A Torah scroll. Photo: RabbiSacks.org.

The year was 1820, and London’s high society was abuzz with the arrival of a dashing new personality.

General Gregor MacGregor, a Scottish war hero with a chest full of medals and a gifted raconteur, had swept into the city and taken it by storm.

Clad in a sharp military uniform and flashing a charming grin, MacGregor regaled audiences with stories of his daring exploits alongside Simón Bolívar during the Venezuelan War of Independence. But what truly captivated the elites wasn’t his charisma or battlefield glory, it was his claim to be the ruler — “cazique” — of a tropical Central American paradise called Poyais.

Poyais, MacGregor declared, was a land of unparalleled riches. Its soil was so fertile that the finest crops grew with barely any effort, its rivers sparkled with gold, and its friendly native tribes were eager to welcome British settlers. It was an investor’s dream and a settler’s utopia. And MacGregor, the benevolent ruler, was more than willing to share his paradise — for a price, of course.

London’s elites fell over themselves to get in on the opportunity. They bought Poyaisian land grants, invested in its government bonds, and dreamed of lounging on their sprawling estates in this New World Garden of Eden. Ships were chartered, and hundreds of eager pioneers boarded them, ready to embark on the adventure of a lifetime.

The problem? Poyais didn’t exist. It was nothing more than a figment of MacGregor’s fertile imagination. The settlers who arrived at the site where Poyais was supposedly located found only a mosquito-infested untamed jungle on the Honduran coast. There was no infrastructure, no resources, and no welcoming natives. Many succumbed to disease and starvation, and the few survivors returned to Britain with harrowing tales of betrayal and disaster.

And MacGregor? He simply shrugged, pocketed the fortune he’d amassed, and moved on to his next scheme. Astonishingly, despite orchestrating one of the most audacious frauds in history, he never faced justice. Instead, he retired to Venezuela, where his earlier association with Bolívar earned him accolades as a war hero. He lived out his days in comfort, unpunished and unrepentant.

It’s hard to imagine anyone matching MacGregor’s sheer chutzpah, but remarkably, he was far from the only 19th-century con artist to leave a trail of devastation in their wake. Fast forward to the late 1870s, and another fraudster — a woman this time — was weaving her web of deceit.

Sarah Howe was the very picture of respectability: impeccably dressed, articulate, and gifted with a knack for making lonely, vulnerable women feel seen and valued. She seemed the perfect person to lead the Ladies’ Deposit Company, a savings bank in Boston catering exclusively to unmarried women.

Howe’s pitch was as appealing as it was bold. Not only did she promise financial security, but she also guaranteed a monthly return of 8% — an eye-popping figure, particularly in an era of economic uncertainty. The deposits poured in. Hundreds of women from across the country entrusted their life savings to Howe, believing they were supporting a visionary cause that promised to give women equal footing in a male-dominated society.

But behind the veneer of benevolence lurked a classic Ponzi scheme. Howe wasn’t investing a penny; she was simply shuffling funds from new deposits to pay earlier investors while skimming off a hefty share to fund her own extravagant lifestyle.

When the scheme inevitably collapsed in 1880, the fallout was catastrophic. Many of Howe’s clients were left destitute. The betrayal stung even more because Howe had presented herself as a champion of women’s empowerment.

And Howe herself? Like MacGregor, she managed to slip through the cracks. After a brief stint in jail, she faded into obscurity, leaving behind a cautionary tale about misplaced trust.

But Howe was far from the most brazen con artist of the late 19th century. If there were an Olympic medal for sheer audacity, James Reavis would have taken the gold. Known as the “Baron of Arizona,” the meticulously groomed and impressively mustached Reavis orchestrated a con so elaborate it could have been plucked straight from a Hollywood script. In the 1880s, he claimed ownership of over 18,000 square miles of land across Arizona and New Mexico — a territory larger than some European countries.

Reavis backed his astounding claim with an intricate web of carefully forged documents, detailed maps, fantastic family legends, and fabricated genealogies, all purporting to trace his land rights to a Spanish land grant awarded to his wife’s family in the 18th century.

For years, Reavis collected rents and fees from settlers, railroads, and even the US government, ultimately pocketing over five million dollars. Few dared to challenge him, convinced that this phony aristocrat held legal dominion over their homes and businesses.

But as with all great frauds, the truth eventually came to light. A team of sharp-eyed government investigators uncovered the forgeries that formed the foundation of Reavis’s empire, and his house of cards collapsed. In 1896, he was convicted of fraud and sentenced to Federal prison — a fitting end for one of history’s most audacious schemers.

Of course, the 19th century wasn’t unique in terms of fraudsters, con artists, and greedy chancers who claimed virtue while ripping people off. After all, wherever there’s money, or even the promise of it, there’s always someone ready to steal it.

The Torah recognizes this timeless truth, and one of its earliest and sharpest examples is Ephron the Hittite in Parshat Chayei Sarah, whose greed and duplicity make him the devilish forebear of MacGregor, Howe, and Reavis.

At first glance, Ephron appears to be the very picture of generosity and goodwill. Abraham is mourning the loss of his wife, Sarah. He approaches Ephron to purchase the Cave of Machpelah as a place to bury her.

Ephron, playing to a hastily gathered audience of hangers-on, theatrically offers to give Machpelah to Abraham for free. “What is 400 shekels of silver between me and you?” he says magnanimously, as though the money were a mere trifle.

But Ephron’s true colors are soon revealed. His offer to gift the burial site is nothing more than a charade. Behind the grand gestures and flattering words lies a shrewd and duplicitous businessman intent on exploiting Abraham’s grief.

Ephron not only charges Abraham the total inflated price of 400 shekels, but insists that the payment be made in the highest quality silver. Ephron epitomizes the timeless brand of voracious greed cloaked in the guise of generosity.

But what makes this story so powerful is Abraham’s response. He could have called Ephron out for his hypocrisy, haggled the price, or used his considerable status to demand better treatment. Instead, Abraham insisted on paying the full price without argument, ensuring the transaction was utterly transparent and entirely irreversible. In doing so, he maintained his integrity, even in the face of Ephron’s dishonesty.

The story of Abraham and Ephron teaches a timeless lesson: in a world teeming with chicanery, the most important thing is to hold fast to your principles. Abraham’s insistence on honesty and transparency ensured his purchase would stand the test of time.

Thousands of years later, the Cave of Machpelah remains a holy site of the Jewish people, a symbol of Abraham’s righteousness, in stark and enduring contrast to the fleeting gains of fraudsters like MacGregor, Howe, and Reavis. Like Ephron’s, their names are remembered as cautionary tales, while Abraham’s legacy inspires a commitment to values that truly last.

The author is a rabbi based in Beverly Hills, California.

The post In an Era of Con Artists, the Torah Instructs Us to Hold Onto Our Integrity first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi arrives on the opening day of the agency’s quarterly Board of Governors meeting at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, Nov. 20, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Lisa Leutner

The UN atomic watchdog’s 35-nation Board of Governors passed a resolution on Thursday again ordering Iran to urgently improve cooperation with the agency and requesting a “comprehensive” report aimed at pressuring Iran into fresh nuclear talks.

Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, which proposed the resolution, dismissed as insufficient and insincere a last-minute Iranian move to cap its stock of uranium that is close to weapons-grade. Diplomats said Iran‘s move was conditional on scrapping the resolution.

Iran tends to bristle at such resolutions and has said it would respond in kind to this one. After previous criticism at the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board, it has stepped up its nuclear activities and reduced IAEA oversight.

China, Russia, and Burkina Faso voted against the text, diplomats in the meeting said. Nineteen countries voted in favor and 12 abstained.

The IAEA and Iran have long been locked in standoffs on a range of issues including Tehran‘s failure to explain uranium traces found at undeclared sites, its barring last year of most of the agency’s top uranium-enrichment experts on the Iran inspection team, and its refusal to expand IAEA monitoring.

The resolution seen by Reuters repeated wording from a November 2022 resolution that it was “essential and urgent” for Iran to explain the uranium traces and let the IAEA take samples as necessary. The resolution in June of this year did the same.

The new text asked the IAEA to issue “a comprehensive and updated assessment on the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran‘s nuclear program, including a full account of Iran‘s cooperation with the IAEA on these issues.”

Western powers hope that report, due by spring 2025, will pressure Iran into negotiations on fresh restrictions on its nuclear activities, albeit less far-reaching ones than in a 2015 deal with major powers that unraveled after then-President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from it in 2018.

With Trump due to return to office in January and Iran having taken its uranium enrichment far beyond the deal’s limits, it is far from clear whether Trump would back negotiations aimed at setting new limits before the 2015 deal’s ones are lifted on “termination day” in October of next year.

If no new limits are agreed before then, the report could be used to strengthen the case for so-called “snapback”, a process under the 2015 deal where the issue is sent to the UN Security Council and sanctions lifted under the deal can be re-imposed.

Last week IAEA chief Rafael Grossi visited Tehran, hoping to convince new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, who is seen as relatively moderate, to improve Iran‘s cooperation with the agency.

IRANIAN REACTION

Grossi formally reported to member states on Tuesday that “the possibility of Iran not further expanding its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent U-235 was discussed” in his meetings with Iranian officials, and that the IAEA had verified Iran had “begun implementation of preparatory measures.”

Iran already has enough material enriched to that level, close to the roughly 90 percent purity that is weapons grade, for four nuclear weapons if enriched further, according to an IAEA yardstick. It has enough material enriched to lower levels for more bombs, but Iran denies seeking nuclear weapons.

Grossi said on Wednesday he had asked Iran to cap that stock of 60 percent material and Iran had accepted his request.

He told a news conference that day that it was “a concrete step in the right direction,” suggesting that he felt a resolution could undermine that progress.

With the resolution passed, Iran is likely to respond.

Moments after the vote, Iranian state media cited a joint statement by the foreign ministry and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran saying Iran‘s nuclear chief Mohammad Eslami has issued orders for measures like activating various new and advanced centrifuges, machines that enrich uranium.

“If there is a resolution, it [Iran] will either increase its activities or reduce the agency’s access,” a senior diplomat said before the vote.

The post IAEA Board Passes Iran Resolution as West Pushes Tehran Towards Talks first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with then-Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi during a meeting in Moscow, Russia, Dec. 7, 2023. Photo: Sputnik/Sergei Bobylev/Pool via REUTERS

Russian prisons have long been battlegrounds for influence among various criminal factions, each striving for control over the prison’s internal economy and hierarchies. Traditionally, the power in Russian penitentiaries has been held by groups following the thieves-in-law (“vor v zakone”) code. However, the prison landscape in Russia has been changing. As more individuals from Russia’s North Caucasus and Central Asia regions, many of whom follow Islam, are incarcerated, Islamist influence in prisons has grown. Some of these inmates, including those with ties to radical groups, have started to organize within the prison system, creating alliances based on religious beliefs rather than traditional criminal codes. This has shifted the balance of power, introducing new dynamics into the established prison hierarchy.

Islamist groups within Russian prisons often prioritize religious solidarity over traditional criminal loyalty, uniting along lines of faith and ethnicity. This religious affiliation offers a powerful alternative to the thieves-in-law code. These groups offer a strict, disciplined structure, sometimes enforcing adherence to Islamic practices and framing their activities as part of a broader religious struggle.

As these Islamist groups gain ground, a new trend has been observed: the emergence of so-called “green zones.” In contrast to the “black zones” and the “red zones,” green zones are areas within prisons where Islamist groups hold significant influence. In green zones, the leadership is largely driven by religious principles, and adherence to Islamic practices is encouraged or even enforced among inmates. Here, power structures revolve around religious loyalty rather than the thieves-in-law code, creating a unique social order within the prison.

The rise of green zones and Islamist influence has introduced new tensions and conflicts within the prison system. Traditional criminal groups and Islamist factions often find themselves in direct competition for power and control over resources within the prison. The two groups have fundamentally different worldviews, and their conflicting codes make cooperation difficult. Islamist groups may view the secular stance of thieves-in-law as incompatible with their religious beliefs, leading to conflicts and violence between factions. Conversely, thieves-in-law see Islamist influence as a threat to their long-established dominance and fear that religious factions might undermine their power base.Russian and Central Asian authorities are deeply concerned about the growth of Islamist influence in the prison system, as it not only disrupts the traditional criminal balance but also increases the risk of religious radicalization. The spread of green zones has heightened concerns about prisons serving as recruitment centers for extremist organizations. In response, prison authorities have introduced stricter controls, particularly over inmates who show signs of extremist affiliation, and increased monitoring of religious practices within prisons. However, the ideological strength of Islamist groups makes this issue particularly difficult to address, as radical beliefs offer followers a powerful sense of identity and community, especially in an environment as isolating as prison.

There is one important factor that makes Islamist groups more competitive than traditional criminal groups in Russian prisons. Traditional Russian prison culture, heavily influenced by the “thieves-in-law” ideology, operates on a rigid hierarchical structure. Within this system, inmates are divided into strata, each with specific roles, rights, and expectations. At the top of the hierarchy are the thieves-in-law themselves, respected as leaders who enforce the criminal code and manage conflicts. Below them are “blatnye” (seasoned criminals who support the thieves’ code), and further down are lower groups who lack influence, including outcasts relegated to the lowest “untouchable” status, often doing undesirable work and serving the needs of higher-ranking prisoners.

However, the rise of Islamism in Russian prisons has disrupted this traditional structure. Islamist ideology, by contrast, places less emphasis on criminal hierarchy and is more democratic in its appeal, focusing on shared religious identity over strict social stratification. This egalitarian nature allows Islamist groups to recruit widely, reaching across strata and even drawing in lower-ranking prisoners who previously held little power. Some of these recruits come from non-Muslim backgrounds but are drawn by the promise of protection, community, and status under a new, religiously driven order. Islamism offers them a chance to rise within an alternative structure that values loyalty to faith over criminal reputation and physical strength.

This inclusiveness gives Islamist groups a strategic advantage over the thieves-in-law hierarchy, which is exclusive and rigidly traditional. Islamist networks provide a sense of purpose and solidarity that transcends the traditional criminal code, attracting those who feel weak, oppressed and excluded from the thieves’ culture. By creating alliances with prisoners across different strata, Islamist groups have been able to build a broader base of influence, further challenging the authority of traditional prison leaders and reshaping the power dynamics within Russia’s prisons.

Prison Islam and Scenarios of Potential Growth of Radical Islamist Influence in Russia: Potential Repercussions for Israel and Europe

Scenario 1. Inertial development, moderate threats. 

The most favorable scenario, both for Russia and for its neighbors in Europe and Asia, would be to follow an inertial path from the point of view of influence of prison Islam. Let’s call it Scenario 1. According to this scenario, the growing influence of radical Islam in prisons would remain under government control. Issues arising from the convergence of crime and jihadism would increase but remain a purely Russian problem (though neighboring Central Asian countries would continue to face similar challenges).

Scenario 2. Growth and trans-nationalization of radical Islamist networks based on prison Islam.

A more dangerous outcome for Russia itself and for many countries worldwide, including Israel, would be the realization of Scenario 2 “Growth and trans-nationalization of radical Islamist networks based on prison Islam” in Russia, Central Asia, and the Wider Middle East.

Let’s describe the tendencies that may lead to realization of this scenario. The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war and the economic strain from Western sanctions have intensified Russia’s socioeconomic challenges, creating a volatile environment that could facilitate the rise of radical Islamist groups. With the Russian economy under increasing pressure, unemployment and poverty rates have grown, particularly affecting marginalized communities, including ethnic and religious minorities, including Muslims. The economic instability may drive disenfranchised youth and individuals from impoverished backgrounds towards radical movements, where promises of solidarity and purpose could provide an appealing alternative to dismal economic prospects.

The situation is further complicated by a demographic shift caused by the war. Mass emigration of middle-class Russians, particularly young professionals, has altered the demographic balance, increasing the proportion of economically and socially vulnerable populations, including migrant communities. This shift is occurring against the backdrop of a long-term trend of demographic growth of national minorities in Russia, driven by differences in birth rate patterns between the ethnic Russian population of Central Russia and the population of the North Caucasus, as well as by large-scale labor migration from Central Asia.

These trends, coupled with rising inter-ethnic tensions and widespread racist practices by Russian authorities, especially, against Central Asian ethnic groups, has created fertile ground for Islamist groups to gain influence. As violence and crime escalate amid the social disorganization of wartime Russia, radical groups may find it easier to recruit, using religious solidarity as a tool to address grievances and perceived injustices.

Moreover, the strained resources of Russian law enforcement, currently focused on internal security challenges and the demands of war, limit their ability to monitor and counter radical groups effectively. This vulnerability creates an opening for radical Islamist organizations to expand their networks and activities.

The likelihood of transnational connections between Russian and Central Asian-based radical Islamist groups and Middle Eastern organizations is also growing. As Islamist groups gain influence in Russia and Central Asia, they may establish stronger ties with larger networks across the Wider Middle East, accessing funding, ideological support, and strategic resources. This transnational element could enable Russian Islamist groups to solidify their influence domestically while extending their reach, posing a complex and multifaceted security challenge to Russia and other nations.

Additionally, the growth of ties between Russian criminal-Islamist groups and similar groups in the Middle East would create an added threat of terrorist attacks. In particular, some experts, such as Russian Afghanistan specialist Andrey Serenko, claim that ISIS-Khorasan is attempting to use criminal infrastructure (including drug trafficking networks) to organize terrorist attacks in Russia. In this context, one can recall the mass attack at Crocus City Hall near Moscow in March 2024, which was preceded by an attempt by ISIS-Khorasan to organize the bombing of a synagogue.

Through such networks, not only are terrorist attacks organized, but also the recruitment of fighters for the war in the Middle East (for example, in ISIS and groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, such as al-Nusra in Syria). In this context, it is worth recalling the phenomenon of mass recruitment into ISIS and other Sunni Islamist groups based in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, a trend that has already been characteristic of Russia and Central Asian states over the past decade. So, such groups can organize terrorist acts or attacks affecting even the territory of Israel.

From the perspective of Israel’s interests, in this context, the threat of a recurrence of antisemitic pogroms, similar to those that took place in the fall of 2023 in the North Caucasus, would also probably sharply increase. In the specific context of the above-mentioned pogrom in the North Caucasus in the fall of 2023, networks of wrestler-athletes were utilized. However, in a number of other inter-ethnic pogroms, such as the Uzbek pogrom in Osh, Kyrgyzstan (2010), the mobilization of rioters occurred through criminal youth groups, albeit not Islamist in nature. The first instance of mobilization for mass pogroms through criminal-Islamist groups (connected to the relatives and associates of former President Nazarbayev, who controlled Kazakh secret police) occurred in January 2022 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. In connection with this case the former head of Kazakh National security committee (KNB) and former prime minister Karim Masimov and some other generals were sentenced for high treason.

Overall, given the trends outlined above, the possibility of mobilizing criminal-Islamist groups to organize pogroms, including those with an antisemitic component, is entirely feasible.

The author is an Affiliated Research Fellow at the PSCR Program, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, PhD (Israel), where a version of this article was first published.

The post How the Radical Islamist Influence in Russian Prisons Can Pose a Threat to Israel and the West (PART ONE) first appeared on Algemeiner.com.