דער אָנגעזעענער פּאָעט און רעדאַקטאָר יהודה גור־אריה און די טאַלאַנטירטע שרײַבערין שירי שפּירא זענען הײַיאָר געוואָרן די לאַורעאַטן פֿון דעם רובינליכט־פּריז. די אויסטיילונג פֿון די פּריזן איז פֿאָרגעקומען דורך זום דעם 16טן דעצעמבער.

די פּרעמיע ווערט געשטיצט פֿון דער פֿונדאַציע אויפֿן נאָמען פֿון אַנאַ און לייב רובינליכט, וועלכער איז אַליין געווען אַ ייִדישער פּאָעט. די פֿונדאַציע, וואָס איז פֿאַרלייגט געוואָרן אין 1986, טיילט צו יערלעכע פּרעמיעס פֿאַר ליטעראַרישער און קולטורעלער טעטיקייט אויף ייִדיש און לטובֿת ייִדיש.

יהודה גור-אריה איז אַ פּאָעט, איבערזעצער און רעדאַקטאָר אין ייִדיש און אין העברעיִש. אַ געבוירענער אין בעסאַראַביע אין 1934 האָט ער דורכגעמאַכט דרײַ יאָר אין טראַנסניסטריע. ער האָט יונגערהייט עולה געווען און זיך באַזעצט אין אלומות, אין עמק הירדן. צענדליקער ביכער האָט ער איבערגעזעצט פֿון ייִדיש אויף העברעיִש, רומעניש און רוסיש. צו זײַן ליד „כפֿל“ האָט נחום היימאַן קאָמפּאָנירט מוזיק און דאָס ליד האָט געזונגען די באַרימטע זינגערין חוה אַלבערשטיין.

אַ גרויסע צאָל ביכער האָט גור־אריה אַרויסגעגעבן; צווישן זיי — „זערורים“, „לידער אין בלוי“, „מיניאַטורן“ (1966); „שבחי קיץ“, לידער (1978); „תעלולי טלי“, דערציילונגען פֿאַר קינדער (1983); „צבעי פרפר“, לידער און אַ צאָל אַנדערע ווערק.

ער האָט אויף העברעיִש איבערגעזעצט ייִדישע ווערק פֿון עלי שעכטמאַן, לייב ראָכמאַן, יצחק באַשעוויס-זינגער, מרים יהבֿ, יהושע פּערלאַ, יענטע מאַש, ש. ל. שנײַדערמאַן, י. י. טרונק און אַלכּסנדר שפּיגלבלאַט, ווי אויך אַן אַנטאָלאָגיע פֿון ייִדישע אַרבעטער־לידער און יאַפּאַנישע לידער.

דער זשורי, וואָס איז באַשטאַנען פֿון טובֿה רעשטיק-דודזאָן, רוני כּהן און דניאל גלאי יהודה גור-אריה, האָט געמאָלדן אַז יהודה גור-אריהן האָט פֿאַרדינט דעם פּריז צוליב „זײַנע ליטעראַרישע שאַפֿונגען אויף עטלעכע זשאַנערן ווי דיכטונג, פּראָזע און דערציילונגען, זײַנע פֿאַרשידנאַרטיקע איבערזעצונגען פֿון ייִדיש, רומעניש און רוסיש וועלכע האָבן באַרײַכערט אונדזער ליטעראַטור, און זײַן אַלגעמיינעם בײַטראָג במשך יאָרן צום קולטור-לעבן אין ישׂראל.“

שירי שפּירא איז אַ יונגע ייִדיש-פּראָזאַיִקערין וואָס איז געבוירן געוואָרן אין ישׂראל אין 1987 און וווינט הײַנט אין ירושלים. די טעג איז זי אַ דאָקטאָראַנטקע בײַם בן-גוריון אוניווערסיטעט, וווּ זי לערנט אויך ייִדיש-קלאַסן. זי האָט אויף העברעיִש איבערגעזעצט די ראָמאַנען פֿון מאַקסים בילער, מאַרלען האַוסהאָפֿער, רות אָזעקי און ריטשאַרד פאַווערס, און טעקסטן פֿון פֿרידריך העלדערלין, דניאל קעלמאַן, ישׂראל ראַבאָן און דבֿורה פֿאָגעל. זי איז אויך אַ רעדאַקטאָרשע אין „המוסך“, אַ העברעיִשן ליטעראַטור־זשורנאַל. אירע ייִדישע דערציילונגען זענען געדרוקט געוואָרן אין די זשורנאַלן „ייִדישלאַנד“, „אויפֿן שוועל“ און „די גאָלדענע פּאַווע“.

הײַיאָר דערשײַנט אין לייוויק-פֿאַרלאַג איר ערשטלינג „די צוקונפֿט“, אַ באַנד דערציילונגען. אַ טייל פון זיי זענען געדרוקט געוואָרן אין ליטעראַרישע זשורנאַלן און אַנדערע זענען אין גאַנצן נײַע שאַפֿונגען. דאָס בוך איז אַן אויסדרוק פֿון אַ פֿרוי, אַ שרײַבערין, וואָס איז אויסגעוואַקסן אין ישׂראל מיט אַלע אירע טראַוומעס און קאָנפֿליקטן, און אַ טיפֿן גלויבן אין דער צוקונפֿט.

דער זשורי האָט געזאָגט אַז שפּירא האָט פֿאַרדינט דעם פּריז „פֿאַר אירע ליטעראַרישע, אייגנאַרטיקע שאַפֿונגען וועלכע שטיצן זיך אויף טיפֿע קענטענישן פֿון דער ייִדישער שפּראַך און ליטעראַטור, מיט די פֿאַרשידענע קוואַלן פֿון וועלכע זי שעפּט אַ זעלטענע אַטמאָספֿער און אינספּיראַציע.“

אין איר דאַנקרעדע בײַם באַקומען די פּרעמיע האָט שפּירא אָפֿן־האַרציק אויסגעדריקט אירע געדאַנקען:

„איך פֿיל זיך אַ ביסל אומגעלומפּערט באַקומענדיק אַ פּרעמיע, בפֿרט ווי אַ שרײַבערין וואָס פּובליקירט אַ בוך אויף אַ שפּראַך וואָס איז ניט איר מאַמע-לשון. אָבער איך האָב אַ חשד, אַז אַלע דורות ייִדישע שרײַבערס האָבן זיך געפֿילט ניט באַהאַוונט אין עפּעס אַ זאַך. מסתּמא האָבן זיך ס׳רובֿ פֿון זיי גאָר היימיש געפֿילט אויף מאַמע-לשון, אָבער אָפֿט זענען זיי געווען מענטשן וואָס האָבן געדאַרפֿט זיך שאַפֿן אַ נײַע היים, און אַ נײַע אידענטיטעט, אַ מאָדערנע, אַ וועלטלעכע. אַזאַ פּאָזיציע איז בדרך-כּלל אַ טייל פֿונעם זײַן אַ קינסטלער, און אַ שרײַבער בפֿרט. און גיכער – זי איז אַ טייל פֿונעם ווערן אַ קינסטלער. די אומזיכערע צוגעהעריקייט איז אויך אַ מין אומגעלומפּערטקייט, און אויך אַ שעפֿערישע קראַפֿט. איך אַליין פּרוּוו זי אויסצוניצן ווען איך שרײַב אויף אַ שפּראַך אין וועלכער איך בין נאָך אַלץ אַ גאַסט.

„עס איז ניט גענוג צו זײַן אַ גאַסט אין אַ נאָך אומבאַקאַנטער שטוב. אַ נײַער קינסטלער דאַרף זײַן אַן אָנגעלייגטער גאַסט, אָדער בקיצור – מע דאַרף אַן עולם. דער זשורי פֿונעם רובינליכט-פּריז גיט מיר אַזוי אַ מין צוזאָג אויף אַן עולם. דאָס צוטיילן דעם פּריז אויך יהודה גור-אריה, אַ שרײַבער און איבערזעצער פֿונעם עלטערן דור, איז פֿאַר מיר אויך אַ צוזאָג אַז דער עולם וויל נאָך בלײַבן אויף לאַנגע יאָרן. איך וויל דאָ אויסדריקן אַ האַרציקן דאַנק פֿאַר אָט דער פֿאַרבעטונג, און אויך אַ האָפֿענונג אַז ווײַטערע אָנגעלייגטע געסט וועלן נאָך אָנקומען אין דער ייִדישער ליטעראַטור, און אַז זיי וועלן נאָך בלײַבן.“

The post Yehuda Gur-Arye and Shiri Shapira win Rubinlicht Prize for Literature appeared first on The Forward.

Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton speaks during AmericaFest, the first Turning Point USA summit since the death of Charlie Kirk, in Phoenix, Arizona, US, Dec. 20, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Cheney Orr

Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton has filed a legal response defending the state’s designation of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) as foreign terrorist organizations, responding to the latter’s federal lawsuit challenging the decision as a violation of free speech rights.

The legal dispute stems from a proclamation signed by Texas Gov. Greg Abbott last month declaring the terrorist designations under state law, citing in part what officials described as longstanding ideological and operational ties between CAIR and Islamist movements hostile to the US and its allies. CAIR, a nonprofit organization that advocates on behalf of Muslim Americans, has especially been scrutinized by US authorities over alleged ties to the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas.

In response, the Dallas-Fort Worth and Austin chapters of CAIR sued Abbott and Paxton, arguing the proclamation “chills” their freedom of speech and association under the First Amendment of the US Constitution and “retaliates against” them for exercising such rights. The CAIR chapters asked the court to stop the state from enforcing the designations and requested “compensatory damages,” according to the complaint.

Paxton on Tuesday announced that his office had taken legal action the prior day by filing an affidavit defending the Texas proclamation, arguing the terrorist designation is a lawful national-security measure aimed at protecting Texans from extremist influence, not a violation of free speech.

“Radical Islamist terrorist groups are anti-American, and the infiltration of these dangerous individuals into Texas must be stopped,” Paxton said in a statement. “My office will continue to defend the governor’s lawful, accurate declaration that CAIR is an FTO [foreign terrorist organization], as well as Texas’s right to protect itself from organizations with documented ties to foreign extremist movements.”

In court filings, Paxton rejected CAIR’s arguments as “speculative” and “baseless,” saying the local chapters failed to show concrete harm caused by the designation. Noting that his office has not pursued any legal action related to Abbott’s designation, Paxton argued the groups can’t sue as the issue currently falls within the authority of Texas’s political leadership, not the courts.

The attorney general’s office emphasized that Texas has broad authority to act against groups it deems a public safety risk, particularly amid heightened concerns over global terrorism and antisemitic violence following the war between Israel and Hamas.

Paxton also argued that the suit has no merit because Texas did not take action against the local chapters but rather CAIR’s national entity, which he described as a “different legal entity.”

CAIR officials castigated Paxton’s filing and vowed to continue their legal fight.

“Although Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton is now claiming that Governor Abbott’s unconstitutional order does not apply to CAIR-Texas, the sweeping order makes no such distinction, and this backtracking will not restore our ability to fully, freely and fearlessly serve the people of Texas so as long as the executive order remains in place,” CAIR-Texas said in a statement. “We look forward to seeing Governor Abbott and Attorney General Paxton in court and defeating this unconstitutional attack on the rights of all Texans.”

Washington, DC-based CAIR expressed similar sentiments.

“By trying to argue that the proclamation does not apply to CAIR-Texas and by arguing that the order raises a political question courts cannot resolve, Mr. Paxton has signaled the weakness of this proclamation,” it said. “We look forward to arguing that the judiciary has the power to decide whether the governor of a state can unilaterally label any American organization he dislikes a ‘terrorist group’ and impose sweeping punishments on that group without any process.”

Abbott’s proclamation described CAIR as a “successor organization” to the Muslim Brotherhood and noted the FBI called it a “front group” for “Hamas and its support network.” The document also outlined the history of the organizations and their historical associations with figures and networks tied to Hamas, an internationally designated terrorist group.

“The Muslim Brotherhood and CAIR have long made their goals clear: to forcibly impose Sharia law and establish Islam’s ‘mastership of the world,’” Abbott said in a statement while announcing the designations last month. “These radical extremists are not welcome in our state and are now prohibited from acquiring any real property interest in Texas.”

In the 2000s, CAIR was named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation terrorism financing case. Politico noted in 2010 that “US District Court Judge Jorge Solis found that the government presented ‘ample evidence to establish the association’” of CAIR with Hamas.

According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), “some of CAIR’s current leadership had early connections with organizations that are or were affiliated with Hamas.” CAIR has disputed the accuracy of the ADL’s claim and asserted that it “unequivocally condemn[s] all acts of terrorism, whether carried out by al-Qa’ida, the Real IRA, FARC, Hamas, ETA, or any other group designated by the US Department of State as a ‘Foreign Terrorist Organization.’”

CAIR leaders have also found themselves embroiled in further controversy since Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, atrocities in southern Israel.

The head of CAIR, for example, said he was “happy” to witness Hamas’s rampage of rape, murder, and kidnapping of Israelis in what was the largest single-day slaughter of Jews since the Holocaust.

“The people of Gaza only decided to break the siege — the walls of the concentration camp — on Oct. 7,” CAIR co-founder and executive director Nihad Awad said in a speech during the American Muslims for Palestine convention in Chicago in November 2023. “And yes, I was happy to see people breaking the siege and throwing down the shackles of their own land, and walk free into their land, which they were not allowed to walk in.”

Then-IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi meets with then-US Central Command (CENTCOM) chief Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie at CENTCOM headquarters on June 22, 2021. Photo: CENTCOM Public Affairs / Tom Gagnier

In recent weeks, voices in Israel have argued that the country has “lost control” over the situation in Gaza and ceded it to the United States.

While there is a grain of truth to the claim — insofar as the US has indeed become a central actor in Gaza’s operational, humanitarian, and political arenas — this view misses the broader strategic transformation that has taken place. What appears to be growing American dominance in Gaza is in fact the latest expression of a deeper structural shift that began in 2022, a shift whose significance most Israelis are only now beginning to understand.

To grasp the change, one must start with how the US military is structured.

The United States operates six global geographic Combatant Commands, each responsible for an enormous region: Europe, Africa, South America, the Indo-Pacific, North America, and the Middle East. Each is headed by a four-star general who reports directly to the Secretary of Defense and the President. These commands are not mere administrative divisions, but strategic frameworks through which the US organizes alliances, coordinates multinational training, conducts combined operations, and integrates intelligence on a global scale.

Geographically, Israel naturally belongs under the Central Command, CENTCOM, which oversees the Middle East. Yet for decades, Israel was placed under the European Command, EUCOM. The reason was political rather than military: Arab states that opposed normalization with Israel refused to be grouped with it under the same command. Allocating Israel to EUCOM allowed Washington to maintain deep military cooperation with Israel without jeopardizing its relations with key Arab allies.

The Abraham Accords fundamentally altered this arrangement.

Once the UAE, Bahrain, and later Morocco agreed to open security and diplomatic cooperation with Israel, the longstanding Arab veto effectively collapsed. The US announced Israel’s move to CENTCOM in 2021, and by 2022, it was fully implemented. Israel thus became an official component of the regional security architecture that the United States had been building for years — an emerging multinational framework designed to counter Iran through shared intelligence, integrated air defense, maritime cooperation, and coordinated operational planning.

This new reality was quickly reflected in joint exercises that had been impossible up to that point. Israel took part in IMX-22, a massive naval drill led by the US Fifth Fleet, in which Arab and Israeli naval forces operated openly under the same command structure for the first time. A year later came Juniper Oak 2023, the largest US-Israeli military exercise ever conducted, involving strategic bombers, fighter jets, naval forces, special operations units, and advanced intelligence platforms. Operationally, it marked the institutionalization of deep, routine, high-tempo military cooperation.

Still, it was not until Hamas’ October 7 attack that the full meaning of Israel’s integration into CENTCOM became clear. The brutality of the massacre underscored to Washington that the Israeli-Palestinian arena is inseparable from the broader regional struggle against Iran. The US responded with a rapid, large-scale deployment: aircraft carriers, missile defense ships, electronic warfare aircraft, and enhanced intelligence assets. In effect, the US provided Israel with a strategic umbrella that reduced the likelihood of a northern escalation and signaled unmistakable deterrence toward Iran and Hezbollah.

The most dramatic developments, however, took place in the context of Iran’s large-scale missile and drone attacks on Israel in 2023 and 2024. These were among the most extensive long-range strikes Iran had ever launched. For the first time, the emerging regional defensive network was activated. US aircraft intercepted dozens of drones over Iraq and the Red Sea; American, British, and French ships shot down cruise missiles; Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE provided air corridors and shared tactical intelligence; Israel synchronized its Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow systems with US command elements. The result was an unprecedented multinational defensive effort that successfully neutralized what could have been devastating strikes. What had long been discussed as a concept became a functioning regional defense mechanism with Israel at its core.

After a temporary ceasefire was established following the Trump plan in Gaza, the US and Israel set up a joint command center in Kiryat Gat. The goal of the joint headquarters is primarily to ensure that the Trump plan is implemented on the ground. This should not be understood as an American takeover of operational decision-making, but as a mechanism to deepen coordination. The joint headquarters facilitates real-time intelligence sharing, access to American reconnaissance capabilities, humanitarian coordination with international actors, and continuous operational deconfliction in a highly complex arena. The physical presence of American officers alongside Israeli commanders has also heightened US understanding of Hamas’ methods — its use of human shields, for example, and diversion of humanitarian aid — and the impossibility of managing the Gaza arena without intense and constant intelligence work.

Israeli critics tend to focus on potential drawbacks: US political leaders may attempt to leverage rapid progress for domestic purposes; they may choose to overlook Hamas’ refusal to disarm, and American expectations may not align with Israel’s interests regarding the end state in Gaza. These risks are not imaginary. However, Israeli defense officials repeatedly emphasize that the current level of cooperation with the US is unprecedented, and no attempt has been made thus far to impose decisions contrary to Israel’s security interests.

For decades, Israel has grappled with the question of whether it should pursue a formal defense treaty with the United States. The idea resurfaced repeatedly at moments of strategic uncertainty after the Lebanon wars, during periods of Iranian nuclear acceleration, and amid discussions about long-term deterrence. A formal treaty promised clear advantages: it would codify America’s commitment to Israel’s security, bolster deterrence against regional adversaries, and guarantee large-scale military assistance in times of crisis. Yet successive Israeli governments hesitated. The central concern was a potential loss of autonomy: a treaty would restrict Israel’s freedom of action, require American approval for sensitive military operations, and bind Israel’s hands precisely in situations where speed and unilateral initiative are essential.

The current arrangement, while not a formal defense pact, effectively delivers many of the benefits associated with one without the drawbacks. It offers deep operational coordination, shared real-time intelligence, integrated regional air defense, and the ability to conduct joint action when necessary. Crucially, it does all this without formally limiting Israel’s sovereignty or imposing rigid treaty obligations. In practice, it creates a “hybrid model” in which Israel enjoys the strategic advantages of quasi-alliance integration while retaining independent decision-making.

The broader strategic reality has changed. For years, Israel feared that the United States was withdrawing from the Middle East. Today the opposite is true: the US is re-engaging, strengthening allies, escalating pressure on Iran, and signaling a renewed commitment to the regional balance of power. This shift naturally raises concerns in Israel about over-dependence, yet in practice, it represents a dramatic enhancement of Israel’s strategic position. For the first time in decades, Israel finds itself embedded within a regional defense architecture that magnifies its strengths and compensates for its vulnerabilities.

Israel has not “lost control.” It would be more accurate to say that Israel has entered a fundamentally new framework, one in which it operates shoulder to shoulder with the United States and, increasingly, with key Arab partners. This emerging de facto regional alliance provides Israel with strategic depth, intelligence and logistical support, operational coordination, and a dramatically improved international posture. In the long term, the advantages of this integration far outweigh its limitations.

Prof. Eitan Shamir serves as the head of the BESA Center and as a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University. His latest book is The Art of Military Innovation: Lessons from the IDF, Harvard University Press, 2023 (with Edward Luttwak). This article appeared at the BESA Center, and in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune in December 2025.