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Why a liberal Zionist rabbi isn’t taking to the streets over Israel’s judicial reform plan
(JTA) — Israel’s 75th anniversary was supposed to be a blowout birthday party for its supporters, but that was before the country was convulsed by street protests over the right-wing government’s proposal to overhaul its judiciary. Critics call it an unprecedented threat to Israel’s democracy, and supporters of Israel found themselves conflicted. In synagogues across North America, rabbis found themselves giving “yes, but” sermons: Yes, Israel’s existence is a miracle, but its democracy is fragile and in danger.
One of those sermons was given a week ago Saturday by Rabbi Ammiel Hirsch of Manhattan’s Stephen Wise Free Synagogue, expressing his “dismay” over the government’s actions. Hirsch is the former head of ARZA, the Reform movement’s Zionist organization, and the founder of a new organization, Amplify Israel, meant to promote Zionism among Reform Jews. He is often quoted as an example of a mainstream non-Orthodox rabbi who not only criticizes anti-Zionism on the far left but who insists that his liberal colleagues are not doing enough to defend the Jewish state from its critics.
Many on the Jewish left, meanwhile, say Jewish establishment figures, even liberals like Hirsch, have been too reluctant to call out Israel on, for example, its treatment of the Palestinians — thereby enabling the country’s extremists.
In March, however, he warned that the “Israeli government is tearing Israeli society apart and bringing world Jewry along for the dangerous ride.” That is uncharacteristically strong language from a rabbi whose forthcoming book, “The Lilac Tree: A Rabbi’s Reflections on Love, Courage, and History,” includes a number of essays on the limits of criticizing Israel. When does such criticism give “comfort to left-wing hatred of Israel,” as he writes in his book, and when does failure to criticize Israel appear to condone extremism?
Although the book includes essays on God, Torah, history and antisemitism, in a recent interview we focused on the Israel-Diaspora divide, the role of Israel in the lives of Diaspora Jews and why the synagogue remains the “central Jewish institution.”
The interview was edited for length and clarity.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: You gave a sermon earlier this month about the 75th anniversary of Israel’s founding, which is usually a time of celebration in American synagogues, but you also said you were “dismayed” by the “political extremism” and “religious fundamentalism” of the current government. Was that difficult as a pulpit rabbi?
Rabbi Ammiel Hirsch: The approach is more difficult now with the election of the new government than it has been in all the years of the past. Because we can’t sanitize supremacism, elitism, extremism, fundamentalism, and we’re not going to. Israel is in what’s probably the most serious domestic crisis in the 75-year history of the state. And what happens in Israel affects American Jewry directly. It’s Israeli citizens who elect their representatives, but that’s not the end of the discussion neither for Israelis or for American Jews. At the insistence of both parties, both parties say the relationship is fundamental and critical and it not only entitles but requires Israelis and world Jews to be involved in each other’s affairs.
For American Jewry, in its relationship with Israel, our broadest objective is to sustain that relationship, deepen that relationship, and encourage people to be involved in the affairs in Israel and to go to Israel, spend time in Israel and so forth, and that’s a difficult thing to do and at the same time be critical.
American Jews have been demonstrating here in solidarity with the Israelis who have been protesting the recent judicial overhaul proposals in Israel. Is that a place for liberal American Jews to make their voices heard on what happens in Israel?
I would like to believe that if I were living in Israel, I would be at every single one of those demonstrations on Saturday night, but I don’t participate in demonstrations here because the context of our world and how we operate is different from in Israel when an Israeli citizen goes out and marches on Kaplan Street in Tel Aviv. It’s presumed that they’re Zionists and they’re speaking to their own government. I’m not critical of other people who reach a different perspective in the United States, but for me, our context is different. Even if we say the identical words in Tel Aviv or on West 68th Street, they’re perceived in a different way and they operate in a different context.
What then is the appropriate way for American Jews to express themselves if they are critical of an action by the Israeli government?
My strongest guidance is don’t disengage, don’t turn your back, double down, be more supportive of those who support your worldview and are fighting for it in Israel. Polls seem to suggest that the large majority of Israelis are opposed to these reforms being proposed. Double down on those who are supportive of our worldview.
You lament in your book that the connections to Israel are weakening among world Jewry, especially among Jewish liberals.
The liberal part of the Jewish world is where I am and where the people I serve are by and large, and where at least 80% of American Jewry resides. It’s a difficult process because we’re operating here in a context of weakening relationship: a rapidly increasing emphasis on universal values, what we sometimes call tikkun olam [social justice], and not as a reflection of Jewish particularism, but often at the expense of Jewish particularism.
There is a counter-argument, however, which you describe in your book: “some left-wing Jewish activists contend that alienation from Israel, especially among the younger generations, is a result of the failures of the American Jewish establishment” — that is, by not doing more to express their concerns about the dangers of Jewish settlement in the West Bank, for example, the establishment alienated young liberal Jews. You’re skeptical of that argument. Tell me why.
Fundamentally I believe that identification with Israel is a reflection of identity. If you have a strong Jewish identity, the tendency is to have a strong connection with the state of Israel and to believe that the Jewish state is an important component of your Jewish identity. I think that surveys bear that out. No doubt the Palestinian question will have an impact on the relationship between American Jews in Israel as long as it’s not resolved, it will be an outstanding irritant because it raises moral dilemmas that should disturb every thinking and caring Jew. And I’ve been active in trying to oppose ultra-Orthodox coercion in Israel. But fundamentally, while these certainly are components putting pressure on the relationship between Israel and Diaspora Jewry, in particular among the elites of the American Jewish leadership, for the majority of American Jews, the relationship with Israel is a reflection of their relationship with Judaism. And if that relationship is weak and weakening, as day follows night, the relationship with Israel will weaken as well.
But what about the criticism that has come from, let’s say, deep within the tent? I am thinking of the American rabbinical students who in 2021 issued a public letter accusing Israel of apartheid and calling on American Jewish communities to hold Israel accountable for the “violent suppression of human rights.” They were certainly engaged Jews, and they might say that they were warning the establishment about the kinds of right-wing tendencies in Israel that you and others in the establishment are criticizing now.
Almost every time I speak about Israel and those who are critical of Israel, I hold that the concept of criticism is central to Jewish tradition. Judaism unfolds through an ongoing process of disputation, disagreement, argumentation, and debate. I’m a pluralist, both politically as well as intellectually.
In response to your question, I would say two things. First of all, I distinguish between those who are Zionist, pro-Israel, active Jews with a strong Jewish identity who criticize this or that policy of the Israeli government, and between those who are anti-Zionists, because anti-Zionism asserts that the Jewish people has no right to a Jewish state, at least in that part of the world. And that inevitably leads to anti-Jewish feelings and very often to antisemitism.
When it came to the students, I didn’t respond at all because I was a student once too, and there are views that I hold today that I didn’t hold when I was a student. Their original article was published in the Forward, if I’m not mistaken, and it generated some debate in all the liberal seminaries. I didn’t respond at all until it became a huge, multi-thousand word piece in The New York Times. Once it left the internal Jewish scene, it seemed to me that I had an obligation to respond. Not that I believe that they’re anti-Zionist — I do not. I didn’t put them in the BDS camp [of those who support the boycott of Israel]. I just simply criticized them.
Hundreds of Jews protest the proposed Israeli court reform outside the Israeli consulate in New York City on Feb. 21, 2023. (Gili Getz)
You signed a letter with other rabbis noting that the students’ petition came during Israel’s war with Hamas that May, writing that “those who aspire to be future leaders of the Jewish people must possess and model empathy for their brothers and sisters in Israel, especially when they are attacked by a terrorist organization whose stated goal is to kill Jews and destroy the Jewish State.”
My main point was that the essence of the Jewish condition is that all Jews feel responsible one for the another — Kol yisrael arevim zeh bazeh. And that relationship starts with emotions. It starts with a feeling of belongingness to the Jewish people, and a feeling of concern for our people who are attacked in the Jewish state. My criticism was based, in the middle of a war, on expressing compassion, support for our people who are under indiscriminate and terrorist assault. I uphold that and even especially in retrospect two years later, why anyone would consider that to be offensive in any way is still beyond me.
You were executive director of ARZA, the Reform Zionist organization, and you write in your book that Israel “is the primary source of our people’s collective energy — the engine for the recreation and restoration of the national home and the national spirit of the Jewish people.” A number of your essays put Israel at the center of the present-day Jewish story. You are a rabbi in New York City. So what’s the role or function of the Diaspora?
Our existence in the Diaspora needs no justification. For practically all of the last 2,000 years, Jewish life has existed in the Diaspora. It’s only for the last 75 years and if you count the beginning of the Zionist movement, the last 125 years or so that Jews have begun en masse to live in the land of Israel. Much of the values of what we call now Judaism was developed in the Diaspora. Moreover, the American Jewish community is the strongest, most influential, most glorious of all the Jewish Diasporas in Jewish history.
And yet, the only place in the Jewish world where the Jewish community is growing is in Israel. More Jewish children now live in Israel than all the other places in the world combined. The central value that powers the sustainability, viability and continuity of the Jewish people is peoplehood. It’s not the values that have sustained the Jewish people in the Diaspora and over the last 2,000 years, which was Torah or God, what we would call religion. I’m a rabbi. I believe in the centrality of God, Torah and religion to sustain Jewish identity. But in the 21st century, Israel is the most eloquent concept of the value of Jewish peoplehood. And therefore, I do not believe that there is enough energy, enough power, enough sustainability in the classical concept of Judaism to sustain continuity in the Diaspora. The concept of Jewish peoplehood is the most powerful way that we can sustain Jewish continuity in the 21st century.
But doesn’t that negate the importance of American Jewry?
In my view, it augments the sustainability of American Jewry. If American Jews disengage from Israel, and from the concept of Jewish peoplehood, and also don’t consider religion to be at the center of their existence, then what’s left? Now there’s a lot of activity, for example, on tikkun olam, which is a part of Jewish tradition. But tikkun olam in Judaism always was a blend between Jewish particularism and universalism — concern for humanity at large but rooted in the concept of Jewish peoplehood. But very often now, tikkun olam in the Diaspora is practiced not as a part of the concept of Jewish particularism but, as I said before, at the expense of Jewish particularism. That will not be enough to sustain Jewish communities going into the 21st century.
I want to ask about the health of the American synagogue as an institution. Considering your concern about the waning centrality of Torah and God in people’s lives — especially among the non-Orthodox — do you feel optimistic about it as an institution? Does it have to change?
I’ve believed since the beginning of my career that there’s no substitute in the Diaspora for the synagogue as the central Jewish institution. We harm ourselves when we underemphasize the central role of the synagogue. Any issue that is being done by one of the hundreds of Jewish agencies that we’ve created rests on our ability as a community to produce Jews into the next generation. And what are those institutions that produce that are most responsible for the production of Jewish continuity? Synagogues, day schools and summer camps, and of the three synagogues are by far the most important for the following reasons: First, we’re the only institution that defines ourselves as and whose purpose is what we call cradle to grave. Second, for most American Jews, if they end up in any institution at all it will be a synagogue. Far fewer American Jews will receive a day school education and or go to Jewish summer camps. That should have ramifications across the board for American Jewish policy, including how we budget Jewish institutions. We should be focusing many, many more resources on these three institutions, and at the core of that is the institution of the synagogue.
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Israel Warns Lebanon of Strikes if Hezbollah Enters Any US-Iran War, Lebanese Officials Say
A man works on an electric pole next to a damaged building, in the aftermath of an Israeli strike on Friday, in Tamnine el Tahta, Bekaa valley, Lebanon, Feb. 21, 2026. Photo: REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
Israel has warned Lebanon that it would strike the country hard, targeting civilian infrastructure including the airport, in the event that Hezbollah gets involved in any US-Iran war, two senior Lebanese officials said on Tuesday.
The Lebanese officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the Israeli message was delivered indirectly. The office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Lebanese presidency did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
Iran and the US will hold a third round of nuclear talks on Thursday in Geneva, Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi said on Sunday, amid growing concerns about the risk of military conflict.
Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, whose government has sought the disarmament of Iran-backed Hezbollah since taking office a year ago, urged the terrorist group not to take Lebanon into “another adventure,” speaking in a newspaper interview published on Tuesday.
Israel dealt heavy blows to Hezbollah during a war in 2024, killing its leader Hassan Nasrallah along with thousands of its fighters and destroying much of its arsenal.
Shi’ite Muslim Hezbollah was established by Iran‘s Revolutionary Guards in 1982.
Hezbollah‘s new leader Naim Qassem said in a televised address last month that the group was “not neutral” in the standoff between Washington and Tehran, and that it was “targeted by the potential aggression.”
“We are determined to defend ourselves. We will choose in due course how to act, whether to intervene or not,” Qassem said.
Hezbollah‘s last war with Israel began after it opened fire in solidarity with its Palestinian ally Hamas at the start of the Gaza conflict in 2023, prompting months of cross-border fighting before Israel mounted its devastating offensive.
PM SALAM WARNS HEZBOLLAH AGAINST ‘ANOTHER ADVENTURE’
“The Gaza adventure imposed a big cost on Lebanon. We hope that we will not be dragged into another adventure,” Salam told Nida al-Watan newspaper in the interview published on Tuesday.
The US State Department is pulling out non-essential government personnel and their eligible family members from the US embassy in Beirut, a senior State Department official said on Monday.
Since a US-backed ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon in 2024, Israel has carried out regular strikes against what it has identified as Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, accusing the group of seeking to rearm.
Israeli strikes have killed around 400 people in Lebanon since the ceasefire, according to a Lebanese toll.
Hezbollah says it has respected the ceasefire in southern Lebanon. In January, the US-backed Lebanese army said it had established operational control over the south, in line with the objective of establishing a monopoly on arms.
Israel said the effort was an encouraging beginning but far from sufficient.
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EU Memo Raises Security Concerns Over Mass Escape From Islamic State-Linked Syria Camp
Members of the Syrian government security forces stand guard as a group of female detainees gather at al-Hol camp after the government took control of it following the withdrawal of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in Hasaka, Syria, Jan. 21, 2026. Photo: REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi
An EU internal memo has raised security concerns about the escape of thousands of people from a detention camp holding relatives of suspected Islamic State fighters in northeastern Syria, suggesting terrorist groups could recruit from them.
The memo, sent from the Cyprus presidency of the Council of the European Union to member states and dated Feb. 23, said the status of third-country nationals who had fled the camp at al-Hol remained unclear and that it was reported that a majority of them had escaped.
“This raises concerns about how terrorist groups might seek to capitalize on the current situation to increase recruitment efforts among escapees,” said the memo, which was reviewed by Reuters.
PRISONERS INCLUDED THOUSANDS OF FOREIGNERS
Al-Hol, near the Iraqi border, was one of the main detention camps for relatives of suspected Islamic State fighters who were detained during the US-backed campaign against the jihadist group in Syria.
Control of the camp changed hands in January, when Syrian government forces under President Ahmed al-Sharaa drove the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces from the area.
The SDF had guarded the facility for years.
The camp‘s population was 23,407 people the day before the government takeover, including 6,280 foreigners from more than 40 nationalities, Reuters reported last week, citing official data from the camp.
The US military said on Feb. 13 it had completed a mission to transfer 5,700 adult male Islamic State fighters from jails in Syria to Iraq. It had originally said up to 7,000 prisoners could eventually be transferred. The EU memo noted that the initial target was not met.
‘CHAOTIC TAKEOVER‘
In a section entitled “Security concerns stemming from the evolving situation in northeast Syria,” the EU memo said the “chaotic takeover led to the collapse of security and services in the al-Hol camp, triggering the escape of a significant portion of its population.”
The UN refugee agency in Syria and the Syrian government “have confirmed that an uncontrolled exodus has occurred over the past few weeks,” it added.
Damascus has accused the SDF of withdrawing from al-Hol on Jan. 20 without any coordination. The SDF has said its forces had been “compelled” to withdraw from the camp to areas surrounding cities which it said were under threat.
A Syrian government security source told Reuters last week that the security authorities, working in cooperation with international partners, had established a unit to “pursue those who are wanted.”
The SDF had guarded prisons holding thousands of Islamic State militants in northeast Syria, in addition to al-Hol and a second camp at Roj, which also holds relatives of suspected jihadists.
The EU memo said the capacity of Damascus “to manage these facilities is assessed as limited and facing significant operational challenges.” It noted that the government’s stated intent to gradually phase out al-Hol camp had “been overtaken by recent events, which raise grave security concerns.”
The EU memo said that al-Hol and Roj camps were hosting around 25,000 people, primarily women and children, “with many of these being highly radicalized and living in degrading humanitarian and security conditions.”
Roj camp remains under the control of the SDF for now.
Last week, the SDF released 34 Australian nationals from Roj, only for them to return later. The Australian government has ruled out helping families of IS terrorists return home. Roj is also home to British-born Shamima Begum.
The EU memo said there was “reason for concern regarding the possible escape of families” from Roj once the Syrian government takes control.
Syria‘s Information Ministry and the US Central Command did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
The memo came amid an uptick of Islamic State violence in Syria.
Islamic State terrorists killed four Syrian government security personnel in northern Syria on Monday, the Syrian state news agency reported, in what would be the group’s deadliest attack on government forces since the ouster of President Bashar al-Assad.
The assault on a checkpoint west of Raqqa city underlined an escalation in attacks by the jihadist group against President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government, two days after the jihadist group declared “a new phase of operations” against it.
Islamic State issued no immediate claim of responsibility for Monday’s attack. On Saturday, the group claimed two attacks targeting Syrian army personnel in northern and eastern Syria, in which a Syrian soldier and a civilian were killed.
The Syrian state news agency said forces foiled Monday’s attack and killed one of the militants. It quoted a security source as saying Islamic State carried out the attack.
The terrorist group, however, only claimed responsibility on Tuesday for a separate attack on an army headquarters in the city of Mayadin in Deir al-Zor in eastern Syria that killed one soldier.
The group had carried out an attack in the same city days earlier.
The Syrian government joined the US-led coalition to combat Islamic State last year. In January, government forces seized control of Raqqa from the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, along with much of the surrounding territory in northern and eastern Syria.
Meanwhile, US forces on Monday began withdrawing from their largest military base in the northeast, according to three Syrian military and security sources – part of a broader pullout of US troops who deployed to Syria a decade ago to fight Islamic State.
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Iran Nears Deal to Buy Supersonic Anti-Ship Missiles From China
An Iranian newspaper with a cover photo of an Iranian missile, in Tehran, Iran, Feb. 19, 2026. Photo: Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS
Iran is close to a deal with China to purchase anti‑ship cruise missiles, according to six people with knowledge of the negotiations, just as the United States deploys a vast naval force near the Iranian coast ahead of possible strikes on the Islamic Republic.
The deal for the Chinese‑made CM‑302 missiles is near completion, though no delivery date has been agreed, the people said. The supersonic missiles have a range of about 290 kilometers and are designed to evade shipborne defenses by flying low and fast. Their deployment would significantly enhance Iran’s strike capabilities and pose a threat to US naval forces in the region, two weapons experts said.
Negotiations with China to buy the missile weapons systems, which began at least two years ago, accelerated sharply after the 12‑day war between Israel and Iran in June, according to the six people with knowledge of the talks, including three officials who were briefed by the Iranian government as well as three security officials. As talks entered their final stages last summer, senior Iranian military and government officials traveled to China, including Massoud Oraei, Iran’s deputy defense minister, according to two of the security officials. Oraei’s visit has not been previously reported.
“It’s a complete gamechanger if Iran has supersonic capability to attack ships in the area,” said Danny Citrinowicz, a former Israeli intelligence officer and now senior Iran researcher at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies think tank. “These missiles are very difficult to intercept.”
Reuters could not determine how many missiles were involved in the potential deal, how much Iran had agreed to pay, or whether China would go through with the agreement now given heightened tensions in the region.
“Iran has military and security agreements with its allies, and now is an appropriate time to make use of these agreements,” an Iranian foreign ministry official told Reuters.
In a comment sent after publication, China‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it was not aware of the talks about a potential missile sale that Reuters had reported. China‘s defense ministry did not respond to a request for comment.
The White House did not directly address the negotiations between Iran and China over the missile system when asked by Reuters. US President Donald Trump has been clear that “either we will make a deal or we will have to do something very tough like last time,” a White House official said, referring to the current standoff with Iran.
The missiles would be among the most advanced military hardware to be transferred to Iran by China and defy a United Nations weapons embargo that was first imposed in 2006. The sanctions were suspended in 2015 as part of a nuclear deal with the US and allies, and then reimposed last September.
US FORCES GATHERING NEAR IRAN
The potential sale would underscore deepening military ties between China and Iran at a moment of heightened regional tension, complicating US efforts to contain Iran’s missile program and curb its nuclear activities. It would also signal China’s growing willingness to assert itself in a region long dominated by US military might.
China, Iran, and Russia hold annual joint naval exercises, and last year the US Treasury Department sanctioned several Chinese entities for supplying chemical precursors to Iran‘s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for use in its ballistic missile program. China rejected those allegations, saying it was unaware of the cases cited in the sanctions and that it strictly enforces export controls on dual-use products.
While hosting Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian for a military parade in Beijing in September, Chinese President Xi Jinping told the Iranian leader that “China supports Iran in safeguarding sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national dignity.”
China joined Russia and Iran in a joint letter on Oct. 18 to say they believed the decision to reimpose sanctions was flawed.
“Iran has become a battlefield between the US” on one side and Russia and China on the other, said one of the officials who was briefed by Iran’s government on the missile negotiations.
The deal comes as the US assembles an armada within striking distance of Iran, including the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and its strike group. The USS Gerald R. Ford and its escorts are also heading to the region. The two ships together can carry more than 5,000 personnel and 150 aircraft.
“China does not want to see a pro-Western regime in Iran,” said Citrinowicz, the Israeli specialist on Iran. “That would be a threat to their interests. They are hoping that this regime will stay.”
Trump said on Feb. 19 he was giving Iran 10 days to reach an agreement over its nuclear program or face military action. The US is preparing for the possibility of sustained, weeks-long operations against Iran if Trump orders an attack, Reuters reported on Feb. 13.
A DEPLETED ARSENAL
The CM-302 purchase would be a significant improvement in an Iranian arsenal depleted by last year’s war, said Pieter Wezeman, a senior researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
China’s state-owned China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) markets the CM-302 as the world’s best anti–ship missile, capable of sinking an aircraft carrier or destroyer. The weapons system can be mounted on ships, aircraft, or mobile ground vehicles. It can also take out targets on land.
CASIC did not respond to a request for comment.
Iran is also in discussions to acquire Chinese surface‑to‑air missile systems, so-called MANPADS, anti‑ballistic weapons, and anti-satellite weapons, the six people said.
China was a major arms supplier to Iran in the 1980s, but large‑scale weapons transfers dwindled by the late 1990s under international pressure. In recent years, US officials have accused Chinese companies of providing missile-related materials to Iran but have not publicly accused it of supplying complete missile systems.