On November 4, 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s henchmen stormed the US embassy in Tehran and held Americans hostage for 444 days, releasing them on January 20, 1981. On October 7, 2023, Hamas storm troopers and Gazan civilians paraglided and marched into Israel and took hundreds of American and Israeli hostages after killing over 1,200.

Comparing the two situations shows how much has changed in the last four decades — none of it for the better.

Hostages, Then and Now

The Americans taken hostage by Khomeini’s followers were all adults working at the US embassy. The captives in Gaza today, both male and female, range from infants to the aged. One hostage, Kfir Bibas, born on January 18, 2023, was only 262 days old when he was stolen from his bed. He celebrated his first birthday as a hostage and has spent the majority of his life as a Hamas prisoner.

Some of the American diplomats were beaten during and after the November 4 siege of the U.S. embassy. They were undoubtedly held in inhumane conditions and sometimes threatened with execution. But unlike those seized on October 7, not one was executed. Not a single one was raped.

After the first few days of their captivity, unless they were being moved from one location to another or paraded in the street, the American diplomats were not blindfolded. Aside from when they were kept periodically in a damp, windowless warehouse on the embassy grounds, which the hostages named “The Mushroom Inn,” they could see outside.

Hamas’ hostages, on the other hand, have likely been kept underground in the maze of tunnels that constitute subterranean Gaza for most of their 445 days of captivity. Many have likely not seen the sun in all that time. They have been severely beaten.

On November 17, 1979, Khomeini ordered the female and African-American hostages released because “Islam has a special respect toward women” and because blacks had been forced to suffer “under American pressure and tyranny.” Some of the women released by Hamas in the November 2023 ceasefire were sexually assaulted and constantly intimidated.

Those Americans held by Iran who were injured or ill received medical care, albeit inferior to what they deserved. One hostage, Richard Queen, the State Department’s Vice Consul, suffering the early stages of undiagnosed multiple sclerosis, was released after 250 days. His symptoms baffled the Iranian physicians who treated him, and his captors feared the consequences of his dying in captivity. Hamas has no such fears.

UN Responses, Then and Now

In 1979, the United Nations was not quite as corrupted as it is today. The Security Council responded if not quickly (on December 4) at least decisively with Resolution 457 calling for the immediate release of the hostages. On December 31, it issued Resolution 461, condemning Iran and citing an International Court of Justice order for the release of all hostages.

In 2023, after weeks of failing to reach a consensus, the Security Council finally issued Resolution 2712 on November 15, calling for the release of all hostages, but it did not condemn or even mention the October 7 attack.

Today’s UN is focused on condemning Israel. It has whitewashed the complicity of the Palestinian people in October 7 and exaggerated their suffering. The Secretary-General’s statement was one half condemnation of Hamas and one-half warning that Israel exercise “maximum restraint” and pursue a “two-state solution.” The International Court of Justice took South Africa’s charges of genocide seriously and opened an investigation into Israeli conduct, and the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.

Media Coverage

In 1979, the media at first repeated the false narrative that the hostage takers were merely religious students, not Khomeini’s agents carrying out his will. But as one hostage, Barry Rosen, put it, “Khomeini was supporting our captivity; it was not just these students acting in his name.” Rosen adds that, “the students couldn’t have continued to hold us without the Imam’s approval.”

Throughout the 444-day ordeal, the media focused on the hostages, their families, and efforts being made to free them. On ABC, Ted Koppel’s career was made by a show called The Iran Crisis: America Held Hostage, which eventually became Nightline.

By contrast, today’s media have not made the hostages the focal point of the story. Rather than seeing the hostages as victims of Islamist aggression, much of today’s media are more sympathetic with Palestinians and Hamas than with their hostages. They focus on “Israel’s War in Gaza,” celebrate anti-Israel protests, and mindlessly repeat Hamas’s inflated casualty and death statistics.

When Israel killed Ismail Haniyeh, the media harped on how much more difficult a “hostage deal” would be and accused Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu of belligerence.

When Israel decimated (or more) the leadership of Hezbollah — another terrorist organization responsible for holding Americans hostage — in a brilliant pager/walkie-talkie sabotage like something out of a James Bond movie, much of the media vilified it as terrorism.

Like the UN, the media have whitewashed the complicity of the Palestinian people on October 7. One of the greatest differences between the coverage of the hostages held in Iran 45 years ago and of the hostages in Gaza today is that no one was on Iran’s side then, while many are on Hamas’s side today.

Academia Reacts

For Americans, and indeed for much of the Western world, the seizure of our diplomats in 1979 was an affront too outrageous to endure. People were angry at the Iranians, Khomeini, and Jimmy Carter. In the days before memes, Americans adopted a line from a popular song by Tony Orlando and Dawn (“Tie a Yellow Ribbon Round the Ole Oak Tree”). Yellow ribbons appeared around trees throughout the nation as symbols of their suffering and the American people longing for their return.

Most American academics were as outraged as everyone else in 1979, and all but the most virulently anti-American among them who weren’t outraged likely kept it to themselves.

By contrast, today’s academics are more likely to celebrate October 7, especially Middle East studies “experts.”

College students were firmly on the side of the US in 1979. If there were any protests, they were anti-Iran protests. As a freshman at the University of Miami in November of 1979, I saw many cars sporting the famous bumper sticker, and people wearing the t-shirt, featuring Mickey Mouse holding an American flag in his right hand while giving the middle-finger salute with his left hand with the caption “Hey Iran.”

By contrast, today’s college students are more likely to wear keffiyehs and chant “From the River to the Sea” or “Globalize the Intifada” and other slogans they don’t understand.

End of the Crises

The 52 Americans held in Iran were released only after one-term president Jimmy Carter left the White House and Ronald Reagan was inaugurated. Reagan called Khomeini and his henchmen “criminals and thugs” and promised a very different approach than the weak coddling that the Carter administration had pursued.

When the hostages were finally released, there was a ticker-tape parade in their honor as they were celebrated in New York City’s “Canyon of Heroes.”

Will the hostages in Gaza have to wait until one-term president Joe Biden leaves the White House and Donald Trump is inaugurated? That will make it 472 days in captivity. Will there be a ticker-tape parade?

President-elect Donald Trump has pledged to get the hostages back and threatened that “there will be hell to pay” if they are not returned by his January 20 inauguration. It will be well-deserved if Hamas doesn’t release the hostages.

Chief Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT) Political Correspondent A.J. Caschetta is a principal lecturer at the Rochester Institute of Technology and a fellow at Campus Watch, a project of the Middle East Forum where he is also a Milstein fellow. A version of this article was published by IPT.

The post Monday Marks Day 445 for Hostages in Gaza — Longer Than the Iranian Hostages first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

The past decade has seen Syria engulfed in a brutal civil war, marked by foreign intervention, relentless repression, and the unraveling of its fragile social fabric. This turmoil has fueled a mass exodus of refugees, reshaping Europe’s demographics and political landscape.

Now, as the Assad regime has collapsed, Syria faces a pivotal question: Can it emerge as a unified sovereign state, or will ethnic divisions dictate its future?

Historical Roots of the Crisis: Artificial Borders and Failed Ethnic Harmony

Syria’s current plight is not solely the result of recent events. It stems from deep-seated issues rooted in the colonial legacy of the Middle East.

The 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement carved up the region with scant regard for its ethnic, religious, and sectarian complexities. The resulting state was a volatile mosaic of Sunni Arabs, Alawites, Druze, Christians, Turkmen, and others.

During the French Mandate, attempts were made to partition Syria into autonomous regions based on ethnic and sectarian lines. These included a Druze state in Jebel Druze, an Alawite state in Latakia, a Turkmen-dominated region of Alexandretta, and separate Arab Sunni states for Damascus and Aleppo. However, this experiment failed, and in 1946, Syria gained independence as a unified state.

A Unified Kingdom or Ethnic Partition?

After Assad’s abdication, the question of Syria’s future looms large. Could it return to being a unified state, or is ethnic partition a more viable path to stability?

Among the potential scenarios:

• Druze Autonomy in Jebel Druze: A concept supported in the past by figures like Israeli leader Yigal Alon, this option could appeal to local Druze communities. However, their willingness to align with a pro-Israel arrangement remains doubtful given their precarious geopolitical position.
• An Alawite State in Latakia: Syria’s coastal region, an Alawite stronghold, could serve as a natural refuge for the community. It’s even conceivable, in the region’s unpredictable dynamics, that Bashar al-Assad himself could return there.
• A Federal Syrian Model: Similar to Iraq, this approach would grant significant autonomy to various groups while maintaining the semblance of a unified state.

Key Challenges

• Foreign Interference: Major players like Russia, Turkey, and Iran have heavily invested in Syria, each pursuing its strategic interests. Any ethnic partition would likely face their strong opposition, especially if it diminishes their influence.
• Leadership and Israeli Policy: Should a figure like Abu Mohammad al-Julani, with roots in al-Qaeda, retain power, the prospects for stability dim further. Julani’s ties to the Golan Heights –his family fled the region after the 1967 war — underscore his likely antagonism toward Israel and territorial concessions.
• The Golan Heights Question: Once a contentious issue in peace negotiations, the strategic importance of the Golan was underscored during the Syrian civil war. The chaos reaffirmed Israel’s security imperative to retain the area, a sentiment bolstered by US recognition of Israeli sovereignty there.

Syria’s Future: A Litmus Test for Israeli Policy

Post-Assad Syria is a test of Israel’s strategic approach to regional instability. Israel must maintain its deterrence posture, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasized during his significant visit to the Golan Heights. Strengthening Israel’s hold on this strategic region is crucial to countering hostile actors.

While some in the international community hope for a unified Syria, the reality suggests otherwise. Ethnic partition appears to be one of the few pragmatic solutions to stabilize the country. Yet, aggressive opposition from global powers and internal factions renders this outcome unlikely in the near term.

Turkey, for instance, vehemently opposes a Kurdish autonomy that might embolden its own Kurdish minority. Iran seeks to consolidate its influence through Shiite alliances, including with the Alawites. Meanwhile, figures like Julani will resist any division that curtails their power or excludes major factions from influence.

Toward a Federal Solution?

The enduring conflict makes meaningful reconstruction a distant prospect. Ethnic partition offers a glimmer of hope for stability, but remains a long shot. Interim solutions, such as a federal system granting limited autonomy within a unified framework, may provide the only viable path forward.

Ultimately, the success of such models depends on creative and painstaking negotiations, both locally and internationally. Syria’s post-Assad reality is a complex battlefield of clashing interests, and achieving the elusive goal of stability will require unprecedented diplomatic ingenuity.

Itamar Tzur is an Israeli scholar and Middle East expert who holds a Bachelor’s degree with honors in Jewish History and a Master’s degree with honors in Middle Eastern Studies. As a senior member of the “Forum Kedem for Middle Eastern Studies and Public Diplomacy,” Tzur leverages his academic expertise to enhance understanding of regional dynamics and historical contexts within the Middle East.

The post Syria in the Post-Assad Era: Towards Ethnic Division or a Unified State? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

JNS.org – The other day, during a discussion with a colleague about the wave of pro-Hamas, antisemitic hysteria sweeping the Republic of Ireland, I unthinkingly quipped that the people of Eire should rename themselves “Paddystinians.” I immediately regretted doing so because the term “Paddy” is an aging pejorative, conjuring up images of Irish drunkenness, the supposed Irish proclivity for casual brawling, and ingrained Irish idiocy—stereotypes any decent person should reject.

As it turns out, I needn’t have worried.

A couple of days after that exchange, I discovered that the hashtag “#Paddystinian” was being eagerly adopted on social media by Irish supporters of Hamas. The accompanying posts were variously obnoxious or downright stupid, with many of those mocking the assertion that their country is antisemitic seemingly unaware of the immortal line spoken by a character in James Joyce’s Ulysses that Ireland “has the honor of being the only country which never persecuted the jews (sic)” because “she never let them in.” (There has, in fact, been a minuscule Jewish presence in Ireland for centuries, numbering the current president of Israel among its offspring, and there have been several episodes of antisemitism during that time, including the present, but Ireland is more or less an instance of the “antisemitism without Jews” phenomenon.)

One might say that Ireland is little different from the rest of Europe when it comes to the volume and the venom of its antisemitism: France, Germany and the United Kingdom, among others, are current examples of a similar trend. But Ireland stands out because of the role of its government in stoking these poisonous sentiments, as well as the fact that antisemitic depictions of Israel sit comfortably in its major political parties across the spectrum. That perhaps explains why Israel has closed its embassy in Dublin.

To my mind, the most grotesque offender in this regard is the Irish president, Michael Higgins. An 83-year-old poet who has carefully cultivated an avuncular image with his three-piece tweed suits and swept back, thinning white hair, Higgins’ high-handed manner is at its most infuriating when he articulates—as he has done on a few occasions since the Hamas atrocities in Israel on Oct. 7, 2023—conspiracy theories about Israel that lean heavily on the theme of shadowy, unaccountable Jewish power. Earlier this year, for example, he blamed a covert Israeli intelligence operation for leaking his fawning letter of congratulations to the Iranian regime’s newly installed President Masoud Pezeshkian and was subsequently too pompous to issue an apology when it was pointed out that the Iranians themselves had publicized his message first. Then, last week, as he accepted the credentials of the new Palestinian ambassador in Dublin, he waxed lyrically about Israeli assaults on the sovereignty of three of its neighbors: Lebanon, Syria and Egypt, where the Israelis apparently “would like, in fact, actually to have a settlement.”

In Egypt? Given that Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula in 1982, not even the most seasoned supporter of Hamas could find actual material evidence that this is Israel’s intention. Higgins had met with his Egyptian counterpart, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, earlier that week, and it’s quite possible that el-Sisi told him something along these lines or had referred to the dispute between Jerusalem and Cairo over the Philadelphi Corridor that runs along the border between Egypt and Gaza. Whatever the content of their conversation, what is absolutely clear is that Higgins has a disposition to believe the most outlandish lies about Israel and that he will respond to any criticism by saying that opposition to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies is not the same as antisemitism—encouraging his audience to think that his beef is with Israel’s leadership and not the Jewish state itself.

But as Dana Erlich, Israel’s ambassador to Ireland, pointed out in a recent interview with an Irish broadcaster, Dublin’s goal has been to undermine Israel’s ability to defend itself by launching lawfare against the Jewish state to chip steadily away at its sovereign rights. Ireland is supporting South Africa’s false claim of Israeli genocide of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague to the point of seeking a redefinition of the term “genocide” in which to shoehorn Israel’s actions against the terrorists of Hamas and Hezbollah, and their Iranian backers. It has promoted anti-Israel measures both domestically and within the European Union. And it has either ignored or mocked the concern that its actions are encouraging the spread of antisemitism in Ireland, including the revival of racial tropes reminiscent of the Nazis.

Two fundamental questions remain. Firstly, why has Ireland adopted this stance? In part, as the Irish commentator John McGuirk recently pointed out, because Ireland is essentially peripheral in the calculations of geopolitics. “We have, for most of our existence, pretended that we can say or do what we like on the international stage because everybody loves us,” he wrote. “The truth is that we’ve been able to be liked because we are irrelevant. Nobody has ever had to choose between Ireland and a powerful ally.”

Even then, as McGuirk argued, this moral grandstanding against Israel has its limits. It was Israel that closed its embassy and not the other way around “because the Irish government knew full well that a formal break in diplomatic relations with Israel would send a signal to the US and the E.U., and Israel’s other powerful allies around the world, that Ireland is a fundamentally unreasonable place that cannot be trusted to be an honest broker when it comes to the world’s only Jewish state.”

Secondly, why the obsession with Israel alone? Not a peep has been heard from the Irish about the revelations coming out of Syria regarding former dictator Bashar Assad’s machinery of murder—something unseen, according to Stephen Rapp, the former U.S. envoy for war crimes—“since the Nazis.” According to my old friend, the Irish writer Eamann Mac Donnchada, both “narcissism,” emanating from Ireland’s belief that the Palestinian war against Israel is a mirror of Ireland’s own struggle against the British, and “ennui,” the lack of purpose that has accompanied Ireland’s growing economic prosperity in recent decades, are key factors here. “Adhesion to [the Palestinian] cause makes many Irish people feel great about themselves while running no physical or economic risks, and that’s what it’s really about,” he wrote.

How should the rest of the world respond, given that, to cite McGuirk again, “not one single thing that the Irish Government has done since Oct. 7, 2023 has impacted Israeli policy one way or another.” Israel, as the offended party, has done what it needs to do. Many Jews have reacted with disgust, but that probably won’t extend to anything more than the odd prohibition on Jameson’s whiskey being served at a synagogue kiddush or bar mitzvah.

As for the United States, traditionally a great friend of Ireland, relations will likely worsen under Donald Trump’s incoming administration because Trump and his team are convinced that Ireland—in the words of future Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick—“runs a trade surplus at our expense.” Israel has nothing to do with that battle. But because Lutnick is a Jew and a noted supporter of Israel, you can rest assured that voices inside and outside the Irish government will eventually draw a connection where none exists. That it’s all so predictable is probably the grimmest joke of all.

The post Welcome to ‘Paddystine’ first appeared on Algemeiner.com.