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How October 7 Should Change Israel’s National Security Calculus
An aerial view shows the bodies of victims of an attack following a mass infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza Strip lying on the ground in Kibbutz Kfar Aza, in southern Israel, Oct. 10, 2023. Photo: REUTERS/Ilan Rosenberg
The events of October 7 marked a total collapse of the basic principles of Israel’s national security doctrine. Three of the four basic components — deterrence, early warning, and defense — failed completely.
In view of this collapse, the State of Israel obviously cannot continue to base its security planning on the existing doctrine. So what is to be done with it? This will be a long conversation that will be held in depth after the war ends. This article presents several initial lines of thought on both the content of Israel’s security doctrine and the process of updating it.
Above all, the time has come to distinguish national security strategy from national security doctrine, and to stop once and for all the problematic preoccupation with the “security concept.”
A national security strategy is the worldview of an administration that defines its basic assumptions underpinning national security. It connects the permanent, emerging, and changing elements of national existence. A national security doctrine is a document containing the fundamental principles and concepts that are to be applied to address military and security threats and challenges.
The foundations of Israel’s national security strategy were defined by David Ben-Gurion. There are five components: conventional qualitative advantage; perception of nuclear deterrence; special relationship with a superpower; technological and economic superiority; and national focus (statehood, majority democracy, the spirit of the Jewish people, and the connection between Israel and the Diaspora).
However, discussions about the ways national security strategy can and should change do not take place in Israel in an orderly manner, and new governments do not clearly define their strategies. The events of October 7 show that the absence of such discussions can lead to a period as long as 18 years (the time since the disengagement from Gaza in 2005) in which no profound changes occurred in the Israeli approach to national security, even though four prime ministers served during that time.
The fundamental questions regarding Israel’s national security strategy are:
The Iranian threat: Is Israel giving it too much weight?
There is no doubt that a scenario in which the Islamic regime in Iran is equipped with nuclear weapons would constitute an existential threat to Israel, and this must be prevented. But the path from this statement to a clear national strategy on the Iranian issue remains unclear.
Iran is advancing towards the nuclear threshold mainly through the accumulation of materièl, but there is still some distance between Iran and a bomb, and there are no signs that it has decided to produce one. What does this mean for Israeli strategy?
Also, Israel has not done everything in its power to prevent an Iranian bomb. It has not militarily attacked the Islamic Republic’s nuclear project. What does this say about its considerations in handling the Iranian nuclear issue?
In the Swords of Iron War, the “Iranian axis,” with the possible exception of Hezbollah, has proven to be a paper tiger with regard to its ability to conduct operations that will seriously harm Israel. What does this say about Israel’s attitude towards Iran regarding issues other than nuclear weapons?
And how should Israel weigh the Iranian regime’s perception of its own domestic threat or its reluctance to engage in an all-out conflict with Israel for its own strategic reasons?
The Palestinians
The Swords of Iron War opens the door for change on the Palestinian issue, if only because a new civil order will take shape in Gaza whose connection to the Palestinian Authority will be loose (at least in the early stages). Along with the reshaping of the Palestinian Authority after the eventual death of Mahmoud Abbas, the conclusion of the war will mark a great opportunity to restart and clarify Israeli strategy towards the Palestinians.
After two decades of postponing a conclusion and instead “managing” the conflict, the time has come for Israel to decide its vision for the Territories. Does it want to hold and annex part of them (the settlement blocs? Area C?) in order to realize the vision of the connection between the people of Israel and the Land of Israel? Does it want to control the territories with a Palestinian population (in Gaza? in the major cities and towns of Judea and Samaria?) or create the reality of another political entity while maintaining freedom of security action?
Independence from, versus dependence on, the United States
The Swords of Iron War has demonstrated Israel’s political and military dependence on the United States. Israel was revealed to be too dependent on Washington, which points to a series of planning and execution failures regarding decisions about the desirable extent of Israel’s independence. Economic and resource decisions led to the emergence of a strategic gap. Israel’s dependence is particularly problematic at a time when trends in the United States on matters concerning Israel are not necessarily in its favor.
To what extent is Israel willing to invest in security and economic independence? What is the depth of her basic commitment to the American axis in the world, and what price is she willing to pay for it? To what extent would it be wise for Israel to spread the risk and establish economic and perhaps also security relationships with other key powers? To what extent should Israel preserve the direct relationship with Russia in an effort to moderate its attitude (as is now occurring after a “bad start” by Moscow towards the Swords of Iron War)?
The changing attitude towards regional alliances
A follow-up to the issue of Israel’s dependence on the United States is the extent to which Israel is willing to risk being tied, economically and to a certain degree in terms of security, to a regional coalition led by Saudi Arabia. Is Israel ready to integrate into the region in a way that will create a dependency on it among its neighbors, for example in energy or investment in hi-tech and critical infrastructure?
Risk management or active design
Until October 7, Israel’s approach was based primarily on risk management and the maintenance of stability. It chose to preserve the rule of Hamas in Gaza, not to advance the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria, and not to defeat the Hezbollah organization and fundamentally change the order in Lebanon. The Swords of Iron War represents a change in Israel’s approach in one of those arenas: It is now actively working to change the governing order in the Gaza Strip.
Does the move in the Gaza Strip signify a shift in overall Israeli strategy away from risk management and towards an initiative or design approach?
The use of force
After years of avoiding full activation of its most significant military tool, its maneuvering and offensive ground army, Israel is now using that tool to great effect in Gaza. This proves that offensive military power remains an essential component of Israel’s strategic toolbox. In light of the scale of the events of October 7, considerations of human life — the fate of the kidnapped civilians and risking of its soldiers — was given a lower precedence on the understanding that national strategic needs had to prevail over individual lives (though not always, and not in every way).
Will Israel’s national security strategy now be more flexible with regard to the use of military force, especially ground maneuvers?
These are only some of questions that should be asked at the level of the National Security Strategy. The answers to these questions will require deep thought, and the conclusion of the Swords of Iron War will represent an unrepeatable opportunity to consider them at the highest levels.
Israel’s National Security Doctrine needs an even more urgent rethink in light of the blows it received on October 7. The National Security Doctrine is the basic document of the security echelon, and in principle it should not be immediately affected by the worldview of an elected political echelon. It defines the basic conventions — i.e., the principles and concepts — involved with security and military challenges. The discussion that needs to take place after the war holds the potential for a profound change in the existing doctrine or perhaps a return to the basics after decades of de facto change.
The issues that need to be addressed as part of the discussion of these principles are:
The transfer of war to the opponent’s territory, which stems from the basic principle of a defensive strategy and an offensive approach. In the reality created by the Swords of Iron War, and in light of the strategic decisions that need to be made about Israel’s willingness to use force to shape the regional environment according to its needs, should Israel reinstate the concepts of preemptive war and the preemptive strike that were once at the heart of its security doctrine?
The principle of the “People’s Army.” Considering the extent of the military commitment manifested in the Swords of Iron War, the vast use of reserve units, and the (likely) need to increase the size of the regular army, might it be wise to reverse the decisions that led to the erosion of the components of the “People’s Army”? Don’t Israel’s updated security needs necessitate a renewed discussion of which populations serve and which do not? To what extent can that discussion be disconnected from its divisive political context and be held in the context of Israel’s security needs?
Another serious discussion will have to be about the basic elements of security doctrine: deterrence, early warning, defense, and decision. The events of October 7 and the ensuing war brought decisive decision back as the core achievement required by the security doctrine. Decades of shifts away from it, and the creation of alternatives like “deterrence campaigns” and defensive countermeasures, turned out to be less relevant to or effective against the types of enemies Israel faces.
The discussion of the basic elements of the security doctrine can go in several directions:
Reducing the basic elements to deterrence and decision only. In practice, these are the two components Israel must be able to bring to bear against its enemies.
Creating a ranking among the components: deterrence and decision as the core components, with the other components — early warning, defense, and possibly thwarting or prevention and participation in coalitions — serving as enablers of the core components.
Flexibility in the application of the components: that is, determining that while all the components are valid, they will vary according to enemy and context. Unlike the doctrine of recent decades, which showed a drift away from decision and towards other components, all the components would be applied according to need. In other words, against certain opponents, decision and deterrence would be at the core and the other components would enable them, while against other adversaries, the response would be based on prevention or thwarting and coalitions, with the others less relevant.
The national security policy document contains the principles of operation of the political-security echelons and expresses their assessment of the current national situation and required political directives. Updates should be derived from the revised National Security Strategy and the updated National Security Doctrine.
One way to promote an orderly process at the national security level is through binding legislation. This would entail legal definitions of structured processes for the development of national security documents, approval by the cabinet/ government, and their presentation and approval in the Knesset. These processes would give form to a substantial, structured, and continuous engagement in national security. Within this framework:
The National Security Strategy would be the basic document of the elected political echelon. On the establishment of a new government, the NSC would lead a process to structure a new strategy document. The cabinet would approve both the classified and public versions of the National Security Strategy document. The prime minister would bring the public document to the Knesset for approval as part of a political announcement up to six months from the date of the government’s establishment. The Knesset’s approval of the document would constitute a vote of confidence in the government.
The National Security Doctrine would be the basic document of the national security echelon. Once every five to seven years, the defense minister would guide the security apparatuses to update the document. At the end of the process, it would be confirmed by the cabinet and both the classified and public versions would be published.
The National Security Policy would be the document containing the operating principles of the political-security echelons for the upcoming year. It would be updated once a year in a process led by the NSC and would be approved by the government and the Knesset as a condition for approving the state budget.
As seen in the United States and other countries, the systematic and mandatory review of national security documents requires a public reexamination of the principles of national security. Even if it is carried out solely to fulfill a formal obligation and there is a gap between it and its implementation, it would be difficult for Israel’s decision-makers and security establishment to avoid addressing the key issues and still remain trapped in outdated concepts that can end up in a grave crisis, as occurred on October 7.
Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai is Deputy Director of the BESA Center and an expert in national security, strategic planning and strategic communication. He is a cyber security strategist and a consultant at leading companies in Israel. Col. Shabtai is about to finish his doctorate at Bar-Ilan University. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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US Sens. Tom Cotton, Lindsey Graham Unveil New Resolution Demanding Iran ‘Dismantle’ Nuclear Program
US Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AK) speaks during a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC, March 11, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Julia Nikhinson
US Republican Sens. Tom Cotton (AK) and Lindsey Graham (SC) on Thursday unveiled a new resolution demanding Iran completely “dismantle” its nuclear program.
The resolution was introduced as the Trump administration continued to engage in talks with Iran to negotiate a deal to curb the latter’s nuclear activity, which Western countries believe is ultimately geared to build nuclear weapons. Iran has claimed its nuclear program is for civilian energy purposes.
“Iran cannot get a nuclear weapon; that’s off the table,” Graham said during a press conference on Thursday.
The resolution calls on the White House to pursue the “complete dismantlement” of Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, cautioning that Tehran would use a nuclear warhead to “carry out one of the most extreme religious ideas on the planet” — a reference to the Islamist ideology of Iran’s rulers.
The senators called on their colleagues in Congress to support the resolution.
Graham warned that if Iran, a predominately Shi’ite country under its current theocratic system, ever acquired a nuclear weapon, then the Sunni Arab countries of the Middle East would then attempt to obtain one themselves, sparking “a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.” Graham also cautioned that Iran would use a nuclear weapon as an “insurance policy” and a tool to destroy its enemies, including Israel. The senator demanded that Iran completely scrap its nuclear program, arguing that anything short of “complete dismantlement” would be “non-negotiable.”
“The ayatollah [Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei,] and his henchmen are virtual religious Nazis,” Graham said. “They openly talk about destroying the state of Israel. They write it on the side of their missiles, and I believe them.”
Graham claimed that Iran has likely enriched enough uranium to produce at least six nuclear weapons.
The South Carolina senator predicted that Iran would also use nuclear bombs to “take over” Muslim holy sites and push the United States out of the Middle East.
“A nuclear Iran makes for a far more dangerous world,” Cotton said.
Cotton argued that Iran would use the security provided by a nuclear weapon to aggressively advance its terrorism campaigns throughout the globe. The senator cited several terror attacks tied to Iran, including the assassination attempt against US President Donald Trump last year. Cotton also cited Iran’s continued operation of proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis — all internationally designated terrorist organizations backed by Tehran.
The Arkansas senator added that an Iranian nuclear weapon would present “an existential threat to our good friend Israel,” which Iran’s leaders regularly threaten to destroy.
Israel has been among the most vocal proponents of dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu arguing that the US should pursue a “Libyan option” to eliminate the possibility of Tehran acquiring a nuclear weapon by overseeing the destruction of Iran’s nuclear installations and the dismantling of equipment.
Both Graham and Cotton stated that they would be supportive of Iran obtaining a true civilian nuclear energy program. However, the senators argued that allowing Iran to enrich uranium or maintain centrifuges itself would inevitably lead to Tehran building a nuclear weapon.
As the US continues to negotiate a potential nuclear deal with Iran, the Trump administration has drawn criticism from some traditional allies who fear the White House could make too many concessions to Tehran. Critics have argued that elements of Trump’s negotiations with Iran mirror parts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — the 2015 deal which placed temporary restrictions on ‘nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of major international sanctions.
The 2015 deal, which the Obama administration negotiated with Iran and other world powers, allowed Iran to enrich significant quantities of uranium to low levels of purity and stockpile them. It did not directly address the regime’s ballistic missile program but included an eight-year restriction on Iranian nuclear-capable ballistic missile activities. Trump withdrew the US from the accord during his first presidential term in 2018, arguing it was too weak and would undermine American interests.
The White House has also received scrutiny from other Republicans in Congress. In a comment posted on X/Twitter, Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX), for example, lamented, “Anyone urging Trump to enter into another Obama Iran deal is giving the president terrible advice.” Urging the White House to reverse course, Cruz added that Trump “is entirely correct when he says Iran will NEVER be allowed to have nukes. His team should be 100% unified behind that.”
Trump has threatened military strikes, additional sanctions, and tariffs if an agreement is not reached to curb Iran’s nuclear activities. However, when asked by a reporter on Wednesday whether his administration would allow Iran to maintain an enrichment program as long as it doesn’t enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels, Trump said his team had not decided. “We haven’t made that decision yet,” Trump said in the White House. “We will, but we haven’t made that decision.”
Western countries believe Iran’s nuclear program is ultimately meant to build nuclear weapons. However, Iran has claimed that its program is for civilian energy purposes.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN’s nuclear watchdog, reported last year that Iran had greatly accelerated uranium enrichment to close to weapons grade at some of its nuclear facilities.
The UK, France, and Germany said in a statement at the time that there is no “credible civilian justification” for Iran’s recent nuclear activity, arguing it “gives Iran the capability to rapidly produce sufficient fissile material for multiple nuclear weapons.”
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Prevost Surprises as First US Pope, Takes Name Leo XIV
Newly elected Pope Leo XIV, Cardinal Robert Prevost of the United States appears on the balcony of St. Peter’s Basilica, at the Vatican, May 8, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Guglielmo Mangiapane
Cardinal Robert Prevost, a long-time missionary in Latin America, was elected as the surprise choice to be the new leader of the Catholic Church on Thursday, becoming the first US pope and taking the name Leo XIV.
Pope Leo appeared on the central balcony of St. Peter’s Basilica after white smoke billowed from a chimney atop the Sistine Chapel, signifying the 133 cardinal electors had chosen him as a successor to Francis, who died last month.
“Peace be with you all,” he told the cheering crowd, speaking in fluent Italian. He also spoke in Spanish during his brief address but did not say anything in English.
Prevost, 69 and originally from Chicago, has spent most of his career as a missionary in Peru and has dual Peruvian nationality. He became a cardinal only in 2023. He has given few media interviews and is known to have a shy personality.
President Donald Trump swiftly congratulated him on becoming the first US pope. “What excitement, and what a Great Honor for our Country. I look forward to meeting Pope Leo XIV. It will be a very meaningful moment!”
However, the new pope has a history of criticizing Trump and Vice President JD Vance’s policies, according to posts on the X account of Robert Prevost.
Massimo Faggioli, an Italian academic who has followed the papacy closely, suggested the tenor of the Trump presidency might have influenced the cardinals to choose a pope from the US, who could directly rebut the president.
“The international upheaval of the rhetoric of the Trump presidency, paradoxically, made possible the impossible,” said Faggioli, a professor at Villanova University in the US.
“Trump has broken many taboos, the conclave now has done the same — in a very different key.”
PRAISE FROM PERU
The appointment was welcomed by the Peruvian president Dina Boluarte.
“His closeness to those most in need left an indelible mark on the hearts of Peru,” her office said in a post on X.
Prevost becomes the 267th Catholic pope following the death of Francis, who was the first from Latin America and who ruled for 12 years.
Francis had widely sought to open the staid institution up to the modern world, enacting a range of reforms and allowing debate on divisive issues such as women’s ordination and better inclusion of LGBT Catholics.
Leo thanked Francis in his speech and repeated his predecessor’s call for a Church that is engaged with the modern world and “is always looking for peace, charity and being close to people, especially those who are suffering.”
He had not been seen as a frontrunner and there was a brief moment of uncertainty when his name was announced to the packed St. Peter’s Square, before people started to clap and cheer.
Unlike Francis, who spurned much of the trappings of the papacy from the day he was elected in 2013, Prevost wore a traditional red papal garment over his white cassock as he first appeared as Leo XIV.
SNAP, a US-based advocacy group for victims of clerical sex abuse, expressed “grave concern” about his election, renewing accusations that Prevost failed to take action against suspected predatory priests in the past in Chicago and in Peru.
“You can end the abuse crisis — the only question is, will you?” it said in a statement addressed to the new pope.
In an interview with the Vatican News website in 2023, Prevost said the Church must be transparent and honest in dealing with abuse allegations.
CHICAGO CELEBRATES
A crowd of clergy and staff members at Chicago’s Catholic Theological Union erupted in a joyful cheer as Pope Leo walked out onto the Vatican balcony, some four decades after he graduated from the South Side school.
It was an “explosion of excitement and cheers that went up in the room … many of us were just simply incredulous and just couldn’t even find words to express our delight, our pride,” said Sister Barbara Reid, president of the theology school.
Pope Leo graduated from the school in 1982 with a master’s degree. Reid called Leo intellectually brilliant, saying he has an extraordinarily compassionate heart.
“It’s an unusual blend that makes him a leader who can think critically, but listens to the cries of the poorest, and always has in mind those who are most needy,” she said.
THE NAME LEO
The last pope to take the name Leo led the Church from 1878-1903. Leo XIII was known for his devoted focus to social justice issues, and is often credited with laying the foundation for modern Catholic social teaching.
Prevost has attracted interest from his peers because of his quiet style and support for Francis, especially his commitment to social justice issues.
Prevost served as a bishop in Chiclayo, in northwestern Peru, from 2015 to 2023.
Francis brought him to Rome that year to head the Vatican office in charge of choosing which priests should serve as Catholic bishops across the globe, meaning he has had a hand in selecting many of the world’s bishops.
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Israel Warns of ‘Severe Consequences’ for Houthis, Vows to Defend Itself After US Cuts Deal With Terror Group
Smoke rises in the sky following US-led airstrikes in Sanaa, Yemen, Feb. 25, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Adel Al Khader
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz on Thursday warned that the Houthis would “suffer severe consequences” if the Yemeni terrorist group continued to attack Israel, emphasizing the Jewish state’s capability to defend itself following US President Donald Trump’s unexpected deal with the Iran-backed rebel militia.
“Israel must be capable of defending itself against any threat or enemy,” Katz wrote in a post on X. “This has been the case throughout many challenges in the past and will remain true in the future.”
“I also warn the Iranian leaders who finance, arm, and operate the Houthi terrorist organization: the balance of power has shifted, and the Axis of Evil has collapsed,” the top Israeli defense official added. “What we did to Hezbollah in Beirut, to Hamas in Gaza, to Assad in Damascus, and to the Houthis in Yemen, we will also do to you in Tehran.”
Katz continued, “We will not allow anyone to harm Israel; and those who do will suffer severe consequences.”
On Sunday, the Houthis, an internationally designated terrorist group, declared they would impose a “comprehensive” aerial blockade on Israel, targeting the country’s airports in retaliation for the Israeli military’s expanded operations in Gaza.
Claiming solidarity with Palestinians in the war-torn enclave, the Iran-backed group took responsibility for a missile strike near Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport, marking the latest in a series of attacks.
While Israel’s missile defense systems have intercepted most strikes from Yemen, Sunday’s missile was the first in a series launched since March to bypass the country’s defense capabilities, following a drone strike on Tel Aviv last year.
Alongside Hezbollah and Hamas, Houthi rebels are a key part of Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” against Israel and the United States.
On Wednesday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to retaliate against the Yemeni terrorist group, reaffirming that the Jewish state will defend itself against any threat.
“Israel will defend itself by itself,” Netanyahu said in a video posted on social media. “If others join us — our American friends — all the better. If they don’t, we will still defend ourselves on our own.”
In response to the Houthis’ latest attack, Israeli forces launched major strikes on the Yemeni port of Hodeidah and the international airport in Yemen’s capital Sanaa, both facilities crucial to the Iran-backed terrorist group’s ability to operate.
The strikes came as Houthi officials revealed that their agreement with Washington to cease targeting US maritime activity in the Red Sea did not include any commitment to stop attacking Israel or ships linked to the Jewish state.
لقطات جديدة للغارات الجوية الإسرائيلية التي أصابت مطار صنعاء الدولي في اليمن. pic.twitter.com/DlzAqg5xES
— الأحداث العالمية (@NewsNow4USA) May 6, 2025
Since the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2023, the Houthis — whose slogan is “death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory to Islam” — have targeted over 100 merchant vessels in the Red Sea with missiles and drones, causing a massive disruption of global trade.
During an Oval Office appearance on Tuesday, Trump announced that the US would halt airstrikes on the Yemeni terrorist group after it agreed to stop attacking American ships — an agreement that ended weeks of escalating tensions with the Iran-backed group and, according to US and Israeli officials, was made without prior notice to Jerusalem.
Since launching its current operation in Yemen, known as Operation Rough Rider, on March 15, the US military says it has struck over 1,000 targets, killing hundreds of Houthi fighters and numerous group leaders.
After Trump announced the deal with the Iran-backed terrorist group, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei praised “the end of the US aggression” on Yemen and thanked Oman for its efforts in mediating the ceasefire agreement.
The post Israel Warns of ‘Severe Consequences’ for Houthis, Vows to Defend Itself After US Cuts Deal With Terror Group first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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