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What Would a Palestinian State Mean for Regional Security, and a War with Iran?
FILE PHOTO: The atomic symbol and the Iranian flag are seen in this illustration, July 21, 2022. REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration/File Photo
Though significant, connections between Palestinian Arab statehood and nuclear war remain generally ignored. For Israel, the seemingly discrete perils of war with Iran and Palestinian Arab statehood are potentially intertwined and mutually reinforcing. This means that continuing to treat these issues as separate security problems could represent an especially grievous policy error.
There are variously clarifying particulars. Once established, a Palestinian state could tilt the balance of power between Israel and Iran. For the moment, there is no law-based Palestinian state (i.e., no Palestinian Arab satisfaction of authoritative requirements delineated at the Montevideo Convention of 1934). But if there should sometime come a point where Palestinian statehood and a direct war with Iran would coincide, the effects could prove determinative. In a worst case scenario, the acceleration of competitive risk-taking in the region would enlarge the risks of unconventional warfare.
For the moment, any direct war between Israel and Iran would be fought without any “Palestine variable.” Ironically, however, one more-or-less plausible outcome of such a war would be more pressure on Israel to accept yet another enemy state. To be sure, Iran’s leaders are unconcerned about Palestinian Arab well-being per se, but even a continuously faux commitment to Palestinian statehood would strengthen their overall power position.
Additionally, any formal creation of “Palestine” would be viewed in Tehran as a favorable development regarding wars fought against Israel. While nothing scientifically meaningful can be said about an unprecedented scenario (in logic and mathematics, true probabilities must always be based upon the determinable frequency of pertinent past events), there are persuasive reasons to expect that “Palestine” would become a reliably belligerent proxy of Iran.
A “Two-State Solution” would enlarge not “only” the jihadist terror threat to Israel (conventional and unconventional), but also prospects for major regional war. Even if such a war were fought while Iran was still pre-nuclear, it could still use radiation dispersal weapons or electromagnetic pulse weapons (EMP) against Israel and/or target the Dimona nuclear reactor with conventional rockets. In a worst case scenario, Iran’s already nuclear North Korean ally would act in direct belligerency against the Jewish State.
In these complex strategic assessments, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations ought never be confined to “general principles.” Rather, variously specific issues will need to be addressed head-on: borders; Jerusalem; relations between Gaza and the “West Bank;” the Cairo Declaration of June 1974 (an annihilationist “phased plan”); and the Arab “right of return” and cancellation of the “Palestine National Charter” (which still calls unambiguously and unapologetically for the eradication of Israel “in stages”).
Not to be overlooked by any means, any justice-based plan would need to acknowledge the historical and legal rights of the Jewish people in Judea and Samaria. Such an acknowledgment would represent an indispensable corrective to lawless Hamas claims of “resistance by any means necessary” and to genocidal Palestinian calls for “liberating” all territories “from the river to the sea.” On its face, the unhidden Palestinian Arab expectation is that Israel would become part of “Palestine.” But this ought not to come as any surprise. All Islamist/Jihadist populations already regard Israel as “occupied Palestine.”
“Everything is very simple in war,” warns classical Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz in On War, “but the simplest thing is still very difficult.” American presidents have always insisted that regional peace be predicated on Arab recognition of the Jewish people’s right to security in their own sovereign nation- state.
Concurrently, most Arab leaders in the Middle East secretly hope for a decisive Israeli victory over Hamas in Gaza and over Hezbollah in Lebanon.
What about North Korea and future Middle Eastern war? Pyongyang has a documented history of active support for Iran and Syria. Regarding ties with Damascus, it was Kim Jung Un who built the Al Kibar nuclear reactor for the Syrians at Deir al-Zor. This is the same facility that was preemptively destroyed by Israel in its “Operation Orchard” (also known in certain Israeli circles as “Operation Outside the Box”) on September 6, 2007.
For Israel, nuclear weapons, doctrine and strategy will remain essential to national survival. In this connection, the country’s traditional policy of “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” or “bomb in the basement” should promptly be updated. The key objective of such dramatic changes would be more credible Israeli nuclear deterrence, a goal that will correlate closely with “selective nuclear disclosure.” Despite being counter-intuitive, Iran will need to become convinced that Israel’s nuclear arms are not too destructive for purposeful operational use. Here, in an arguably supreme irony, the credibility of Israel’s nuclear deterrent could vary inversely with its presumed destructiveness.
For Israeli nuclear deterrence to work longer-term, Iran will need to be told more rather than less about Israel’s nuclear targeting doctrine and about the invulnerability of Israel’s nuclear forces/infrastructures. In concert with such changes, Jerusalem will also need to clarify its still opaque “Samson Option.” The point of such clarifications would not be to suggest Israel’s willingness to “die with the Philistines,” but to enhance the “high destruction” pole of its nuclear deterrence continuum.
If the next US president maintains America’s support of Palestinian statehood, Iran will more likely consider certain direct conflict options vis-à-vis Israel. At some point in these considerations, Israel could need to direct explicit nuclear threats (counter-value and/or counter-force) toward the Islamic Republic. As policy, this posture could represent a “point of no return.”
For Israel, the unprecedented risks of Palestinian statehood could prove irreversible and irremediable. These risks would likely be enlarged if they had to be faced concurrent with an Israel-Iran war. It follows that Jerusalem’s core security obligation should be to keep Iran non–nuclear and to simultaneously prevent Palestinian statehood. From the standpoint of authoritative international law, meeting this two-part obligation would be in the combined interests of counter-terrorism, nuclear war-avoidance and genocide prevention. Prime facie, meeting this overriding obligation would be in the interests of regional and global justice.
Louis René Beres was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) and is the author of many books, monographs, and scholarly articles dealing with military nuclear strategy. In Israel, he was Chair of Project Daniel. Over recent years, he has published on nuclear warfare issues in Harvard National Security Journal (Harvard Law School); Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs; The Atlantic; Israel Defense; Jewish Website; The New York Times; Israel National News; The Jerusalem Post; The Hill and other sites. A version of this article appeared in Israel National News.
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US, Regional Diplomats Urge Respect for Minorities in Syria after Assad, Blinken Says
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaks during a media conference after a meeting of NATO foreign ministers at the Czernin Palace, in Prague, Czech Republic, May 31, 2024. Photo: Peter David Josek/Pool via REUTERS
Top diplomats from the United States, Turkey, the European Union and Arab nations have agreed that a new government in Syria should respect minority rights, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on Saturday following talks in Jordan and direct contacts with the rebels who ousted President Bashar al-Assad.
The meetings occurred as regional and global powers scramble for influence over whatever government replaces Assad, forced to flee a week ago.
Blinken said at a news conference that the group had agreed on a joint communique that also calls for an inclusive and representative government that respects the rights of minorities and does not offer “a base for terrorist groups.”
The joint statement also “affirmed the full support for Syria’s unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty,” a comment that appeared aimed at Israel, which has moved into Syria beyond a previously agreed buffer zone since Assad fell.
“Today’s agreement sends a unified message to the new interim authority and parties in Syria on the principles crucial to securing much needed support and recognition,” Blinken said.
Blinken also said US officials had now had “direct contact” with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and had urged them and other rebel groups to assist with locating US journalist Austin Tice, who was detained in Syria in 2012. The US has also shared with actors in Syria what it wants to see from the country’s transition, he added.
Syria’s neighbor Jordan was hosting Saturday’s gathering in Aqaba. Russia and Iran, who were Assad’s key supporters, were not invited.
Blinken, U.N. Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen and EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan and foreign ministers from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Qatar met around a circular table at a Jordanian government guesthouse. There was no Syrian representative at the table.
The Arab diplomats earlier met separately and issued a statement calling for a peaceful and inclusive political transition that leads towards elections and a new constitution.
Arab diplomats attending the talks told Reuters they were seeking assurances from Turkey that it supported this, as well as preventing the partition of Syria on sectarian lines.
Turkey and the United States, both NATO members, have conflicting interests when it comes to some of the rebels. Turkish-backed rebels in northern Syria have clashed with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
The SDF, which controls some of Syria’s largest oil fields, is the main ally in a US coalition against Islamic State militants. It is spearheaded by YPG militia, a group that Ankara sees as an extension of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) militants who have fought the Turkish state for 40 years and who it outlaws.
Blinken told Turkish officials during a visit to Ankara on Thursday and Friday that Islamic State must not be able to regroup, and the SDF must not be distracted from its role of securing camps holding IS fighters, according to a U.S. official. Turkish leaders agreed, the official with the U.S. delegation said.
Fidan told Turkish TV later on Friday that the elimination of the YPG was Turkey’s “strategic target” and urged the group’s commanders to leave Syria.
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Hezbollah Chief Says Group Lost its Supply Route Through Syria
Lebanon’s Hezbollah leader Sheikh Naim Qassem leads prayers during funeral of Hezbollah senior leader Ibrahim Aqil and Hezbollah member Mahmoud Hamad, who were killed in Israeli strike on Beirut’s southern suburbs, in Beirut, Lebanon, Sept. 22, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Amr Abdallah Dalsh
Hezbollah head Naim Qassem said on Saturday that the Lebanese armed group had lost its supply route through Syria, in his first comments since the toppling of President Bashar al-Assad nearly a week ago by a sweeping rebel offensive.
Under Assad, Iran-backed Hezbollah used Syria to bring in weapons and other military equipment from Iran, through Iraq and Syria and into Lebanon. But on Dec. 6, anti-Assad fighters seized the border with Iraq and cut off that route, and two days later, Islamist rebels captured the capital Damascus.
“Yes, Hezbollah has lost the military supply route through Syria at this stage, but this loss is a detail in the resistance’s work,” Qassem said in a televised speech on Saturday, without mentioning Assad by name.
“A new regime could come and this route could return to normal, and we could look for other ways,” he added.
Hezbollah started intervening in Syria in 2013 to help Assad fight rebels seeking to topple him at that time. Last week, as rebels approached Damascus, the group sent supervising officers to oversee a withdrawal of its fighters there.
More than 50 years of Assad family rule has now been replaced with a transitional caretaker government put in place by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a former al Qaeda affiliate that spearheaded the rebel offensive.
Qassem said Hezbollah “cannot judge these new forces until they stabilize” and “take clear positions,” but said he hoped that the Lebanese and Syrian peoples and governments could continue to cooperate.
“We also hope that this new ruling party will consider Israel an enemy and not normalize relations with it. These are the headlines that will affect the nature of the relationship between us and Syria,” Qassem said.
Hezbollah and Israel exchanged fire across Lebanon’s southern border for nearly a year in hostilities triggered by the Gaza war, before Israel went on the offensive in September, killing most of Hezbollah’s top leadership.
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Before His Ouster, Syria’s Assad Told Iran that Turkey Was Aiding Rebels to Unseat Him
Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad attends the Arab League summit, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, May 19, 2023. Photo: Saudi Press Agency/Handout via REUTERS
In the final days leading to his ouster, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad complained to Iran’s foreign minister that Turkey was actively supporting Sunni rebels in their offensive to topple him, two Iranian officials told Reuters this week.
Five decades of rule by Assad’s family ended on Sunday when he fled to Moscow, where the government granted him asylum. Iran had backed Assad in Syria’s long civil war and his overthrow was widely seen as a major blow to the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance,” a political and military alliance that opposes Israeli and US influence in the Middle East.
As rebel forces from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly aligned to al Qaeda, seized major cities and advanced towards the capital, Assad met Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi in Damascus on Dec. 2.
At the meeting, Assad voiced anger over what he said was Turkey’s intensified efforts to unseat him, according to a senior Iranian official. Araqchi assured Assad of Iran’s continued support and promised to raise the issue with Ankara, the official said.
The next day, Araqchi met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to express Tehran’s deep concerns over Ankara’s support for rebel advances.
“The meeting was tense. Iran expressed its unhappiness with Turkey’s alignment with US and Israeli agendas and conveyed Assad’s concerns,” a second Iranian official said, referring to Ankara’s support for rebels and cooperation with Western and Israeli interests in targeting Iran’s allies in the region.
Fidan, the official said, blamed Assad for the crisis, asserting that his failure to engage in genuine peace talks and his years of oppressive rule were the root causes of the conflict.
A Turkish foreign ministry source familiar with Fidan’s talks said that those were not the exact remarks by Fidan, and added that Araqchi did not bring and convey any messages from Assad to Turkey, without elaborating.
Fidan told reporters in Doha on Sunday that the Assad regime “had precious time” to address Syria’s existing problems, but did not, instead allowing “a slow decay and collapse of the regime.”
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Wednesday that Assad’s toppling was the result of a plan by the United States and Israel.
He said that one of Syria’s neighbors also had a role and continues to do so. He did not name the country, but appeared to be referring to Turkey.
NATO member Turkey, which controls swathes of land in northern Syria after several cross-border incursions against the Syrian Kurdish YPG militia, was a main backer of opposition groups aiming to topple Assad since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011.
Assad’s downfall stripped Iran and its ally the Lebanese group Hezbollah of a vital ally. Tehran’s ties to Damascus had allowed Iran to spread its influence through a land corridor from its western border via Iraq all the way to Lebanon to bring arms supplies to Hezbollah.
Iran spent billions of dollars propping up Assad during the war and deployed its Revolutionary Guards to Syria to keep its ally in power.
Hezbollah also played a major part, sending fighters to support him, but had to bring them back to Lebanon over the last year to fight in a bruising war with Israel – a redeployment that weakened Syrian government lines.
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