf, and US allies in the region despite the American and Israeli attempts to destroy the launchers and intercept the armaments.

North Korea understands that the US and its allies have military superiority in specific fields like aerial superiority and missile defense. That is why North Korea’s deterrent shield is built on nuclear weapons. North Korea spends more than 20% of its GNP on defense, but knows it can’t compete with Washington’s military might in terms of conventional deterrence. Pyongyang develops and manufactures less expensive military equipment in part to deter the US, but also to sell to allies. This equipment includes drones, sold to Russia and Iran, that can attack US and South Korean forces; artillery along the DMZ and missiles that threaten Seoul; and middle-range missiles that can target US bases in the region.

The Failure of Iranian Intelligence

The penetrability of Iranian intelligence is one of Pyongyang’s biggest concerns. The loopholes that allowed US and Israeli military forces to attack with such precision are one of the biggest threats to the security of North Korea. Should US, South Korean, and Japanese counterintelligence gain access to the location of Kim Jong-un and his political and military milieu, they would be able to eliminate the North Korean chain of command. To avert this threat, Pyongyang is likely to increase its control over Internet access. It will also likely expand its cybersecurity efforts to prepare for the new cyber battlefield.

Vulnerability of the Chain of Command

The surprise blitz on the first day of the war, during which the US and Israeli air forces wiped out Iran’s civilian and military leadership, demonstrated the vulnerability of Iran’s political and military leadership. The attack raised serious questions in Tehran about how US and Israeli intelligence had managed to penetrate its security shield. It also showed how defenseless Iran was against the special bombs used in the attack.

The attack on the Iranian leadership appeared to justify North Korean paranoia over the years. Their biggest fear has long been that Washington will consider pursuing regime change by attacking the head of state. These concerns were raised during the Kim Jong-il era, when Pyongyang believed Washington had such a plan in mind. After the killing of the Iranian leadership, these concerns were raised once again under Kim Jong-un.

While Iran was able to choose new political leaders, the North Korean leadership is centralized under Kim. Decentralizing his control might be seen as a potential threat to his leadership. His successors include Kim Ju-ae (his daughter) and Kim Yo-jong (his sister). An attack on the ruling family, as occurred in Iran, would threaten North Korea’s stability. North Korean political and military institutions are not built to choose alternative leadership. The US and Israeli surprise attack on the Iranian leadership was a wake-up call for the North Korean leadership to reevaluate its traditional leadership policy.

North Korea’s Role in Iran’s Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons

The end of the war with Iran might raise the question of whether Tehran should change its policy from that of a threshold nuclear state to that of a nuclear state to prevent another attack on its soil. Will Iran develop its own nuclear bomb and incur severe economic sanctions and/or new military attacks on its nuclear facilities, or will it acquire a nuclear bomb from one of its allies? If the latter, North Korea is a possible choice.

North Korea and Iran have cooperated over the years on the development of unconventional weapons. One example was the Dier al-Zor nuclear project in Syria. Would it serve North Korea’s interests to sell nuclear bombs to Iran now? While doing so would boost North Korea’s foreign income, it also might lead to harsher sanctions imposed upon it by Washington. But the capture of Venezuelan president Maduro and the attack on Iran show that President Trump is unpredictable. Kim Jong-un can’t be sure that Trump will not perceive the sale of nuclear bombs to Iran as sufficiently worrisome to order either an attack on North Korea or the elimination of the ruling dynasty.

Kim Jong-un could use the potential sale of nuclear bombs to Iran as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Trump in an attempt to convince him to lift the sanctions — but he might find himself facing a Trump who believes he can use his country’s military capabilities to pursue regime change in North Korea.

Dr. Alon Levkowitz is a senior lecturer in Asian Studies at Bar-Ilan University and a senior research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. A different version of this article was published by The BESA Center.

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