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Why Gaza Fatality Data Has Become Completely Unreliable
An UNRWA aid truck at the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Photo: Reuters/Amr Abdallah Dalsh
Heated debates over the Palestinian death toll in the Hamas-Israel war tend to focus on the fact that widely cited fatality numbers make no distinction between combatants and noncombatants. While this is true, it misses a more fundamental problem: the numbers themselves have lost any claim to validity.
In the first month of the war, the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health (MOH) in Gaza relied on its existing collection system, made up primarily of hospitals and morgues, to certify each death.
Starting in early November, however, hospitals in northern Gaza began to shut down or evacuate during the Israeli ground invasion, spurring the MOH to introduce a new, undefined methodology for counting fatalities: media reports. This methodology, which the MOH has rarely acknowledged publicly, accounts for the majority of fatalities reported over the past four months, surpassing the traditional collection system.
A comparison of the two methodologies, using MOH reports and claims published by the Hamas-controlled Government Media Office (GMO), yields wildly different and irreconcilable results, indicating that the media reports methodology is dramatically understating fatalities among adult males, the demographic most likely to be combatants. This undercuts the persistent claim that 72 percent of those killed in Gaza are women and children — a problematic claim that has worsened since it was first noted by a Washington Institute report in January.
The result is that MOH statistics do not appear to offer a reliable guide to the actual Palestinian death toll even by the “foggy” standards of normal wartime reporting. Journalists, analysts, and government officials need to be aware that the actual overall death toll may be significantly higher (or, less likely, lower) than what the MOH has reported; the demographic composition of these fatalities is certainly far different than what the MOH claims.
Building a Database
To assess this problem, the author has assembled a comprehensive collection of publicly available Gaza fatality data that includes:
Daily updates covering the period October 7 through March 21, obtained from four sources: the Hamas-run MOH in Gaza, the Hamas-run GMO, the Palestinian Authority Ministry of Health in Ramallah, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (which simply relays Gaza MOH/GMO claims, sometimes inaccurately).
Compiled data from 13 Health Sector Emergency Reports published by the Gaza MOH between December 11 and March 18 (these documents can be accessed via the MOH Telegram channel or the Internet Archive).
Two comprehensive MOH data releases on October 26 and January 7 (the latter covering up to November 2 for all of Gaza and up to January 5 for the south).
The following analysis is based primarily on the Health Sector Emergency Reports and occasional GMO updates.
If interested, you can download a condensed version of the author’s database. (The full database with sources, methodology, and other information will be published on a future date.)
Limitations of Media Reports
The regular methodology used by the MOH (hereafter the “central collection system”) records deaths at hospitals and morgues, along with deaths reported by the Palestinian Red Crescent Society ambulance service and other unspecified sources (for a more detailed explanation of these practices, see the author’s January study). This methodology is well-understood and has been relatively accurate in the past.
Unlike in previous conflicts, however, neither OCHA nor local and international NGOs are currently conducting real-time fatality verification in Gaza or attempting to distinguish between civilians and combatants. Moreover, only a third of Gaza’s hospitals are even partially functional, and many parts of the Strip have serious access problems, curtailing the use of this methodology to count deaths outside of Rafah and Khan Yunis governorates.
On November 10, the MOH announced that it could no longer report deaths from two northern governorates; a month later, officials acknowledged that they were relying on what they called “reliable media sources” to report deaths in those areas. In reality, they had begun using this methodology as early as November 3, according to the MOH dataset released on January 7.
To be sure, it is not uncommon to use news reports when attempting to count deaths in chaotic battlespaces with access issues and damaged institutions. Yet this practice is notoriously difficult and typically looks backward rather than attempting a real-time count. The reliability of any such effort is greatly dependent on its methodological details, but the MOH has refused to elaborate on how it collects this data, which is a major problem given that media reports have become the dominant input in the Gaza death toll, accounting for more than 14,000 reported fatalities.
Comparing the Methodologies
Despite known problems with the MOH central collection system (outlined in more detail in the January study), it is the more reliable methodology because it involves identity verification and counting of actual bodies.
Media reports, by contrast, are much more difficult to verify, regularly lack details necessary to determine the identities or disposition of those killed, and may double-count or miss many fatalities. The divergence between the two methodologies is perhaps best shown by how differently they have reported demographic details about Gaza deaths.
For instance, the MOH Health Sector Emergency Reports provide separate data on men, women, and children when their deaths are recorded through the central collection system, but only a single aggregated figure for deaths gleaned from media reports. When these reports coincide with the GMO’s periodic reports (which provide demographic breakdowns), one can compare how they treat fatalities among different demographic groups.
This comparison reveals sharp differences — most notably, a sixfold decrease in adult male fatalities recorded from media reports and a fourfold increase in child fatalities. (For reference, children make up roughly 50% of Gaza’s population, and men and women make up a quarter each.)
Some of these differences may be explained by the fact that media reports are unlikely to capture combatant deaths accurately due to access issues and fear of retribution for exposing Hamas losses. In most cases, however, the numbers are too far apart to be reconcilable, or too divorced from the realities on the ground to be credible.
For example, according to the media reports methodology, only 1,192 men had been killed in northern and central Gaza as of March 18, despite four and a half months of heavy ground fighting (see the author’s condensed database). Five days later, that number inexplicably decreased to 1,170 — a feat that would have required 22 men to somehow come back to life by March 23 in order to reconcile the central collection system data with the overall claim. In contrast, Israeli authorities estimate that 13,000 militants have been killed — a figure that may incorporate many combatant deaths not recorded by either MOH methodology.
Without clarification from the MOH, such findings suggest significant omission or manipulation aimed at understating the number of men killed and overstating the number of children killed. One possibility is that fatalities among militants — most of whom are men — are more likely to go unreported because they occur in tunnels or on battlefields, where most reporters are either unable to access bodies or unwilling to risk Hamas retribution or the dangers of combat zones. Another possibility is active manipulation — that is, using the media reports methodology as a smokescreen for altering the data in support of the claim that 72% of those killed are women and children.
Meanwhile, data from the central collection system indicates a sharp decrease in overall deaths since November and a sustained increase in the proportion of men killed.
In addition to the MOH’s growing reliance on the media reports methodology, these trends may reflect various factors on the ground, such as Israel’s shift from a primarily air-based campaign to ground fighting, the mass evacuation of civilians from the north to Rafah governorate, and the decreasing intensity of fighting in areas where the central collection system is still functioning. Such factors would be expected to reduce overall civilian casualties and therefore increase the proportion of adult men killed, since that is the demographic most likely to serve as combatants.
Caveats and Recommendations
This analysis is solely intended to compare various Hamas fatality claims against each other and raise questions about the resultant discrepancies. It makes no claims about the true death toll in Gaza or the civilian-combatant ratio, nor is it meant to distract from the very real and widespread loss of life in Gaza and the severe humanitarian crisis that its population continues to suffer.
Regarding the over-representation of men in the fatality statistics, this point is not intended to imply that all Gazan men are militants. Rather, adult men are the most likely to be militants across any group (though Hamas is known to use children in combat and support roles). Their overrepresentation has also been used to help estimate militant deaths in the past.
Caveats aside, the above findings should prompt analysts, media outlets, and government officials to bear the following points in mind when assessing Gaza fatality statistics:
The discrepancies between the methodologies for counting fatalities warrant much more intense scrutiny and should be paired with appropriate caveats if cited. Whether through passive omission, active manipulation, or both, the Gaza Health Ministry’s media reports methodology significantly understates the number of men killed and may overstate the number of children killed.
The repeated claim that 72% of the dead are women and children is very likely incorrect. Data from the central collection system indicates that 58% of those killed since the start of the war are women and children; this figure drops to 48% for those killed since November 3. For the 72% claim to be accurate, women and children would have to make up about 90% of deaths recorded from media reports. This proportion is implausible — men comprise a quarter of the population, and these fatalities have largely occurred in areas with fewer civilians and more combatants, most of whom are adult men.
Data from both methodologies suggests that the war has decreased in intensity. Fatalities have declined from an average of 348 per day in the first weeks of the war to around 85 per day in March.
The existing data is too limited to allow for definitive conclusions about the true death toll or the civilian-combatant ratio. A high proportion of reported deaths come from an unknown methodology that may be misrepresenting the data, while enormous uncertainty persists regarding how many combatant fatalities go uncounted in tunnels and other battlespaces. The exact proportions of men, women, and children killed are even more unclear. The available data does not allow for reliable estimates about the ratio of civilians to combatants killed either, whether independently or by comparison with Israeli estimates.
Gabriel Epstein is a Research Assistant at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where this article was originally published.
The post Why Gaza Fatality Data Has Become Completely Unreliable first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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US Lawmakers Slam Zohran Mamdani Over Pledge to Scrap IHRA Definition of Antisemitism
Candidate Zohran Mamdani speaks during a Democratic New York City mayoral primary debate, June 4, 2025, in New York, US. Photo: Yuki Iwamura/Pool via REUTERS
Two members of the US Congress on Wednesday slammed New York City Democratic mayoral nominee Zohran Mamdani after he pledged to abandon a widely used definition of antisemitism if elected.
Reps. Mike Lawler, a Republican from New York, and Josh Gottheimer, a Democrat from New Jersey, said in a joint statement that Mamdani’s plan to scrap the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism is “dangerous” and “shameful.” The IHRA definition — adopted by dozens of US states, dozens of countries, and hundreds of governing institutions, including the European Union and United Nations — has been a cornerstone of global efforts to monitor and combat antisemitic hate.
“Walking away from IHRA is not just reckless — it undermines the fight against antisemitism at a time when hate crimes are spiking,” Lawler said in his own statement. Gottheimer echoed that concern, arguing that dismantling the definition “sends exactly the wrong message to Jewish communities who feel under siege.”
The backlash followed Mamdani’s comments last week to Bloomberg News in which he vowed, if elected, to reverse New York City Mayor Eric Adams’ executive order in June adopting the IHRA standard. Mamdani, a democratic socialist and state assemblymember, argued that the IHRA definition blurs the line between antisemitism and political criticism of Israel and risks chilling free speech.
“I am someone who has supported and support BDS [the boycott, divestment, and sanctions movement against Israel] and nonviolent approaches to address Israeli state violence,” he said at the time.
The BDS movement seeks to isolate Israel from the international community as a step toward its eventual elimination. Leaders of the movement have repeatedly stated their goal is to destroy the world’s only Jewish state.
“Let’s be extremely clear: the BDS movement is antisemitic. Efforts to delegitimize Israel’s right to exist are antisemitic. And refusing to outright condemn the violent call to ‘globalize the intifada’ — offering only that you’d discourage its use — is indefensible,” Lawler and Gottheimer said in their joint statement, referring to Mamdani’s recent partial backtracking after his initial defense of the use of the phrase “globalize the intifada.”
“There are no two sides about the meaning of this slogan — it is hate speech, plain and simple,” the lawmakers continued. “Given the sharp spike in antisemitic violence, families across the Tri-State area should be alarmed. Leaders cannot equivocate when it comes to standing against antisemitism and the incitement of violence against Jews.”
IHRA — an intergovernmental organization comprising dozens of countries including the US and Israel — adopted the “working definition” of antisemitism in 2016. Since then, the definition has been widely accepted by Jewish groups and lawmakers across the political spectrum.
According to the definition, antisemitism “is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” It provides 11 specific, contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere. Beyond classic antisemitic behavior associated with the likes of the medieval period and Nazi Germany, the examples include denial of the Holocaust and newer forms of antisemitism targeting Israel such as demonizing the Jewish state, denying its right to exist, and holding it to standards not expected of any other democratic state.
In a statement, the Mamdani campaign confirmed that the candidate would not use the IHRA definition of antisemitism, which major civil rights groups have said is essential for fighting an epidemic of anti-Jewish hatred sweeping across the US.
“A Mamdani administration will approach antisemitism in line with the Biden administration’s National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism — a strategy that emphasizes education, community engagement, and accountability to reverse the normalization of antisemitism and promote open dialogue,” Mamdani spokesperson Dora Pekec told the New York Post.
Lawler and Gottheimer’s pushback comes as Congress debates the Antisemitism Awareness Act, legislation that would codify IHRA’s definition into federal law. Advocacy groups such as the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) have urged lawmakers to back the measure, warning that antisemitic incidents have surged nationwide over the past two years and having a clear definition will better enable law enforcement and others to combat it.
For Mamdani, the controversy over the IHRA definition adds a new flashpoint to a mayoral campaign already drawing national attention.
A little-known politician before this year’s Democratic primary campaign, Mamdani is an outspoken supporter of the BDS movement. He has also repeatedly refused to recognize Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, falsely suggesting the country does not offer “equal rights” for all its citizens, and promised to arrest Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu if he visits New York.
Mamdani especially came under fire during the summer when he initially defended the phrase “globalize the intifada”— which references previous periods of sustained Palestinian terrorism against Jews and Israels and has been widely interpreted as a call to expand political violence — by invoking the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising during World War II. However, Mamdani has since backpedaled on his support for the phrase, saying that he would discourage his supporters from using the slogan.
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Jewish Leaders in UK, Canada, Australia Urge Governments to Reconsider Palestinian State Recognition
Women hold up flags during a a pro-Palestinian rally in Hyde Park, Sydney, Australia, Oct. 15, 2023. Photo: REUTERS/Lewis Jackson
Jewish umbrella organizations in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have jointly expressed “grave concerns” over their governments’ plans to recognize a Palestinian state at the United Nations General Assembly next week.
In a joint statement, the Executive Council of Australian Jewry, the Board of Deputies of British Jews, and the Canadian Center for Israel and Jewish Affairs urged their governments to reconsider their intention to recognize a “State of Palestine.”
This month, several Western countries — including France — are expected to recognize a Palestinian state at the UN General Assembly, marking their latest effort to increase international pressure on Israel over the war in Gaza.
However, Jewish communities in these countries have strongly opposed the move, urging their governments to concentrate diplomatic efforts on securing the release of all remaining Israeli hostages held by Hamas and dismantling the Palestinian terrorist group’s military and political power.
They also emphasized the need to ensure humanitarian aid reaches civilians in Gaza without being diverted for terrorist operations and that all parties comply with international law.
“We are gravely concerned that our governments’ announced intentions to recognize a Palestinian state at the UN this month are seen by Hamas as a reward for its violence and rejectionism towards Israel, and these announcements have therefore lessened rather than maximized pressure for the hostages’ release and for Hamas to disarm,” the joint statement read.
“Extremists have answered [Hamas’s] call for escalations in global violence by carrying out brutal assaults on Jews — citizens of each of our countries,”” it continued. “For the sake of a better future for Israelis, Palestinians, and the wider Middle East, it is an imperative to avoid serving this agenda.”
Supporters of the recognition argue that this move would actually undermine Hamas’s control, noting that the terrorist group has never supported a two-state solution to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and would likely oppose a Palestinian state since it would have no governing role.
However, Hamas has praised such plans to recognize a Palestinian state as “the fruits of Oct. 7,” citing the Hamas-led invasion of and massacre across southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, as the reason for increasing Western support.
“The fruits of Oct. 7 are what caused the entire world to open its eyes to the Palestinian issue,” senior Hamas official Ghazi Hamad said in a recent interview with Al Jazeera.
Israeli officials and opponents of such recognition argue that Hamad’s remarks show these countries are, essentially, rewarding acts of terrorism.
US President Donald Trump has strongly opposed the move, warning that it would hinder Gaza ceasefire negotiations and empower Hamas instead of advancing peace.
During a bilateral meeting on Thursday amid Trump’s state visit to the UK, he was asked about Britain’s plans to recognize a Palestinian state.
“I have a disagreement with the prime minister on that score, one of our few disagreements, actually,” Trump said, referring to British Prime Minister Keir Starmer.
For his part, Starmer said he and Trump were aligned on the shared goal of achieving peace in the region.
“We absolutely agree on the need for peace and a road map, because the situation in Gaza is intolerable,” the British leader said.
In their joint statement, Jewish communities in the UK, Canada, and Australia argued that their governments’ plans to recognize a Palestinian state without making Hamas’s disarmament and the release of hostages a precondition would set back, rather than advance, prospects for a genuine two-state peace.
“Our governments are in effect saying that the fulfilment of these requirements post-recognition will be taken on trust and left for some unspecified time in the future,” the statement read. “This is a posture that lacks credibility, borders on recklessness, and sets up Palestinian statehood for failure from the outset.”
“Let it never be forgotten that Hamas and other terrorist groups in Gaza initiated this war [and] they remain openly committed to the genocidal goal of destroying Israel as a state and expelling or eradicating its Jewish population,” it continued.
Western powers have been negotiating with the Palestinian Authority (PA) on conditions for Gaza governance after Hamas is removed from power, while the PA continues to pledge reforms — a strategy experts say is unlikely to succeed given its lack of credibility and ongoing support for terrorism against Israel.
Jewish leaders have argued that these governments appear to be accepting the PA’s promises of reform at face value, rather than waiting to see if its behavior truly changes.
The PA, which has long been riddled with accusations of corruption, has maintained for years a so-called “pay-for-slay” program, which rewards terrorists and their families for carrying out attacks against Israelis.
Under the policy, the Palestinian Authority Martyr’s Fund makes official payments to Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails, the families of “martyrs”” killed in attacks on Israelis, and injured Palestinian terrorists. Reports estimate that approximately 8 percent of the PA’s budget is allocated to paying stipends to convicted terrorists and their families.
PA President Mahmoud Abbas had announced plans to reform this system earlier this year, but the PA has continued to issue payments.
The Palestinian Authority has been lying to the world for decades.
Once again, they are trying to whitewash the “Pay-for-Slay” policy of payments to terrorists and their families. Instead of paying the “Prisoners” and “Martyrs” through the old method, they are paying through a… https://t.co/IDlSEBqYDn
— Israel Foreign Ministry (@IsraelMFA) September 17, 2025
The PA has also avoided holding elections for nearly 20 years, largely due to Abbas’s limited support among Palestinians.
According to a poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), if an agreement is reached to end the war in Gaza, only 40 percent of Palestinians “support the return of the PA to managing the affairs of the Gaza Strip,” while 56 percent oppose it.
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‘Antisemitism Is Alive and Well’: Swastika Graffiti at Dartmouth College Shakes Jewish Community
Swastika graffitied outside of Jewish student’s dormitory at Dartmouth College. Photo: Screenshot/X.
An unknown person or group graffitied a swastika, the symbol of the Nazi Party, outside the dormitory of a Jewish student at Dartmouth College — at least the second such incident at an elite US college during the early weeks of fall semester.
“This act of bigotry and targeted harassment at a person’s home will not be tolerated on our campus,” Dartmouth president Sian Beilock said in a statement on Wednesday, noting that both the local police force and the college’s own security department are investigating the incident. “Antisemitism has no place at Dartmouth. Acts of bigotry — and all forms of hate — are deeply hurtful and stand in direct opposition to what each of us is working so hard to create at Dartmouth. This is not who we are.”
The graffitiing of a swastika as a method of intimidation and expression of hate on the campus came as a shock to Dartmouth’s Jewish community and stands out for being perpetrated only days before Jews across the US and the world observe Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year.
“With Jewish high holidays around the corner, our community feels the impact of this crime even more profoundly,” Ruby Benjamin, a Jewish Dartmouth student and president of the campus Chabad, told The Dartmouth, the college’s official student newspaper. “In a time that should be marked with joy, we are forced to look hatred in the eye. While we are disgusted by yesterday’s events, we are not afraid. Today, as always, we stand together as a strong community.”
Another Jewish student and Hillel International affiliate, Jacob Markman told the paper, “This just shows that antisemitism is alive and well, and that it is something we need to take seriously and address.”
The incident came about a week after an unknown person graffitied antisemitic messages inside the Weinstein residence hall at New York University.
Dartmouth College, located in Hanover, New Hampshire, has seen this kind of incident before.
In April 2023, someone carved a swastika into dirt on The Green of Dartmouth College, a a five- acre, grassy common space at the center of the school’s campus. Three years earlier, in 2020, a former student, Carlos Wilcox, vandalized a public menorah on campus by shooting it with a pellet gun during the 2020 Hanukkah holiday. The 20-year-old Bronx, New York native also shot the windows of several college buildings, causing $1,500 in damage in total. Wilcox, who managed to dodge a hate crime charge and was charged with felony criminal mischief, was expelled from the college and banned from campus.
In April 2022, according to The Dartmouth, he reached an agreement with the prosecutors of Grafton County, where Dartmouth is located, under which the charges against him were dropped in exchange for his paying the college $2,ooo in damages, completing 100 hours of community service, and attending substance abuse counseling. Wilcox was also ordered to meet with Dartmouth Chabad Rabbi Moshe Leib Gray and other members of the campus community.
Throughout the process, he maintained his innocence, claiming that another student, Zachary Wang, shot the menorah and that he only purchased the pellet gun and witnessed the incident.
Dartmouth has also been the site of extreme anti-Zionist activity.
In May, a pro-Hamas group which calls itself the “New Deal Coalition” (NDC) commandeered the anteroom of the Parkhurst Hall administrative building but limited the demonstration to business hours, as its members went home when it was shuttered at 6 pm. Before leaving the building, however, the group contributed to injuries sustained by a member of Beilock’s staff and an officer of the school’s Department of Safety and Security officer, according to The Dartmouth.
During the unauthorized demonstration, the agitators shouted “free, free Palestine,” words shouted only recently by another anti-Israel activist who allegedly murdered two Israeli diplomats outside the Capital Jewish Museum in Washington DC.
The following day, the group at Dartmouth defended the behavior, arguing that it is a legitimate response to the college’s rejection of a proposal — inspired by the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement — to divest from armaments and aerospace manufacturers which sell to Israel and its recent announcement of a new think tank, the Davidson Institute for Global Security, which it claims is linked to the Jewish state.
“We took this escalated action — one deployed several times in Dartmouth’s history to protest against apartheid — because Dartmouth funded, US-backed Israel has been escalating its genocidal assault on Palestine,” the group wrote. “In an effort to ‘dialogue,’ a group of students, staff, and faculty, and alumni spent months drafting extensively researched 55-page divestment proposal … How did the college respond? They rejected divestment on every single criteria and, the day after, announced that they are reinvesting in colonial genocide with the launch of the Davidson Institute for Global Security.”
The statement concluded with an ambiguous threat.
“So long as you fund actively imperialistic violence, we will continue to hold you accountable,” it said. “There is only one solution! Intifada! Revolution!”
Amid these disturbances, the Dartmouth administration has declined to legitimate the claims of anti-Zionists who demand a boycott of Israel.
A week before the demonstration, Dartmouth College’s Advisory Committee on Investor Responsibility (ACIR) unanimously rejected a proposal imploring the school to adopt the BDS movement, which seeks to isolate Israel from the international community as a step toward its eventual elimination.
“By a vote of nine to zero, [ACIR] at Dartmouth College finds that the divestment proposal submitted by Dartmouth Divest for Palestine and dated Feb. 18, 2025, does not meet criteria, laid out in the Dartmouth Board of Trustees’ Statement on Investment and Social Responsibility and in ACIR’s charge, that must be satisfied for the proposal to undergo further review,” the committee said in a report explaining its decision. “ACIR recommends not to advance the proposal.”
A copy of the document reviewed by The Algemeiner shows that the committee evaluated the BDS proposal, submitted by the Dartmouth Divest for Palestine (DDP) group, based on five criteria regarding the college’s divestment history, capacity to address controversial issues through discourse and learning, and campus unity. It concluded that DDP “partially” met one of them by demonstrating that Dartmouth has divested from a country or industry in the past to establish its moral credibility on pressing cultural and geopolitical issues but noted that its analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lacks nuance, betraying the group’s “lack of engagement with counter arguments.”
ACIR added that DDP also does not account for the sheer divisiveness of BDS and its potential to “degrade” rather than facilitate “additional dialogue on campus.”
Follow Dion J. Pierre @DionJPierre.