Palestinians inspect the damage at the site of an Israeli strike on a tent camp sheltering displaced people, in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, May 18, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Hatem Khaled

The Israeli military said on Sunday it had begun “extensive ground operations” in northern and southern Gaza, stepping up a new campaign in the enclave.

Israel made its announcement after sources on both sides said there had been no progress in a new round of indirect talks between Israel and the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas in Qatar.

The office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the latest Doha talks included discussions on a truce and hostage deal as well as a proposal to end the war in return for the exile of Hamas militants and the demilitarization of the enclave – terms Hamas has previously rejected.

The substance of the statement was in line with previous declarations from Israel, but the timing, as negotiators meet, offered some prospect of flexibility in Israel’s position. A senior Israeli official said there had been no progress in the talks so far.

Israel’s military said it conducted a preliminary wave of strikes on more than 670 Hamas targets in Gaza over the past week to support its ground operation, dubbed “Gideon’s Chariots.”

It said it killed dozens of Hamas fighters. Palestinian health authorities say hundreds of people have been killed including many women and children.

Asked about the Doha talks, a Hamas official told Reuters: “Israel’s position remains unchanged, they want to release the prisoners (hostages) without a commitment to end the war.”

He reiterated that Hamas was proposing releasing all Israeli hostages in return for an end to the war, the pull-out of Israeli troops, an end to a blockade on aid for Gaza, and the release of Palestinian prisoners.

Israel’s declared goal in Gaza is the elimination of the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas, which attacked Israeli communities on October 7, 2023, killing about 1,200 people and seizing about 250 hostages.

The Israeli military campaign has devastated the enclave, pushing nearly all residents from their homes and killing more than 53,000 people, according to Gaza health authorities.

The post Israel Declares Start of Gaza Ground Operations, No Progress Seen in Talks first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

Pro-Palestinian demonstrators during a protest against Israel to mark the 77th anniversary of the “Nakba” or catastrophe, in Berlin, Germany, May 15, 2025. REUTERS/Axel Schmidt

JNS.org – A smattering of Arabic words has entered the English language in recent years, the direct result of more than a century of conflict between the Zionist movement and Arab regimes determined to prevent the Jews from exercising self-determination in their historic homeland.

These words include fedayeen, which refers to the armed Palestinian factions; intifada, which denotes successive violent Palestinian uprisings against Israel; and naksa, which pertains to the defeat sustained by the Arab armies in their failed bid to destroy Israel during the June 1967 war.

At the top of this list, however, is nakba, the word in Arabic for “disaster” or “catastrophe.” The emergence of the Palestinian refugee question following Israel’s 1948-49 War of Independence is now widely described as “The Nakba,” and the term has become a stick wielded by anti-Zionists to beat Israel and, increasingly, Jews outside.

Last Thursday, a date which the U.N. General Assembly has named for an annual “Nakba Day,” workers at a cluster of Jewish-owned businesses in the English city of Manchester arrived at the building housing their offices to find that it had been badly vandalized overnight. The front of the building, located in a neighborhood with a significant Jewish community, was splattered with red paint. An external wall displayed the crudely painted words “Happy Nakba Day.”

The culprits were a group called Palestine Action, a pro-Hamas collective of activists whose sole mission is to intimidate the Jewish community in the United Kingdom in much the same way as Sir Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists did back in the 1930s. Its equivalents in the United States are groups like Within Our Lifetime and Students for Justice in Palestine, who have shown themselves equally enthused when it comes to intimidating Jewish communities by conducting loud, sometimes violent, demonstrations outside synagogues and other communal facilities, all too frequently showering Jews with the kind of abuse that was once the preserve of neo-Nazis. These thugs, cosplaying with keffiyehs instead of swastika armbands, can reasonably be described as the neo-neo-Nazis.

The overarching point here is that ideological constructs like nakba play a key role in enabling the intimidation they practice. It allows them to diminish the historic victimhood of the Jews, born of centuries of stateless disempowerment, with dimwitted formulas equating the nakba with the Nazi Holocaust. It also enables them to camouflage hate speech and hate crimes as human-rights advocacy—a key reason why law enforcement, in the United States as well as in Canada, Australia and most of Europe, has been found sorely wanting when it comes to dealing with the surge of antisemitism globally.

Part of the response needs to be legislative. That means clamping down on both sides of the Atlantic on groups that glorify designated terrorist organizations by preventing them from fundraising; policing their access to social media; and restricting their demonstrations to static events in a specific location with a predetermined limit on attendees, rather than a march that anyone can join, along with an outright ban on any such events in the environs of Jewish community buildings.

These are not independent civil society organizations, as they pretend to be, but rather extensions of terrorist organizations like Hamas and—in the case of Samidoun, another group describing itself as a “solidarity” organization—the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. If we cannot ban them outright, we need to contain them much more effectively. We can start by framing the issue as a national security challenge and worry less about their “freedom of speech.”

But this is also a fight that takes us into the realm of ideas and arguments. We need to stop thinking about the nakba as a Palestinian narrative of pain deserving of empathy by exposing it for what it is—another tool in the arsenal of groups whose goal is to bring about the elimination of Israel as a Jewish state.

When it was originally introduced in the late 1940s, the word nakba had nothing to do with the plight of the Palestinian refugees or their dubious claim to be the uninterrupted, indigenous inhabitants of a land seized by dispossessing foreign colonists. Popularized by the late Syrian writer Constantine Zureik in a 1948 book titled The Meaning of Disaster, the nakba described therein was, as the Israeli scholar Shany Mor has crisply pointed out, simply “the failure of the Arabs to defeat the Jews.”

Zureik was agonized by this defeat, calling it “one of the harshest of the trials and tribulations with which the Arabs have been inflicted throughout their long history.” His story is fundamentally a story of national humiliation and wounded pride. Yet there is absolutely no reason why Jews should be remotely troubled by the neurosis it projects. Their defeat was our victory and our liberation, and we should unreservedly rejoice in that fact.

The only aspect of the nakba that we should worry about is the impact it has on us as a community, as well as on the status of Israel as a sovereign member of the international society of states. As Mizrahi Jews know well (my own family among them), the nakba assembled in Zureik’s imagination really was a “catastrophe”— for us. Resoundingly defeated on the battlefield by the superior courage and tactical nous of the nascent Israeli Defense Forces, the Arabs compensated by turning on the defenseless Jews in their midst. From Libya to Iraq, ancient and established Jewish communities were the victims of a cowardly, spiteful policy of expropriation, mob violence and expulsion.

The inheritors of that policy are the various groups that compose the Palestinian solidarity movement today. Apoplectic at the realization that they have been unable to dislodge the “Zionists”—and knowing now that the main consequence of the Oct. 7, 2023 pogrom in Israel has been the destruction of Gaza—they, too, have turned on the Jews in their midst.

They have done so with one major advantage that the original neo-Nazis never had: sympathy and endorsement from academics, celebrities, politicians and even the United Nations. Indeed, the world body hosted a two-day seminar on “Ending the Nakba” at its New York headquarters at the same time that pro-Hamas fanatics were causing havoc just a few blocks downtown. Even so, we should take heart at the knowledge that nakba is not so much a symbol of resistance as it is defeat. Just as the rejectionists and eliminationists have lost previous wars through a combination of political stupidity, diplomatic ineptitude and military flimsiness, so, too, can they lose this one.

The post The ‘Nakba’ Is Not Our Problem first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

An Iron Dome anti-missile system fires an interceptor missile as a rocket is launched from the Gaza Strip towards Israel, at the sky near the Israel-Gaza border August 7, 2022. REUTERS/Amir Cohen

JNS.org – Israeli air defense operators and system engineers are learning lessons from both local and overseas conflict zones, as a global and regional technological arms race continues to unfold.

In Israel, fighting a multi-front war against Iranian-backed jihadist armies that have fired barrages of drones, cruise missiles and ballistic threats, a rapid and continuous evolution in air defense capabilities is ongoing.

This evolution is somewhat informed by overseas flashpoints such as the Ukrainian-Russian war and even the India–Pakistan flare-up. Iran, meanwhile, continues to mass-produce and develop a host of ballistic and cruise missiles and drones.

The primary challenge remains robust detection and accurate identification of diverse threats, an informed Western observer told JNS.

This is particularly acute with the proliferation of low-cost drones that can be hard to distinguish from benign aerial objects or even friendly assets, as tragically highlighted in past incidents, such as the Oct. 13, 2024, Hezbollah drone strike on the Golani Brigade training base near Binyamina, which killed four soldiers and injured dozens.

“The first question is detection,” the observer stated. “The second is the ability to identify and verify,” he added. “Israel faces this problem with UAV infiltrations, where it’s difficult to distinguish them from, say, helicopters operating on similar routes.”

This complex threat environment is driving significant upgrades across Israel’s renowned multi-layered air defense array.

The Iron Dome

Building on operational lessons from the current war, the Israel Missile Defense Organization (IMDO) in the Defense Ministry and Haifa-based Rafael Advanced Defense Systems successfully completed a series of comprehensive flight tests for the Iron Dome system in March 2025. These tests examined scenarios simulating current and future threats, including rockets, cruise missiles and UAVs, and incorporated enhancements to the system.

“Throughout this war, we’ve seen that the Iron Dome… remains a critical asset,” said IMDO director Moshe Patel at the time of the trial, adding that its capabilities are continuously being enhanced “on both land and sea—even while operating under fire.”

Rafael CEO Yoav Tourgeman described the current war as the “largest and most significant ever conducted with the Iron Dome.”

The sheer quantity of ordnance expended in modern conflicts, both offensively and defensively, is another critical lesson, according to the Western source.

“One of the key takeaways is the enormous consumption of ammunition,” he stated. This has led to massive American funding for replenishing Israel’s stocks of Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow interceptors.

The Defense Ministry and Israel Aerospace Industries signed a multi-billion-shekel deal in December 2024 to significantly expand the procurement of Arrow 3 interceptors, which are designed to engage long-range ballistic threats of the type the Houthis in Yemen frequently fire at Israel, in space, before they reenter the atmosphere and potentially maneuver.

However, the observer cautioned about waiting for too long for funding to arrive to boost capabilities.

“From the moment a check arrives until a missile is delivered, factoring in supply chain issues, it can be years. Aid is announced, [but] takes months to arrive, and then often comes in batches.”

This necessitates sophisticated planning and, at times, for the Defense Ministry to take calculated risks to fund production gaps, or “bridge,” as the source said, needing to overcome bureaucratic elements focused strictly on procedure.

The war in Ukraine offers a stark illustration of high-intensity air warfare. “The Ukrainians and Russians are on a contact line reminiscent of World War I, though the Russians are slowly pushing,” he said.

For Ukraine, with its vast territory and roughly 100 brigades to equip, the primary need is for tactical, shorter-range air defense systems, supplemented by longer-range air defense capabilities like the Patriot mobile interceptor missile surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. “They don’t need many long-range strike assets; what they have, they use effectively, converting various systems to strike deep into Russia,” he said.

A significant development in Ukraine has been the extensive use of drones with fiber-optic tethers for secure communications, a response to potent Russian electronic warfare (ECM) capabilities.

However, the observer clarified, “It’s not really a new genre.” In fact, he argued, it’s the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) that has significantly hampered Russian armored advances.

For that threat, Israeli armored vehicles are equipped with active protection systems—either the Rafael Trophy for tanks or Elbit Systems’ Iron Fist.

Israel, the observer continued, must enhance defenses for its own heavy unmanned aerial vehicles, and even its helicopters, drawing lessons from incidents like Houthi attacks on expensive American drones.

This necessitates bolstering “soft-kill” capabilities, primarily those targeting Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS—the generic term for a range of satellite navigation system—including GPS, GLONASS and Galileo).

“Soft defense is strengthening today, mainly because a large part of attack assets use GNSS,” he explained. “Its advantage is that it generally affects everyone in the area, requires relatively few personnel and resources, and is much cheaper than kinetic [firepower] interceptors.”

Manpower remains a primary constraint for Israel, as it is for many European nations, the source noted, when it comes to air defenses. “People don’t realize this is the first limitation,” the observer stressed.

While Israel can utilize trained reservists, especially for systems such as older artillery cannons, automation is being pursued, though its ability to fully compensate for manpower shortages is debatable without compromising certain command structures preferred by the Air Force.

The Iron Beam

Looking to the future, Israel is on the cusp of deploying a revolutionary capability: the Iron Beam high-energy laser system. Developed by Rafael and the Defense Ministry, Iron Beam is expected to be operational by the end of 2025 and will be integrated into Israel’s multi-layered defense network.

Rafael confirmed to JNS in mid-March that “the system has already demonstrated successful interceptions, and Rafael, together with Israel’s defense establishment, is accelerating its deployment.”

A senior Defense Ministry official described it in March as a “technological breakthrough at the global level,” capable of downing rockets, mortars, UAVs and cruise missiles.

The most significant advantage of Iron Beam is its low cost. “Each interception costs only a few dollars in electricity,” Rafael stated, fundamentally changing the economic equation where adversaries launch cheap projectiles against expensive interceptors. A single Iron Dome Tamir interceptor costs around $50,000, while terrorist rockets can cost as little as $500.

Iron Beam, with its 100-kilowatt laser and an effective range of eight-10 kilometers, will provide “continuous protection with an unlimited interception capacity,” according to a Rafael source. It will be connected to Israel’s national threat detection grid and will complement Iron Dome, with command algorithms deciding when to use lasers versus missiles.

While ground-based initially, laser systems are also being developed for mobile ground units, and airborne platforms, with a successful 2021 test of an airborne laser intercepting UAVs in the skies. This technology is being closely watched internationally, with Lockheed Martin partnering with Rafael to develop an export version for the U.S. market.

Preparing for the future

To address urgent operational needs during the current war, the IDF also confirmed the deployment of Rafael’s Spyder mobile air defense system. The Spyder All-in-One (AiO) version, which integrates radar, command, launcher and camera sensor on a single vehicle for high mobility, is in service and has conducted several successful UAV interceptions.

The Israeli Air Force also announced on May 6 the establishment of a new air defense battalion, though details of its specific systems (whether laser, Spyder or other) were not disclosed, it points to ongoing expansion and specialization of air defense units.

Every interception, or failure to intercept, provides invaluable data. “Every attack event in Ukraine, Israel, or India-Pakistan is accompanied by lessons learned,” the observer noted.

He pointed to instances where even advanced systems like Arrow 3, which successfully intercepts ballistic missiles in space, don’t always achieve a kill, sometimes due to the complexities of discriminating the warhead carrying reentry vehicle from other debris, like the spent motor, especially when these components travel at similar speeds. “The interceptor is not 100%; it depends on many other things,” including correct target identification by the detection system.

On May 4, a Houthi ballistic missile fired at Ben-Gurion Airport hit near a terminal building after an Arrow 3 interceptor, as well as a U.S. THAAD interceptor, missed it. The IAF later concluded that its interceptor suffered a rare malfunction.

The arms race between air defenders and attackers does not look to be slowing down any time soon.

The post Israeli Air Defense Operators Learn from Wars Near and Far first appeared on Algemeiner.com.