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It Is in Israel’s Interest to Uphold Egypt’s Role in Gaza
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. Photo: Russian Presidential Press and Information Office.
JNS.org – As could have been predicted well in advance, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, in power in Egypt since the overthrow of Mohammed Mursi in July 2013—and elected in 2014 and again in 2018—met with no difficulty in his 2023 bid to secure a third term in office. He won 89.6% of the vote, against a number of nearly anonymous pseudo-candidates.
At least in theory, this should serve to re-establish the legitimacy of his rule, both at home and in the eyes of regional and international players. And yet, in early 2024 he faces a troubling combination of woes and challenges—above all on the economic front—that, over time, may amount to a threat to the social order and hence the regime’s stability.
The Egyptian economy has been plagued for more than a year by the consequences of a severe balance of payments problem, the collapse of the Egyptian pound—which has lost more than half its value against the U.S. dollar since the autumn of 2022—and a growing difficulty in abiding by the requirements of the International Monetary Fund, which has already led to a delay in the disbursement of the loan it was supposed to receive under the terms of a December 2022 agreement. As a result, Egypt’s credit rating was downgraded by Moody’s, and there are signs that investors, including some of Egypt’s wealthiest men, are shifting their activities to the more stable and comfortable environment of the Gulf monarchies.
One of the driving factors behind this crisis is the shortage of essential supplies and their rising prices—above all, due to the war in Ukraine, which until February 2022 was the main source of Egypt’s wheat imports. Over the years, the long-term damage inflicted upon Egyptian agriculture by the Aswan High Dam (which stops the fertile silt from being carried downstream by the river) has diminished crop yields: recently, as sugar cane crops dwindled, Egypt’s 155-year-old sugar factory in Minya was forced to close down.
Another factor is the steady increase in Egypt’s population, which has gone well past the one hundred million threshold in recent years—including, by some estimates, up to 9 million refugees, mainly from Sudan but also from war-torn Libya and Syria. The combined result is that Egypt has turned from a grain exporter into one of the world’s largest importers of wheat and cereals. This dependence is the main reason that the Egyptian national debt has doubled since 2016, despite reform efforts made by Sisi early on in his years in power, such as cutting fuel subsidies.
Recent events have dealt a further, double blow to Egypt’s sources of revenue. Before the war in Gaza broke out, the tourist industry—one of the pillars of the Egyptian economy and a vital source of foreign currency—was already showing signs of decline, enhanced by regional tensions and violence. The slow revival which followed the end of the COVID-19 crisis has once again been thrown into reverse. The second and more recent blow—although this was initially denied by the Suez Canal Authority—is the increasingly severe decline in income from passage through the canal due to the Yemen Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping. Many major shipping groups now prefer the much longer route around the Cape of Good Hope, rather than risk sailing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait at the mouth of the Red Sea.
The Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is another troubling issue casting a long shadow over Egypt’s economy—and in the eyes of some Egyptians, over the nation’s sheer survival (a somewhat exaggerated fear, since Ethiopia does not intend to stop the Blue Nile altogether). The repeated attempts to achieve a negotiated agreement over the rate at which the reservoir would be filled have failed, and after the collapse of meetings in Addis Ababa in December 2023, Egypt has reverted once again to thinly veiled threats warning that they will not tolerate a shortage of water for a nation of one hundred million people. In practice, however, Egypt’s military options are limited, not least because of the civil war currently raging in Sudan.
Egypt’s role in the Gaza war
At these difficult times, it is Egyptian involvement in Palestinian affairs—Sisi hosted Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas for a tripartite summit with King Abdullah of Jordan on Jan. 10, 2024—specifically in Gaza, that lends Egypt additional weight, regionally and internationally. This is due to the direct and effective levers it has on Hamas “on the ground” (or rather under it) as well as its straightforward dialog with the Israeli leadership. Both efforts are led by the head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate, Maj. Gen. Abbas Kamel. Not for the first time, Egypt finds itself in fierce and practically open competition with Qatar, which hosts the Hamas leadership in Doha. Still, it has been the Egyptian efforts that have borne fruit so far with the hostage-prisoner swaps of November 2023.
Notably, Egypt avoids any semblance of formal legitimacy for Hamas operatives. While some of the movement’s leaders do reside in Cairo, Egypt does not grant them official status. This reflects Cairo’s continued commitment to the P.A. and Abbas as the sole representatives of the Palestinian people—another reason being Hamas’s affiliation with the hated Muslim Brotherhood, Sisi’s sworn enemies. In its 1988 covenant, Hamas explicitly defined itself openly as a branch of the Ikhwan—the Muslim Brotherhood—even if later, in their 2017 policy document, wary of Sisi’s hostility, they muted this aspect. As a result, it’s not the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs but rather Kamel’s organization that manages direct contacts with Hamas’s command structure in Gaza.
At the same time, Egypt’s control of the southern approaches to the Gaza Strip, and the crucial function of the Rafah Crossing, give Cairo unique leverage over Hamas. (There was widespread anger in Egypt over the false impression that the Israeli defense team in The Hague had accused Egypt of being responsible for the failure to arrange for the entry of humanitarian supplies to Gaza). Technical arrangements make it possible for Abbas Kamel to have direct—and occasionally blunt—conversations with Hamas leaders, including Yahya Sinwar, as well as to maintain at all times open channels with Israel.
All these aspects place Egypt in the lead: hence it was Cairo that put forward to both sides a plan for resolving the hostage situation that in its final phase would also lead to an end to the fighting (with Hamas surviving in Gaza). Israel at least gave it a hearing at the cabinet level; Palestinian Islamic Jihad and then Hamas rejected it out of hand. But Egypt’s efforts continue.
Egypt on Israel’s agenda
It continues to be in Israel’s interest for Sisi’s Egypt, rather than Qatar, to maintain the lead on the hostage situation, as both military pressure and indirect channels of communication are being used to generate progress once again. This preference should be shared with the Biden administration, which seems to be unduly beholden to the Qataris and at times insufficiently attentive to Egypt’s needs—and Egypt’s importance.
As Israel’s leadership has made all too clear, it will not accept an outline that means, in practice, an end to the fighting while Hamas retains its hold on power over at least parts of the Gaza Strip. There are reasons to believe that the Egyptians themselves, regardless of their formal position, share the understanding (as do others in the Arab world) that the future of the region may well depend on Israel’s ability to dismantle Hamas and take down a notch the muqawama (“resistance”) camp—led by Iran—and the myth of heroic achievements that has been built around it.
At the same time, Israel should invest consistent efforts at the highest level to sustain open channels of communication with Egypt, focusing on six key aspects:
Allaying fears that Israel intends to deport or induce masses of Gazans to migrate into Sinai. Due to repeated statements by senior members of Israel’s governing coalition, Cairo views this as a real threat, and the concerns expressed by Egypt are not a mere anti-Israeli propaganda ploy. Given the almost mystical attachment of Egyptians to “every grain of sand” of the country’s soil, this is a sensitive issue; it also raises the specter of renewed terror activity in northern Sinai, after years of bloody warfare against the “Sinai Province” of ISIL. An unambiguous Israeli commitment in this respect—even if it entailed political difficulties at home—would reassure Egypt and could provide legitimacy for its continued engagement with Israel on matters of importance to both countries—arguing that “this is what enabled us to prevent the deportations.”
Proceeding carefully and in close coordination with the Egyptian military as regards the achievement of full operational control of the so-called “Philadelphi Corridor.” Such control will ultimately serve the interests of Egypt as well, but the obvious sensitivity and the need to avoid friction requires further work to secure mutual understanding. Israel after all gave its consent again and again in the last decade to the deployment of significant Egyptian forces in Sinai, well above the levels allowed under the Military Annex of the 1979 Peace Treaty. It is thus entitled to a similar Egyptian recognition of the IDF’s operational needs.
Bringing Egypt into the inner circle of consultations on “the Day After” in Gaza, after the Americans but ahead of others—once Israel and the Biden administration engage in an orderly discussion of options and modalities, looking toward the future. In any strategic design chosen, Egypt is bound to play a role given its geographical position and its vital interests—although neither Egypt nor Israel are planning to rule Gaza directly by military force, as Egypt did from 1948 to 1967 and Israel did briefly in 1956 and again from 1967 to 2005.
Offering Egypt a vision whereby northern Sinai, which saw—as mentioned above—intensive warfare between the regime and ISIL, can become a vital logistical and economic hinterland for the reconstruction effort in Gaza, with significant benefits for all.
Building upon this option, and with a wider regional view, Israel should promote the economic and energetic integration of Northern Sinai, and of Egypt more generally, with other partners in the Eastern Mediterranean, including an improved port at al-Arish. Greece and Cyprus could join Israel and Egypt to create a new transport architecture that could also assist Gaza in “the Day After.”
Amid all this, Israel and its friends should systematically work to improve Egypt’s standing in the American (and allied) public domain, in Congress, and with key administration figures—seeking to underline the importance of Egypt’s role and the need to find solutions for its present difficulties, while neutralizing as much as possible the counter-pressures by “progressives” who remain focused on the iniquities of Sisi’s regime.
Originally published by The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.
The post It Is in Israel’s Interest to Uphold Egypt’s Role in Gaza first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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US Clamps Sanctions on Israel-bashing UN Rights Monitor Albanese

Francesca Albanese, UN special rapporteur on human rights in the Palestinian territories, attends a side event during the Human Rights Council at the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, March 26, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Denis Balibouse
The Trump administration has imposed sweeping sanctions against Francesca Albanese, the United Nations Special Rapporteur for the Occupied Palestinian Territories, citing the UN official’s lengthy record of singling out Israel for condemnation.
In a post on X, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced the sanctions under a February executive order targeting those who “prompt International Criminal Court (ICC) action against U.S. and Israeli officials, companies, and executives.” He accused Albanese of waging “political and economic warfare” against both nations and asserted that “such efforts will no longer be tolerated.”
“Today I am imposing sanctions on UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese for her illegitimate and shameful efforts to prompt [International Criminal Court] action against U.S. and Israeli officials, companies, and executives,” Rubio announced on X/Twitter.
“Albanese’s campaign of political and economic warfare against the United States and Israel will no longer be tolerated,” declared the Trump administration’s top foreign affairs official. “We will always stand by our partners in their right to self-defense.”
Rubio concluded: “The United States will continue to take whatever actions we deem necessary to respond to lawfare and protect our sovereignty and that of our allies.”
The decision to impose sanctions on Albanese marks an escalation in the ongoing feud between the White House and the United Nations over Israel. The Trump administration has repeatedly accused the UN and Albanese of unfairly targeting Israel and mischaracterizing the Jewish state’s conduct in Gaza.
Albanese, an Italian lawyer and academic, has held the position of UN special rapporteur on human rights in the Palestinian territories since 2022. The position authorizes her to monitor and report on alleged “human rights violations” by Israel against Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.
Last week, Albanese issued a scathing report accusing companies of helping Israel maintain a so-called “genocide economy.” She called on the companies to cut off economic ties with Israel and warned that they might be guilty of “complicity” in the so-called “genocide” in Gaza.
Critics of Albanese have long accused her of exhibiting an excessive anti-Israel bias, calling into question her fairness and neutrality.
Albanese has an extensive history of using her role at the UN to denigrate Israel and seemingly rationalize Hamas’ attacks on the Jewish state.
In the months following the Palestinian terrorist group’s atrocities across southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, Albanese accused the Jewish state of perpetrating a “genocide” against the Palestinian people in revenge for the attacks and circulated a widely derided and heavily disputed report alleging that 186,000 people had been killed in the Gaza war as a result of Israeli actions.
The action comes as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visits Washington, where he has received a warm reception from the Trump administration. Netanyahu has been meeting with US officials to discuss next steps in the ongoing Gaza military operation.
Gideon Sa’ar, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Israel, commended the Rubio announcement with his own post on X/Twitter, exclaiming: “A clear message. Time for the UN to pay attention!”
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Hardball: Trump Administration Reports Harvard to Accreditor Over Antisemitism Allegations

US President Donald Trump speaks during a Cabinet meeting at the White House in Washington, DC, July 8, 2025. Photo: Kevin Lamarque via Reuters Connect.
The Trump administration escalated its showdown against Harvard University on Wednesday, reporting the institution to its accreditor for alleged civil rights violations resulting from its weak response to reports of antisemitic bullying, discrimination, and harassment following Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023 massacre across southern Israel.
The US Department of Education (DOE) announced the action on Wednesday. Citing Harvard’s admitted failure to treat antisemitism as seriously as it treated others forms of hatred in the past, the DOE called on the New England Commission of Higher Education to review and, potentially, revoke its accreditation — a designation which qualifies Harvard for federal funding and attests to the quality of the educational services its provides.
“Accrediting bodies play a significant role in preserving academic integrity and a campus culture conducive to truth seeking and learning,” said Secretary of Education Linda McMahon. “Part of that is ensuring students are safe on campus and abiding by federal laws that guarantee educational opportunities to all students. By allowing anti-Semitic harassment and discrimination to persist unchecked on its campus, Harvard University has failed in its obligation to students, educators, and American taxpayers.”
The DOE, McMahon added, “expects the New England Commission of Higher Education to enforce its policies and practices, and to keep the Department fully informed of its efforts to ensure that Harvard is in compliance with federal law and accreditor standards.”
As previously reported by The Algemeiner, Harvard’s Presidential Task Force on Combating Antisemitism has acknowledged that the university administration’s handling of campus antisemitism fell well below its obligations under both Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its own nondiscrimination policies.
In a 300-plus-page report, the task force compiled a comprehensive record of antisemitic incidents on Harvard’s campus in recent years — from the Harvard Palestine Solidarity Committee’s endorsement of the Oct. 7 terrorist atrocities to an anti-Zionist faculty group’s sharing an antisemitic cartoon depicting Jews as murderers of people of color. The report identified Harvard’s past refusal to afford Jews the same protections against discrimination enjoyed by other minority groups as a key source of its problem.
Coming several weeks after President Donald Trump ordered the freeze of $2.26 billion in federal research grants and contracts for Harvard, the task force report found it was “clear” that antisemitism and anti-Israel bias have been fomented, practiced, and tolerated not only at Harvard but also within academia more widely.”
The university is now suing the federal government over the funding halt.
President Trump has spoken scathingly of Harvard, calling it, for example, an “Anti-Semitic, Far Left Institute … with students being accepted from all over the world that want to rip our Country apart” in an April post to his Truth Social platform.
In recent weeks, however, both Trump and McMahon had commended Harvard’s constructive response in negotiations over reforms the administration has asked it to implement as a precondition for restoring federal funds. The requested reforms include hiring more conservative faculty, shuttering diversity, equity, and inclusion [DEI] programs, and slashing the size of administrative offices tangential to the university’s central educational mission.
The administration has since changed its tone in the wake of a report by The Harvard Crimson that interim Harvard President Alan Garber has said “behind closed doors” that he has no intention of doing anything that would make Harvard more palatable to conservatives.
Earlier this month, the Trump administration’s Joint Task Force to Combat Antisemitism issued Harvard a formal “notice of violation” of civil rights law. Charging that Harvard willfully exposed Jewish students to a flood of racist and antisemitic abuse both in and outside of the classroom, it threatened to strip whatever remains of Harvard’s federal funding.
“Failure to institute adequate changes immediately will result in the loss of all federal financial resources and continue to affect Harvard’s relationship with the federal government,” wrote the federal officials comprising the multiagency Task Force. “Harvard may of course continue to operate free of federal privileges, and perhaps such an opportunity will spur a commitment to excellence that will help Harvard thrive once again.”
In Wednesday’s announcement, US Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. said Harvard’s conduct “forfeits the legitimacy that accreditation is designed to uphold.”
“HHS and Department of Education will actively hold Harvard accountable through sustained oversight until it restores public trust and ensures a campus free of discrimination,” he said.
Follow Dion J. Pierre @DionJPierre.
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IDF Strikes Hezbollah Sites in South Lebanon as Terror Group Pushes to Rebuild Amid US Disarmament Talks

IDF operating in southern Lebanon. Photo: IDF Spokesperson
Israeli forces uncovered and destroyed Hezbollah weapons caches in southern Lebanon on Wednesday, as a new report indicated that despite ongoing U.S.-led efforts to secure a disarmament deal, the Iran-backed group is making repeated, largely concealed attempts to rebuild its military presence in the area.
Troops carried out several operations targeting Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon on Wednesday morning, destroying weapons depots, explosives and multibarrel launchers concealed in forested terrain, the IDF said, in violation of the November ceasefire, which requires Hezbollah to withdraw its forces 20 miles from the Israeli border.
A new report released this week by the Alma Research and Education Center found that Hezbollah is focused on rebuilding in three areas: operational deployment, weapons acquisition, and financial recovery.
“Hezbollah didn’t give up its resistance narrative and motivation,” Alma’s director, Lt. Col. (Res.) Sarit Zehavi, told The Algemeiner.
“It wants to rebuild its capabilities and infrastructures, whether it’s the villages that will be used as human shields or the military infrastructure in South Lebanon and in Lebanon in general.”
According to Zehavi, Hezbollah is attempting to return Radwan fighters to positions south of the Litani River as part of a wider plan to restore its elite forces to operational readiness. The IDF on Monday killed Radwan commander Ali Abd al-Hassan Haidar in a targeted strike. The action came hours after US Special Envoy for Syria Thomas Barrack met with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri in Beirut to discuss a long-term deal that would include an Israeli withdrawal and complete disarmament of Hezbollah.
Barrack described the Lebanese response to the proposal as positive. Later, he issued a blunt warning to Hezbollah in response to a vow by the terror group’s leader, Naim Qassem, not to lay down its arms. “If they mess with us anywhere in the world, they will have a serious problem with us,” Barrack said in an interview with Lebanese news network LBCI. “They don’t want that.”
Zehavi said it was premature to predict the outcome of the diplomatic efforts. She warned that the challenge of disarming Hezbollah remains enormous and emphasized that the Lebanese Armed Forces have not demonstrated the capability or willingness to confront the group.
“It’s too soon to be optimistic or pessimistic,” she said, noting that no firm commitments have emerged from the Beirut talks.
Hezbollah’s efforts to smuggle and manufacture weapons have been complicated by both Israeli strikes and the regional realignment over recent months. While Israeli strikes have disrupted many supply routes, according to Zehavi, Syrian authorities have intercepted far more Hezbollah-bound weapons than the Lebanese Army, which claims to have uncovered 500 arms caches but has provided no evidence.
The financial front marks the third aspect of Hezbollah’s rebuilding effort. Last week, the group halted cash payments to Shiite civilians whose homes were damaged in the war, citing liquidity problems. Zehavi attributed the shortfall to disruptions in Iran’s funding networks — an outcome of the 12-day war against the regime in Tehran — and said the constraints would likely hamper Hezbollah’s ability to compensate its base and sustain operations.
“I hope they will continue to have problems with the cash flow, that way it will be very difficult for them to recover,” she said.
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