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Israel Is Not Defeating Hezbollah in Lebanon – It’s Only Laying the Groundwork for the Next War
Smoke billows over Khiam, amid ongoing hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, as pictured from Marjayoun, near the border with Israel, Oct. 29, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Karamallah Daher
Following the unexpected success of the series of blows inflicted by Israel on Hezbollah’s high command in August and September, the IDF began a ground operation in Lebanon.
The confusion and embarrassment that gripped Hezbollah undoubtedly damaged not only its strategic and systemic command capabilities, but also the functioning of its operational formations. The organization’s rate of rocket launches in late September was much lower than expected. More importantly, the quality of those launches — the ability to concentrate barrages of complex rockets and missiles to overcome Israeli air defenses, and the ability to locate and accurately hit targets in Israel — was significantly diminished.
Precisely in light of the enemy’s disequilibrium, the modest goals of the “Northern Arrows” operation stand out. From everything that has been said and published, the operation is intended to return the residents of the north to their homes through the cleansing of the first line of Lebanese villages from Radwan Force attack-supporting infrastructure.
This relatively modest plan suits the Israeli government’s political goals as well as the Americans’ desire to limit the war. A limited plan may entail limited risks in principle, but from a narrow military point of view, this particular plan is based on simplistic work assumptions and entails great operational risks. A clear definition of the work assumptions implicit in the plan will make it possible to critically assess whether the situation has changed and whether the plan should accordingly be changed.
According to the IDF, a force numbering about two divisions (accurate to early October) entered the strip of Lebanese villages very close to the Israeli border with the aim of destroying the Radwan infrastructure there. In other words:
- The IDF launched an operation against infrastructure, not against an enemy.
- As long as the enemy allows it, the IDF will prefer to carry out the mission without combat confrontation.
Although Hezbollah’s top command level was neutralized and a significant part of its rocket and missile arrays destroyed, the organization’s ground army in southern Lebanon was only slightly damaged. The IDF’s announcements about the operation’s limited objectives were intended for Israeli and American ears, but also signaled the enemy. The implied message was this: “If you refrain from opposing IDF forces in the limited operation, its expansion will be avoided. This will allow Hezbollah’s southern units to survive.”
If that was indeed the message, then it is clear that Israel’s strategic goal is to end the war with an international agreement after the destruction of Hezbollah’s infrastructure on the border line.
From a purely military point of view, the Northern Command’s operational concept here is problematic. The deployment of the IDF on a very thin strip, in the face of a Hezbollah army that maintains significant military strength, including anti-tank and mortar capabilities, raids and ambushes, exposes the brigades to dangerous enemy initiatives. At least one battle so far, in which almost 50 fighters of the Egoz battalion’s combat team were injured, illustrated this risk, and since early October IDF casualties have grown significantly.
The IDF is trying to overcome this weakness by securing the forces with concentrated air effort and firepower. But from a military standpoint, it would have been more correct to capture the Hezbollah army in southern Lebanon through rapid divisional moves deep into the south and encircle the enemy based on the river lines (the Litani, Zaharni or Avali).
Defeating an enemy in battle is usually based on the principle of reducing friction with the hard shell and then quickly and aggressively surrounding and squeezing it. In this instance, the encirclement of Hezbollah’s military force and threat to destroy it would offer a better chance, if not a promise, of a) continuing to deny the enemy a return to operational equilibrium and b) bringing about the disintegration of the tactical arrays in the south in the same way the command arrays collapsed in Beirut.
On the micro-tactical level, quick and decisive divisional moves are supposed to reduce the main threat to IDF forces: advanced anti-tank missiles. In general, fast combat movement makes it more difficult for the defender and reduces his ambush and shooting opportunities. More concretely, as the days pass from the beeper blasts and the broad Air Force attacks on the bank of targets in the south, the more likely it is that the Hezbollah units will recover and prepare better for battle.
Despite the inherent risks, the strategy of clearing a narrow buffer strip and ending the war in the north with an agreement is a legitimate choice. Hezbollah’s southern army is a significant military threat capable of exacting a heavy price from the IDF. Hezbollah knows full well that after a year of fighting in Gaza, the IDF is not the fresh, capable army, armed to the teeth and furious, that it was at the beginning of the war. It is very possible that the enemy will cooperate with the plan and take the chance of preserving its power over an attempt to restore its lost dignity. It is also possible that that is Iran’s directive.
Either way, the assumptions underlying the current plan must be defined and their validity examined. One must also prepare for an immediate change of the plan in the north if it turns out that the enemy has chosen not to cooperate. In fact, just preparing the broader ground move may have a restraining effect on Hezbollah’s ground forces in the south.
We must define the situation clearly:
- The IDF went into Lebanon to fight the enemy’s infrastructure, not the enemy itself.
- Under these circumstances, combat contact will usually be initiated by the enemy.
- The current move is not optimal in terms of securing IDF forces. Israel is allowing Hezbollah’s defense and attack units, which are mostly complete, to watch the IDF’s moves and initiate action accordingly.
- De-equilibrium is, by definition, a temporary matter. As time passes, the impact of the inflicted blows weakens and operational cohesion returns. Restoring self-respect in the face of operational opportunities in the field may turn out to be a growing logic among the enemy forces in the south.
- Choosing a strategy that does not seek Hezbollah’s military defeat will inevitably leave the organization a military force in Lebanon.
If the risks inherent in points 1-4 materialize in several consecutive events, then the option of encirclement and ground decision of the Hezbollah army in the south should be realized quickly. It must be prepared for, both as an operational response and as a reserved threat to the enemy.
The fifth point concerns Israel’s strategy. At the moment, the strategy strives for the demobilization of South Lebanon not by force but by some kind of political agreement, apparently in the spirit of 1701 (the UN Security Council resolution that ended the Second Lebanon War). As we have bitter experience of the unreliability of foreign demobilization mechanisms, the true meaning of Israel’s strategy is that the current Lebanon War is not an end to the conflict with Hezbollah but simply a prelude to the next war.
Again, this is not necessarily a wrong strategy. Despite the achievements of the strikes in the summer, Hezbollah is not defeated, and its ground units in the south are certainly still capable of battle. Israel, meanwhile, is fighting in seven arenas. Also, to a significant degree, the prolongation of the war in Lebanon serves Hamas in Gaza, where the pressure has been eased. It is also difficult to see a clear ending mechanism for the direct war that has started between Iran and Israel. Each strategy has advantages and disadvantages, and the important thing is to understand them.
The current strategy strives to shorten the long war we have fallen into. The thinking underlying this strategy is that the current Lebanon war will not be the last. As ever, Hezbollah will prepare for the next war while learning from its failures in the current round. In the future, Israel will not be able to assume that a series of secret operations will provide it with the same benefits. It is also possible that the bank of targets will not be replenished at the same rate in light of information security lessons the enemy is now learning.
The current war is being waged while counter-terrorism tactics, such as eliminating senior commanders, are yielding surprising systemic achievements. But even with these successes, Israel is choosing not to take advantage of a rare opportunity to overwhelm Hezbollah’s army in the south. This choice does not show much self-confidence in the purely military field.
If the IDF is to defeat Hezbollah’s future military power in the south and learn lessons from the current war, it will have to be not only more determined but also more adaptable. The current Israeli caution stems, at least in part, from an understanding that on the military level, our forces are dangerously vulnerable to enemy capabilities and not effective enough to cleanse the south without sinking into an eternal guerilla war.
The current strategy may be successful. It is possible that we will return the residents of the north and reach an agreement. But such a success, should it occur, will mark not only the operational achievement of the covert and air strikes that landed on the enemy but also their limitations.
No one will dismantle Hezbollah in Lebanon for us. And if a significant part of its power is preserved, its deterrence of Israel will improve, and Israel will not be able to enforce demilitarization by force. Hezbollah’s survival in defeat will simply turn over the hourglass for the next clash with a smarter enemy that is eager to restore its honor.
The current war marks, therefore, the opening of the race between the parties to prepare for the next war. This may be the decisive conflict not only in the north, but also for the future of the axis. The IDF must develop a clear and distinct military decision-making capacity — a military capacity, not just another list of methods of fighting terrorism.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal recently retired from military service as commander of the Dado Center for Multidisciplinary Military Thinking. His book The Battle Before the War (MOD 2022, in Hebrew) dealt with the IDF’s need to change, innovate and renew a decisive war approach. His next book, Renewal – The October 7th War and Israel’s Defense Strategy, is about to be published by Levin Publications. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
The post Israel Is Not Defeating Hezbollah in Lebanon – It’s Only Laying the Groundwork for the Next War first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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Welcome to ‘Paddystine’
A man walks past graffiti reading ‘Victory to Palestine’ after Ireland has announced it will recognize a Palestinian state, in Dublin, Ireland, May 22, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Hannah McKay
JNS.org – The other day, during a discussion with a colleague about the wave of pro-Hamas, antisemitic hysteria sweeping the Republic of Ireland, I unthinkingly quipped that the people of Eire should rename themselves “Paddystinians.” I immediately regretted doing so because the term “Paddy” is an aging pejorative, conjuring up images of Irish drunkenness, the supposed Irish proclivity for casual brawling, and ingrained Irish idiocy—stereotypes any decent person should reject.
As it turns out, I needn’t have worried.
A couple of days after that exchange, I discovered that the hashtag “#Paddystinian” was being eagerly adopted on social media by Irish supporters of Hamas. The accompanying posts were variously obnoxious or downright stupid, with many of those mocking the assertion that their country is antisemitic seemingly unaware of the immortal line spoken by a character in James Joyce’s Ulysses that Ireland “has the honor of being the only country which never persecuted the jews (sic)” because “she never let them in.” (There has, in fact, been a minuscule Jewish presence in Ireland for centuries, numbering the current president of Israel among its offspring, and there have been several episodes of antisemitism during that time, including the present, but Ireland is more or less an instance of the “antisemitism without Jews” phenomenon.)
One might say that Ireland is little different from the rest of Europe when it comes to the volume and the venom of its antisemitism: France, Germany and the United Kingdom, among others, are current examples of a similar trend. But Ireland stands out because of the role of its government in stoking these poisonous sentiments, as well as the fact that antisemitic depictions of Israel sit comfortably in its major political parties across the spectrum. That perhaps explains why Israel has closed its embassy in Dublin.
To my mind, the most grotesque offender in this regard is the Irish president, Michael Higgins. An 83-year-old poet who has carefully cultivated an avuncular image with his three-piece tweed suits and swept back, thinning white hair, Higgins’ high-handed manner is at its most infuriating when he articulates—as he has done on a few occasions since the Hamas atrocities in Israel on Oct. 7, 2023—conspiracy theories about Israel that lean heavily on the theme of shadowy, unaccountable Jewish power. Earlier this year, for example, he blamed a covert Israeli intelligence operation for leaking his fawning letter of congratulations to the Iranian regime’s newly installed President Masoud Pezeshkian and was subsequently too pompous to issue an apology when it was pointed out that the Iranians themselves had publicized his message first. Then, last week, as he accepted the credentials of the new Palestinian ambassador in Dublin, he waxed lyrically about Israeli assaults on the sovereignty of three of its neighbors: Lebanon, Syria and Egypt, where the Israelis apparently “would like, in fact, actually to have a settlement.”
In Egypt? Given that Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula in 1982, not even the most seasoned supporter of Hamas could find actual material evidence that this is Israel’s intention. Higgins had met with his Egyptian counterpart, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, earlier that week, and it’s quite possible that el-Sisi told him something along these lines or had referred to the dispute between Jerusalem and Cairo over the Philadelphi Corridor that runs along the border between Egypt and Gaza. Whatever the content of their conversation, what is absolutely clear is that Higgins has a disposition to believe the most outlandish lies about Israel and that he will respond to any criticism by saying that opposition to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies is not the same as antisemitism—encouraging his audience to think that his beef is with Israel’s leadership and not the Jewish state itself.
But as Dana Erlich, Israel’s ambassador to Ireland, pointed out in a recent interview with an Irish broadcaster, Dublin’s goal has been to undermine Israel’s ability to defend itself by launching lawfare against the Jewish state to chip steadily away at its sovereign rights. Ireland is supporting South Africa’s false claim of Israeli genocide of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague to the point of seeking a redefinition of the term “genocide” in which to shoehorn Israel’s actions against the terrorists of Hamas and Hezbollah, and their Iranian backers. It has promoted anti-Israel measures both domestically and within the European Union. And it has either ignored or mocked the concern that its actions are encouraging the spread of antisemitism in Ireland, including the revival of racial tropes reminiscent of the Nazis.
Two fundamental questions remain. Firstly, why has Ireland adopted this stance? In part, as the Irish commentator John McGuirk recently pointed out, because Ireland is essentially peripheral in the calculations of geopolitics. “We have, for most of our existence, pretended that we can say or do what we like on the international stage because everybody loves us,” he wrote. “The truth is that we’ve been able to be liked because we are irrelevant. Nobody has ever had to choose between Ireland and a powerful ally.”
Even then, as McGuirk argued, this moral grandstanding against Israel has its limits. It was Israel that closed its embassy and not the other way around “because the Irish government knew full well that a formal break in diplomatic relations with Israel would send a signal to the US and the E.U., and Israel’s other powerful allies around the world, that Ireland is a fundamentally unreasonable place that cannot be trusted to be an honest broker when it comes to the world’s only Jewish state.”
Secondly, why the obsession with Israel alone? Not a peep has been heard from the Irish about the revelations coming out of Syria regarding former dictator Bashar Assad’s machinery of murder—something unseen, according to Stephen Rapp, the former U.S. envoy for war crimes—“since the Nazis.” According to my old friend, the Irish writer Eamann Mac Donnchada, both “narcissism,” emanating from Ireland’s belief that the Palestinian war against Israel is a mirror of Ireland’s own struggle against the British, and “ennui,” the lack of purpose that has accompanied Ireland’s growing economic prosperity in recent decades, are key factors here. “Adhesion to [the Palestinian] cause makes many Irish people feel great about themselves while running no physical or economic risks, and that’s what it’s really about,” he wrote.
How should the rest of the world respond, given that, to cite McGuirk again, “not one single thing that the Irish Government has done since Oct. 7, 2023 has impacted Israeli policy one way or another.” Israel, as the offended party, has done what it needs to do. Many Jews have reacted with disgust, but that probably won’t extend to anything more than the odd prohibition on Jameson’s whiskey being served at a synagogue kiddush or bar mitzvah.
As for the United States, traditionally a great friend of Ireland, relations will likely worsen under Donald Trump’s incoming administration because Trump and his team are convinced that Ireland—in the words of future Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick—“runs a trade surplus at our expense.” Israel has nothing to do with that battle. But because Lutnick is a Jew and a noted supporter of Israel, you can rest assured that voices inside and outside the Irish government will eventually draw a connection where none exists. That it’s all so predictable is probably the grimmest joke of all.
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Tradition or Tragedy?
An employee tends to a medical cannabis plants at Pharmocann, an Israeli medical cannabis company in northern Israel, Jan. 24, 2019. Photo: Reuters / Amir Cohen / File.
JNS.org – I am writing these lines from the United States, where I am nearing the end of my latest speaking tour. I’ve been to New York, Toronto, Detroit, Philadelphia, and now Miami.
Coming from South Africa, where we suffer one of the highest murder rates in the world—more than 70 people per day are killed throughout the country—I was nevertheless shocked by the most recent school shooting here in the “land of the free and the home of the brave.” In what is stated by CNN to be “the 83rd school shooting in the USA this year,”15-year-old Natalie Rupnow opened fire at a private Christian school in Madison, Wis., killing a fellow classmate and teacher, and then turned the gun on herself. Besides others who were wounded, two more students were today listed in critical condition.
What on earth would motivate a 15-year-old girl to shoot up her classmates? Where did she get a gun? Were her parents negligent? These and more are the questions Americans are asking themselves.
And in other news this week (I must sound like a news reporter), music megastar Sir Elton John, who was just named TIME magazine’s “Icon of the Year” had this to say about one of the current moral dilemmas still being hotly debated around the world: “Legalizing marijuana in the United States and Canada is one of the greatest mistakes of all time.”
The rock star, who was affected by addiction to cocaine and other drugs in the past, said that his own experience leads him to argue that marijuana is addictive and leads to other drug use. “And when you’re stoned—and I’ve been stoned—you don’t think normally.”
Quite a confession from one of the music legends of our time.
By now, you may be forgiven for wondering what on earth all of this has to do with my usual theme, the Torah portion. Well, this week in Vayeshev, Joseph is sold into slavery and, at age 17, finds himself down in Egypt working for Potiphar, the head of Pharaoh’s abattoirs and butcheries. Here is a youngster of high school age, far away from home, with no family, no support—no one to assist or guide him in life.
Quite remarkably, all on his own, he manages to stay afloat and goes on to succeed at everything he does. Furthermore, when the lady of the house tries to seduce him, he finds the inner strength to withstand temptation.
How did he do it? Day after day, she would beguile him, entice him, try to charm him. And then, when there was no one home and no one would ever know the difference, he still eludes her smooth talk and blandishments. No one knew his origins. He was a stranger in a foreign land; he had nothing to lose. And still, he stood his ground.
Elsewhere, I have written about the image of Joseph’s father, Jacob, which appeared to him at that critical moment, giving him strength and courage just as he felt himself starting to slip and succumb. Is it not extraordinary to see how powerful the influence of parents and grandparents on young minds and hearts can be! In the heat of the moment when most people lose their moral grip and stumble into sin, Joseph was able to keep his head and resist the seduction so many might have fantasized about.
I remember in my own youth struggling with personal life choices. One part of me wanted to be a journalist. But I couldn’t bear to disappoint my father and grandfather, who were devout and dedicated Chassidim, so I decided to give yeshivah a chance. The rest is history. I was inspired by Torah—specifically, by Chassidic philosophy, which answered so many of life’s questions.
The other day in Philadelphia visiting our children, I was able to spend some precious time learning Talmud with my two grandsons, Ari and Tzvi. They understood it well and made me proud. I pray that I can have the same positive influence on them that my grandfather had on me.
This Friday is the 19th of Kislev, which marks the liberation from the antisemitic imprisonment in czarist Russia of the founder of Chabad— Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi—back in 1798. His release and vindication also spelled the beginning of a much broader dissemination of the teachings of Chassidic philosophy throughout Europe.
And the Jewish world has never looked back. Today, a wide range of communities around the world will celebrate this day and are inspired to study his life-changing work—the Tanya—and other profound teachings of Chassidic philosophy.
I can’t help thinking that had young Natalie Rupnow and a younger Elton John had those same influences as Joseph did, or even as I did, they might never have fallen into tragedy and addiction.
We should be eternally grateful for our heritage, our family legacies and the teachings of Torah, both revealed and mystical, that have inspired us and kept us on track and in check throughout the generations.
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After Hezbollah Supply Lines Cut in Syria, Tehran Will ‘Reexamine Options’
Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad speaks during an interview with Sky News Arabia in Damascus, Syria in this handout picture released by the Syrian Presidency on August 8, 2023. Syrian Presidency/Handout via REUTERS
JNS.org – Iran’s arms supply lines to Hezbollah via Syria have been severed by the fall of President Bashar al-Assad, leading to an unprecedented strategic setback for Tehran and its Lebanese terror proxy, according to observers in Israel.
Tal Beeri, head of Research at the Alma Center, which specializes in Israel’s security challenges in the northern arenas, told JNS on Monday that “we’re talking about a very, very significant blow“ to Hezbollah’s Iranian supply chain.
The first reason for this initial near-term assessment, he said, is that the Syrian territory once controlled by Assad served as Iran’s primary conduit for transporting weapons into Lebanon.
“Practically all the weapons for Hezbollah were funneled through this corridor,” which encompassed land routes, air routes through Syrian airports—possibly including the Russian airbase Khmeimim—and sea routes stretching from the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas in Iran to northwest Syria, mainly the port of Banias, from where weapons would be delivered to inland depots.
“That’s how the Iranians moved goods to Lebanon. Meaning, effectively, the entry gate of Iranian weaponry on Syrian soil has been cut off,” said Beeri. “In the end, control throughout Syria is in the hands of the rebel factions and Kurds, who, by the way, dominate all of eastern Syria, including the land entry routes. So currently, it is not possible to transfer weapons to Hezbollah through Syria.”
The second factor, he added, is the large-scale air strikes conducted by the Israel Defense Forces, targeting the entire Syrian military and its weapons depots. This prevented “a last-minute quick transfer of relevant weapons into Hezbollah’s hands,” according to Beeri.
“For these two reasons, there is basically a nearly complete severing of the weapon oxygen line to Hezbollah,” he said.
However, Beeri cautioned that Iran and Hezbollah might yet adapt and adjust to the new situation. “I estimate they will recalculate and make new efforts … possibly by attempting direct shipments of weapons to Lebanon” by air or sea. Such efforts could see ships and planes travel to Lebanon from Iran via third-party countries to try and deceive Israeli intelligence,” he added.
In addition, said Beeri, “money trumps ideology.” The Iranians could try to establish connections with rebel factions by buying them out, thereby attempting to rebuild the weapons corridor.
Professor Boaz Ganor, president of Reichman University and founder of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, told JNS, “The biography of Ahmad al-Sharaa [aka Mohammed al-Julani, the leader of the largest rebel umbrella group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham] points to fundamental hostility toward Israel. His senior membership in Al Qaeda, close to [Abu Musab al-]Zarqawi and [Ayman al-]Zawahiri, could indicate the future trends of Syria under his rule.”
Ganor warned that “we must not let the seemingly pragmatic position he presents recently mislead the world or Israel.”
Addressing moves by Turkey to exploit the situation, Ganor added, “Syria will not be able to exist without the aid of another country or countries. Those countries will become the patron of the new regime, and there is no doubt that Iran will try to bridge past hostilities with the rebels and establish ties with al-Julani through generous economic aid, emphasizing an anti-Israel ideological common denominator and concealing the religious tensions between Sunni and Shi’ite.” (The Syrian rebel factions are mostly Sunni Muslims, whereas Iran is Shi’ite.)
Ganor noted that Iran could have back-door influence on Al Qaeda through the organization’s leader, Saif al-Adel, who sought and received asylum in Iran after U.S. forces entered Afghanistan.
“If al-Julani returns to his ideological roots in Al Qaeda, Iran’s influence on him could grow stronger,” said Ganor. That might enable the reestablishment of the weapons corridor if Iran and the new Syrian regime found common ground, he added.
On Dec. 13, Israel Hayom reported that Hezbollah’s Secretary General Naim Qassem had acknowledged publicly the impact of Assad’s collapse on the terror group, including the loss of military supply routes in Syria. However, he claimed Hezbollah would work around this and look for new ways to smuggle weapons into Lebanon.
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