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On Iran, Israel’s Policy of Nuclear Ambiguity Is Outdated and Dangerous

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei visits the Iranian centrifuges in Tehran, Iran, June 11, 2023. Photo: Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS

Israel’s nuclear posture remains “deliberately ambiguous.” In the past, this stance appears to have been sensible, even incontestable. Today, however, during a continuing Gaza War and following unprecedented missile aggressions from Iran, it requires fundamental reconsideration. In essence, there are compelling reasons to argue that Israel’s traditional “bomb in the basement” posture is no longer tenable.

There are clarifying particulars. A prudent nuclear posture for Israel should necessarily be based upon calculable assessments of all plausible options. At a minimum, any cost-effective changes of Israeli nuclear ambiguity would need to be readily identifiable but also not be gratuitously provocative. For a time, such changes might need to remain implicit in the small country’s codified military doctrine.

Israel, after all, is less than half the size of America’s Lake Michigan.

A comprehensive Israeli strategic doctrine represents the general framework from which any specific posture of deliberate nuclear ambiguity or selective nuclear disclosure would be extracted. More precisely, the principal importance of Israeli nuclear doctrine lies not only in the several ways that it can animate, unify, and optimize the state’s armed forces, but also in the more-or-less efficient manner in which it could transmit cautionary messages to enemy state Iran and sub-state surrogate Hamas.

Understood in terms of Israel’s many-sided strategic policy, any continuous across-the-board nuclear ambiguity could have existential consequences. This is because effective deterrence and defense policies call for a military doctrine that is at least partially recognizable by adversary states and terrorist proxies. Today, as Israel decides on whether to re-ignite a multi-front war with Iran — a war that could prove indispensable to preventing Iranian nuclear weapons — such “wise counsel” is conspicuously urgent.

For Israel, any ultimate and durable military success against Iran must lie in credibly-layered nuclear deterrence options, never in nuclear war-fighting. Recalling ancient Chinese military thought offered by Sun-Tzu in The Art of War, “Supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.” Soon, in the overriding matter of nuclear deterrence, Israeli decision-makers will need to acknowledge that there are occasions when too much further secrecy would degrade the country’s national security.

Israel’s nuclear weapons should always be oriented to deterrence ex ante, not revenge ex post. Nuclear weapons can succeed only in their calculated non-use. By definition, once they have been used for actual battle, nuclear deterrence will have failed, perhaps irremediably. Once they were used in any possible form, tactical or strategic, all traditional meanings of “victory” would immediately become moot.

Israel’s nuclear deterrence posture could have certain counter-terrorism benefits, but only with direct regard to Iran. Reciprocally, allowing itself to be weakened by Iran-backed terrorists (Sunni or Shia) could enlarge Israel’s existential vulnerabilities to the Islamic Republic. In evaluating such perplexing interconnections, Israeli planners will have to devote continuous attention to all possible synergies and “force multipliers.”

The original Cold War is over; still, “Cold War II” is underway between the United States, Russia, and (this time) China. If Iran is allowed to become nuclear, Israel’s deterrence relationship with Iran would never be comparable to what earlier was obtained between the US and the USSR. In such unique or sui generis circumstances, any unmodified continuance of total nuclear ambiguity could cause an already-nuclear Iran to underestimate or overestimate Israel’s nuclear retaliatory capacity. Either kind of misestimating could lead to catastrophic war.

The world is a system. Accordingly, various uncertainties surrounding Israel’s nuclear posture could lead other enemy states to reach similar kinds of misunderstanding. For example, Israel’s willingness to make good on any threatened nuclear retaliation could sometime be taken as inversely related to weapon system destructiveness. Ironically, therefore, if Israel’s nuclear weapons were thought “too destructive,” they might not deter.

Any continuing Israeli posture of deliberate nuclear ambiguity could cause terrorist-mentoring Iran to overestimate the first-strike vulnerabilities of Israel’s nuclear forces. This could be the result of a too-rigorous silence concerning measures of protection deployed to safeguard Israel’s nuclear weapons and infrastructures. Alternatively, such an over-estimation could represent the product of Israeli doctrinal opacity regarding the country’s potential for defense, an absence of transparency that would be wrongly interpreted as fragile or “porous” ballistic missile defense.

Though any such Iranian conclusion would seem preposterous after Israel’s extraordinary recent success at active defense, anything less than a 100% probability of interception would be inadequate vis-a-vis Iranian nuclear attacks.

To deter an enemy state attack or post-preemption retaliation against Israel, Jerusalem must always prevent a rational aggressor, via threats of unacceptably damaging retaliation or counter-retaliation, from deciding to strike first. Understood in such a “classic” context, Israel’s national security should now be sought by convincing a presumptively rational Iranian attacker that the costs of any considered attack on Israel would exceed the expected benefits.

Assuming that Iran values its national self-preservation more highly than any other preference or combination of preferences, and that it would always choose rationally among all alternative options, that enemy state will refrain from launching any attack on an Israel that is believed willing and able to deliver unacceptably damaging reprisals.

The “bottom line” should be clear in Jerusalem. Israel’s security posture of deliberate nuclear ambiguity is outdated and dangerous. With Israel’s operational nuclear forces and doctrine kept locked away in its metaphoric “basement,” Iran could conclude, rightly or wrongly, that a first-strike attack or post-preemption reprisal against Israel would be rational and cost-effective. But if relevant Israeli doctrine were made more obvious to Tehran, Israel’s nuclear forces could more reliably serve their existential security functions.

Another critical success factor of Israeli nuclear doctrine is “presumed willingness.” How can Israel convince Iranian decision-makers that it possesses the resolve to deliver an appropriately destructive retaliation or counter retaliation? The answer to this core question lies in antecedent strategic doctrine, in Israel’s estimated strength of commitment to carry out such an attack and in the tangible nuclear ordnance that would likely be available.

Any continued ambiguity over Israel’s nuclear posture could create the erroneous impression of a state that is unwilling to retaliate. Conversely, any doctrinal movement toward some as-yet-undetermined level of nuclear disclosure could heighten the impression that Israel is actually willing to follow-through on its pertinent nuclear threats.

What if Iran were ultimately allowed to become nuclear? To be deterred by Israel, a newly-nuclear Iran would need to believe that a critical number of Israel’s retaliatory forces could survive an Iranian first-strike and that these forces could not subsequently be prevented from hitting pre-designated targets in Iran. Concerning the “presumed survivability” of Israeli nuclear forces, continued sea-basing (submarines) by Israel would be self-evidently gainful.

If carefully articulated, expanding doctrinal openness or selective nuclear disclosure would represent a rational and plausibly imperative option for Israel. The operational benefits of such an expanding doctrinal openness would accrue from certain deliberate flows of information concerning Israeli weapons dispersion, multiplication or hardening of nuclear weapon systems and other technical weapon features. Most importantly, doctrinally controlled and orderly flows of information could serve to remove any intermittent or lingering Iranian doubts about Israel’s nuclear force capabilities and intentions. At some point, if left unchallenged, such doubts could undermine Israeli nuclear deterrence with unprecedented suddenness and lethality. This is the case, moreover, whether Iran were pre-nuclear or already-nuclear.

A summarizing thought dawns. As Israel confronts a state enemy that would best be countered while still in its pre-nuclear form, Jerusalem should understand that avoiding active warfare with Iran need not be in Israel’s best security interests. Ipso facto, if Israel could fight a law-based and comprehensive war against a still pre-nuclear Iran, it could plausibly avoid a nuclear war in the future. Under authoritative international law, such a defensive war could represent a fully permissible expression of “anticipatory self-defense.”

Looking ahead, Israel must do whatever possible and lawful to prevent a nuclear Iran. In this genuinely existential obligation, a pronounced shift in strategic posture from deliberate nuclear ambiguity to selective nuclear disclosure would represent Israel’s most expressly rational decision. By drawing upon such “wise counsel,” Israel could prudently plan for a no-choice war against a still non-nuclear Iranian foe.

The author is Emeritus Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University. Educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971), he is the author of twelve major books dealing with international relations, military strategy and world affairs. Dr. Beres was born in Zürich, Switzerland on August 31, 1945, and lectures and publishes widely on issues of terrorism, counter-terrorism, nuclear strategy and nuclear war. Professor Beres’ latest book is Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (2016; 2nd ed. 2018).  A version of this article was originally published by Israel National News.

The post On Iran, Israel’s Policy of Nuclear Ambiguity Is Outdated and Dangerous first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Trump’s Travel Ban on 12 Countries Goes Into Effect Early Monday

US President Donald Trump attends the Saudi-US Investment Forum, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, May 13, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Brian Snyder

US President Donald Trump’s order banning citizens of 12 countries from entering the United States goes into effect at 12:01 am ET (0401 GMT) on Monday, a move the president promulgated to protect the country from “foreign terrorists.”

The countries affected by the latest travel ban are Afghanistan, Myanmar, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen.

The entry of people from seven other countries – Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan and Venezuela – will be partially restricted.

Trump, a Republican, said the countries subject to the most severe restrictions were determined to harbor a “large-scale presence of terrorists,” fail to cooperate on visa security, have an inability to verify travelers’ identities, as well as inadequate record-keeping of criminal histories and high rates of visa overstays in the United States.

He cited last Sunday’s incident in Boulder, Colorado, in which an Egyptian national tossed a gasoline bomb into a crowd of pro-Israel demonstrators as an example of why the new curbs are needed. But Egypt is not part of the travel ban.

The travel ban forms part of Trump’s policy to restrict immigration into the United States and is reminiscent of a similar move in his first term when he barred travelers from seven Muslim-majority nations.

Officials and residents in countries whose citizens will soon be banned expressed dismay and disbelief.

Chad President Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno said he had instructed his government to stop granting visas to US citizens in response to Trump’s action.

“Chad has neither planes to offer nor billions of dollars to give, but Chad has its dignity and its pride,” he said in a Facebook post, referring to countries such as Qatar, which gifted the U.S. a luxury airplane for Trump’s use and promised to invest billions of dollars in the U.S.

Afghans who worked for the US or US-funded projects and were hoping to resettle in the US expressed fear that the travel ban would force them to return to their country, where they could face reprisal from the Taliban.

Democratic US lawmakers also voiced concern about the policies.

“Trump’s travel ban on citizens from over 12 countries is draconian and unconstitutional,” said US Representative Ro Khanna on social media late on Thursday. “People have a right to seek asylum.”

The post Trump’s Travel Ban on 12 Countries Goes Into Effect Early Monday first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Israeli Military Says It Struck Hamas Member in Southern Syria

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa speaks during a joint press conference with French President Emmanuel Macron after a meeting at the Elysee Palace in Paris, France, May 7, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Stephanie Lecocq/Pool

The Israeli military said on Sunday that it struck a member of the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas in southern Syria’s Mazraat Beit Jin, days after Israel carried out its first airstrikes in the country in nearly a month.

Hamas did not immediately comment on the strike.

Israel said on Tuesday it hit weapons belonging to the government in retaliation for the firing of two projectiles towards Israel for the first time under the country’s new leadership. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz held Syria’s President Ahmed al-Sharaa accountable.

Damascus in response said reports of the shelling were unverified, reiterating that Syria does not pose a threat to any regional party.

A little known group named “Martyr Muhammad Deif Brigades,” an apparent reference to Hamas’ military leader who was killed in an Israeli strike in 2024, reportedly claimed responsibility for the shelling. Reuters, however, could not independently verify the claim.

The post Israeli Military Says It Struck Hamas Member in Southern Syria first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Israel Orders Military to Stop Gaza-Bound Yacht Carrying Greta Thunberg

FILE PHOTO: Activist Greta Thunberg sits aboard the aid ship Madleen, which left the Italian port of Catania on June 1 to travel to Gaza to deliver humanitarian aid, in this picture released on June 2, 2025 on social media. Photo: Freedom Flotilla Coalition/via REUTERS/File Photo

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz told the military on Sunday to stop a charity boat carrying activists including Sweden’s Greta Thunberg who are planning to defy an Israeli blockade and reach Gaza.

Operated by the pro-Palestinian Freedom Flotilla Coalition (FFC), the British-flagged Madleen yacht set sail from Sicily on June 6 and is currently off the Egyptian coast, heading slowly towards the Gaza Strip, which is besieged by Israel.

“I instructed the IDF to act so that the Madleen .. does not reach Gaza,” Katz said in a statement.

“To the antisemitic Greta and her Hamas-propaganda-spouting friends, I say clearly: You’d better turn back, because you will not reach Gaza.”

Climate activist Thunberg said she joined the Madleen crew to “challenge Israel’s illegal siege and escalating war crimes” in Gaza and highlight the urgent need for humanitarian aid. She has rejected previous Israeli accusations of antisemitism.

Israel went to war with Hamas in October 2023 after the Islamist terrorists launched a surprise attack on southern Israel, killing more 1,200 people and taking 251 hostages back to the enclave.

Katz said the blockade was essential to Israel’s national security as it seeks to eliminate Hamas.

“The State of Israel will not allow anyone to break the naval blockade on Gaza, whose primary purpose is to prevent the transfer of weapons to Hamas,” he said.

The Madleen is carrying a symbolic quantity of aid, including rice and baby formula, the FFC has said.

FFC press officer Hay Sha Wiya said on Sunday the boat was currently some 160 nautical miles (296 km) from Gaza. “We are preparing for the possibility of interception,” she said.

Besides Thunberg, there are 11 other crew members aboard, including Rima Hassan, a French member of the European Parliament.

Israeli media have reported that the military plans to intercept the yacht before it reaches Gaza and escort it to the Israeli port of Ashdod. The crew would then be deported.

In 2010, Israeli commandos killed 10 people when they boarded a Turkish ship, the Mavi Marmara, that was leading a small flotilla towards Gaza.

The post Israel Orders Military to Stop Gaza-Bound Yacht Carrying Greta Thunberg first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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