RSS
Israel Is Not Defeating Hezbollah in Lebanon – It’s Only Laying the Groundwork for the Next War
Smoke billows over Khiam, amid ongoing hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, as pictured from Marjayoun, near the border with Israel, Oct. 29, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Karamallah Daher
Following the unexpected success of the series of blows inflicted by Israel on Hezbollah’s high command in August and September, the IDF began a ground operation in Lebanon.
The confusion and embarrassment that gripped Hezbollah undoubtedly damaged not only its strategic and systemic command capabilities, but also the functioning of its operational formations. The organization’s rate of rocket launches in late September was much lower than expected. More importantly, the quality of those launches — the ability to concentrate barrages of complex rockets and missiles to overcome Israeli air defenses, and the ability to locate and accurately hit targets in Israel — was significantly diminished.
Precisely in light of the enemy’s disequilibrium, the modest goals of the “Northern Arrows” operation stand out. From everything that has been said and published, the operation is intended to return the residents of the north to their homes through the cleansing of the first line of Lebanese villages from Radwan Force attack-supporting infrastructure.
This relatively modest plan suits the Israeli government’s political goals as well as the Americans’ desire to limit the war. A limited plan may entail limited risks in principle, but from a narrow military point of view, this particular plan is based on simplistic work assumptions and entails great operational risks. A clear definition of the work assumptions implicit in the plan will make it possible to critically assess whether the situation has changed and whether the plan should accordingly be changed.
According to the IDF, a force numbering about two divisions (accurate to early October) entered the strip of Lebanese villages very close to the Israeli border with the aim of destroying the Radwan infrastructure there. In other words:
- The IDF launched an operation against infrastructure, not against an enemy.
- As long as the enemy allows it, the IDF will prefer to carry out the mission without combat confrontation.
Although Hezbollah’s top command level was neutralized and a significant part of its rocket and missile arrays destroyed, the organization’s ground army in southern Lebanon was only slightly damaged. The IDF’s announcements about the operation’s limited objectives were intended for Israeli and American ears, but also signaled the enemy. The implied message was this: “If you refrain from opposing IDF forces in the limited operation, its expansion will be avoided. This will allow Hezbollah’s southern units to survive.”
If that was indeed the message, then it is clear that Israel’s strategic goal is to end the war with an international agreement after the destruction of Hezbollah’s infrastructure on the border line.
From a purely military point of view, the Northern Command’s operational concept here is problematic. The deployment of the IDF on a very thin strip, in the face of a Hezbollah army that maintains significant military strength, including anti-tank and mortar capabilities, raids and ambushes, exposes the brigades to dangerous enemy initiatives. At least one battle so far, in which almost 50 fighters of the Egoz battalion’s combat team were injured, illustrated this risk, and since early October IDF casualties have grown significantly.
The IDF is trying to overcome this weakness by securing the forces with concentrated air effort and firepower. But from a military standpoint, it would have been more correct to capture the Hezbollah army in southern Lebanon through rapid divisional moves deep into the south and encircle the enemy based on the river lines (the Litani, Zaharni or Avali).
Defeating an enemy in battle is usually based on the principle of reducing friction with the hard shell and then quickly and aggressively surrounding and squeezing it. In this instance, the encirclement of Hezbollah’s military force and threat to destroy it would offer a better chance, if not a promise, of a) continuing to deny the enemy a return to operational equilibrium and b) bringing about the disintegration of the tactical arrays in the south in the same way the command arrays collapsed in Beirut.
On the micro-tactical level, quick and decisive divisional moves are supposed to reduce the main threat to IDF forces: advanced anti-tank missiles. In general, fast combat movement makes it more difficult for the defender and reduces his ambush and shooting opportunities. More concretely, as the days pass from the beeper blasts and the broad Air Force attacks on the bank of targets in the south, the more likely it is that the Hezbollah units will recover and prepare better for battle.
Despite the inherent risks, the strategy of clearing a narrow buffer strip and ending the war in the north with an agreement is a legitimate choice. Hezbollah’s southern army is a significant military threat capable of exacting a heavy price from the IDF. Hezbollah knows full well that after a year of fighting in Gaza, the IDF is not the fresh, capable army, armed to the teeth and furious, that it was at the beginning of the war. It is very possible that the enemy will cooperate with the plan and take the chance of preserving its power over an attempt to restore its lost dignity. It is also possible that that is Iran’s directive.
Either way, the assumptions underlying the current plan must be defined and their validity examined. One must also prepare for an immediate change of the plan in the north if it turns out that the enemy has chosen not to cooperate. In fact, just preparing the broader ground move may have a restraining effect on Hezbollah’s ground forces in the south.
We must define the situation clearly:
- The IDF went into Lebanon to fight the enemy’s infrastructure, not the enemy itself.
- Under these circumstances, combat contact will usually be initiated by the enemy.
- The current move is not optimal in terms of securing IDF forces. Israel is allowing Hezbollah’s defense and attack units, which are mostly complete, to watch the IDF’s moves and initiate action accordingly.
- De-equilibrium is, by definition, a temporary matter. As time passes, the impact of the inflicted blows weakens and operational cohesion returns. Restoring self-respect in the face of operational opportunities in the field may turn out to be a growing logic among the enemy forces in the south.
- Choosing a strategy that does not seek Hezbollah’s military defeat will inevitably leave the organization a military force in Lebanon.
If the risks inherent in points 1-4 materialize in several consecutive events, then the option of encirclement and ground decision of the Hezbollah army in the south should be realized quickly. It must be prepared for, both as an operational response and as a reserved threat to the enemy.
The fifth point concerns Israel’s strategy. At the moment, the strategy strives for the demobilization of South Lebanon not by force but by some kind of political agreement, apparently in the spirit of 1701 (the UN Security Council resolution that ended the Second Lebanon War). As we have bitter experience of the unreliability of foreign demobilization mechanisms, the true meaning of Israel’s strategy is that the current Lebanon War is not an end to the conflict with Hezbollah but simply a prelude to the next war.
Again, this is not necessarily a wrong strategy. Despite the achievements of the strikes in the summer, Hezbollah is not defeated, and its ground units in the south are certainly still capable of battle. Israel, meanwhile, is fighting in seven arenas. Also, to a significant degree, the prolongation of the war in Lebanon serves Hamas in Gaza, where the pressure has been eased. It is also difficult to see a clear ending mechanism for the direct war that has started between Iran and Israel. Each strategy has advantages and disadvantages, and the important thing is to understand them.
The current strategy strives to shorten the long war we have fallen into. The thinking underlying this strategy is that the current Lebanon war will not be the last. As ever, Hezbollah will prepare for the next war while learning from its failures in the current round. In the future, Israel will not be able to assume that a series of secret operations will provide it with the same benefits. It is also possible that the bank of targets will not be replenished at the same rate in light of information security lessons the enemy is now learning.
The current war is being waged while counter-terrorism tactics, such as eliminating senior commanders, are yielding surprising systemic achievements. But even with these successes, Israel is choosing not to take advantage of a rare opportunity to overwhelm Hezbollah’s army in the south. This choice does not show much self-confidence in the purely military field.
If the IDF is to defeat Hezbollah’s future military power in the south and learn lessons from the current war, it will have to be not only more determined but also more adaptable. The current Israeli caution stems, at least in part, from an understanding that on the military level, our forces are dangerously vulnerable to enemy capabilities and not effective enough to cleanse the south without sinking into an eternal guerilla war.
The current strategy may be successful. It is possible that we will return the residents of the north and reach an agreement. But such a success, should it occur, will mark not only the operational achievement of the covert and air strikes that landed on the enemy but also their limitations.
No one will dismantle Hezbollah in Lebanon for us. And if a significant part of its power is preserved, its deterrence of Israel will improve, and Israel will not be able to enforce demilitarization by force. Hezbollah’s survival in defeat will simply turn over the hourglass for the next clash with a smarter enemy that is eager to restore its honor.
The current war marks, therefore, the opening of the race between the parties to prepare for the next war. This may be the decisive conflict not only in the north, but also for the future of the axis. The IDF must develop a clear and distinct military decision-making capacity — a military capacity, not just another list of methods of fighting terrorism.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal recently retired from military service as commander of the Dado Center for Multidisciplinary Military Thinking. His book The Battle Before the War (MOD 2022, in Hebrew) dealt with the IDF’s need to change, innovate and renew a decisive war approach. His next book, Renewal – The October 7th War and Israel’s Defense Strategy, is about to be published by Levin Publications. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
The post Israel Is Not Defeating Hezbollah in Lebanon – It’s Only Laying the Groundwork for the Next War first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
RSS
Lebanon Claims It Is Replacing Hezbollah in the South
Lebanese Prime Minister-designate Nawaf Salam speaks at the presidential palace on the day he meets with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, in Baabda, Lebanon, Jan. 14, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
JNS.org – Lebanon’s leadership declared in recent days that the Lebanese Army has begun replacing Hezbollah forces in the country’s southern region.
In an April 15 interview with The New Arab, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun announced that 2025 would be the year of the Lebanese state’s monopoly on arms.
Aoun pledged that only the state would have weapons, referring to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and stressed this goal would be achieved through direct dialogue with Hezbollah, while explicitly ruling out steps that could ignite conflict with Hezbollah.
“I told the Americans that we want to remove Hezbollah’s weapons, but we will not ignite a civil war in Lebanon,” Aoun said, referencing a meeting with US Deputy Envoy Morgan Ortagus.
Aoun added that Hezbollah members could potentially integrate individually into the LAF but rejected replicating the Iraqi model where Shi’ite, Iranian-backed paramilitary groups formed independent units within the military. He asserted the LAF was conducting missions throughout the country “without any obstruction from Hezbollah.”
Hezbollah member Mahmoud Qamat, however, responded by stating, “No one in the world will succeed in laying a hand on this weapon,” according to Lebanese media.
Hezbollah Member of Parliament Ali Fayyad stated the group was open to internal dialogue but warned against pressure on the LAF to disarm Hezbollah.
Col. (res.) Dr. Hanan Shai, a research associate at the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy and a former investigator for the IDF’s commission on the 2006 Second Lebanon War, told JNS on Wednesday that statements by Lebanese officials and the activities of the Lebanese army are “unequivocally an achievement for Israel.”
But Shai warned that due “the weakness of the Lebanese army, the IDF cannot rely on it and must back it up with its own parallel defense—mainly through detailed intelligence monitoring and targeted thwarting of any violation not only in Southern Lebanon but also [deep] within it, including at sea and air ports.”
The fragility of the situation was highlighted when a LAF soldier was killed, and three others were wounded while attempting to neutralize suspected Hezbollah ordnance in the Tyre district of Southern Lebanon on April 14.
Hezbollah’s real intentions were also apparent when its supporters reportedly burned billboards celebrating Lebanon’s “new era.”
Most tellingly, the Israel Defense Forces is continuing to detect intelligence of illegal Hezbollah activity in Southern Lebanon, and acting on that intelligence. Overnight between April 15 and 16, the IDF conducted strikes against Hezbollah infrastructure in Southern Lebanon.
In one strike near Aitaroun in Southern Lebanon, an IDF aircraft killed Ali Najib Bazzi, identified by the IDF as a squad commander in Hezbollah’s Special Operations unit. Other recent IDF actions included strikes and artillery fire targeting a Hezbollah engineering vehicle near Ayta ash-Shab in Southern Lebanon.
Meanwhile, reports emerged suggesting Hezbollah was actively adapting its methods for acquiring weapons. Reports indicated a shift towards sea-based smuggling routes utilizing Beirut Port.
The Saudi Al-Hadath news site reported on April 8 that Iran’s Quds Force created an arms smuggling sea route that bypasses Syria.
Amidst these reports, Aoun visited Beirut Port on April 11, calling for strict government cargo monitoring.
Karmon expresses skepticism
Senior research scholar Ely Karmon of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at Reichman University in Herzliya stated, “There’s no doubt there’s a change in Lebanon, first of all on the political level— the fact that President Joseph Aoun was elected—supported by the West, the United States, Saudi Arabia.”
In addition, he said, “Hezbollah’s political weight in parliament and in Lebanon in general has dropped significantly after the blow they received from the IDF.”
On the other hand, Karmon expressed deep skepticism about Aoun’s stated path to disarming Hezbollah. Aoun’s statement that he “isn’t interested in coming to military confrontation with Hezbollah,” and that it needs to be a “slow process,” as well as his call for Hezbollah to enter Lebanese army units, should not be taken at face value, according to Karmon.
“I don’t really believe it. First of all, because traditionally, in the Lebanese Army, most of the soldiers were Shi’ites, for a simple demographic reason. And therefore, the integration of thousands of Hezbollah fighters or personnel into the army—certainly at this stage in my opinion—it’s a danger that they’ll take control of the army from within, after they’ve already for years cooperated with the army.”
He added, “We know, for example, that they received weapons from the Lebanese Army—tanks and APCs—when they operated in Syria in 2013, 2010, and they even presented them publicly in Qusayr [in Syria]. On the other hand, we also heard one article from a Hezbollah representative who’s on their political committee, stating, ‘Absolutely not, we will not give up the weapons!’ It is clear there’ll be opposition.”
Karmon said he was skeptical about Lebanese government claims about taking over around 95 out of some 250 Hezbollah positions in Southern Lebanon. Karmon assessed that Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsors would be cautious but that they would continue to try “as usual, to act and to bring in weapons, to prepare some infrastructure in case, for example, there is a crisis in the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue.”
The post Lebanon Claims It Is Replacing Hezbollah in the South first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
RSS
‘Tradition, Tradition!’
An image from “Family at the Seder,” from the 1935 Haggadah by artist Arthur Szyk (b. 1894, Lodz, Poland—d. 1951, New Canaan, CT). Photo: Courtesy of Irvin Ungar
JNS.org – How important is tradition in Judaism? Obviously, the answer is that it is very important. I mean, they even dedicated a major song by that title in “Fiddler on the Roof!”
How strong is the need for tradition in the spiritual consciousness of Jews today? Despite the effects of secularism, I’d venture to suggest that there is still a need inside us to feel connected to our roots, our heritage and our sense of belonging to the Jewish people. Perhaps more than any time of the year, Passover is the season when millions of Jews embrace their traditions with love, warmth and lots of nostalgia.
But for vast numbers of our people, tradition alone has not been enough. And that applies not only to the rebellious among us who may have cast aside their traditions with impunity, but also to many ordinary, thinking people who decided that to do something just because “that’s the way it has always been done” was simply not good enough.
So what if my grandfather did it? My grandfather rode around in a horse and buggy! Must I give up my car for a horse just because my Zaidy rode a horse? And if my Bubbie never got a university degree, why shouldn’t I? Just because my grandparents practiced certain Jewish traditions, why must I? Perhaps those traditions are as obsolete as the horse and buggy?
There are masses of Jews who think this way and who will not be convinced to behave Jewishly just because their grandparents did.
We need to tell them why their grandparents did it. They need to understand that their grandparents’ traditions were not done just for tradition’s sake, but there was a very good reason why their forbears practiced those traditions. And those very same reasons and rationales still hold good today. There is, in fact, no such thing as “empty ritual” in Judaism. Everything has a reason, and a good one, too.
Too many young people were put off by tradition because some cheder or Talmud Torah teacher didn’t take their questions seriously. They were silenced with a wave of the hand, a pinch of the ear, the classic “when you get older, you’ll understand,” or the infamously classic, “just do as you’re told.”
There are answers. There have always been answers. We may not have logical explanations for tsunamis and other tzuris, but all our traditions are founded on substance and have intelligible, credible underpinnings. If we seek answers, we will find them in abundance, including layers and layers of meaning, from the simple to the symbolic to the philosophical and even mystical.
The seventh day of Passover recalls the “Song of the Sea” sung by Moses and the Jewish people following the splitting of the sea and their miraculous deliverance from the Egyptian armies. Early on, we find the verse, “This is my God and I will glorify Him, the God of my fathers, and I will exalt Him.”
The sequence is significant. First comes “my God,” and only thereafter “the God of my fathers.” In the Amidah prayer, the silent devotion, which is the apex of our daily prayers, we begin addressing the “Almighty, as our God and the God of our fathers … Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.” Again, “our God” comes first. So while the God of our fathers, i.e., tradition, most definitely plays a very important role in Judaism, an indispensable prerequisite is that we must make God ours, personally. Every Jew must develop a personal relationship with God. We need to understand the reasons and the significance of our traditions lest they be mistaken for empty ritual to be discarded by the next generation.
Authentic Judaism has never shied away from questions. Questions have always been encouraged and formed a part of our academic heritage. Every page of the Talmud is filled with questions and answers. You don’t have to wait for the Passover seder to ask a question.
When we think, ask and find answers to our faith, the traditions of our grandparents become alive, and we understand fully why we should make them ours. Once a tradition has become ours and we realize that this very same practice has been observed uninterruptedly by our ancestors throughout the generations, then tradition becomes a powerful force that can inspire us forever.
The seders we celebrated at the beginning of Passover are among the most powerful in our faith. They go back to our ancestors in Egypt, where the very first seder was observed. How truly awesome is it that we are still practicing these same traditions more than 3,300 years later!
Our traditions are not empty. They are rich and meaningful and will, please God, be held on to preciously for generations to come.
With acknowledgments to Chabad.org.
The post ‘Tradition, Tradition!’ first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
RSS
Thousands of Protesters Rally Against Trump Across US
“Protect Migrants, Protect the Planet” rally in New York City, U.S., April 19, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Caitlin Ochs
Thousands of protesters rallied in Washington and other cities across the US on Saturday to voice their opposition to President Donald Trump’s policies on deportations, government firings, and the wars in Gaza and Ukraine.
Outside the White House, protesters carried banners that read “Workers should have the power,” “No kingship,” “Stop arming Israel” and “Due process,” media footage showed.
Some demonstrators chanted in support of migrants whom the Trump administration has deported or has been attempting to deport while expressing solidarity with people fired by the federal government and with universities whose funding is threatened by Trump.
“As Trump and his administration mobilize the use of the US deportation machine, we are going to organize networks and systems of resistance to defend our neighbors,” a protester said in a rally at Lafayette Square near the White House.
Other protesters waved Palestinian flags while wearing keffiyeh scarves, chanting “free Palestine” and expressing solidarity with Palestinians killed in Israel’s war in Gaza.
Some demonstrators carried symbols expressing support for Ukraine and urging Washington to be more decisive in opposing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine.
Since his January inauguration, Trump and his billionaire ally, Elon Musk, have gutted the federal government, firing over 200,000 workers and attempting to dismantle various agencies.
The administration has also detained scores of foreign students and threatened to stop federal funding to universities over diversity, equity and inclusion programs, climate initiatives and pro-Palestinian protests. Rights groups have condemned the policies.
Near the Washington Monument, banners from protesters read: “hate never made any nation great” and “equal rights for all does not mean less rights for you.”
Demonstrations were also held in New York City and Chicago, among dozens of other locations. It marked the second day of nationwide demonstrations since Trump took office.
The post Thousands of Protesters Rally Against Trump Across US first appeared on Algemeiner.com.