RSS
Israel Needs a Large Army — Not Just Advanced Technology (PART TWO)
Israeli soldiers drape their country’s flag over an IDF tank near the border with Gaza after the October 7 Hamas massacre. Photo: Reuters/Ronen Zvulun
For Part One of this article, click here.
The offensive fighting in Gaza has drawn the bulk of the IDF’s effort. Meanwhile, approximately 100,000 Israeli citizens cannot return to their homes on the Lebanese border, and no one is able to commit to a date for dealing with this problem. Again, there are several reasons for this, but the most influential is the lack of sufficient forces. The IDF was unable to simultaneously conduct major ground offensives in both Gaza and Lebanon. Although the IDF’s achievements in the ongoing war of attrition on the Lebanese front have been good, they are far from sufficient to achieve Israel’s political goal: the removal of Hezbollah forces from the border to allow our citizens to return home.
Consider the lessons of the Yom Kippur War. After that war, the IDF increased its standing forces to deal with the threat of another multi-front surprise, but it also increased its reserve forces to enable victory to be achieved faster. Over the past few decades, the IDF has drastically reduced both its standing and reserve forces (about 170,000 soldiers were dismissed from the reserves due to a decision by IDF leadership that they were no longer required). The current war has demonstrated that this reduction of the reserve forces was a mistake in every possible respect. Not only were they reduced numerically, but most of those not cancelled had their training budgets drastically reduced. It is no coincidence that it took almost three weeks of retraining before the IDF was able to go on the attack in the current war. In the Yom Kippur War, reserve forces were fighting in large numbers within a single day on the Syrian front and within two and a half days on the Egyptian front.
The IDF has always depended on the reserve forces to complete its combat power on the battlefield – in fact, the reserves were considered the main force. However, the mobilization of reserves dictates short wars. Israel is also committed to short wars because of the intense political pressure it is invariably under to stop fighting before it has reached the achievements required to guarantee its security.
This is not a new situation. But the need for short wars returns us to the issue of the size of the force, and this war created a chain reaction: the inability to attack the whole Gaza Strip simultaneously led to the prolongation of the fighting, which led in turn to the release of reserves before the mission was completed. The continuation of the war also led to the loss of patience of countries that had supported Israel, which ratcheted up the pressure on Israel and led to the partial stagnation that now prevails in Gaza.
The fact is that after over six months of war, despite all the operational achievements of the IDF, politically and strategically the State of Israel is still in the basic state of defeat it suffered on October 7. Israelis remain expelled from their homes with no possibility of defining a clear time limit on their status as internal refugees, and this is because the full sovereignty of the State of Israel has not yet been restored to all its territories.
The military technology used by IDF forces, for all its sophistication, cannot change this strategic reality. Over the past two decades, some of the most advanced technologies in the world have been acquired by the IDF. Much has been said about the use of computer network warfare technologies, precision weaponry and remotely operated means to replace old and supposedly obsolete means that are no longer needed. This concept failed in the war in Ukraine, and it failed once again in the war in Gaza.
The most efficient and useful tools turned out to be the “unnecessary” ones that had been reduced in number and were not sufficiently available for the forces – tanks, bulldozers, mortars, etc. This does not mean the new technologies have no value; they add additional performance, but do not obviate the need for the old means. In the war in Ukraine, the leading powers in the field of cyber warfare did not achieve a single achievement of strategic significance. Also, despite the use of many varieties of precision weaponry and remotely operated aircraft, battles are decided by “outdated” statistical artillery and mass. If the IDF had had two or three additional divisions available, even equipped with less advanced technology, Israel’s strategic situation would have improved considerably.
Advanced technology is important, but the question is which technology and at what level of investment and equipment. Most of us have phones and computers with many tools and options we don’t use or need, but we pay a lot for the latest models anyway. The IDF has spent huge amounts on advanced technologies whose overall contribution to the results on the battlefield is less than their alternative cost. Interception systems for the defense of the home front are a necessary technology; systems such as the “Trophy” (which has saved hundreds of fighters) are necessary; but many other technologies, while scientifically amazing, cost more than they are worth.
For example, a basic Merkava 4 costs 150% more than a Merkava 3. An advanced Merkava 4 costs even more. But some of the additions and upgrades it contains do not provide sufficient tactical value to justify the additional cost. The lack of sufficient tanks was due not only to the perception that they are unnecessary but also to their increasingly high price. Among other things, the steep price led to a reduction in training in a way that diminished the competence of commanders and crews. Cheaper tanks in greater quantity, with advanced technology limited to specific tactically important capabilities rather than the best that can be created whatever the cost, would have enabled maintaining larger and better-trained tank forces — forces that were lacking during this war.
Another example is drones. The cost of professional military drones is much higher than that of commercial civilian drones. Military UAVs have important capabilities that civilian models do not, and a certain number of them is required — but, as was proven in the war in Ukraine and again in athe current war in Gaza, cheap civilian UAVs and drones of all kinds are able to provide most of the required capabilities at a negligible cost. It is possible to distribute them widely in the army, not only to a small number of specialist units, and thus better exploit their unique tactical contribution.
In conclusion, the IDF needs more ground forces than it currently has at its disposal. It is important not to exaggerate and increase forces to dimensions the State of Israel cannot sustain without intolerable financial cost. Technology is an important component of war-fighting too – but again, it is important not to exaggerate. Operational experience, not only from the current war but also from Israel’s previous wars and the wars of others, shows that not every technological innovation is beneficial. Sometimes their costs cause more damage than the added capability they provide because acquiring them reduces the ability to acquire other no-less necessary capabilities.
In our opinion, considering the existing and emerging threats surrounding the State of Israel, the IDF needs at least two more armored/mechanized divisions, and preferably three. It is desirable for Israel to have technological superiority over its enemies, but the benefit of this superiority is not equal in every field. There are areas in which it would be advantageous for the IDF to equip with the most modern technology available, provided it is able to purchase a reasonable amount — a “critical mass” — and still have a budget that enables the training of operators and the purchase of quantities of older tools. Inadequate skill levels due to a sharp cut in the depth and quality of training over many years led to Israel’s paying a price in casualties and insufficient performance, despite the very advanced technologies the forces had at their disposal.
In most cases, an improved technology that is “good enough” in large quantities is many times better than an excellent technology, even the most advanced that exists, but in a tiny quantity. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule that must be identified and invested in.
One area where a particularly large shortage was discovered is ammunition. The ammunition shortage is not unique to Israel. Russia and Ukraine have also discovered that they do not have either enough stocks or sufficient capacity to produce new ammunition, and this shortage has severely limited their ability to conduct operations. The NATO countries are behind Ukraine, but all of them put together are unable to meet the needs of the Ukrainians. Russia’s situation is a little better, and this gap is greatly affecting the results of the fighting. Although there is a huge effort by many countries to increase production, there are also shortages in raw materials, production machines and skilled workers, slowing down the industrial build-up to increase production. To this must be added fear of an escalation of conflict in East Asia over the issue of Taiwan or other possible flashpoints, which, if it occurs, will create an even greater shortage. Therefore, Israel should do as much as it can to increase its independent production capacities and accumulate stocks much bigger than the ones with which it started the current war.
Dr. Eado Hecht is a researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies and a lecturer in the master’s degree program in Security Studies at Bar-Ilan University. Prof. Eitan Shamir is Director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
The post Israel Needs a Large Army — Not Just Advanced Technology (PART TWO) first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
RSS
Examining Three Remarkable Women From Jewish History in These Turbulent Times
A Torah scroll. Photo: RabbiSacks.org.
Anyone interested in history will know that the Yalta Conference was a meeting between the leaders of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union that took place in February 1945 towards the end of the Second World War. There is a famous photograph of Roosevelt and Stalin sitting next to an unhappy Winston Churchill, who realized he was being marginalized. As we now know, Stalin suckered Roosevelt into believing him to be someone that could be worked with, when he was actually a murderous fanatic. And it seems so far that Putin is going to sucker Trump over Ukraine, and I fear Iran will too.
Like Roosevelt, Trump wants a deal. But as Barack Obama has shown, naive appeasement is the road to disaster. Only time will tell if the case with Iran is going to be another example.
But here, by way of distraction, I am writing about a person. This Yalta was a distinguished lady from a noble and wealthy family who lived in Babylon between the end of the Second and the Third centuries. She had a strong sense of self-worth, and self-confidence in an era of almost total male dominance. She was, according to Rashi, the daughter of the Exilarch, the head of the Jewish community in Babylon. She was familiar with Jewish law. But she had a temper. When she thought she was being slighted, she smashed four hundred barrels of wine after a guest offended her and women in general (TB Brachot 51b.)
Yalta showed her expertise in kashrut matters. In a debate that hinted at current questions of what constitutes meat if it is produced artificially, she asked her husband about kosher food that would taste like meat cooked in milk. She argued the halachic case expertly. And he accepted the argument (TB Chullin 109b). She also argued the law in other matters such as purity.
Yalta was a doctor too. She personally took Rav Amram to the bathhouse to soak in hot water for a cure when he was stricken with an unknown disease (TB Gittin 67b). And she offered her husband counsel on how to deal with someone who was arguing with him disrespectfully (TB Kidushin 70b). Perhaps these were not in themselves major issues — but they were indicative of her importance in that society, where the only chance women had beyond the home depended either on independent wealth or a compliant husband.
The more famous Talmudic woman however, was Bruria, the daughter of the saintly Chaninah Ben Teradion (an outstanding scholar, from a very wealthy family and martyred by the Romans). She was the wife of Rebbi Meir, who lived in Israel during the second century CE. He is the third most frequently mentioned rabbi in the Mishnah.
She was admired for her breadth of knowledge. She was said to have learned 300 laws from the rabbis on a single cloudy day (TB Pesachim 62b) and was happy to challenge rabbis she thought less knowledgeable than she was. She was also renowned for her sharp wit and often caustic jibes, attacking males for underestimating women. Rebbi Meir was sorely troubled by local louts and prayed that they should die. Bruria argued that he should rather pray that evil disappear. Not people.
The third important woman is Rav Chisda’s daughter. Her actual name is never mentioned. She was gifted with the power of prophecy. She predicted her marriage to her father’s two students (consecutively). First, she was the wife of the Rami Bar Chama, and after his death she married Rava (both were Amoraim of the third generation). She is mentioned many times in the Talmud and commentaries in the Talmud and its commentaries only as “the daughter of Rav Chisda.” The Talmud (TB Bava Batra 12b) says she sat on her father’s lap as he taught Torah in the academy and taught her and her sisters Torah and laws, personally. There were rabbis in those days and later who recognized the value of female scholarship and empowerment — even in times when the rest of the world resolutely refused to encourage it.
Right now, we need people who demonstrate leadership through creativity and flexibility. Most are being silenced by the plague of conformity and the fear of stepping out of line. But the reality is that more and more women within the Orthodox world are studying to the highest levels and making their mark. There are signs of their campaigning to achieve political power too. More power to their elbows (so long as they are covered of course)! You can’t keep a good woman down forever. And more young men are volunteering to serve in the army.
Trump seems to have learnt the lesson of Yalta. But will his natural desire for a long-term deal end up with his being suckered by Iran’s ideology of deceit to achieve victory? Time will tell. Meanwhile, I pray Israel will take a long hard look at its divisive politics.
The author is a writer and rabbi, currently based in New York.
The post Examining Three Remarkable Women From Jewish History in These Turbulent Times first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
RSS
Battling to Survive, Hamas Faces Defiant Clans and Doubts Over Iran
Hamas terrorists carry grenade launchers at the funeral of Marwan Issa, a senior Hamas deputy military commander who was killed in an Israeli airstrike during the conflict between Israel and Hamas, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, in the central Gaza Strip, Feb. 7, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Ramadan Abed
Short of commanders, deprived of much of its tunnel network, and unsure of support from its ally Iran, the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas is battling to survive in Gaza in the face of rebellious local clans and relentless Israeli military pressure.
Hamas fighters are operating autonomously under orders to hold out as long as possible, but the Islamist group is struggling to maintain its grip as Israel openly backs tribes opposing it, three sources close to Hamas said.
With a humanitarian crisis in Gaza intensifying international pressure for a ceasefire, Hamas badly needs a pause in the fighting, one of the people said.
Not only would a ceasefire offer respite to weary Gazans, who are growing increasingly critical of Hamas, but it would also allow the Islamist group to crush rogue elements, including some clans and looters who have been stealing aid, the person said.
To counter the immediate threat, Hamas has sent some of its top fighters to kill one rebellious leader, Yasser Abu Shabab, but so far he has remained beyond their reach in the Rafah area held by Israeli troops, according to two Hamas sources and two other sources familiar with the situation.
Reuters spoke to 16 sources including people close to Hamas, Israeli security sources, and diplomats who painted a picture of a severely weakened group, retaining some sway and operational capacity in Gaza despite its setbacks, but facing stiff challenges.
Hamas is still capable of landing blows: it killed seven Israeli soldiers in an attack in southern Gaza on Tuesday. But three diplomats in the Middle East said intelligence assessments showed it had lost its centralized command and control and was reduced to limited, surprise attacks.
An Israeli military official estimated Israel had killed 20,000 or more Hamas fighters and destroyed or rendered unusable hundreds of miles of tunnels under the coastal strip. Much of Gaza has been turned to rubble in 20 months of conflict.
One Israeli security source said the average age of Hamas fighters was “getting lower by the day.” Israeli security sources say Hamas is recruiting from hundreds of thousands of impoverished, unemployed, displaced young men.
Hamas does not disclose how many of its fighters have died.
“They’re hiding because they are being instantly hit by planes, but they appear here and there, organizing queues in front of bakeries, protecting aid trucks, or punishing criminals,” said Essam, 57 a construction worker in Gaza City.
“They’re not like before the war, but they exist.”
Asked for comment for this story, senior Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhri said the group was working for an agreement to end the war with Israel but “surrender is not an option.”
Hamas remained committed to negotiations and was “ready to release all prisoners at once,” he said, referring to Israeli hostages, but it wanted the killing to stop and Israel to withdraw.
‘IT DOESN’T LOOK GOOD’
Hamas is a shadow of the group that attacked Israel in 2023, killing 1,200 people and taking another 251 hostages. Israel responded with a military campaign aimed at freeing the hostages and dismantling Hamas.
The damage inflicted by Israel is unlike anything Hamas has suffered since its creation, with most of its top military commanders in Gaza killed. Founded in 1987, Hamas had gradually established itself as the main rival of the Fatah faction led by President Mahmoud Abbas and finally seized Gaza from his control in 2007.
With a US-brokered truce in the Iran-Israel war holding, attention has switched back to the possibility of a Gaza deal that might end the conflict and release the remaining hostages.
One of the people close to Hamas told Reuters it would welcome a truce, even for a couple of months, to confront the local clans that are gaining influence.
But he said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s terms for ending the war – including Hamas leaders leaving Gaza – would amount to total defeat, and Hamas would never surrender.
“We keep the faith, but in reality it doesn’t look good,” the source said.
Yezid Sayigh, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, said he believed Hamas was simply trying to survive. That was not just a physical challenge of holding out militarily, he said, but above all a political one.
“They face being eliminated on the ground in Gaza if the war doesn’t stop, but they also face being erased from any governing formula that ends the war in Gaza (if such a thing can be found),” he wrote in response to Reuters’ questions.
Palestinian tribes have emerged as part of Israel’s strategy to counter Hamas. Netanyahu has said publicly that Israel has been arming clans that oppose Hamas, but has not said which.
One of the most prominent challenges has come from Abu Shabab, a Palestinian Bedouin based in the Rafah area, which is under Israeli control.
Hamas wants Abu Shabab captured, dead or alive, accusing him of collaboration with Israel and planning attacks on the terrorist group, three Hamas sources told Reuters.
Abu Shabab controls eastern Rafah and his group is believed to have freedom of movement in the wider Rafah area. Images on their Facebook page show their armed men organizing the entry of aid trucks from the Kerem Shalom crossing.
Announcements by his group indicate that it is trying to build an independent administration in the area, though they deny trying to become a governing authority. The group has called on people from Rafah now in other areas of Gaza to return home, promising food and shelter.
In response to Reuters’ questions, Abu Shabab’s group denied getting support from Israel or contacts with the Israeli army, describing itself as a popular force protecting humanitarian aid from looting by escorting aid trucks.
It accused Hamas of violence and muzzling dissent.
A Hamas security official said the Palestinian security services would “strike with an iron fist to uproot the gangs of the collaborator Yasser Abu Shabab,” saying they would show no mercy or hesitation and accusing him of being part of “an effort to create chaos and lawlessness.”
Not all of Gaza’s clans are at odds with Hamas, however.
On Thursday, a tribal alliance said its men had protected aid trucks from looters in northern Gaza. Sources close to Hamas said the group had approved of the alliance’s involvement.
Israel said Hamas fighters had in fact commandeered the trucks, which both the clans and Hamas denied.
IRAN UNCERTAINTY
Palestinian analyst Akram Attallah said the emergence of Abu Shabab was a result of the weakness of Hamas, though he expected him to fail ultimately because Palestinians broadly reject any hint of collaboration with Israel.
Nevertheless, regardless of how small Abu Shabab’s group is, the fact Hamas has an enemy from the same culture was dangerous, he said. “It remains a threat until it is dealt with.”
Israel’s bombing campaign against Iran has added to the uncertainties facing Hamas. Tehran’s backing for Hamas played a big part in developing its armed wing into a force capable of shooting missiles deep into Israel.
While both Iran and Israel have claimed victory, Netanyahu on Sunday indicated the Israeli campaign against Tehran had further strengthened his hand in Gaza, saying it would “help us expedite our victory and the release of all our hostages.”
US President Donald Trump said on Wednesday that great progress was being made on Gaza, adding that the strike on Iran would help get the hostages released.
A Palestinian official close to Hamas said the group was weighing the risk of diminished Iranian backing, anticipating “the impact will be on the shape of funding and the expertise Iran used to give to the resistance and Hamas.”
One target of Israel’s campaign in Iran was a Revolutionary Guards officer who oversaw coordination with Hamas. Israel said Saeed Izadi, whose death it announced on Saturday, was the driving force behind the Iran–Hamas axis.
Hamas extended condolences to Iran on Thursday, calling Izadi a friend who was directly responsible for ties with “the leadership of the Palestinian resistance.”
A source from an Iran-backed group in the region said Izadi helped develop Hamas capabilities, including how to carry out complex attacks, including rocket launches, infiltration operations, and drones.
Asked about how the Israeli campaign against Iran might affect its support for Hamas, Abu Zuhri said Iran was a large and powerful country that would not be defeated.
The post Battling to Survive, Hamas Faces Defiant Clans and Doubts Over Iran first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
RSS
Israeli Strikes Targeting Hezbollah Pummel South Lebanon Hilltops
Smoke billows from the Nabatieh district, following Israeli strikes, as seen from Marjayoun, in southern Lebanon, June 27, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Karamallah Daher
More than a dozen Israeli air strikes battered a row of hilltops in southern Lebanon on Friday, security sources said, with the Israeli military saying it had attacked a damaged military site that terrorist group Hezbollah was seeking to restore.
The simultaneous strikes hit a mountainous strip near the southern Lebanese city of Nabatieh, according to the Lebanese security sources, who said Iran-backed Hezbollah likely still had arms depots there. There was no immediate comment from the Islamist group.
The Israeli military said its fighter jets had attacked a site used to manage Hezbollah’s “fire and defense system.” It said the site was destroyed in last year’s war but that Hezbollah was attempting to resume activities there in breach of the November truce that ended the conflict.
Lebanon‘s President Joseph Aoun on Friday fired the same accusation back at Israel, saying it was continually violating the US-brokered ceasefire deal by keeping up strikes on Lebanon.
The ceasefire deal stipulates that southern Lebanon must be free of any non-state arms or fighters, Israeli troops must leave southern Lebanon as Lebanese troops deploy there. and all fire across the Lebanese-Israeli border must stop.
Israeli troops remain in at least five posts within Lebanese territory and its air force regularly kills rank-and-file Hezbollah members or people affiliated with the group.
The post Israeli Strikes Targeting Hezbollah Pummel South Lebanon Hilltops first appeared on Algemeiner.com.