The matter of Syria’s chemical and biological weapons (CBW) program has long lingered. It was initiated in the 1970s by President Hafez al-Assad and steadily increased over time. The issue has reemerged multiple times: in efforts to reach an agreement to eliminate Syria’s under-declared CW arsenal (2013); in the Syrian military’s subsequent recurrent employment of CW against the rebels during the civil war; in the reestablishment of a Syrian CW alignment within certain installations; and in the US-UK-France raid on Syrian CW facilities (2018). The issue recently surfaced once again, amid the collapse of the Assad regime. Various CW facilities became uncontrolled, some of which were destroyed by Israel.

Apparently, all the sides involved – the rising new Syrian regime, NATO, Russia and Israel – are willing to eliminate Syria’s CW alignment. Radical rebel groups might be keen to capture residual Syrian CW (the extent and deployment of which are not clear), along with the associated expert personnel. Russia and Iran might rush to get rid of any traces of their assistance to the Syrian CW program, in terms of both classified technical knowhow and CW Convention violations. Related North Korean and Chinese rudimentary (yet curious) contributions might also be traceable. In addition, profound inquiry could finally reveal whether concealed CBW possessed by Saddam Hussein’s regime was smuggled into Syria 20 years ago. At any rate, the complete disarmament of Syria’s CW would reduce the number of Muslim states possessing CW to three – Iran, Pakistan and Egypt – thereby diminishing the menace of CW use in the Middle East.

Originally, the overall Syrian CW alignment consisted of about 35 facilities in roughly 11 sites. However, it underwent many revisions, and its dimensions are now fairly obscure. The best way to attain a complete picture of the entire alignment (or what remains of it) might be to interrogate pertinent high-ranking Syrian (or Iranian in Syria) military and MoD figures and to locate genuine Syrian classified software and documents.

Basically, the components comprising the Syrian CW alignment include stocks of raw materials, final precursors of the binary nerve agents sarin and VX, sulfur mustard, chlorine, possibly some incapacitants, mechanical parts of the binary systems, and adjusted warheads. Selective bombardment of certain of these components would not cause environmental pollution but would prevent operability. In terms of installations, the alignment consists of development, production and storage facilities. Some of those facilities were attacked by the IDF “in order that they will not fall into the hands of extremists” (including Hezbollah, presumably), as noted by Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Since 2014, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has raised 26 questions over potential stockpiles with the Syrian authorities, but only seven have been resolved. “It is up to the international community to seize this opportunity … to eradicate this criminal program once and for all,” Fernando Arias, director general of the OPCW, said on December 12, 2024, at an emergency meeting of the implementing body for the international CW Convention.

Upon taking control of Syria, the Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group pledged its “readiness to cooperate with the international community in everything related to monitoring weapons and sensitive areas”. The group also indicated that it would safeguard the country’s remaining CW stockpiles and ensure that they are not used against citizens. Further, one of the Syrian opposition leaders stressed that the opposition is committed to fully implementing CW disarmament in Syria.

Upon the collapse of the Assad regime, a senior Biden administration official said: “We are doing everything we can to prudently ensure that those (CW) materials are either not available to anyone or are cared for.” He further indicated that the Biden administration isn’t planning to send US troops into Syria to secure or destroy CW. Beyond that, he said that Washington will act at all costs to prevent any attempt by Syria or Iran to develop nuclear weapons. That last sentence is notable, as it pertains to the sphere of WMD at large rather than solely with regard to Iran. Also of note, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had intended to collect fresh environmental samples from suspected nuclear-related sites in Syria, but the collapse of the Assad regime disrupted this important monitoring.

As regards Iran, its military nuclear program is certainly in progress. Recently, then-IAEA head Rafael Grossi said that “Iran [has] developed much stronger capabilities… and is practically at the same level as nuclear-armed states.” Alongside that assessment, a report by the Office of the US Director of National Intelligence maintained that “Iran now has enough fissile material to make more than a dozen nuclear weapons.”

At any rate, the unequivocal statement by the above senior Biden administration official in reference to removing the nuclear WMD dimension echoes a previous statement (December 2021) by David Barnea, Head of the Mossad: “Iran will not have nuclear weapons, not in the coming years, and it never will. This is my commitment, and this is the commitment of the Mossad.”

Also worthy of mention is the possession of operational CW and BW arsenals by Iran, albeit a state party to the international CW and BW conventions. Iran is increasingly active in the area of weaponizing pharmacologically derived substances, both chemical and biological.

The third dimension of WMD – biological weapons – surfaced in the Syrian context in a press statement by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken (December 10): “The United States reaffirms its full support for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition…. The transition process and new government must also…. ensure that any chemical or biological weapons stockpiles are secured and safely destroyed.” The Assad regime had an active BW program that was divided in two: the development of toxins (such as botulinum, ricin and cobra toxins) by the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center, and the development of pathogens (such as anthrax and Brucella) by that center plus the Atomic Energy Commission of Syria. Thus, the Syrian BW program constitutes a serious issue of its own. This is particularly true as Syria is not a state party to the international BW Convention.

Tight and meticulous cooperation and collaboration ought to be potentiated between the new Syrian regime and the international community for the purpose of dealing appropriately with all the above-detailed challenges in Syria, apart from those no less meaningful ones that concern Iran.

 Dr. Dany Shoham is a former senior analyst in IDF military intelligence and the Ministry of Defense. He specializes in chemical and biological warfare in the Middle East and worldwide. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

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