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Israel Is Not Defeating Hezbollah in Lebanon – It’s Only Laying the Groundwork for the Next War
Smoke billows over Khiam, amid ongoing hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, as pictured from Marjayoun, near the border with Israel, Oct. 29, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Karamallah Daher
Following the unexpected success of the series of blows inflicted by Israel on Hezbollah’s high command in August and September, the IDF began a ground operation in Lebanon.
The confusion and embarrassment that gripped Hezbollah undoubtedly damaged not only its strategic and systemic command capabilities, but also the functioning of its operational formations. The organization’s rate of rocket launches in late September was much lower than expected. More importantly, the quality of those launches — the ability to concentrate barrages of complex rockets and missiles to overcome Israeli air defenses, and the ability to locate and accurately hit targets in Israel — was significantly diminished.
Precisely in light of the enemy’s disequilibrium, the modest goals of the “Northern Arrows” operation stand out. From everything that has been said and published, the operation is intended to return the residents of the north to their homes through the cleansing of the first line of Lebanese villages from Radwan Force attack-supporting infrastructure.
This relatively modest plan suits the Israeli government’s political goals as well as the Americans’ desire to limit the war. A limited plan may entail limited risks in principle, but from a narrow military point of view, this particular plan is based on simplistic work assumptions and entails great operational risks. A clear definition of the work assumptions implicit in the plan will make it possible to critically assess whether the situation has changed and whether the plan should accordingly be changed.
According to the IDF, a force numbering about two divisions (accurate to early October) entered the strip of Lebanese villages very close to the Israeli border with the aim of destroying the Radwan infrastructure there. In other words:
- The IDF launched an operation against infrastructure, not against an enemy.
- As long as the enemy allows it, the IDF will prefer to carry out the mission without combat confrontation.
Although Hezbollah’s top command level was neutralized and a significant part of its rocket and missile arrays destroyed, the organization’s ground army in southern Lebanon was only slightly damaged. The IDF’s announcements about the operation’s limited objectives were intended for Israeli and American ears, but also signaled the enemy. The implied message was this: “If you refrain from opposing IDF forces in the limited operation, its expansion will be avoided. This will allow Hezbollah’s southern units to survive.”
If that was indeed the message, then it is clear that Israel’s strategic goal is to end the war with an international agreement after the destruction of Hezbollah’s infrastructure on the border line.
From a purely military point of view, the Northern Command’s operational concept here is problematic. The deployment of the IDF on a very thin strip, in the face of a Hezbollah army that maintains significant military strength, including anti-tank and mortar capabilities, raids and ambushes, exposes the brigades to dangerous enemy initiatives. At least one battle so far, in which almost 50 fighters of the Egoz battalion’s combat team were injured, illustrated this risk, and since early October IDF casualties have grown significantly.
The IDF is trying to overcome this weakness by securing the forces with concentrated air effort and firepower. But from a military standpoint, it would have been more correct to capture the Hezbollah army in southern Lebanon through rapid divisional moves deep into the south and encircle the enemy based on the river lines (the Litani, Zaharni or Avali).
Defeating an enemy in battle is usually based on the principle of reducing friction with the hard shell and then quickly and aggressively surrounding and squeezing it. In this instance, the encirclement of Hezbollah’s military force and threat to destroy it would offer a better chance, if not a promise, of a) continuing to deny the enemy a return to operational equilibrium and b) bringing about the disintegration of the tactical arrays in the south in the same way the command arrays collapsed in Beirut.
On the micro-tactical level, quick and decisive divisional moves are supposed to reduce the main threat to IDF forces: advanced anti-tank missiles. In general, fast combat movement makes it more difficult for the defender and reduces his ambush and shooting opportunities. More concretely, as the days pass from the beeper blasts and the broad Air Force attacks on the bank of targets in the south, the more likely it is that the Hezbollah units will recover and prepare better for battle.
Despite the inherent risks, the strategy of clearing a narrow buffer strip and ending the war in the north with an agreement is a legitimate choice. Hezbollah’s southern army is a significant military threat capable of exacting a heavy price from the IDF. Hezbollah knows full well that after a year of fighting in Gaza, the IDF is not the fresh, capable army, armed to the teeth and furious, that it was at the beginning of the war. It is very possible that the enemy will cooperate with the plan and take the chance of preserving its power over an attempt to restore its lost dignity. It is also possible that that is Iran’s directive.
Either way, the assumptions underlying the current plan must be defined and their validity examined. One must also prepare for an immediate change of the plan in the north if it turns out that the enemy has chosen not to cooperate. In fact, just preparing the broader ground move may have a restraining effect on Hezbollah’s ground forces in the south.
We must define the situation clearly:
- The IDF went into Lebanon to fight the enemy’s infrastructure, not the enemy itself.
- Under these circumstances, combat contact will usually be initiated by the enemy.
- The current move is not optimal in terms of securing IDF forces. Israel is allowing Hezbollah’s defense and attack units, which are mostly complete, to watch the IDF’s moves and initiate action accordingly.
- De-equilibrium is, by definition, a temporary matter. As time passes, the impact of the inflicted blows weakens and operational cohesion returns. Restoring self-respect in the face of operational opportunities in the field may turn out to be a growing logic among the enemy forces in the south.
- Choosing a strategy that does not seek Hezbollah’s military defeat will inevitably leave the organization a military force in Lebanon.
If the risks inherent in points 1-4 materialize in several consecutive events, then the option of encirclement and ground decision of the Hezbollah army in the south should be realized quickly. It must be prepared for, both as an operational response and as a reserved threat to the enemy.
The fifth point concerns Israel’s strategy. At the moment, the strategy strives for the demobilization of South Lebanon not by force but by some kind of political agreement, apparently in the spirit of 1701 (the UN Security Council resolution that ended the Second Lebanon War). As we have bitter experience of the unreliability of foreign demobilization mechanisms, the true meaning of Israel’s strategy is that the current Lebanon War is not an end to the conflict with Hezbollah but simply a prelude to the next war.
Again, this is not necessarily a wrong strategy. Despite the achievements of the strikes in the summer, Hezbollah is not defeated, and its ground units in the south are certainly still capable of battle. Israel, meanwhile, is fighting in seven arenas. Also, to a significant degree, the prolongation of the war in Lebanon serves Hamas in Gaza, where the pressure has been eased. It is also difficult to see a clear ending mechanism for the direct war that has started between Iran and Israel. Each strategy has advantages and disadvantages, and the important thing is to understand them.
The current strategy strives to shorten the long war we have fallen into. The thinking underlying this strategy is that the current Lebanon war will not be the last. As ever, Hezbollah will prepare for the next war while learning from its failures in the current round. In the future, Israel will not be able to assume that a series of secret operations will provide it with the same benefits. It is also possible that the bank of targets will not be replenished at the same rate in light of information security lessons the enemy is now learning.
The current war is being waged while counter-terrorism tactics, such as eliminating senior commanders, are yielding surprising systemic achievements. But even with these successes, Israel is choosing not to take advantage of a rare opportunity to overwhelm Hezbollah’s army in the south. This choice does not show much self-confidence in the purely military field.
If the IDF is to defeat Hezbollah’s future military power in the south and learn lessons from the current war, it will have to be not only more determined but also more adaptable. The current Israeli caution stems, at least in part, from an understanding that on the military level, our forces are dangerously vulnerable to enemy capabilities and not effective enough to cleanse the south without sinking into an eternal guerilla war.
The current strategy may be successful. It is possible that we will return the residents of the north and reach an agreement. But such a success, should it occur, will mark not only the operational achievement of the covert and air strikes that landed on the enemy but also their limitations.
No one will dismantle Hezbollah in Lebanon for us. And if a significant part of its power is preserved, its deterrence of Israel will improve, and Israel will not be able to enforce demilitarization by force. Hezbollah’s survival in defeat will simply turn over the hourglass for the next clash with a smarter enemy that is eager to restore its honor.
The current war marks, therefore, the opening of the race between the parties to prepare for the next war. This may be the decisive conflict not only in the north, but also for the future of the axis. The IDF must develop a clear and distinct military decision-making capacity — a military capacity, not just another list of methods of fighting terrorism.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal recently retired from military service as commander of the Dado Center for Multidisciplinary Military Thinking. His book The Battle Before the War (MOD 2022, in Hebrew) dealt with the IDF’s need to change, innovate and renew a decisive war approach. His next book, Renewal – The October 7th War and Israel’s Defense Strategy, is about to be published by Levin Publications. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
The post Israel Is Not Defeating Hezbollah in Lebanon – It’s Only Laying the Groundwork for the Next War first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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US Supreme Court to Weigh Landmark Terrorism Case Targeting Palestinian Authority’s ‘Pay-for-Slay’ Program
PA President Mahmoud Abbas at the UN General Assembly in New York. Photo: Reuters/Caitlin Ochs
In a case that could redefine the legal landscape for victims of terrorism seeking justice, the US Supreme Court is set to hear arguments against the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) over their role in incentivizing violence against Americans abroad.
The high-profile brief — filed this week by a legal coalition and more than a dozen organizations in response to the 2018 murder of Israeli-American Ari Fuld by a Palestinian terrorist — calls on justices to hold Palestinian leadership accountable for its controversial “pay-for-slay” program.
The amicus brief, submitted on Tuesday by the International Legal Forum (ILF) and 16 other Jewish and pro-Israel organizations, argues that the PA and PLO have long been complicit in orchestrating and financially rewarding acts of terror.
“Since their founding, the PLO and the Palestinian Authority have been an instrumental element in inciting, funding, and rewarding terrorism, especially through the pay-for-slay program,” ILF CEO Arsen Ostrovsky told The Algemeiner. “They are not a powerless bystander but a leading driver of modern-day terrorism. Enough is enough.”
The so-called “pay-for-slay” scheme has been widely condemned by US lawmakers, with reports estimating that approximately 8 percent of the PA’s budget is allocated to paying stipends to convicted terrorists and their families. As outlined in the ILF’s legal filing, “the more deadly the attack and the longer the terrorist spends in prison, the greater the stipends they receive.”
The legal brief contends that the US Congress has clear constitutional authority to permit American victims of Palestinian terrorism to sue the PA and PLO in US courts, since these entities have maintained a presence on American soil and were previously warned that their activities could expose them to legal action. Palestinian leaders “had been on notice that their activities would subject them to jurisdiction, yet have continued to reward and sponsor terrorism regardless,” Ostrovsky said.
The lawsuit was initially filed under the US Anti-Terrorism Act by Fuld’s widow and other American victims of Palestinian terror, seeking damages from the PA and PLO. However, the case faced a major setback in 2023 when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that US federal courts lack jurisdiction over the Palestinian entities, citing concerns over the due process rights of foreign organizations.
Congress attempted to address this legal gap in 2019 with the passage of the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA), which sought to ensure that the PA and PLO could be held accountable in American courts if they funded attacks against US citizens or conducted activities within the United States. The brief argues that the PA and PLO have done both, and therefore must face legal consequences.
“It is imperative to hold not only Hamas accountable, but the Palestinian leadership as well,” Ostrovsky said. “Acts of terror, such as the one that claimed the life of Ari Fuld, do not occur in a vacuum. They are the direct result of a pervasive Palestinian infrastructure that indoctrinates hate and incentivizes violence.”
The development coincides with an ongoing ceasefire and hostage release deal between Israel and Hamas, which included the release last month of Ari Fuld’s killer, Khalil Jabarin. Ari Fuld’s brother, Hillel Fuld, said the family’s “personal grievance and loss was currently amplified” by Jabarin’s release from prison.
Reflecting on the hostage deal that saw Jabarin walk free — financially secure by Palestinian standards due to the pay-for-slay stipends he received while in prison — Fuld acknowledged that the situation was “not black and white.”
“On the one hand this is a terrible, terrible deal from a strategic perspective, and there’s no sugarcoating the fact that letting go of thousands of monsters is just horrible,” he told The Algemeiner. “The flip side is that it’s the most beautiful thing there is to see those families reunited, and it’s a fundamental pillar of Judaism to free our prisoners, our people, and our soldiers need to know that we will do whatever it takes to bring them back if such a thing happens to them.”
Ostrovsky expressed his hope that the Supreme Court would hold Palestinian leaders accountable and prevent them from “rewarding and underwriting murderers of American nationals abroad, like Ari Fuld.”
The court’s decision to take up the case marks a pivotal moment in US counterterrorism law. If the justices rule in favor of the plaintiffs, it could set a precedent allowing American victims of international terrorism to pursue legal claims against foreign entities that support or enable such attacks. The brief was filed on behalf of ILF by the Holtzman Vogel law firm as well as the National Jewish Advocacy Center, with oral arguments expected later in the year.
The post US Supreme Court to Weigh Landmark Terrorism Case Targeting Palestinian Authority’s ‘Pay-for-Slay’ Program first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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US Lawmakers Reintroduce Antisemitism Awareness Act
US Rep. Josh Gottheimer (D-NJ) at a press conference in Bergenfield, New Jersey, US on June 5, 2023. Photo: Kyle Mazza/NurPhoto via Reuters Connect
A bipartisan group of US lawmakers on Wednesday reintroduced the Antisemitism Awareness Act, which would mandate the Department of Education to apply the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism when enforcing federal anti-discrimination laws.
The lawmakers — Reps. Josh Gottheimer (D-NJ), Mike Lawler (R-NY), Max Miller (R-OH), and Jared Moskowitz (D-FL) — reintroduced the legislation after it passed the US House during the last Congress by a vote of 320-91. However, the Senate ultimately opted not to consider the bill in December.
Observers speculated that Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-NY), the Senate leader, feared exposing potential fractures within the Democratic coalition regarding antisemitism and Israel. Following the onset of the Gaza war between Israel and Hamas in October 2023, Democrats have shown inconsistent support for the Jewish state, with some high-profile liberal lawmakers suggesting that Israel’s war against Hamas could be considered a “genocide.” Last November, 17 Democrats voted to implement a partial arms embargo against Israel.
IHRA — an intergovernmental organization comprising dozens of countries including the US — adopted the definition of antisemitism in 2016. Since then, the definition has been widely accepted by Jewish groups and lawmakers across the political spectrum, and it is now used by hundreds of governing institutions, including the US State Department, European Union, and United Nations. Dozens of US states have also formally adopted it through law or executive action.
According to the definition, antisemitism “is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” It provides 11 specific, contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere. Beyond classic antisemitic behavior associated with the likes of the medieval period and Nazi Germany, the examples include denial of the Holocaust and newer forms of antisemitism targeting Israel such as demonizing the Jewish state, denying its right to exist, and holding it to standards not expected of any other democratic state.
In a statement, Gottenheimer said on Thursday that the “explosion of antisemitic violence” after the Hamas-led Oct. 7, 2023 massacre of 1,200 people in southern Israel inspired him to reintroduce the Antisemitism Awareness Act. He added that the legislation would provide state officials and law enforcement a “clear framework” on how to properly address antisemitic violence.
“Since the heinous Oct. 7 attacks on Israel, we have seen an explosion of antisemitic violence and intimidation on college campuses and in communities across New Jersey and the nation. Far too many in our community no longer feel safe in their own homes or classrooms,” Gottheimer said.
Lawler, a Jewish lawmaker and one of the most strident supporters of Israel in Congress, explained his decision to reintroduce the legislation, writing that “no person should feel unsafe, targeted, or ostracized because of their faith — and the Antisemitism Awareness Act will stop it from happening.”
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‘Hypocrisy Will Be Exposed’: Israeli Defense Chief Calls Out Spain, Ireland, Others Over Trump’s Gaza Plan
Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares (center), Norway’s Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide (right), and Ireland’s Foreign Minister Micheal Martin (left) gesture after a press conference in Brussels, Belgium, May 27, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Johanna Geron
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz on Thursday warned that the “hypocrisy” of Spain, Ireland, and other European countries hostile to the Jewish state will be exposed if they do not take in Palestinians who choose to leave Gaza, the war-torn enclave that US President Donald Trump has said he intends to rebuild after the population resettles elsewhere for a unknown period of time.
Katz called out several countries in Europe while announcing he had ordered the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to prepare a plan to allow Gaza residents who wish to leave to exit the enclave voluntarily.
“The people of Gaza should have the right to freedom of movement and migration, as is customary everywhere in the world,” Katz posted on X/Twitter. I welcome President Trump’s bold initiative, which can create extensive opportunities for those in Gaza who wish to leave, assist them in resettling in host countries, and support long-term reconstruction efforts in a demilitarized, threat-free Gaza after Hamas — an effort that will take many years.”
He said his plan would include exit options via land crossings, as well as special arrangements for departure by sea and air, noting that the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas, which controlled Gaza before the current war and remains the strongest faction there absent the Israeli army, has used residents as “human shields” and and now “holds them hostage.”
Katz’s order came two days after Trump said that the US would take over Gaza and develop it economically after Palestinians are safely resettled elsewhere.
I have instructed the IDF to prepare a plan that will allow any resident of Gaza who wishes to leave to do so, to any country willing to receive them.
Hamas has used the residents of Gaza as human shields, built its terror infrastructure in the heart of the civilian population,…
— ישראל כ”ץ Israel Katz (@Israel_katz) February 6, 2025
Global reaction to Trump’s plan was largely negative, with many countries expressing both incredulity and indignation.
Spain, for example, said that Palestinians must stay in Gaza.
“I want to be very clear on this: Gaza is the land of Gazan Palestinians and they must stay in Gaza,” Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares told reporters on Wednesday. “Gaza is part of the future Palestinian state Spain supports and has to coexist guaranteeing the Israeli state’s prosperity and safety.”
Katz took issue with countries that have been vocal critics of Israel and portrayed themselves as staunch defenders of the Palestinians taking such a stance.
“Countries such as Spain, Ireland, Norway, and others, which have falsely accused Israel over its actions in Gaza, are legally obligated to allow Gazans to enter their territory,” Katz said in his social media post. “Their hypocrisy will be exposed if they refuse. Meanwhile, countries like Canada, which has a structured immigration program, have previously expressed willingness to take in residents from Gaza.”
Albares rejected Katz’s suggestion that Spain should accept displaced Palestinians.
“Gazans’ land is Gaza and Gaza must be part of the future Palestinian state,” Albares said in an interview with Spanish radio station RNE.
Meanwhile, a spokesperson for the Irish Foreign Ministry told the Turkish state-run Anadolu Agency on Thursday that Katz’s post was “unhelpful and a source of distraction,” adding, “The objective must be that the people of Palestine return safely to their home.”
Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar said during a press conference on Wednesday that Gaza under Hamas rule has been a “failed experiment, adding, “As long as immigration is voluntary and there is a country willing to accept them, can anyone really say it’s immoral or inhumane?”
“עזה זה ניסוי שנכשל” – שר החוץ גדעון סער נואם במליאה: “כל עוד הגירה מתבצעת מרצונו החופשי של אדם, וכל עוד יש מדינה שמוכנה לקלוט את אותו אדם, מישהו יכול להגיד שזה לא מוסרי ולא אנושי?” @gidonsaar pic.twitter.com/VxNy7jSdZC
— ערוץ כנסת (@KnessetT) February 5, 2025
Since Hamas started the Gaza war with its invasion of and massacre across southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, both Spain and Ireland have been fierce critics of the Jewish state.
In the aftermath of the Oct. 7 atrocities, Spain launched a diplomatic campaign to curb Israel’s military response. At the same time, several Spanish ministers in the country’s left-wing coalition government issued pro-Hamas statements and called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, with some falsely accusing Israel of “genocide.”
More recently, Spanish officials said they would not allow ships carrying arms for Israel to stop at its ports. The US Federal Maritime Commission recently opened an investigation into whether Spain, a NATO ally, has been denying port entry to cargo vessels reportedly transporting US weapons to Israel.
Spain stopped its own defense companies from shipping arms to Israel in October 2023.
One year later, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez urged other members of the EU to suspend the bloc’s free trade agreement with Israel over its military campaigns against Hamas in Gaza and the terrorist organization Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Sanchez’s demand came three days after the Spanish premier urged other countries to stop supplying weapons to the Jewish state.
In Ireland, meanwhile, President Michael D. Higgins used his platform speaking at a Holocaust commemoration last month to launch a tirade against Israel’s military campaign targeting Hamas terrorists, appearing to draw parallels between Israel’s war in Gaza and the Nazi genocide of Jews during the Holocaust.
The speech came against a backdrop of strained Irish-Israeli relations, exacerbated by Ireland’s decision to join South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and its support for redefining genocide in order to secure a conviction against Jerusalem.
In December, Israel announced it was shuttering its embassy in Dublin, accusing the Irish government of undermining Israel at international forums and promoting “extreme anti-Israel policies.”
Last month, Israel announced it was shuttering its embassy in Dublin, accusing the Irish government of undermining Israel at international forums and promoting “extreme anti-Israel policies.”
In October, Irish leaders called on the EU to “review its trade relations” with Israel after the Israeli parliament passed legislation banning the activities in the country of UNRWA, the United Nations agency responsible for Palestinian refugees, because of its ties to Hamas.
Spain and Ireland, along with Norway, officially recognized a Palestinian state in May, claiming the move was accelerated by the Israel-Hamas war and would help foster a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israeli officials described the decision as a “reward for terrorism.”
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