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How October 7 Should Change Israel’s National Security Calculus
An aerial view shows the bodies of victims of an attack following a mass infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza Strip lying on the ground in Kibbutz Kfar Aza, in southern Israel, Oct. 10, 2023. Photo: REUTERS/Ilan Rosenberg
The events of October 7 marked a total collapse of the basic principles of Israel’s national security doctrine. Three of the four basic components — deterrence, early warning, and defense — failed completely.
In view of this collapse, the State of Israel obviously cannot continue to base its security planning on the existing doctrine. So what is to be done with it? This will be a long conversation that will be held in depth after the war ends. This article presents several initial lines of thought on both the content of Israel’s security doctrine and the process of updating it.
Above all, the time has come to distinguish national security strategy from national security doctrine, and to stop once and for all the problematic preoccupation with the “security concept.”
A national security strategy is the worldview of an administration that defines its basic assumptions underpinning national security. It connects the permanent, emerging, and changing elements of national existence. A national security doctrine is a document containing the fundamental principles and concepts that are to be applied to address military and security threats and challenges.
The foundations of Israel’s national security strategy were defined by David Ben-Gurion. There are five components: conventional qualitative advantage; perception of nuclear deterrence; special relationship with a superpower; technological and economic superiority; and national focus (statehood, majority democracy, the spirit of the Jewish people, and the connection between Israel and the Diaspora).
However, discussions about the ways national security strategy can and should change do not take place in Israel in an orderly manner, and new governments do not clearly define their strategies. The events of October 7 show that the absence of such discussions can lead to a period as long as 18 years (the time since the disengagement from Gaza in 2005) in which no profound changes occurred in the Israeli approach to national security, even though four prime ministers served during that time.
The fundamental questions regarding Israel’s national security strategy are:
The Iranian threat: Is Israel giving it too much weight?
There is no doubt that a scenario in which the Islamic regime in Iran is equipped with nuclear weapons would constitute an existential threat to Israel, and this must be prevented. But the path from this statement to a clear national strategy on the Iranian issue remains unclear.
Iran is advancing towards the nuclear threshold mainly through the accumulation of materièl, but there is still some distance between Iran and a bomb, and there are no signs that it has decided to produce one. What does this mean for Israeli strategy?
Also, Israel has not done everything in its power to prevent an Iranian bomb. It has not militarily attacked the Islamic Republic’s nuclear project. What does this say about its considerations in handling the Iranian nuclear issue?
In the Swords of Iron War, the “Iranian axis,” with the possible exception of Hezbollah, has proven to be a paper tiger with regard to its ability to conduct operations that will seriously harm Israel. What does this say about Israel’s attitude towards Iran regarding issues other than nuclear weapons?
And how should Israel weigh the Iranian regime’s perception of its own domestic threat or its reluctance to engage in an all-out conflict with Israel for its own strategic reasons?
The Palestinians
The Swords of Iron War opens the door for change on the Palestinian issue, if only because a new civil order will take shape in Gaza whose connection to the Palestinian Authority will be loose (at least in the early stages). Along with the reshaping of the Palestinian Authority after the eventual death of Mahmoud Abbas, the conclusion of the war will mark a great opportunity to restart and clarify Israeli strategy towards the Palestinians.
After two decades of postponing a conclusion and instead “managing” the conflict, the time has come for Israel to decide its vision for the Territories. Does it want to hold and annex part of them (the settlement blocs? Area C?) in order to realize the vision of the connection between the people of Israel and the Land of Israel? Does it want to control the territories with a Palestinian population (in Gaza? in the major cities and towns of Judea and Samaria?) or create the reality of another political entity while maintaining freedom of security action?
Independence from, versus dependence on, the United States
The Swords of Iron War has demonstrated Israel’s political and military dependence on the United States. Israel was revealed to be too dependent on Washington, which points to a series of planning and execution failures regarding decisions about the desirable extent of Israel’s independence. Economic and resource decisions led to the emergence of a strategic gap. Israel’s dependence is particularly problematic at a time when trends in the United States on matters concerning Israel are not necessarily in its favor.
To what extent is Israel willing to invest in security and economic independence? What is the depth of her basic commitment to the American axis in the world, and what price is she willing to pay for it? To what extent would it be wise for Israel to spread the risk and establish economic and perhaps also security relationships with other key powers? To what extent should Israel preserve the direct relationship with Russia in an effort to moderate its attitude (as is now occurring after a “bad start” by Moscow towards the Swords of Iron War)?
The changing attitude towards regional alliances
A follow-up to the issue of Israel’s dependence on the United States is the extent to which Israel is willing to risk being tied, economically and to a certain degree in terms of security, to a regional coalition led by Saudi Arabia. Is Israel ready to integrate into the region in a way that will create a dependency on it among its neighbors, for example in energy or investment in hi-tech and critical infrastructure?
Risk management or active design
Until October 7, Israel’s approach was based primarily on risk management and the maintenance of stability. It chose to preserve the rule of Hamas in Gaza, not to advance the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria, and not to defeat the Hezbollah organization and fundamentally change the order in Lebanon. The Swords of Iron War represents a change in Israel’s approach in one of those arenas: It is now actively working to change the governing order in the Gaza Strip.
Does the move in the Gaza Strip signify a shift in overall Israeli strategy away from risk management and towards an initiative or design approach?
The use of force
After years of avoiding full activation of its most significant military tool, its maneuvering and offensive ground army, Israel is now using that tool to great effect in Gaza. This proves that offensive military power remains an essential component of Israel’s strategic toolbox. In light of the scale of the events of October 7, considerations of human life — the fate of the kidnapped civilians and risking of its soldiers — was given a lower precedence on the understanding that national strategic needs had to prevail over individual lives (though not always, and not in every way).
Will Israel’s national security strategy now be more flexible with regard to the use of military force, especially ground maneuvers?
These are only some of questions that should be asked at the level of the National Security Strategy. The answers to these questions will require deep thought, and the conclusion of the Swords of Iron War will represent an unrepeatable opportunity to consider them at the highest levels.
Israel’s National Security Doctrine needs an even more urgent rethink in light of the blows it received on October 7. The National Security Doctrine is the basic document of the security echelon, and in principle it should not be immediately affected by the worldview of an elected political echelon. It defines the basic conventions — i.e., the principles and concepts — involved with security and military challenges. The discussion that needs to take place after the war holds the potential for a profound change in the existing doctrine or perhaps a return to the basics after decades of de facto change.
The issues that need to be addressed as part of the discussion of these principles are:
The transfer of war to the opponent’s territory, which stems from the basic principle of a defensive strategy and an offensive approach. In the reality created by the Swords of Iron War, and in light of the strategic decisions that need to be made about Israel’s willingness to use force to shape the regional environment according to its needs, should Israel reinstate the concepts of preemptive war and the preemptive strike that were once at the heart of its security doctrine?
The principle of the “People’s Army.” Considering the extent of the military commitment manifested in the Swords of Iron War, the vast use of reserve units, and the (likely) need to increase the size of the regular army, might it be wise to reverse the decisions that led to the erosion of the components of the “People’s Army”? Don’t Israel’s updated security needs necessitate a renewed discussion of which populations serve and which do not? To what extent can that discussion be disconnected from its divisive political context and be held in the context of Israel’s security needs?
Another serious discussion will have to be about the basic elements of security doctrine: deterrence, early warning, defense, and decision. The events of October 7 and the ensuing war brought decisive decision back as the core achievement required by the security doctrine. Decades of shifts away from it, and the creation of alternatives like “deterrence campaigns” and defensive countermeasures, turned out to be less relevant to or effective against the types of enemies Israel faces.
The discussion of the basic elements of the security doctrine can go in several directions:
Reducing the basic elements to deterrence and decision only. In practice, these are the two components Israel must be able to bring to bear against its enemies.
Creating a ranking among the components: deterrence and decision as the core components, with the other components — early warning, defense, and possibly thwarting or prevention and participation in coalitions — serving as enablers of the core components.
Flexibility in the application of the components: that is, determining that while all the components are valid, they will vary according to enemy and context. Unlike the doctrine of recent decades, which showed a drift away from decision and towards other components, all the components would be applied according to need. In other words, against certain opponents, decision and deterrence would be at the core and the other components would enable them, while against other adversaries, the response would be based on prevention or thwarting and coalitions, with the others less relevant.
The national security policy document contains the principles of operation of the political-security echelons and expresses their assessment of the current national situation and required political directives. Updates should be derived from the revised National Security Strategy and the updated National Security Doctrine.
One way to promote an orderly process at the national security level is through binding legislation. This would entail legal definitions of structured processes for the development of national security documents, approval by the cabinet/ government, and their presentation and approval in the Knesset. These processes would give form to a substantial, structured, and continuous engagement in national security. Within this framework:
The National Security Strategy would be the basic document of the elected political echelon. On the establishment of a new government, the NSC would lead a process to structure a new strategy document. The cabinet would approve both the classified and public versions of the National Security Strategy document. The prime minister would bring the public document to the Knesset for approval as part of a political announcement up to six months from the date of the government’s establishment. The Knesset’s approval of the document would constitute a vote of confidence in the government.
The National Security Doctrine would be the basic document of the national security echelon. Once every five to seven years, the defense minister would guide the security apparatuses to update the document. At the end of the process, it would be confirmed by the cabinet and both the classified and public versions would be published.
The National Security Policy would be the document containing the operating principles of the political-security echelons for the upcoming year. It would be updated once a year in a process led by the NSC and would be approved by the government and the Knesset as a condition for approving the state budget.
As seen in the United States and other countries, the systematic and mandatory review of national security documents requires a public reexamination of the principles of national security. Even if it is carried out solely to fulfill a formal obligation and there is a gap between it and its implementation, it would be difficult for Israel’s decision-makers and security establishment to avoid addressing the key issues and still remain trapped in outdated concepts that can end up in a grave crisis, as occurred on October 7.
Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai is Deputy Director of the BESA Center and an expert in national security, strategic planning and strategic communication. He is a cyber security strategist and a consultant at leading companies in Israel. Col. Shabtai is about to finish his doctorate at Bar-Ilan University. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
The post How October 7 Should Change Israel’s National Security Calculus first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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Iran Is Using Foreign Islamic Centers to Spread Terror and Hatred; the World Must Close Them
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei speaks during a meeting with a group of students in Tehran, Iran, Nov. 2, 2022. Photo: Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS
Last month, Germany announced that it would deport Mohammed Mofatteh, the former director of Hamburg’s Shi’a Islamic Center, which local authorities had ordered shut down five weeks earlier for propagating extremism, and for its financial links to Hezbollah.
Mofatteh, according to German authorities, was getting direct orders from the Iranian Supreme Leader’s office about radical public messaging on the current war in Gaza between Israel and Hamas.
Since it banned Hezbollah as a terrorist organization four years ago, Germany has closed six Iranian-linked Islamic Centers and deported some of their officials. In November 2022, Germany expelled the deputy director of the Hamburg Shi’a Islamic Center. In June 2024, the German government ordered the deportation of the director of a Berlin-based center.
Other countries should follow Germany’s approach.
After nearly four decades of virtually unhindered activity, Iranian-backed cultural centers and mosques have proliferated outside the Middle East. They have indoctrinated, radicalized, converted, and mobilized thousands of locals, who, unlike Mofatteh and his colleagues, cannot be deported.
Cases in point: Pro-Iranian centers exist in Italy, Spain, and South Africa. Their directors are, respectively, Italian-born, Spanish-born, and South African-born graduates of Al Mustafa. They peddle pro-Iran and pro-Hezbollah narratives through their centers’ activities.
The main bastions of Iran’s ideological influence beyond its borders are mosques and cultural centers, directly controlled by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, or linked to Al Mustafa International University, an ostensibly academic institution also under Khamenei’s direct control.
The US Department of the Treasury sanctioned Al Mustafa in 2020 for its role in Iran’s propaganda efforts, including support for the training and indoctrination of Shiite militias.
With a budget of more than $100 million a year, directly provided by the Office of the Supreme Leader, Al Mustafa has been able to train tens of thousands of emissaries, who are now deployed overseas to spread the word of Iran’s sponsored Axis of Resistance and recruit locals to the cause of Khomeini’s revolution. Establishing mosques and cultural centers is central to this elaborate, global effort to spread Iran’s revolutionary brand. These institutions pose as places of worship and cultural inquiry. In fact, they are propaganda tools in the ayatollahs’ war against the West.
Beyond Europe, the problem is even more acute. European governments can and should follow Germany’s example, since they rely on robust counter-terrorism legislation and designations of organizations like Hezbollah — albeit, in most cases, just the so-called military wing.
Countries in Latin America and Africa, on the other hand, do not have as strong a legal framework to take similar actions. But Iran’s propaganda networks are very active there.
According to the 2015 annual posture statement of the then-US Southern Command’s leader, General John F. Kelly, Iran had by then established more than 80 centers in the Western Hemisphere. That number has since grown. Moreover, a Middle East Forum 2018 report identified 17 Al Mustafa branches in Africa, alongside dozens of schools and other institutions affiliated with it, and thousands of students and graduates.
Al Mustafa’s propagation model relies on its graduates as force multipliers. Many return to their home countries to open and run new centers, while their alma mater supports their work from regional headquarters headed by Iranian officials. Al Mustafa, for example, has a regional headquarter, headed by its permanent representative, Seyed Mojtaba Hosseini Nejad, in Venezuela and a campus in Johannesburg, run by a South African cleric trained in Iran. Clergy from the various centers routinely meet and coordinate propaganda activities, while emissaries travel to and from Iran regularly.
There are sparse but notable exceptions to the laissez-faire approach of governments that host Iranian centers.
Last April, Brazilian immigration authorities detained Sheikh Ruben Edgardo (aka Suheil) Assaad, a key Iranian propaganda emissary, as he arrived in São Paulo, Brazil, from Doha, Qatar, to attend a Western Hemisphere gathering of Iran and Hezbollah clergy. Brazil’s federal authorities believe Assaad is linked to Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. On that basis, they put Assaad on the next plane to Doha and will no longer grant him entry into the country.
Yet, while Assaad may no longer visit Brazil, there remains a robust cohort of Al Mustafa-trained Shi’a clerics with local citizenship running centers across the region.
Assaad trained many of them, alongside his boss, sheikh Mohsen Rabbani, who is wanted by Argentina’s authorities and Interpol due to his role in the bombing of the AMIA Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires that was destroyed by a suicide car bomb in 1994, leaving 85 people dead and more than 200 wounded.
The problem is even more acute now.
Since October 7, 2023 — when Hamas massacred 1,200 Israelis, triggering a new conflict in the region on behalf of its proxy, Iran — Tehran and its proxies have been leveraging their networks overseas, including their cultural and religious centers, to carry out terror attacks, while whipping up a frenzy of anti-Israel hatred in the public sphere.
Last November, Brazilian authorities foiled a Hezbollah plot to target Jewish institutions in Brasilia, the country’s capital. The point man in the plot, a Hezbollah member with both Syrian and Brazilian citizenships who sought to recruit Brazilian nationals with a criminal background, was instrumental in the recent establishment of an Iranian cultural center in Brasilia and was closely connected to both a prominent Shi’a Brazilian convert and key Iran propagandist, and to a Shi’a cleric who works in a São Paulo Shi’a mosque affiliated with Hezbollah.
In August, a Tajikistan national and graduate of Al Mustafa was arrested in Central Asia, where he was allegedly plotting terror attacks. Other plots have also just emerged in France and Germany, where local Iranian proxies followed a similar modus operandi and sought to recruit criminals to carry out terror attacks.
At this critical juncture, governments must do more: Minimizing the risk of terror attacks requires not only foiling active plots but also nipping in the bud efforts to radicalize and incite captive audiences.
Closing these centers, as Germany did; denying entry to Iranian clerical emissaries, as Brazil did; and monitoring the content of sermons and the dissemination of literature and proselytizing material by Iran-affiliated centers, are all urgently required steps that must be undertaken elsewhere by governments to protect their citizens from Iranian-backed terror.
Western governments have routinely undertaken similar actions in the past, when the threat from Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State was most acute. There is no reason they should not do the same with Iran, its proxies, and the elaborate web of cultural and religious institutions they use to spread Iran’s radical extremism.
Wouldn’t it be better to preempt the next attack, rather than have a government’s leaders commit themselves to renewed vigilance while standing in the smoldering ruins of an Iranian-backed strike?
Emanuele Ottolenghi is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington DC-based non-partisan research institution focusing on national security and foreign policy. Follow him on X @eottolenghi
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More Hezbollah Communications Devices Detonate Across Lebanon as Terror Group Thrown Into Disarray
People gather as smoke rises from a mobile shop in Sidon, Lebanon as Hezbollah communication devices explode across the country on Sept. 18, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Hassan Hankir
More communications devices used by the Iran-backed terrorist organization Hezbollah exploded on Wednesday afternoon across the group’s main stronghold in Beirut and in southern Lebanon.
Lebanon’s health ministry said at least nine people were killed and 300 were wounded in the latest series of device explosions as Hezbollah, which wields significant political and military influence across Lebanon, was thrown into disarray for the second day in a row.
The attack began on Tuesday, when thousands of Hezbollah members were seriously wounded when the pagers they use to communicate exploded. At least 12 people were killed, and more than 2,800 were wounded in the initial round of blasts.
Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani was among those injured by the pager explosions and reportedly lost an eye.
Then on Wednesday, hand-held radios used by Hezbollah detonated. According to eyewitness reports, at least one of the blasts took place during the funerals for some of the terrorists killed the prior day in the first wave of explosions.
Videos shared on social media showed scenes of chaos across Lebanon on both days, with hospitals overflowing with victims and some explosions reportedly taking place in apartments and houses.
A source close to Hezbollah, speaking on condition of anonymity, told AFP that the pagers from Tuesday’s detonations were “sabotaged at the source” before being imported by Hezbollah. Meanwhile, one Hezbollah official told Reuters that the explosions marked the “biggest security breach” in the terrorist group’s history.
The hand-held radios were reportedly purchased by Hezbollah five months ago, around the same time that the pagers were bought.
Hezbollah members in the southern suburbs of Beirut were seen on Wednesday “frantically taking out the batteries of any walkie-talkies on them that had not exploded, tossing the parts in metal barrels around them,” Reuters reported.
The walkie-talkies were said to be part of Hezbollah’s emergency communications systems for use during a conflict with Israel, which borders southern Lebanon.
A Hezbollah official told Reuters that as the attack began, the terrorist group raised its level of military readiness in case it was the beginning of a bigger Israeli offensive by Israel. Meanwhile, Hezbollah leaders, who did not carry the devices, turned to the group’s internal phone network to find out what was happening.
Experts and several media outlets have said that Israeli intelligence was behind the explosions with a sophisticated, long planned operation, although Israel has neither publicly confirmed nor denied responsibility.
“The goal was to convince Hezbollah that it is in its interest to disconnect itself from Hamas and cut a separate deal for ending the fighting with Israel regardless of a ceasefire in Gaza,” an anonymous source told Axios.
Dr. Eyal Pinko, an Israeli cyber and national security expert, similarly said the operation served as a message to Hezbollah, showcasing vulnerabilities in its security apparatus and serving as a form of deterrence.
“It’s saying that, ‘you’re already being penetrated. We know where you are and what you do. Now look what we can do: In one single shot, in less than a second, we can eliminate almost 3,000 terror operatives,’” Pinko said during a briefing with reporters on Tuesday evening.
Despite Israel’s silence on the explosions, senior Lebanese officials have blame the Jewish state. So too has Hezbollah, which said Israel would receive “its fair punishment.”
The Iran-backed terrorist group, which seeks Israel’s destruction, said on Wednesday it had attacked Israeli artillery positions with rockets.
Hezbollah has fired barrages of rockets, missiles, and drones at northern Israel almost daily following the Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas-led Palestinian terrorists on the Jewish state’s southern region. Since then, both sides have been exchanging fire constantly while avoiding a major escalation as war rages in Gaza to the south.
About 80,000 Israelis have been forced to evacuate their homes in northern Israel and flee to other parts of the country amid the unrelenting attacks from Hezbollah.
Israeli leaders have said they seek a diplomatic resolution to the conflict with Hezbollah along the border with Lebanon but are prepared to use large-scale military force if needed to ensure all citizens can safely return to their homes.
On Monday night, Israel’s security cabinet expanded its war goals to include returning the displaced Israelis from the north.
According to some reports, the explosions occurred this week because Israel feared Hezbollah was becoming suspicious and would discover the secret operation.
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How the International Law Cases Against Israel Could Truly Cripple the IDF
International Criminal Court Prosecutor Karim Khan speaks during an interview with Reuters in The Hague, Netherlands, Feb. 12, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Piroschka van de Wouw
Due to the sheer volume of recent news stories concerning Israel, you may have missed two mostly unnoticed but important developments regarding Israel in the world of international law.
In the International Court of Justice (ICJ), South Africa has been suing Israel for genocide. I’ve been saying for months that South Africa does not have a case, but that the lawsuit is nonetheless dangerous because South Africa’s goal is not to win. Instead, its goal is to achieve an “emergency injunction” that would stop Israel’s campaign against Hamas, effectively handing the terror organization a victory.
Such an injunction would not require actually proving the claims against Israel, and so the emergency injunction has always been South Africa’s (and Hamas’) best chance of effectively defeating the IDF.
South Africa has made two unsuccessful attempts to obtain emergency orders, and is now coming up against an October 28 deadline to, at long last, submit their actual evidence of “genocide.”
Last week, South Africa petitioned the ICJ for an extension of several months, apparently because (unsurprisingly) they have not succeeded in finding such evidence.
While this is a small vindication, it is by no means the end of the story. Ihe ICJ is only nominally a “court,” but in reality, functions as a political body. The ICJ’s current President is Nawaf Salam of Lebanon, which is effectively controlled by the Iranian backed Hezbollah terror organization and is actively at war with Israel. The ICJ judges include representatives from countries that have recently demonstrated strongly anti-Israel agendas, such as China and Brazil, as well as South Africa — the very country that’s suing Israel. Even the US delegate to the court has voted consistently against Israel in recent decisions.
In fact the only judge who has stood both firmly and eloquently in favor of Israel is the court’s Vice President, Julia Sebutinde of Uganda.
So while logic dictates that South Africa should not be able to win a lawsuit without evidence, politics has no such limitations. Israel has been petitioning the United States Congress for support in pressuring the ICJ to drop their case, and so has my organization.
An entirely separate international body is the International Criminal Court (ICC), in which prosecutor Karim Khan has petitioned the court to issue arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, as well as several Hamas leaders (two of whom are now dead).
The court has been deliberating the request since May, and last week, Khan issued a new request that the court issue the arrest warrants “urgently.”
It is not clear why such arrest warrants are now more urgent than before, yet some Israeli sources are concerned that the ICC may be sympathetic to the prosecutor’s request anyway. There is some speculation that this “urgency” may be designed to preempt Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech to the UN General Assembly later this month.
Much like the emergency orders in the ICJ, these ICC arrest warrants do not actually require proof. Instead, the prosecutor needs to provide only minimal evidence that his claims are reasonably possible, and he gets to do so “ex parte” — which means alone and without Israel having the opportunity to respond.
Like the ICJ, the ICC is also primarily a political body in the guise of a “court,” and therefore, sufficiently dramatic claims against Israel, especially when presented “ex parte” and with the right political pressure, may be adequate to persuade the judges.
Why does all of this matter? Here’s just one example: since the election of the Labor government, the UK has removed its objection to the ICC proceedings, and this month suspended the shipment of certain military items to Israel, in what amounts to essentially a “soft embargo.” The items in question include important parts for military equipment, such as the F-35 fighter jet, which wear out quickly and need constant replacement. Such parts are manufactured in only a few factories in the entire world and cannot be easily replaced.
Why doesn’t Israel make the parts itself? The factories are so specialized that even if Israel started building one today, it would take years and billions of dollars before production could even begin. Even “Israeli” inventions, such as the Merkava tank, make use of these specialized parts from foreign sources. In short, for the foreseeable future Israel depends on foreign resources to keep the IDF working.
If a relevant international body such as the ICJ were to make a ruling against Israel, instead of seeing a “soft embargo” of some military equipment by some countries, we might see official worldwide embargoes encompassing all equipment.
In as little as several months, as equipment begins to fail, the IDF could run out of working jets, helicopters, tanks, and all of the other tools necessary for the IDF to function as an actual army. Israel would become defenseless, not only against even a weakened Hamas, but also against Iran and all of its various proxies.
This reality relates to may other issues. For example, in the recent debate over whether Israel should abandon the Philadelphi corridor as part of a hostage deal, some IDF generals claim that Israel can simply retake it “at any time.” Yet when IDF generals speak about Israel’s capabilities, they usually refer only to military tactics and strategy, and often overlook the geopolitical forces that could strip the IDF of its capacity to function.
If Israel were to enter an internationally binding agreement (for example over Philadelphi) and then violate it, these kind of embargoes are just one possible consequence.
For this reason, we are keeping a close eye on activities at the ICC, the ICJ, the United Nations, the US Congress, and all the various bodies that have significant influence over Israel’s long term safety, and are actively involved in petitioning those bodies as well.
Daniel Pomerantz is the CEO of RealityCheck, an organization dedicated to deepening public conversation through robust research studies and public speaking.
The post How the International Law Cases Against Israel Could Truly Cripple the IDF first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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