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How the Radical Islamist Influence in Russian Prisons Can Pose a Threat to Israel and the West (PART ONE)
Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with then-Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi during a meeting in Moscow, Russia, Dec. 7, 2023. Photo: Sputnik/Sergei Bobylev/Pool via REUTERS
Russian prisons have long been battlegrounds for influence among various criminal factions, each striving for control over the prison’s internal economy and hierarchies. Traditionally, the power in Russian penitentiaries has been held by groups following the thieves-in-law (“vor v zakone”) code. However, the prison landscape in Russia has been changing. As more individuals from Russia’s North Caucasus and Central Asia regions, many of whom follow Islam, are incarcerated, Islamist influence in prisons has grown. Some of these inmates, including those with ties to radical groups, have started to organize within the prison system, creating alliances based on religious beliefs rather than traditional criminal codes. This has shifted the balance of power, introducing new dynamics into the established prison hierarchy.
Islamist groups within Russian prisons often prioritize religious solidarity over traditional criminal loyalty, uniting along lines of faith and ethnicity. This religious affiliation offers a powerful alternative to the thieves-in-law code. These groups offer a strict, disciplined structure, sometimes enforcing adherence to Islamic practices and framing their activities as part of a broader religious struggle.
As these Islamist groups gain ground, a new trend has been observed: the emergence of so-called “green zones.” In contrast to the “black zones” and the “red zones,” green zones are areas within prisons where Islamist groups hold significant influence. In green zones, the leadership is largely driven by religious principles, and adherence to Islamic practices is encouraged or even enforced among inmates. Here, power structures revolve around religious loyalty rather than the thieves-in-law code, creating a unique social order within the prison.
The rise of green zones and Islamist influence has introduced new tensions and conflicts within the prison system. Traditional criminal groups and Islamist factions often find themselves in direct competition for power and control over resources within the prison. The two groups have fundamentally different worldviews, and their conflicting codes make cooperation difficult. Islamist groups may view the secular stance of thieves-in-law as incompatible with their religious beliefs, leading to conflicts and violence between factions. Conversely, thieves-in-law see Islamist influence as a threat to their long-established dominance and fear that religious factions might undermine their power base.Russian and Central Asian authorities are deeply concerned about the growth of Islamist influence in the prison system, as it not only disrupts the traditional criminal balance but also increases the risk of religious radicalization. The spread of green zones has heightened concerns about prisons serving as recruitment centers for extremist organizations. In response, prison authorities have introduced stricter controls, particularly over inmates who show signs of extremist affiliation, and increased monitoring of religious practices within prisons. However, the ideological strength of Islamist groups makes this issue particularly difficult to address, as radical beliefs offer followers a powerful sense of identity and community, especially in an environment as isolating as prison.
There is one important factor that makes Islamist groups more competitive than traditional criminal groups in Russian prisons. Traditional Russian prison culture, heavily influenced by the “thieves-in-law” ideology, operates on a rigid hierarchical structure. Within this system, inmates are divided into strata, each with specific roles, rights, and expectations. At the top of the hierarchy are the thieves-in-law themselves, respected as leaders who enforce the criminal code and manage conflicts. Below them are “blatnye” (seasoned criminals who support the thieves’ code), and further down are lower groups who lack influence, including outcasts relegated to the lowest “untouchable” status, often doing undesirable work and serving the needs of higher-ranking prisoners.
However, the rise of Islamism in Russian prisons has disrupted this traditional structure. Islamist ideology, by contrast, places less emphasis on criminal hierarchy and is more democratic in its appeal, focusing on shared religious identity over strict social stratification. This egalitarian nature allows Islamist groups to recruit widely, reaching across strata and even drawing in lower-ranking prisoners who previously held little power. Some of these recruits come from non-Muslim backgrounds but are drawn by the promise of protection, community, and status under a new, religiously driven order. Islamism offers them a chance to rise within an alternative structure that values loyalty to faith over criminal reputation and physical strength.
This inclusiveness gives Islamist groups a strategic advantage over the thieves-in-law hierarchy, which is exclusive and rigidly traditional. Islamist networks provide a sense of purpose and solidarity that transcends the traditional criminal code, attracting those who feel weak, oppressed and excluded from the thieves’ culture. By creating alliances with prisoners across different strata, Islamist groups have been able to build a broader base of influence, further challenging the authority of traditional prison leaders and reshaping the power dynamics within Russia’s prisons.
Prison Islam and Scenarios of Potential Growth of Radical Islamist Influence in Russia: Potential Repercussions for Israel and Europe
Scenario 1. Inertial development, moderate threats.
The most favorable scenario, both for Russia and for its neighbors in Europe and Asia, would be to follow an inertial path from the point of view of influence of prison Islam. Let’s call it Scenario 1. According to this scenario, the growing influence of radical Islam in prisons would remain under government control. Issues arising from the convergence of crime and jihadism would increase but remain a purely Russian problem (though neighboring Central Asian countries would continue to face similar challenges).
Scenario 2. Growth and trans-nationalization of radical Islamist networks based on prison Islam.
A more dangerous outcome for Russia itself and for many countries worldwide, including Israel, would be the realization of Scenario 2 “Growth and trans-nationalization of radical Islamist networks based on prison Islam” in Russia, Central Asia, and the Wider Middle East.
Let’s describe the tendencies that may lead to realization of this scenario. The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war and the economic strain from Western sanctions have intensified Russia’s socioeconomic challenges, creating a volatile environment that could facilitate the rise of radical Islamist groups. With the Russian economy under increasing pressure, unemployment and poverty rates have grown, particularly affecting marginalized communities, including ethnic and religious minorities, including Muslims. The economic instability may drive disenfranchised youth and individuals from impoverished backgrounds towards radical movements, where promises of solidarity and purpose could provide an appealing alternative to dismal economic prospects.
The situation is further complicated by a demographic shift caused by the war. Mass emigration of middle-class Russians, particularly young professionals, has altered the demographic balance, increasing the proportion of economically and socially vulnerable populations, including migrant communities. This shift is occurring against the backdrop of a long-term trend of demographic growth of national minorities in Russia, driven by differences in birth rate patterns between the ethnic Russian population of Central Russia and the population of the North Caucasus, as well as by large-scale labor migration from Central Asia.
These trends, coupled with rising inter-ethnic tensions and widespread racist practices by Russian authorities, especially, against Central Asian ethnic groups, has created fertile ground for Islamist groups to gain influence. As violence and crime escalate amid the social disorganization of wartime Russia, radical groups may find it easier to recruit, using religious solidarity as a tool to address grievances and perceived injustices.
Moreover, the strained resources of Russian law enforcement, currently focused on internal security challenges and the demands of war, limit their ability to monitor and counter radical groups effectively. This vulnerability creates an opening for radical Islamist organizations to expand their networks and activities.
The likelihood of transnational connections between Russian and Central Asian-based radical Islamist groups and Middle Eastern organizations is also growing. As Islamist groups gain influence in Russia and Central Asia, they may establish stronger ties with larger networks across the Wider Middle East, accessing funding, ideological support, and strategic resources. This transnational element could enable Russian Islamist groups to solidify their influence domestically while extending their reach, posing a complex and multifaceted security challenge to Russia and other nations.
Additionally, the growth of ties between Russian criminal-Islamist groups and similar groups in the Middle East would create an added threat of terrorist attacks. In particular, some experts, such as Russian Afghanistan specialist Andrey Serenko, claim that ISIS-Khorasan is attempting to use criminal infrastructure (including drug trafficking networks) to organize terrorist attacks in Russia. In this context, one can recall the mass attack at Crocus City Hall near Moscow in March 2024, which was preceded by an attempt by ISIS-Khorasan to organize the bombing of a synagogue.
Through such networks, not only are terrorist attacks organized, but also the recruitment of fighters for the war in the Middle East (for example, in ISIS and groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, such as al-Nusra in Syria). In this context, it is worth recalling the phenomenon of mass recruitment into ISIS and other Sunni Islamist groups based in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, a trend that has already been characteristic of Russia and Central Asian states over the past decade. So, such groups can organize terrorist acts or attacks affecting even the territory of Israel.
From the perspective of Israel’s interests, in this context, the threat of a recurrence of antisemitic pogroms, similar to those that took place in the fall of 2023 in the North Caucasus, would also probably sharply increase. In the specific context of the above-mentioned pogrom in the North Caucasus in the fall of 2023, networks of wrestler-athletes were utilized. However, in a number of other inter-ethnic pogroms, such as the Uzbek pogrom in Osh, Kyrgyzstan (2010), the mobilization of rioters occurred through criminal youth groups, albeit not Islamist in nature. The first instance of mobilization for mass pogroms through criminal-Islamist groups (connected to the relatives and associates of former President Nazarbayev, who controlled Kazakh secret police) occurred in January 2022 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. In connection with this case the former head of Kazakh National security committee (KNB) and former prime minister Karim Masimov and some other generals were sentenced for high treason.
Overall, given the trends outlined above, the possibility of mobilizing criminal-Islamist groups to organize pogroms, including those with an antisemitic component, is entirely feasible.
The author is an Affiliated Research Fellow at the PSCR Program, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, PhD (Israel), where a version of this article was first published.
The post How the Radical Islamist Influence in Russian Prisons Can Pose a Threat to Israel and the West (PART ONE) first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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Under US Pressure, Syria and Israel Inch Toward Security Deal
Members of Israeli security forces stand at the ceasefire line between the Golan Heights and Syria, July 16, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Ammar Awad
Under US pressure, Syria is accelerating talks with Israel for a security pact that Damascus hopes will reverse Israel‘s recent seizures of its land but that would fall far short of a full peace treaty, sources briefed on the talks said.
Washington is pushing for enough progress to be made by the time world leaders gather in New York for the UN General Assembly at the end of this month to allow President Donald Trump to announce a breakthrough, four of the sources told Reuters.
Even a modest agreement would be a feat, the sources said, pointing to Israel‘s tough stance during months of talks and Syria‘s weakened position after sectarian bloodshed in its south inflamed calls for partition.
Reuters spoke to nine sources familiar with the discussions and with Israel‘s operations in southern Syria, including Syrian military and political officials, two intelligence sources, and an Israeli official.
They said Syria‘s proposal aims to secure the withdrawal of Israeli troops from territory seized in recent months, to reinstate a demilitarized buffer zone agreed in a 1974 truce, and to halt Israeli air strikes and ground incursions into Syria.
The sources said talks had not addressed the status of the Golan Heights, which Israel seized in a 1967 war. A Syrian source familiar with Damascus’s position said it would be left “for the future.”
The two countries have technically been at war since the creation of Israel in 1948, despite periodic armistices. Syria does not recognize the state of Israel.
After months of encroaching into the demilitarized zone, Israel abandoned the 1974 truce on Dec. 8, the day a rebel offensive ousted Syria‘s then-president Bashar al-Assad. It struck Syrian military assets and sent troops to within 20 kilometers (12 miles) of Damascus.
Israel has shown reluctance during the closed-door talks to relinquish those gains, the sources said.
“The US is pressuring Syria to accelerate a security deal – this is personal for Trump,” said an Israeli security source, who said the US leader wanted to present himself as the architect of a major success in Middle Eastern diplomacy.
But, the source said, “Israel is not offering much.”
The offices of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, who has been leading the negotiations, did not respond to Reuters questions.
A State Department official said Washington “continues to support any efforts that will bring lasting stability and peace between Israel, Syria, and its neighbors.” The official did not answer questions on whether the US wanted to announce a breakthrough during the General Assembly.
TRUST DEFICIT AT TALKS
Israel has voiced hostility to Syria‘s Islamist-led government, pointing to President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s former jihadist links, and has lobbied Washington to keep the country weak and decentralized.
But the US has encouraged talks – keen to expand the countries that signed peace deals with Israel under the Abraham Accords during Trump’s first administration.
Exploratory contacts began in Abu Dhabi following Sharaa’s April visit to the Emirates, which have ties with Israel. The two sides then met in the Azerbaijani capital Baku in July.
Days later, discussions were plunged into disarray when Syrian troops deployed to the southwestern Sweida region to quell sectarian violence between Bedouin and Druze militias. Israel said the deployment violated its enforcement of a “demilitarized zone” and bombed the defense ministry in Damascus. Sharaa accused it of seeking pretexts to interfere in Syria‘s south.
A US-brokered ceasefire ended the violence and, a month later, bilateral negotiations resumed in Paris – marking the first time Syria publicly acknowledged holding direct talks with its longtime foe.
However, the atmosphere in the room was tense, with a lack of trust between the two sides, according to two Syrian sources and a Western diplomat.
Negotiators are following a phased process modeled on deals Israel reached with Egypt that paved the way for a landmark normalization of relations in 1980. That involved the return to Egypt of the Sinai peninsula, seized by Israel in the 1967 war.
Six sources briefed on the talks said Israel would be unwilling even in the longterm to return the Golan, which Trump unilaterally recognized as Israeli in his first term.
Instead, Israel floated a proposal to the US special envoy for Syria, Thomas Barrack, that it could withdraw from southern Syria in return for Sharaa relinquishing the Golan, the Israeli official said.
“Our feelers via the Americans suggest this is a non-starter,” the official said. Netanyahu’s office, Dermer’s office, and the US State Department did not respond to questions on the swap proposal.
A Syrian official told Reuters that Sharaa understood that “any compromise on the Golan would mean the end of his rule” and had told Barrack the security pact must be anchored in the 1974 lines.
While Sharaa is willing to accelerate talks with Israel to please Washington, he remains wary, according to a Western intelligence officer, the Israeli official, and Syrian source.
He has told Barrack that conditions are not yet ripe for a broad peace agreement. “The basic elements of trust are simply not there,” said the Syrian official.
A senior US administration official told Reuters that Trump was clear when he met Sharaa in May in Riyadh that “he expected Syria to work towards peace and normalization with Israel and its neighbors.”
“The administration has actively supported this position since then,” the official said. “The president wants peace throughout the Middle East.”
NARROW PATH FOR SHARAA
Realities on the ground have limited the Syrian leader’s options.
On the one hand, Israel‘s incursions and support for the Druze have hardened Syrian public opinion against any deal, a factor weighing on Sharaa, officials say.
On the other, Israel‘s land grabs in Syria pose a threat to Damascus, making a de-escalatory pact all the more important for Sharaa.
A Syrian military officer based near the border with Israel, who asked not to be identified, said Syrian army patrols in the south avoid confronting Israeli troops, who regularly raid villages and go door-to-door collecting household data and searching for arms.
In response to Reuters questions, the Israeli military said its operations had discovered “numerous weapons,” thwarted smuggling attempts, and apprehended “dozens of suspects involved in advancing terrorist activity.”
The Israeli military was operating in southern Syria to protect Israel and its citizens, the statement said. Israel has threatened air strikes on any significant Syrian military or intelligence presence near the border without its consent.
Israel uses its new post at Mount Hermon, which it seized after Assad’s fall, to surveil the region. Defense Minister Israel Katz said last month Israel would not cede the location.
Israel‘s military has imposed buffer zones in some neighboring countries following the Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Hamas, in which some 1,200 people were killed.
“As in northern Gaza and southern Lebanon, Israel is now enforcing a wider demilitarized zone in southern Syria,” Syrian security analyst Wael Alwan said.
DRUZE DEVELOPMENTS BOLSTERED ISRAEL
Israel‘s position has been strengthened by developments in Sweida, where Syrian forces stand accused of execution-style killings of Druze civilians. Druze leaders are calling for independence and a humanitarian corridor from Golan to Sweida – a challenge to Sharaa’s vow to centralize control of Syrian territory.
Two senior Druze figures, who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter, said that since the Sweida fighting, Israel was helping unify splintered Druze factions and had delivered military supplies including guns and ammunition to them.
The two Druze commanders and a Western intelligence source said that Israel was also paying salaries for many of the roughly 3,000 Druze militia fighters.
Reuters was not able to independently confirm the munitions supplies nor the payments. The offices of Netanyahu and Dermer did not respond to Reuters questions on support for the Druze militia.
Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani dismissed the possibility of a humanitarian corridor at the Paris talks, saying it would infringe on Syria‘s sovereignty, according to a Syrian official familiar with the discussions.
Both sides agreed that stability in Syria‘s south was key to preventing a resurgence of covert agents linked to Iran, Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah, or Palestinian terrorist groups – common enemies of Israel and Syria‘s new leaders. Israel agreed to allow interior ministry forces to deploy checkpoints in Sweida.
“Both parties are probing areas of common ground,” said the Syrian official.
Sharaa is keen not to provoke his southern neighbor, aware of how much damage its military can inflict, one close aide said on condition of anonymity: “Avoiding confrontation is central to his plan to rebuild and govern.”
Erdem Ozan, a former Turkish diplomat and expert on Syria, said Sharaa could accelerate talks to secure economic aid and reconstruction support from investors, Gulf benefactors, and Washington.
“Sharaa’s focus on economic delivery could push him toward pragmatic concessions, but he’ll need to balance this with maintaining legitimacy among his supporters,” Ozan said.
Concessions could include handing greater autonomy to regional groups, including the Kurds and Druze, Ozan said, as well as demilitarization near Syria‘s borders with Israel and Jordan.
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Qatar, US Near Defense Deal After Israeli Strike in Doha
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio listens as he speaks to media at Ben Gurion International Airport, as he departs Tel Aviv for Qatar following an official visit, near Lod, Israel, Sept. 16, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Nathan Howard/Pool
Qatar and the United States are on the verge of finalizing an enhanced defense cooperation agreement, top US diplomat Marco Rubio said on Tuesday, after Israel’s attack on Hamas political leaders in Doha last week drew widespread condemnation.
“We have a close partnership with the Qataris. In fact, we have an enhanced defense cooperation agreement, which we’ve been working on, we’re on the verge of finalizing,” Rubio said while departing Tel Aviv for Doha.
Rubio met with Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani and discussed defense cooperation, Qatari foreign ministry spokesperson Majed Al Ansari said.
“This [Israeli] attack, of course, expedites the need for a renewed strategic defence agreement between us and the United States. It’s not something new per se, but certainly expedited,” Al Ansari said in a briefing after Rubio’s visit.
QATAR HOSTS BIGGEST US BASE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The attack in Doha was especially sensitive as Qatar is a close US ally and home to the biggest US military base in the Middle East. Qatar has been hosting and mediating ceasefire talks – alongside Egypt – since the Gaza war started nearly two years ago.
When asked about the mediation efforts in light of the Doha attack, Al Ansari said: “Our focus right now is protecting our sovereignty and we will not look into other issues until this one is resolved.”
The Amiri Diwan, or Emir’s Office, said in a later statement that the emir discussed with Rubio the future of joint diplomatic efforts to reach a ceasefire in Gaza and release Israeli hostages held in the enclave, as well as Palestinian prisoners.
The two also discussed the repercussions of the Israeli attack in Doha, the Emir’s Office added.
TRUMP ‘UNHAPPY’ WITH ISRAELI STRIKE
US President Donald Trump said during a visit to Doha in May that Washington would protect Qatar if it ever came under attack. He said he was not informed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in advance about Israel’s attack.
Trump said he was unhappy with Israel’s strike, which he described as a unilateral action that did not advance US or Israeli interests.
He sought to assure the Qataris that such attacks would not happen again during a meeting with the Qatari prime minister in New York on Friday.
Rubio called for Qatar to continue its role as a mediator between Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire in the Gaza war, saying there was “a very short window of time in which a deal could happen.”
“If any country in the world can help mediate it, Qatar is the one. They’re the ones that can do it,” Rubio said while departing Tel Aviv for Doha.
Qatar called the Israeli attack “cowardly and treacherous,” but said it wouldn’t deter it from its role as a mediator, alongside Egypt and the United States.
Netanyahu threatened to attack Hamas leaders “wherever they are” during a press conference with Rubio on Monday, as the heads of Arab and Islamic states held a summit to back Qatar after Israel’s attack last week in the Gulf state.
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Israeli Military Targets Iran-Backed Houthis, Striking Yemen’s Red Sea Port of Hodeidah
Illustrative: Smoke billows following an Israeli air strike in Sanaa, Yemen, Sept. 10, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah
Israel said it struck a military infrastructure site in its latest attack on Yemen’s Houthi terrorists at the Red Sea port of Hodeidah on Tuesday.
The Houthis, Islamist rebels backed by Iran who control the most populous parts of Yemen, have attacked vessels in the Red Sea in what they describe as solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza.
Tuesday’s attack came hours after the Israeli military issued an evacuation order for the port and a few weeks after a major Israeli attack that killed Houthi officials in August.
Al Masirah TV, a station affiliated with the Houthis, said that 12 Israeli strikes targeted the port‘s docks.
Two sources at the port told Reuters the strikes targeted three docks restored after previous Israeli hits. Residents in the area told Reuters the attack lasted about 10 minutes.
“The Houthi terrorist organization will continue to suffer blows and will pay painful prices for any attempt to attack the State of Israel,” Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said in a post on X following the attack.
The Houthis have also in the past fired missiles towards Israel, most of which have been intercepted.
Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree said on Telegram that the group’s air defenses had been able to force Israeli warplanes away but provided no proof.
The Israeli military‘s statement gave no details of the strike beyond saying they hit infrastructure.
“The Hodeidah Port is used by the Houthi terrorist regime for the transfer of weapons supplied by the Iranian regime, in order to execute attacks against the State of Israel and its allies,” it said.