Uncategorized
Netanyahu’s new government could lose a critical constituency: American conservatives
WASHINGTON (JTA) — The op-ed was typical of the Wall Street Journal’s conservative editorial page, extolling the virtues of moderation in all things.
The difference was that the author of the piece published Wednesday, Bezalel Smotrich, has a reputation for extremism, and the political landscape he was imagining is in Israel, not America.
Experts who track the U.S.-Israel relationship say the op-ed had a clear purpose: to quell the fears of American conservatives whom Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has long cultivated as allies and who may be rattled by his new extremist partners in governing Israel.
Those partners include Smotrich, the Religious Zionist bloc leader and self-described “proud homophobe” whom Israeli intelligence officials have accused of planning terrorist attacks — and who was sworn in as finance minister in Netanyahu’s new government Thursday. They also include Itamar Ben-Gvir, who has been convicted of incitement for his past support of Jewish terrorists, who will oversee Israel’s police.
The presence of Smotrich, Ben-Gvir and their parties in Netanyahu’s governing coalition has alarmed American liberals, including some in the Biden administration. But insiders say conservatives are feeling spooked, too.
“The conservative right was with [Netanyahu] and now he seems to be riding the tiger of the radical right,” said David Makovsky, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy who just returned from a tour of Israel where he met with senior officials of both the outgoing and incoming governments. “And I think that is bound to alienate the very people who counted on him being risk-averse and to focus on the economy.”
In his op-ed published on Tuesday, two days before the new Israeli government was sworn in, Smotrich sought to persuade Americans that the new government is not the hotbed of ultranationalist and religious extremism it has been made out to be in the American press.
“The U.S. media has vilified me and the traditionalist bloc to which I belong since our success in Israel’s November elections,” he wrote. “They say I am a right-wing extremist and that our bloc will usher in a ‘halachic state’ in which Jewish law governs. In reality, we seek to strengthen every citizen’s freedoms and the country’s democratic institutions, bringing Israel more closely in line with the liberal American model.”
The op-ed is at odds with the stated aims of the coalition agreements; whereas Smotrich says there will be no legal changes to disputed areas in the West Bank, the agreements include a pledge to annex areas at an unspecified time, and to legalize outposts deemed illegal even under Israeli law. He says changes to religious practice will not involve coercion, but the agreement allows businesses to decline service “because of a religious belief,” which a member of his party has anticipated could extend to declining service to LGBTQ people.
Netanyahu has alienated the American left with his relentless attacks on its preference for a two-state outcome to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which he perceives as dangerous and naive. (He also differs from them on how to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.) He has instead cultivated a base on the right through close ties with the Republican Party and among evangelicals, made possible in part because he has long espoused the values traditional conservatives hold dear, including free markets and a united robust Western stance against extremism and terrorism.
But his alliance with Smotrich and others perceived as theocratic extremists may be a bridge too far even for Netanyahu’s conservative friends, who champion democratic values overseas, said Dov Zakheim, a veteran defense official in multiple Republican administrations.
“Traditional conservatives are much closer to the Bushes, and Jim Baker and those sorts of folks,” he said, referring to the two former presidents and the secretary of state under the late George H. W. Bush.
Jonathan Schanzer, a vice president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said the op-ed was likely written at Netanyahu’s behest with those conservatives in mind.
“The Wall Street Journal piece was designed to appeal to traditional conservatives,” he said. “It was designed to send a message to the American public writ large that the way in which Smotrich and perhaps [Itamar] Ben Gvir have been described is based on past utterances and not necessarily their forward-looking policies.”
The immediate predicate for the op-ed, insiders say, was likely a New York Times editorial on Dec. 17 that called the incoming government “a significant threat to the future of Israel” because of the extremist positions Smotrich and other partners have embraced, including the annexation of the West Bank, restrictions on non-Orthodox and non-Jewish citizens, diminishing the independence of the courts, reforming the Law of Return that would render ineligible huge chunks of Diaspora Jewry, and anti-LGBTQ measures.
Smotrich in his op-ed casts the changes not as radical departures from democratic norms but as tweaks that would align Israel more with U.S. values. He said he would pursue a “broad free-market policy” as finance minister. He likened religious reforms to the Supreme Court decision that allowed Christian service providers to decline work from LGBTQ couples.
“For example, arranging for a minuscule number of sex-separated beaches, as we propose, scarcely limits the choices of the majority of Israelis who prefer mixed beaches,” Smotrich wrote. “It simply offers an option to others.”
In the West Bank, Smotrich said, his finance ministry would promote the building of infrastructure and employment which would benefit Israeli Jewish settlers and Palestinians alike. “This doesn’t entail changing the political or legal status of the area.”
Such salves contradict the stated aims of the new government’s coalition agreement, Anshel Pfeffer, a Netanyahu biographer and analyst for Haaretz said in a Twitter thread picking apart Smotrich’s op-ed.
“Smotrich says his policy doesn’t mean changing the political or legal status of the occupied territories while annexation actually appears in the coalition agreement and his plans certainly change the legal status of the settlements,” Pfeffer said.
Danielle Pletka, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, said foreign media alarm at the composition of the incoming government was premature.
“I suspect that the vast mass of people will maintain the support that they have for Israel because it hasn’t got anything to do with the passing of one government to another and has everything to do with the principle that Israel is a pro-American democracy in a region that’s pretty important,” she said.
That said, Pletka said, the changes in policy embraced by Smotrich and his cohort could alienate Americans should they become policy.
“I think a lot of things can change if the rhetoric from Netanyahu’s government becomes policy, but right now, it’s rhetoric,” she said. “What you tend to see in normal governments is that they need to make a series of compromises between rhetoric that plays to their base and governance.”
Pletka said Netanyahuu’s stated ambition to expand the 2020 Abraham Accords to peace with Saudi Arabia would likely inhibit plans by Smotrich to annex the West Bank. In the summer of 2020, the last time Netanyahu planned annexation, the United Arab Emirates, one of the four Arab Parties to the Abraham Accords, threatened to pull out unless Netanyahu pulled back — which he did.
“It’s not just the relationship with the United States,” she said. “This might alienate their new friends in the Gulf, which, at the end of the day, may actually have more serious consequences.”
Netanyahu has repeatedly sought to relay the impression that he will keep his coalition partners on a short leash.
“They’re joining me, I’m not joining them,” he said earlier this month. “I’ll have two hands firmly on the steering wheel. I won’t let anybody do anything to LGBT [people] or to deny our Arab citizens their rights or anything like that.”
Zakheim said that Netanyahu, who is Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, from 1996 to 1999 and then from 2009 to 2021, has proven chops at steering rangy coalitions — but there are two key differences now.
Netanyahu wants his coalition partners to pass a law that would effectively end his trial for criminal fraud, and so they exercise unprecedented leverage over him. Additionally, Netanyahu in the past has faced the greatest pressure from haredi Orthodox parties, who are susceptible to suasion by funding their impoverished sector. That’s not true of his new ideologically driven partners.
“If you look at his past governments, he has really never been forced into real policy decisions by those to the right of him,” Zekheim said. “Now he’s got a problem because these 15 or so seats of those to his right are interested in policy, not just in money.”
Makovsky said Netanyahu appears to be leaving behind a conservatism that was sympathetic to the outlook of its American counterpart.
“His success has been that he’s a stabilizer. He’s risk-averse. He’s focused on the prosperity of the country, with high-tech success. He’s the one to be seen as the tenacious guardian against Iranian nuclear influence,” he said. “And those are things people could relate to. Now, it just seems like he’s just throwing the playbook out the window.”
—
The post Netanyahu’s new government could lose a critical constituency: American conservatives appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
Uncategorized
A last-ditch effort to dismantle Israeli democracy
As Israelis prepare for what may be the most consequential election in the country’s history on Oct. 27, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition has launched an extraordinary legislative blitz before the Knesset’s coming summer recess, which begins at the end of this week. Already the coalition has passed a pair of laws legitimizing Haredi draft evasion; the plan also includes a series of bills weakening democratic oversight.
Viewed individually, these initiatives appear to be about technical legal questions that might appear arcane to anyone not steeped in Israeli constitutional law. Viewed together, they’re clearly a coordinated attempt to weaken nearly every independent institution capable of restraining executive power.
That includes the civil service and the office of the attorney general, as well as independent regulators and the mechanism by which the greatest governmental failure in Israeli history, the Oct. 7 massacre, will eventually be investigated.
The legislative package is, in other words, a constitutional project meant to entrench elected autocracy.
The comparison many Israelis now invoke is Turkey, where President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did not abolish elections. Instead, he gradually weakened the institutions capable of constraining executive power while maintaining democratic forms. Today Turkey ranks 163rd out of 180 countries in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index.
Critics don’t fear that Israel will become Turkey overnight. But they understand that democracies can erode incrementally through legal mechanisms enacted by elected governments.
The Basic Law: Torah Study
The cornerstone of the legislative effort recognizes long-term Torah study as a meaningful service to the state and the Jewish people. This is critical for entrenching the support of the Haredi community for Netanyahu; without them, he has no hope of a majority.
It was passed into law late Monday, despite wall-to-wall opposition by parties not in Netanyahu’s coalition.
Few Jewish Israelis dispute the historic importance of Torah study. Critics object instead to the law’s practical purpose, which is to provide constitutional protection for the continued exemption of huge numbers of Haredi yeshiva students from military service, making future judicial intervention far more difficult.
The law also aims to ensure such students will receive the same amount of financial support as military veterans.
In nearly three years of war, reservists have repeatedly returned to the front — sometimes for hundreds of days a year — while tens of thousands of Haredi youth have remained exempt. In that context, it’s no surprise that the vast majority of Israelis oppose the exemptions. Only about a fifth support them — just slightly more than the country’s Haredi population.
A linked proposal blocking arrests of Haredi draft evaders passed Tuesday, again in the face of massive mobilization by the opposition and howls of protest from chiefs of the security establishment. Israel Defense Forces chief Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir warned that the move would encourage evasion and, in a rare direct rebuke to the government, said it was “clearly and unequivocally inconsistent with the IDF’s needs.”
The government’s argument is that criminal law cannot resolve a social dispute decades in the making. But the practical consequence is to create two classes of citizens: those who face legal consequences for refusing military service, and those who do not. During the Israeli military’s gravest manpower crisis in generations, that distinction is both morally and constitutionally corrosive.
Weakening legal safeguards
Another proposal would split the Attorney General’s dual function as legal adviser to the government and chief public prosecutor.
Supporters note that several democracies separate those roles. But Israel’s institutional structure is unusual, and that the Attorney General has long served as one of the principal safeguards against executive abuse. This office, critics contend, is essential in a country that has no constitution, no bicameral parliament, no federal structure, and no legislators beholden to voters directly instead of party leadership.
Weakening that office becomes especially troubling when the sitting prime minister remains on trial.
At the same time, the coalition has advanced legislation that would weaken legal advisers to cabinet ministers. Right now, those advisers must answer primarily to professional legal standards. The coalition wants them to become substantially more accountable to the ministers themselves — transforming lawyers whose job is to prevent unlawful government action into political employees expected to facilitate it.
All these bills are related to Netanyahu’s wider effort to weaken Israel’s judiciary in 2023, which sparked a spasm of protests that ended only with the Oct. 7 Hamas invasion and massacre. If Netanyahu wins another term in office in October, expect the most contentious parts of that overhaul to be revived, including a massive politicization of judicial appointments, and an “override” allowing parliament to overrule judicial decisions.
The Oct. 7 inquiry
Also related to the judicial overhaul — although it may not appear to be — is the inquiry over Israel’s security and intelligence failures on Oct. 7.
Rather than establishing the traditional independent state commission chaired by a retired Supreme Court justice, the coalition has promoted a political alternative — which is part and parcel of its efforts to undermine the Supreme Court by painting it as a tool of the liberal opposition.
Under the government’s proposal, which last week passed the first of three required readings, the inquiry would be made up equally by coalition and opposition supporters, but controlled by the coalition. That is meant to sound fair, but it politicizes the procedure by definition, and guarantees that findings would be disputed.
The principle is simple: A government should not exercise decisive influence over investigations into their own failures. The very purpose of an independent inquiry is to establish facts without interference by political interests. That is what happened in the wake of previous government failures, including the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre in Lebanon.
This trick comes after years in which Netanyahu insisted that no commission could exist while warfare continued, which raised concerns that this incentivized a forever war. At the same time, the Netanyahu social media machine has promoted the so-called “internal betrayal” conspiracy theory, claiming Israel’s security establishment purposely allowed the massacre in order to harm Netanyahu — a baseless claim that about a third of Israelis now actually believe. This, too, factors into Netanyahu’s culture war. Inciting against the security establishment, set up by Israel’s founding generations to be apolitical, is key to his plan to establish an autocracy.
In the background is the precedent set by the government last week when the cabinet announced that it would refuse to recognize the practical consequences of a binding Supreme Court ruling involving the Second Authority for Television and Radio. The move — again seemingly arcane — created a shocking precedent for future refusals to heed court challenges of all the above reforms and decisions.
That’s the real point of this plan: to set up the coming election as a battle between elected politicians and the court. If the Supreme Court strikes down any of this legislation while Netanyahu remains in power, he will spin their rulings to try and further delegitimize them, and entrench his own rule.
The good news is that Israel’s democratic traditions run deep. During the 2023 protests, millions of Israelis demonstrated that they are prepared to defend liberal democratic institutions with extraordinary persistence. And opposition leaders have vowed to repeal all these laws should they win the October election.
Netanyahu’s coalition has devoted enormous political capital not to rebuilding shattered public confidence, but rather to reshaping the institutions designed to hold them accountable. That is why Israelis must understand that what’s at stake isn’t one or two offputting laws. It’s about nothing less than whether Israel will remain a democracy.
The post A last-ditch effort to dismantle Israeli democracy appeared first on The Forward.
Uncategorized
The past engagement of Yiddish with Communism and its legacy today
דער „אינטערנאַציאָנאַלער אַרבעטער אָרדן“ איז געװען אַ מין יוצא־דופֿן צװישן אַמעריקאַנער עפֿנטלעכע און פּאָליטישע אָרגאַניזאַציעס, צום גרויסן טייל — צוליב זײַן פֿילשפּראַכיקײט. ער האָט געהאַט ניט ווייניקער ווי זעכצן שפּראַך־בראַנזשעס פֿאַר פֿאַרשײדענע אמיגראַנטישע עדות. זײַן הױפּטצװעק איז געװען צו באַזאָרגן אַרבעטער מיט פֿינאַנציעלער פֿאַרזיכערונג און העלפֿן זײ אין זײער קאַמף פֿאַר בירגערלעכע און פּאָליטישע רעכט.
דער אָרדן האָט אויך געהאַט אַ ספּעציעלע בראַנזשע פֿאַר אַפֿריקאַנער אַמעריקאַנער ווײַל דער ענין פֿון ראַסע־יושרדיקײט איז געװען פּונקט אַזױ חשובֿ װי אַלע אַנדערע באַוועגונגען פֿאַר גערעכטיקייט.
די מחברים פֿונעם זאַמלבוך „פֿונעם פֿאָלקספֿראָנט צו דער קאַלטער מלחמה“, רעדאַקטירט פֿון עליסאַ סאַמפּסאָן און ראָבערט זעקער, באַהאַנדלען די טעטיקײט פֿון צוויי בראַנזשעס אינעם „אָרדן“: דער ייִדישער און דער אַפֿריקאַנער־אַמעריקאַנער. דאָס רובֿ פֿאָרשונגען אינעם בוך שעפּן מאַטעריאַל פֿון דער אַרכיװאַלער זאַמלונג בײַם קאָרנעל־אוניװערסיטעט.
דער אָרדן איז געגרינדט געוואָרן אין 1930. נאָך דער פּאָליטישער שפּאַלטונג אינעם ייִדישן „אַרבעטער רינג“, האָבן אַרום 500 מיטגלידער פֿאַרלאָזט די אָרגאַניזאַציע און געשאַפֿן אַן אײגענע פּאָליטישע גרופּע, באַקאַנט ווי „די לינקע“. די דאָזיקע גרופּע איז געװאָרן די ייִדישע בראַנזשע אינעם נײַעם „אינטערנאַציאָנאַלן אַרבעטער אָרדן“.
פֿון סאַמע אָנהײב איז דער אָרדן געװען נאָענט פֿאַרבונדן מיט דער אַמעריקאַנער קאָמוניסטישער פּאַרטײ, און די פּאָליטישע ליניע פֿון דער דאָזיקער פּאַרטײ איז דיקטירט געװאָרן פֿונעם קאָמוניסטישן אינטערנאַציאָנאַל אין מאָסקװע.
אין די 1930ער יאָרן האָט סטאַלין בדעה געהאַט צו שאַפֿן אַ ברײטן פֿאָלקספֿראָנט (פּאָפּולערן פֿראָנט), װאָס זאָל אַרײַננעמען כּלערלײ פּראָגרעסיװע אָבער ניט אױסגעשפּראָכן קאָמוניסטישע קולטורעלע, עפֿנטלעכע און פּראָפֿעסיאָנעלע אָרגאַניזאַציעס, כּלומרשט ניט קײן קאָמוניסטישע, אָבער סימפּאַטעטישע פֿאַרן סאָװעטן פֿאַרבאַנד.
דער אָרדן איז געװען אַזאַ מין אָרגאַניזאַציע. ער האָט צוגעצױגן מאַסן אַרבעטער, דער עיקר אימיגראַנטן, צוליב צוטריטלעכע פֿאַרזיכערונגען און פֿאַרשײדענע אַקטיװיטעטן אױף זײערע שפּראַכן.
לרובֿ זײַנען די מיטגלידער ניט געװען קײן קאָמוניסטן און האָבן געהאַט אַ קנאַפּן אינטערעס אין דער קאָמוניסטישער אידעאָלאָגיע, הגם די אָנפֿירער פֿונעם אָרדן, אַזעלכע װי משה אָלגין, זײַנען טאַקע יאָ געװען פּאַרטײ־מיטגלידער.
דערבײַ האָט די אַמעריקאַנער קאָמוניסטישע פּאַרטײ ניט געװאָלט שאַפֿן אַן אײַנדרוק, אַז זי איז אַן אָרגאַניזאַציע פֿון אימיגראַנטן. דערפֿאַר האָט די פּאַרטײ ניט אונטערגעהאַלטן נאָענטע באַציִונגען מיטן אָרדן.
אָפֿיציעל האָט די פּאַרטײ באַװיליקט די קולטורעלע און לינגװיסטישע אַמעריקאַניזאַציע פֿון אימיגראַנטן, בעת דער אָרדן האָט געפֿירט די אַרבעט אױף די שפּראַכן פֿון זײַנע מיטגלידער: ייִדיש, איטאַליעניש, פֿיניש, סלאָװאַקיש, פּױליש און אַנדערע, און דערבײַ אַ ביסל אָפּגעשוואַכט זײער אַסימילאַציע.
די פּראָ־סאָװעטישע פּאָליטיק פֿונעם אָרדן אין די 1930ער יאָרן האָט ניט דערלאָזט זײַנע ייִדישע מיטגלידער מיטאַרבעטן מיט אַנדערע ייִדישע אָרגאַניזאַציעס, בפֿרט ציוניסטישע. דאָס האָט זיך אָבער געביטן בעת דער צװײטער װעלט־מלחמה, שרײַבט סאַמפּסאָן. אַ היפּשע ראָלע האָט דערבײַ געשפּילט דער באַזוך פֿון די אָנפֿירער פֿונעם מאָסקװער ייִדישן אַנטי־פֿאַשיסטישן קאָמיטעט שלמה מיכאָעלס און איציק פֿעפֿער אין אַמעריקע אין 1943. פֿעפֿער האָט ספּעציעל באַזוכט דעם קעמפּ „קינדערלאַנד“.
צוליב דער נײַער „אַחדות“־פּאָליטיק איז די ייִדישע בראַנזשע פֿונעם אָרדן אַרײַנגענומען געװאָרן אין דער הױפּטשטראָמיקער „אַמעריקאַנער ייִדישער קאָנפֿערענץ“, װוּ זי האָט מיטגעאַרבעט אַפֿילו מיט די ציוניסטן.
אין 1944 איז די ייִדישע בראַנזשע געװאָרן אַ מין אומאָפּהענגיקע אָרגאַניזאַציע — דער „ייִדישער פֿראַטערנאַלער פֿאָלקס־אָרדן“. דער נײַער אָרדן האָט זיך דערװײַטערט פֿון זײַן קאָמוניסטישן עיזבֿון און זיך אָפּגעגעבן, דער עיקר, מיט ייִדישע ענינים. נאָך 1945 האָבן זײ זיך אָפּגעגעבן מיט דער הילף פֿאַר דער שארית־הפּליטה אין אײראָפּע.
די קאַלטע מלחמה איז געװען אַ טאָפּלטע מפּלה. אין אַמעריקע האָבן זיך אָנגעהױבן רדיפֿות אױף קאָמוניסטן, בעת אינעם סאָװעטן־פֿאַרבאַנד האָט סטאַלין צו נישט געמאַכט די גאַנצע ייִדישע קולטור. סוף־כּל־סוף איז דער אַמעריקאַנער „פֿאָלקס־אָרדן“ ליקװידירט געװאָרן אין 1955.
בילדונג איז געװען אַ װיכטיקער טײל פֿון זייער פּאָליטישער אַרבעט. אין 1926 האָבן די לינקע ייִדישיסטן אין ניו־יאָרק געשאַפֿן דעם „ייִדישן אַרבעטער אוניװערסיטעט“, װאָסער ציל איז געװען צו דערציִען אַ נײַעם דור פּאָליטישע אַקטיװיסטן, װאָס זאָלן זײַן באַהאַװנט סײַ אין דער ייִדישער קולטור און סײַ אין דער מאַרקסיסטישער טעאָריע.
דאָס איז געװען „אײנע פֿון די אַנשטאַלטן אינעם גערעם פֿונעם ברײטערן פּראָיעקט פֿון ייִדישע קאָמוניסטן צו שאַפֿן אַן אײגענע קולטור־װעלט“, שרײַבט דילאַן קאַופֿמאַן־אָבסטלער. צו דעם דאָזיקן פּראָיעקט האָבן געהערט אױך קעמפּ „קינדערלאַנד“, דער װױנונג־קאָאָפּעראַטיװ אין דער בראָנקס — די „אַמאַלגאַמייטעד“ — און די קאָמוניסטישע צײַטונג „מאָרגן־פֿרײַהײט“.
אַלע ייִדישע קאָמוניסטישע פּראָיעקטן, און דער אוניװערסיטעט בתוכם, האָבן געהאַט אַן אינערלעכע סתּירה אין זײער תּוך. פֿון אײן זײַט איז זײער ציל געװען אָפּצוהיטן ייִדיש און די װעלטלעכע ייִדישע קולטור אינעם אַמעריקאַנער „שמעלצטאָפּ“. פֿון דער אַנדערער זײַט האָט מען געגלױבט אינעם אַלװעלטלעכן קאָמוניסטישן אינטערנאַציאָנאַל אָן קײן שום נאַציאָנאַלע גרענעצן.
די דאָזיקע סתּירה האָט גורם געװען שפּאַנונגען אין דער ייִדישער קאָמוניסטישער סבֿיבֿה. אין די 1930ער יאָרן זײַנען זײ נאָך געװען ביכולת צו געפֿינען אַ פּשרה. מען האָט געטענהט, אַז ייִדיש איז געװען דער סאַמע פּאַסיקסטער מיטל צו פֿאַרשפּרײטן קאָמוניסטישע אידעען בײַ די ייִדישע אימיגראַנטן.
אָבער די דאָזיקע סתּירה איז געװאָרן נאָך שאַרפֿער בעת דער צװײטער װעלט־מלחמה, װען די טראַגעדיע פֿונעם ייִדישן חורבן איז געװאָרן װיכטיקער פֿאַר אַמעריקאַנער ייִדן אײדער דער קאָמוניסטישער חלום.
װי אַקטועל איז די דאָזיקע געשיכטע װעגן דעם שידוך צװישן ייִדישקײט און קאָמוניזם פֿאַרן הײַנטיקן פּאָליטישן סדר־היום? אין די 1930ער יאָרן האָבן ייִדישע אימיגראַנטן פֿון מזרח־אײראָפּע לרובֿ געהערט צו דעם אַרבעטער־קלאַס. זײ האָבן נאָך געהאַט זײער שפּראַך, ייִדיש, און פֿאַרמאָגט אַ שטאַרקע עטנישע אידענטיטעט. דערצו האָבן זײ געליטן פֿון אַנטיסעמיטיזם, װאָס איז געװען פֿאַרשפּרײט, דער עיקר, צװישן װײַסע אַמעריקאַנער נאַציאָנאַליסטן. אױף דעם דאָזיקן יסוד האָט מען געקענט בױען אַ ברײטע מאַסן־באַװעגונג, װאָס זאָל פֿאַראײניקן אימיגראַנטן און די אַפֿריקאַנער אַמעריקאַנער.
דער איצטיקער מצבֿ איז אַנדערש. הײַנט געהערן ייִדן אין אַמעריקע לרובֿ צו דעם מיטלשטאַנד, און זײער עטנישער אָפּשטאַם איז אַן ענין פֿאַר נאָסטאַלגישע מעשׂיות. אָבער זײער סאָציאַלער אױפֿקום האָט ניט בטל געמאַכט דעם אַנטיסעמיטיזם.
נאָך מער, הײַנט איז אַנטיסעמיטיזם פֿאַרשפּרײט אי בײַ די רעכטע „מאַגאַ“־נאַצינאַליסטן אי בײַ די ראַדילאַקע לינקע. כּדי צו װערן אַן „אײגענער“ בײַ די לינקע, מוז אַ ייִדישער אַקטיװיסט זיך אָפּלײקענען פֿון ציוניזם און מדינת־ישׂראל.
דאָ קומט צו נוץ די אַלטע ירושה פֿונעם ייִדישיסטישן קאָמוניזם. מען זעט דערין אַ מין אַלטערנאַטיװע ייִדישקײט, װאָס איז אי פּראָגרעסיװ אי אַנטי־ציוניסטיש. אָבער װי אַזױ קען מען מחיה־מתים זײַן די לעבעדיקע ייִדישע סבֿיבֿה פֿון יענער תּקופֿה? אין יענע יאָרן האָבן די ייִדן — ניט געקוקט אױף זייערע טיפֿע פּאָליטישע חילוקי־דעות —פֿאָרט געהאַט אַ וויכטיקע זאַך בשותּפֿות: די אײגענע שפּראַך און קולטור.
The post The past engagement of Yiddish with Communism and its legacy today appeared first on The Forward.
Uncategorized
‘The Winter’s Tale’ is one of Shakespeare’s most confounding plays; was it also his most Jewish?
We all know about Shakespeare’s anti-Jewish play. But did he also write a Jewish play? Well, not explicitly or consciously, but The Winter’s Tale, which begins performances July 25 at the Public Theater’s Delacorte Theater in Central Park, appears to be full of Jewish motifs — themes from the Hebrew Bible (filtered through the Christian Bible, of course).
The play is a tale of exile, the abandonment of a child, years in the wilderness, repentance, homecoming and redemption. It is reminiscent at least in part of the stories of Moses in Egypt and the Exodus, as well as Joseph and his brothers.
Daniel Sullivan, the play’s director at the Delacorte, told me over the phone that he thought the biblical connection was an interesting idea — “certainly a possibility,” he said. Sullivan, 86, was less certain whether Shakespeare had explored these biblical themes “knowledgeably or whether it was something he simply shared” with the time. A version of those themes can be found, for example, in the source of the play’s plot, the 1588 tragic pastoral romance novella Pandosto: The Triumph of Time by Robert Greene.
Scholars have written about these biblical allusions. But The Winter’s Tale is of course about much more than that. “I’ve always been amazed by it,” Sullivan said. “It’s a play that’s sort of impossible. It’s a difficult piece in terms of both its tragic and comic elements. But it’s also one of the most moving of all of Shakespeare’s plays and one of the most human.”
The play’s first half lurches into utter Shakespearean tragedy, then miraculously changes direction and turns into Shakespearean comedy. Leontes, king of Sicilia, becomes insanely jealous, believing his pregnant wife, Hermione, has been unfaithful with his longtime and childhood friend, the king of Bohemia. He imprisons her, she gives birth in prison, she is tried and collapses in court and it is announced that she has died.
Leontes and Hermione’s young son, Mamillius, dies of grief. Leontes exiles his newborn daughter, who is taken to the kingdom of Bohemia, where she is abandoned and discovered by a shepherd, who raises her as his own. Sixteen years pass before she returns to Sicilia, as the play begins its surprising metamorphosis. Hermione — magically — reappears and there is an (almost) happy denouement.
The opening part of the play is an intensely detailed —especially for the time it was written — example of irrational psychology, of Leontes’ jealousy and delusion — it is, Sullivan said, “very challenging” to direct.
And then, when you think all will be lost, as in King Lear, or Hamlet, or Othello, the playwright reverses the course of his tragic source material. (Things do not end happily for King Pandosto of Pandosto.)
Why does Sullivan think Shakespeare decided to veer away from his play’s, and Pandosto’s, disastrous path? One possibility, he said, is that Shakespeare could see that he could create “a fantastical element in it — that for 16 years Hermione has been hiding somewhere.” (In Pandosto the queen just dies.) “It’s sort of wonderfully out there in terms of a plot device. And I think that Shakespeare gloried in that. It goes from extremely tragic to very charming, and there aren’t a lot of Shakespeare’s plays that are like that,” Sullivan said.
But there’s something else. The play is, after all, a tale of redemption and forgiveness. It’s a late play, written around 1609-1611 — Shakespeare died in 1616 — and, Sullivan said, the play’s late birth perhaps had something to with its theme. “I think whether he knew the end was coming or not, certainly the idea of redemption is sort of the undergirding of this play.”
Even so, the ending is not a completely happy one. Mamillius, the royal family’s son, does not return. “That’s one of the elements of the play that Shakespeare buries a little bit,” Sullivan said.
Could Shakespeare have been thinking of his own young son, Hamnet, who died of the plague at age 11? “I think that’s probably true,” said Sullivan.
Still, Sullivan has managed in a way to bring back the king’s son. “One of the things we do with this,” he said, “is when the character of Time comes out to tell us what’s happened,” that 16 years have passed in the story, “we actually use the character of Mamillius as a sort of angel to tell us.”
Sullivan has been directing professionally for more than a half-century and has helmed more than 30 plays on Broadway. He won the directing Tony Award for David Auburn’s Proof in 2001, and has received seven other Tony nominations. He is also very much a Shakespeare maven. This is his 12th production for Free Shakespeare in the Park.
Directing Shakespeare has long been, and remains, special for Sullivan. “ I just love being around it more than anything else,” he said. “I love getting deeply into it, and researching it as much as I possibly can. I’ve done a lot of the plays more than once, and every time I come back to them they always seem completely different to me. I think about my own life and, in the way that I see things differently than I did 20 years ago, I see these plays differently.”
The Winter’s Tale contains perhaps the most famous stage direction in all of Shakespeare — “Exit, pursued by a bear.” This summer, will the Delacorte, long a home to scene-stealing raccoons, bear witness to a much larger stage creature?
“The one thing I really didn’t want to do was have a man in a bear suit chasing the actor across the stage. It’s just too funny. It’s possible that Shakespeare wanted it to be rather comic. But we find it rather tragic. So we’re doing it in a way that I think will be somewhat surprising. I’m not going to tell you. People will have to come and see.”
Performances of The Winter’s Tale run through Aug. 23 at the Delacorte.
The post ‘The Winter’s Tale’ is one of Shakespeare’s most confounding plays; was it also his most Jewish? appeared first on The Forward.
