For Part One of this article, click here.

Scenario 3. The incorporation of elements of Islamic radicalism from criminal subcultures into the country’s political system

The most dangerous scenario for Russia and other countries would be Scenario 3 that foresees the incorporation of elements of Islamic radicalism from criminal subcultures into the country’s political system. Among the trends suggesting the possibility of such a scenario are the following. Since the 1990s, there has been an evident link between Russia’s political and business elite and criminal circles. Currently, there is a notable trend toward the division of key assets among criminal-political groups, particularly those of North Caucasian origin.

The trend toward state conservatism as part of Russia’s modern ideology is leading to de-secularization and strengthening of the connection between Islamic ideology and regional political systems in Russia’s autonomous republics of the North Caucasus. The power structure established in Chechnya under Ramzan Kadyrov, based on political Islam (of a conservative-Sufi nature), is the first example of a stable Islamist regime in the post-Soviet space (experiments with the introduction of Sharia laws in independent Chechnya between the First and Second Chechen Wars lasted a significantly shorter time).

Already, there is a noticeable link between the spread of radical Islam in prisons and among criminal groups, driven by the growing popularity of radical Islam among young people from certain Russian regions and among the most vulnerable migrant groups. Some experts say that there is also growing tendency towards introduction of radical Islamism as the ideology of different criminal groups in Russia and Central Asia. Added to this is the rise in the use of political Islam as a mechanism for integration among power groups at the regional regime level, alongside a trend toward overall instability in Russia.

As a result of all these trends, a situation may quickly emerge, when regional political systems in the North Caucasus, amid a weakening federal center, will begin to rely on support of criminal-Islamist groups. This is logical since the leaders of these groups already use criminal gangs (sometimes with elements of radical Islamic ideology) in the conflicts over property, as the Wildberries case demonstrates.

To understand the reality of such a scenario, one only needs to recall that elements of criminal-Islamist groups were integrated into the official structures of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (specifically, its Armed Forces) between the two Chechen wars. Elements of the practices that developed at that time (including the combination of formal work in security structures with informal criminal activity, particularly informal protection activities) have persisted in a modified form in today’s Chechen Republic. In modern Dagestan and several other national autonomous republics of the North Caucasus, similar processes can be observed along two lines, or trends.

The first trend is the connection between regional elites and organized crime. In this context, two officially documented cases can be mentioned. From 2016 to 2019, Rauf Arashukov was a member of the Federation Council, the upper chamber of the Russian parliament. He was delegated there by the executive authority of Karachay-Cherkessia, a national republic in the North Caucasus. He had also previously served as the head of a district and as the first deputy head of the republic’s government. In 2022, he was convicted of organizing a criminal community and for murder. Another, no less high-profile case is the story of the former mayor of Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan, Said Amirov, who was convicted in 2014 on similar charges.  It is evident that this is only the tip of the iceberg, revealing the connections between regional political systems in the North Caucasus and criminal groups. Based on this, it can be assumed that, in some cases, gangs act as informal (and sometimes even formalized when integrated into official law enforcement agencies) forces relied upon by certain regional elites.

The second trend indicating the real possibility of Scenario 3 is the increasing official Islamic religiosity of regional elites, including within the framework of the conservative ideology that currently dominates in Russia.

Accordingly, it is entirely plausible to hypothetically assume a further convergence of these two developmental trends described above, meaning that regional elites could merge with criminal-Islamist groups.

An example of the merging of the trends described above is the terrorist attack in Dagestan on June 23, 2024. During the attack, a synagogue, two Orthodox churches, and a traffic police checkpoint in Makhachkala and Derbent were targeted. Twenty-one people lost their lives—16 police officers and five civilians, including a 66-year-old Orthodox priest in Derbent—and more than 20 others were injured. It was discovered that three relatives of Magomed Omarov, the head of the Sergokala district in Dagestan, were involved in the attack, including his own son.

Consequently, the influence of radical Islam, with its anti-Western and anti-Semitic tendencies, could expand across all of Russia and may start influence the policy of the federal government. This situation could pose significant threats to Europe and Israel.

The facts described above highlight the need to deepen the study of the links between Jihadism and criminal activity, as well as the study of prison Islam (which, of course, is not solely limited to Islamic radicalism but can also represent prisoners’ legitimate search for meaning, justice and social integration). Two obstacles stand in the way of this endeavor.

One obstacle lies in the politicization of the issue. As a result, experts leaning toward a right-wing discourse tend to focus primarily on counterterrorism and criminal behavior, while academics inclined toward a left-wing discourse may emphasize prisoner rights and religious freedom violations in post-Soviet countries. An accurate assessment of the situation requires a comprehensive approach that integrates both aspects of the issue mentioned above. Today, there are many interesting theoretical and comparative scholarly studies of convergence between criminal and terrorist activities, this approach can be applied also to the case of prison Islam and convergence between criminal and religious extremist activity in Russia and Central Asia.

The second obstacle is the difficulty of accessing both underground criminal-Islamist groups at large (who are not inclined to disseminate information about themselves) and prisoners (since authorities in many post-Soviet countries are not interested in exposing prison conditions due to serious human rights violations within these institutions).

The author is an Affiliated Research Fellow at the PSCR Program, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, PhD (Israel), where a version of this article was first published.

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