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What Is Next for Ukraine and Russia?
Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskiy listens during a bilateral meeting with US President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the 74th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York City, New York, US, September 25, 2019. Photo: REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst.
There are two weeks to go before Donald Trump, elected to a second term on November 5, 2024, returns to the White House, but the outlines of the first “100 days” of his policy, albeit at the declarative level, are already quite clear. In addition to mass deportation of illegal immigrants, abolishing the education policy of the outgoing administration, “streamlining” the executive branch by cutting thousands of federal government positions, and other ambitious measures, there are also steps to implement one of the main campaign promises. Namely, to end as quickly as possible the “hot phase” of regional armed conflicts that could trigger political and economic instability in the world at large.
Trump’s promise to bring the war in Ukraine to an end through diplomatic measures is not the lowest on this list. Although the campaign promise to bring Putin and Zelensky to the negotiating table and end the conflict within 24 hours has already disappeared from the Trump team’s rhetoric, they remain confident that after January 20, 2024, the White House and the US State Department will have enough political and material resources to bring the hostilities to a relatively quick halt. And to convince Ukrainian and Russian leaders to accept Washington’s proposed roadmap, if not for a peaceful settlement, then for a long-term ceasefire (i.e., freezing the conflict). Donald Trump reaffirmed his commitment to an immediate ceasefire and negotiations to end the war during his December 7 meeting in Paris with French President Emmanuel Macron and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
Possible offer for Russia
According to observers, the compromise arrangements that Trump intends to offer to both sides do not satisfy either Kyiv or Moscow so far. Thus, Putin, although showing glimmers of interest in ending the conflict, continues to insist that peace is possible only if, as a result of the negotiations, Kyiv officially refuses to join NATO and if Ukraine and the West agree to Russia’s annexation of five Ukrainian regions. Specifically, Crimea, officially annexed back in 2014, and four regions – Donetsk, Luhansk (the former self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics”), Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts. Moreover, Moscow wants to receive these regions in their entirety within their administrative boundaries, not only those parts that are already occupied by Russian troops.
Although according to Reuters sources in Moscow, “Russia may also be open to withdrawing from the relatively small patches of territory it holds in the Kharkiv and Mykolaiv regions, in the north and south of Ukraine.” Basically, Putin is in no hurry. Western sanctions against the Russian economy have not yet had the expected effect, internal opposition to the regime is weak, and Russian troops continue to push through the AFU defenses in the east of the country, albeit slowly. And to him, observers believe, dragging out does make sense in order to gain more by pursuing further land grabs. Finally, the level of public support for the SMO (“Special Military Operation,” as Russia officially calls the war with Ukraine) is still quite high. For example, at the end of November, according to the Moscow-based sociological Levada Center, the level of this support was 77% — despite the fact that a third of respondents confirmed that the country was still experiencing difficulties related to the SMO, and about 40% believed that real difficulties lay ahead. This may be why, judging by the same survey, support for the idea of peace talks in November 2024 stood at 57%, while support for continued military action fell to 35%. However, these figures hardly mean anything more than passive readiness of Russians to agree with any decision of the country’s leadership — to continue or end the SMO, but the latter, most likely, on the terms officially announced by the authorities.
Trump’s team seems to recognize this reality, which probably explains why the three options for a plan to end the war offered by his team to Putin, according to media reports, appear to contain more “carrots” than “sticks” for Russia. According to the first option, which was presented by Trump’s incoming Russia-Ukraine envoy, retired Army Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg together with former National Security Council official Fred Fleitz, as an analytical report by The America First Policy Institute, a think tank close to Trump, calls for freezing the current battle lines.
The second and third scenarios, presented respectively by Vice President-elect JD Vance, and by Richard Grenell, Trump’s former acting intelligence chief and ambassador to Germany, are essentially very close to the Kellogg/Fleitz ideas, except for some technical additions of varying degrees of importance. The Vance project also envisages the creation of a demilitarized zone at the existing front lines that would be “heavily fortified” to prevent further Russian incursions. The Grenell plan suggests the creation of “autonomous zones” in eastern Ukraine, without much detail as to what exactly is meant. (Purely theoretically, one can assume that it could be a territorial autonomy within Ukraine with expanded sovereignty; a quasi-state like the “Palestinian autonomy” under a de facto Russian protectorate, or a Russian-Ukrainian condominium with the participation of some external forces; or some third option).
The stick in all these scenarios is a threat to Moscow to dramatically increase military and other aid to Kyiv should it refuse to accept US proposals.
Incentives and warnings for Ukraine
In fact, this is what the outgoing administration of Joe Biden intends to do: according to media reports, it has developed a “last-minute” program that provides for an “avalanche” of military aid. In any case, this is what Joe Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, told the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Andriy Yermak. He said that by mid-January 2025, the USA intends to supply the Ukrainian Armed Forces with hundreds of thousands of additional artillery shells and a large number of missiles and armored vehicles, as well as to train new Ukrainian troops at sites outside Ukrainian territory.
And all of this comes in a package with a promise to transfer roughly $9 billion in military aid to Kyiv through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) and defense packages under the president’s authority. As well as a new set of sanctions against Russia, which, according to the same reports, are called to complicate “Russia’s ability to sustain its war effort and boosting Ukraine’s bargaining power at the negotiation table that could lay the groundwork for a future settlement.” However, there are doubts in American media and political circles that the outgoing administration has enough time to utilize these resources. Just as it is clear that all this large-scale and, from the point of view of many in Ukraine, very late influx of weapons cannot be carried out in a matter of weeks, so it will have to be implemented — or abandoned — mostly by the new administration.
This scenario may be convenient for Trump’s team as a “stick” for Moscow. However, judging by what is being reported from the president-elect’s inner circle, so far they would prefer, in response to Kremlin, to start with incentives rather than intimidation. It is indicative, for example, that all three scenarios of completing the war in Ukraine that were produced by Trump’s inner circle, denied the NATO membership for Ukraine in the foreseeable future. The difference is that while in the plans of Vance and Kellogg/Fleitz this looks like an inevitable concession to Putin in exchange for his agreement to end or freeze the conflict on terms more or less satisfactory to all parties involved, the plan of Grenell, who was one of the few people at a September meeting in New York between Trump and Zelensky, presents Ukraine’s non-participation in NATO as a conceptual judgment (“NATO membership for Ukraine was not in America’s interest”).
Yet, this is precisely what Kyiv is not ready to accept by definition. Ukraine’s joining, or initiating the process of joining NATO, was a critical element of the “Victory Plan” presented by Volodymyr Zelensky in September 2024, amid a perceived decline in Western interest in Ukraine and accumulated war fatigue in Eastern Europe. Key points of the plan included recognizing Ukraine’s absolute right to be a member of any alliance, regardless of the opinion of “third countries” on the matter; large-scale investments in military production facilities in Ukraine; auditing and expanding anti-Russian sanctions; and diplomatic pressure on Moscow.
This plan, presented in the Verkhovna Rada and at various high-profile international events, as well as Zelensky’s earlier proposed “peace formula,” did not evoke much enthusiasm among Ukraine’s allies. Therefore, at this stage Kyiv is ready for a minimal alternative — to be “invited” to the alliance, and to receive some “guarantees of Ukraine’s security” from American and European leaders, and to have a “deterrence potential”, including an arsenal of conventional weapons sufficient to deliver a sensitive blow to the Russian Federation in case it violates the ceasefire regime. And at this stage — to obtain weapons and other resources capable of turning the situation on the front line and creating conditions for negotiations.
Kyiv would clearly be satisfied with such an arrangement if it became a fundamental element of Ukraine’s obtaining the status of “major US ally outside NATO,” which would at least partially raise the level of relations to that which binds the US, for example, with Israel, Japan, or Australia. However, Ukraine rejected such a partnership back in 2021, and although the question seems to have returned to the agenda after February 24, 2022, the chances of its implementation are slim. As a result, the position of the Ukrainian leadership in relations with the incoming US administration is rather weak.
Unlike Russian leaders, who still have a considerable amount of time and room for maneuver, Zelensky’s team has significantly less of these two resources. Ukraine experiences manpower shortages, growing territorial losses, a drop in public morale due to accumulated war fatigue, lack of prospects, and the feeling that Western allies are “preventing Ukraine from winning” by rationing aid. There is also outrage at corruption at all levels and a sense of injustice regarding the distribution of the war burden within Ukrainian society. Therefore, Zelensky has to be open to negotiations to find diplomatic solutions, especially since it is quite obvious that the public has such a demand.
Under these circumstances, Trump has much more leverage over Zelensky than over Putin, and it is possible that at some point the balance of “carrots and sticks” in Ukrainian politics will shift in favor of the latter. So far, the more or less openly articulated position of the Trump team fits into a simple formula: Kyiv should agree to negotiations with Moscow based on the White House and the State Department’s understanding of the optimal arrangement for a diplomatic solution under the threat of halting military aid, but boosting assistance if Russian President Vladimir Putin refuses.
In a sense, such an approach stymies Ukraine’s president, who signed a decree in 2022 forbidding Ukraine from negotiating with Russia as long as Putin is in power. Theoretically, Ukraine could formally cede some of its territory if such a move is approved in a national referendum, which, judging by opinion polls, is unlikely. In other words, there is obviously a built-in contradiction in the vision of the Ukrainian political establishment: a clear understanding of the lack of prospects for defeating Russia on the battlefield and the need to seek a diplomatic solution, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the impossibility of removing from the official discourse the declared goal of resisting Russian aggression, that is the restoration of Kyiv’s sovereignty over the entire territory of Ukraine within the 1991 borders.
Today, Zelensky’s team does not have many other options. One of them is to continue to insist on inviting Ukraine to NATO with the help of the so-called contact group consisting of France, Poland, Great Britain and Germany, which was launched on December 9, 2024 by Friedrich Merz, candidate to the German chancellor from the CDU party, to develop a common position on ending the war. The Ukrainian presidential administration pitched the initiative as a group of countries that have long-range weapons, that are investing the most in Ukrainian defense production, and on which Ukraine’s accession to NATO depends.
Nevertheless, it is clear that eventually everything will depend on the US position. And it is still unclear whether Kyiv and Moscow are impressed enough by Trump’s reputation as a “hard pragmatist” on foreign policy issues, and by the set of “carrots and sticks” voiced by his men for each side of the conflict, to soften their unyielding positions.
Prof. Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin lectures in Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and is Academic Chairman of the Institute for Euro-Asian Jewish Studies in Herzliya, Israel. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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Ritchie Torres Announces Intent to Vote for Sanctions Against ICC, Citing Anti-Israel ‘Ideological Crusade’
US Rep. Ritchie Torres (D-NY) speaks during the House Financial Services Committee hearing in Washington, DC, Sept. 30, 2021. Photo: Al Drago/Pool via REUTERS
US Rep. Ritchie Torres (D-NY) announced on Wednesday that he intends to vote in favor of imposing sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) over its decision to issue arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his former defense minister, Yoav Gallant.
In statements posted on X/Twitter, Torres lambasted the ICC over its “weaponization of international law,” arguing that the Hague-based court has waged an ideological propaganda campaign against Israel and unfairly maligned Israeli leaders for “daring to defend” their country against terrorist groups.
“The ICC’s decision to issue arrest warrants against the leadership of Israel represents the weaponization of international law at its most egregious,” Torres said. “The ICC has set a precedent for criminalizing self-defense: any country daring to defend itself against an enemy that exploits civilians as human shields will face persecution posing as prosecution.”
Torres accused the ICC of brushing aside Israel’s motives for prosecuting its war against the Hamas terrorist group. He also castigated the ICC as a “kangaroo court,” criticizing it for ignoring Hamas’s intentional use of the Palestinian people as human shields to maximize civilian casualties — a tactic employed by the terrorist group to tarnish Israel’s international reputation.
“The ICC ignores the cause and context of the war. Israel did not initiate the war. The war was imposed upon Israel by the unbridged barbarism of Hamas on Oct. 7 [of 2023],” Torres said. “Not only did Hamas wage war on Israel, causing the deadliest day for Jews since the Holocaust, it carefully constructed a battlefield designed to maximize the loss of civilian life. None of that context seems to matter to the kangaroo court of the ICC, which cannot let facts get in the way of its ideological crusade against the Jewish State. The ICC should be sanctioned not for enforcing the law but for distorting it beyond recognition.”
In November, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu, Gallant, and Hamas terror leader Ibrahim al-Masri (better known as Mohammed Deif) for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Gaza conflict. The ICC said there were reasonable grounds to believe Netanyahu and Gallant were criminally responsible for starvation in Gaza and the persecution of Palestinians — charges vehemently denied by Israel, which has provided significant humanitarian aid into the war-torn enclave throughout the war.
US and Israeli officials issued blistering condemnations of the ICC move, decrying the court for drawing a moral equivalence between Israel’s democratically elected leaders and the heads of Hamas, the Palestinian terrorist group that launched the ongoing war in Gaza with its massacre across southern Israel last Oct. 7.
The ICC’s chief prosecutor, Karim Khan, initially made his surprise demand for arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant on the same day in May that he suddenly canceled a long-planned visit to both Gaza and Israel to collect evidence of alleged war crimes. The last-second cancellation infuriated US and British leaders, according to Reuters, which reported that the trip would have offered Israeli leaders a first opportunity to present their position and outline any action they were taking to respond to the war crime allegations.
Following the official issuing of arrest warrants in November, a slew of US lawmakers vowed to seek retribution against the ICC after President-elect Donald Trump takes office later this month.
“These allegations have been refuted by the US government,” Rep. Mike Waltz (R-FL), Trump’s pick to serve as White Hous national security adviser in the incoming administration, wrote on X. “Israel has lawfully defended its people & borders from genocidal terrorists. You can expect a strong response to the antisemitic bias of the ICC & UN come January.”
Incoming US Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R-SD) has also threatened to push legislation imposing sanctions on the ICC if it does not halt its efforts to pursue arrest warrants against Israeli officials.
Israel says it has gone to unprecedented lengths to try and avoid civilian casualties in Gaza, noting its efforts to evacuate areas before it targets them and to warn residents of impending military operations with leaflets, text messages, and other forms of communication. However, Hamas, which rules Gaza, has in many cases prevented people from leaving, according to the Israeli military.
Another challenge for Israel has been Hamas’s widely recognized military strategy of embedding its terrorists within Gaza’s civilian population and commandeering civilian facilities like hospitals, schools, and mosques to run operations and direct attacks.
The ICC has no jurisdiction over Israel as it is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, which established the court. Other countries including the US have similarly not signed the ICC charter. However, the ICC has asserted jurisdiction by accepting “Palestine” as a signatory in 2015, despite no such state being recognized under international law.
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Biden Administration Shifts $100 Million in US Military Aid From Israel and Egypt to Lebanon
Lebanese army soldiers gesture as they secure the area near the US embassy in Awkar, Lebanon, June 5, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
In the final days of US President Joe Biden’s time in office, his administration has redirected over $100 million in military aid from Israel and Egypt to Lebanon, citing a need to strengthen a ceasefire agreement to halt fighting between the Jewish state and the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah.
The US State Department issued two separate notices to Congress dated Jan. 3, announcing that it would shift $95 million in military aid intended for Egypt and $7.5 million intended for Israel toward the Lebanese military and its government, the Associated Press reported.
The move came after some lawmakers in Congress expressed concerns about Egypt’s human rights record, particularly the arrests of thousands of political prisoners.
Most of the money will go to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), which has a central role in enforcing the November ceasefire that stopped nearly 14 months of war between Israel and Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Islamist terrorist organization that wielded significant political and military influence in Lebanon.
“Successful implementation [of the ceasefire] will require an empowered LAF, which will need robust assistance from the United States and other partners,” the State Department said in its letters.
Hezbollah relentlessly pummeled northern Israeli communities with daily barrages of missiles, rockets, and drones in the months following the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas’s invasion of southern Israel from Gaza in the south. Roughly 80,000 Israelis were forced to evacuate Israel’s north due to the unrelenting attacks.
Israel intensified its military efforts against Hezbollah in September, using airstrikes and ground operations in southern Lebanon — bolstered by sophisticated intelligence operations — to decimate much of the terrorist group’s leadership and weapons stockpiles.
In late November, both Israel and Lebanon agreed to a ceasefire, which in part requires Israeli forces to gradually withdraw from southern Lebanon over 60 days. Meanwhile, the Lebanese army will enter these areas and ensure that Hezbollah retreats north of the Litani River, located some 18 miles north of the border with Israel.
The newly shifted US aid is largely meant to help the LAF in dispatching troops throughout southern Lebanon to supplement UN peacekeeping efforts there.
“US security assistance to the LAF increases its capacity as the country’s only legitimate military force and defender of Lebanon’s territorial integrity, enables the LAF to prevent potential destabilization from ISIS and other terrorist groups, and enables the LAF to provide security both for the Lebanese people and for US personnel,” the State Department said in its notices.
The department also rejected the claim that members of Hezbollah are serving in the LAF, insisting that the Lebanese army serves as a valuable “counterweight” to Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon.
“US support to the LAF reinforces the LAF as an important institutional counterweight to Hezbollah, which receives weapons, training, and financial support from Iran,” the State Department wrote. “The LAF continues to be an independent, non-sectarian institution in Lebanon, and is respected across all sectors.”
Critics have noted that UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the last war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006 and is the basis for the current ceasefire, failed to disarm Hezbollah, with the terrorist group becoming more powerful despite the presence of the LAF and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
Nonetheless, US Sen. Chris Murphy (D-CT) applauded the Biden administration’s announcement, arguing that the diversion of funds to Lebanon helps bolster American priorities in the region.
“Our military aid should advance US values and national security interests in the Middle East — not reflexively reward the Egyptian government, despite its failures to meet human rights conditions set by Congress,” Murphy said.
However, Richard Goldberg, senior adviser at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington, DC-based think tank, argued that shifting money toward the LAF was ill-advised.
“If we actually saw the LAF take on Hezbollah, there might be value in this support, but right now, we are throwing away taxpayer money to a Hezbollah enabler. Egypt should be pressured to do much more to secure the release of hostages held by Hamas, but moving money from a Hamas enabler to a Hezbollah enabler makes no sense,” Goldberg said in a statement.
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Israeli Minister of Culture Urges FIFA to Remove Senior PA Official for Inciting Terrorism Against Israel
Palestinian Football Association head Jibril Rajoub speaks during a press conference regarding the cancellation of the soccer match between Argentina and Israel, in the West Bank city of Ramallah, Sunday, June 6, 2018. Photo: Flash90.
Israel’s Minister of Culture and Sports Miki Zohar called on Tuesday for FIFA, the international governing body of soccer, to remove Jibril Rajoub as president of the Palestine Football Association (PFA) for inciting, justifying, and supporting violence against Israel.
Zohar wrote in a letter to FIFA President Gianni Infantino that Rajoub’s alleged incitement to violence is a “blatant infringement of the core values that international sports aim to promote — values of peace, unity, and mutual respect.” He urged Infantino and the FIFA Executive Committee to act swiftly and expel Rajoub from his senior position.
“There is no place for individuals who incite or support terrorism and violence within sports institutions,” he added. “His continued membership in senior roles within the sports world undermines public trust and sends a dangerous message — that the platform of sports can be exploited for political agendas and the promotion of hatred and violence … It is our collective responsibility to ensure that sports remain a unifying force that brings people together, rather than a stage for incitement and terror. I trust in your leadership and in FIFA’s commitment to upholding the integrity of international sports, and I am confident that you will act to safeguard its moral future.”
Zohar noted in his letter that following the Hamas-led deadly terrorist attack in southern Israel on Oct, 7, 2023 — in which 1,200 people were murdered and over 250 were kidnapped – Rajoub “publicly justified these acts of terror, stating that they were a ‘natural response to the occupation.’”
“He has repeated this appalling justification on several occasions,” Zohar added. He additionally pointed out that on Sunday, Rajoub made a guest appearance on television and “openly called for continued violent attacks against innocent Israeli civilians. He even encouraged the Palestinian Authority to take responsibility for overseeing such acts.”
“Tragically, within 24 hours of Mr. Rajoub’s statement, multiple terrorist attacks were carried out in Israel, resulting in the deaths of three innocent civilians: a 70-year-old woman, a 73-year-old woman, and a 35-year-old man,” Zohar explained.
Rajoub was fined and temporarily suspended by FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee in 2018 for inciting hatred and violence. He received the suspension after he called on soccer fans to burn jerseys of the Argentinian Football Association as well as pictures of Argentinian soccer player Lionel Messi ahead of a soccer match between Argentina and Israel. The Argentinians ultimately pulled out of the soccer game.
Since the start of the ongoing Israel-Hamas war, the PFA has repeatedly called for FIFA to suspend Israel from all international soccer matches because of its military actions in the Gaza Strip, which target Hamas terrorists who orchestrated the Oct. 7 massacre in Israel. FIFA is expected to make an announcement regarding the matter in May. A number of international soccer organizations have voiced support for the PFA’s efforts to have Israel suspended from FIFA, including the Asian Football Confederation and the Norwegian Football Association (NFF).
“The Norwegian FA is not indifferent to the disproportionate attacks Israel has subjected the civilian population of Gaza to over time … The NFF is actively advocating for FIFA to address the Palestinian FA’s proposal for sanctions against Israel,” NFF President Lise Klaveness said in December. “We are also closer to the region and the Palestinian Football Association than most other European associations. For over 10 years we have worked on the ground in the region and the Palestinian West Bank to train female football coaches and create football activities for children in schools and refugee camps.”
Kaveness also denied reports that Norway has refused to compete against Israel.
“Israel is currently part of UEFA’s competitions. We are following the situation closely, and follow the policies set by FIFA, UEFA, and the Norwegian authorities,” Kaveness added. “This means our national team will play against Israel — in March away on a neutral pitch, and in October at home at Ullevaal Stadium. Everyone now has a clear responsibility to protect and respect the football matches and the players on both teams.”
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