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Harvard Anti-Zionists Dispute Survey Results on Divestment From Israel
Visitors enter the Harvard University campus in Cambridge, MA on June 3, 2025. Photo: Jason Bergman/Sipa USA via Reuters Connect
Anti-Zionists at Harvard University, including the Harvard Crimson newspaper which endorsed boycotting Israel in 2022, are contesting the interpretation of the results of an undergraduate survey onto which the Palestine Solidarity Committee (PSC) muscled a series of questions which asked students if they support “divesting” from the Jewish state.
On Thursday, the Crimson reported that Harvard students “report favoring divestment from Israel” while downplaying the Harvard Undergraduate Association (HUA) Election Commission’s saying that about 600 of “roughly 7,000 students in Harvard College,” or 8.4%, had “responded ‘yes’ to the question on divestment.” Slightly more of the student body, 9.3%, said they support Harvard’s disclosing “investments in Israel.”
The HUA added that over 80 percent of students either declined to answer the survey, skipped the divestment question, or registered an agnostic opinion regarding the matter. The Harvard Crimson, however, said it had obtained a partially redacted copy of the survey results showing that the majority of votes cast in the Sports Team Office Election, an unrelated vote in which respondents had to participate in order to answer the optional Israel-related questions, supported divestment.
“Based on similar calculations, a majority of students also said they thought Harvard should disclose investments in Israel,” the Crimson reported.
Nonetheless, the newspaper admitted that “the results still have a question mark hanging over them” and that “many students interviewed by the Crimson … said they were not aware of the survey questions.”
PSC later used Harvard’s reporting as the basis of its own propaganda, accusing the administration of censoring results “after the Harvard Crimson reports majority support.”
As previously reported, the PSC — a self-described revolutionary movement which issued some of the world’s first endorsements of Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, massacre across southern Israel — overcame objections expressed by the Harvard Undergraduate Association, a student government body, to place the idea on this academic year’s fall survey. Another group, working in concert with PSC, prevailed over the HUA as well, and added a survey question which aims to build a consensus of opposition to the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s definition of antisemitism.
“Should Harvard disclose its investments in companies and institutions operating in Israel?” asked PSC’s question, which was originally framed to accuse Israel of committing genocide in Gaza. “Should Harvard divest from companies and institutions operating in Israel?”
On Friday, Middle East expert and columnist Alex Joffe told The Algemeiner that the Crimson confected a story which serves its ideological bias.
“Campus media is both politicized and incompetent,” he said. “The latter is not surprising and is forgivable, as no one should expect careful reporting from teenagers, even ones at Harvard. But the manner in which activists insert themselves into campus media is obvious, and the obfuscations in this particular case indicate how students tendentiously ‘report’ results — in this case fragmentary and contradictory ones — in order to present the conclusion that Harvard students ‘support divestment.’”
He added, “Better documented and reported surveys have suggested that a hard core of students on campus do indeed support divestment and other anti-Israel measure but that a majority are uncertain or disinterested in these issues. Painting all college students as anti-Israel is certainly false but campus media, and certainly mainstream media, almost exclusively feature anti-Israel voices.”
The Crimson has since reported another, similar story including the same numbers showing that over 85 percent of students declined to take the survey. This time, however, the Harvard administration used the occasion to restate its opposition to boycotting Israel, citing a 2024 statement regarding the matter.
“Harvard leadership has made clear that it opposes calls for a policy of boycotting Israel and its academic institutions,” the university said. “In the words of [former] President Bacow responding to a 2022 editorial in the Harvard Crimson that had endorsed the boycott, divestment, and sanctions [BDS] movement, ‘targeting or boycotting a particular group because of disagreements over the policies pursued by their governments is antithetical to what we stand for as a university,’ and ‘academic boycotts have absolutely no place at Harvard, regardless of who they target.’”
The Harvard Crimson has promoted anti-Zionism before, curating facts and quotes.
In 2022, the Crimson’s editorial board endorsed the BDS movement, which seeks to isolate the world’s lone Jewish state on the international stage as a step toward its eventual elimination.
“Palestinians, in our board’s view, deserve dignity and freedom. We support the boycott, divest, and sanctions movement as a means to achieving that goal,” the board wrote. “In the past, our board was skeptical of the movement (if not, generally speaking, of its goals), arguing that BDS as a whole did not ‘get at the nuances and particularities of the Israel-Palestine conflict.’ We reject and regret that view.”
It also pushed back against “accusations” of antisemitism over its stance, condemning “antisemitism in every and all forms, including those times when it shows up on the fringes of otherwise worthwhile movements.”
“BDS remains a blunt approach, one with the potential to backfire or prompt collateral damage in the form of economic hurt. But the weight of this moment — of Israel’s human rights and international law violates and of Palestine’s cry for freedom — demands this step. As a board, we are proud to finally lend our support to both Palestinian liberation and BDS — we call on everyone to do the same.”
Anti-Israel animus, while present at Harvard for years, exploded across campus following Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, massacre across southern Israel.
After the atrocities, the Harvard Palestine Solidarity Committee issued a statement blaming Israel for the attack and vowed to pressure the university to cut ties with the Jewish state. Later, students stormed academic buildings chanting “globalize the intifada”; a faculty group posted an antisemitic cartoon on its social media page; a mob followed and surrounded a Jewish student, screaming “Shame! Shame! Shame!” into his ears; and the Harvard Law School student government passed a resolution that falsely accused Israel of genocide and ethnic cleansing.
While largely present among left-wing campus groups on campus, such sentiments have recently emerged among Harvard’s far right.
Earlier this year, a conservative student magazine published an article that echoed the words of Nazi leader Adolf Hitler.
The Harvard Salient published an opinion piece in September which bore likeness to key tenets of Nazi doctrine, as first articulated in 1925 in Hitler’s autobiographical manifesto Mein Kampf, or My Struggle, and later in a blitzkrieg of speeches he delivered throughout the Nazi era to justify his genocide of European Jews.
Written by David F.X. Army, the article chillingly echoed a January 1939 Reichstag speech in which Hitler portended mass killings of Jews as the outcome of Germany’s inexorable march toward war with France and Great Britain. Whereas Hitler said, “France to the French, England to the English, America to the Americans, and Germany to the Germans,” Army wrote, “Germany belongs to the Germans, France to the French, Britain to the British, America to the Americans.”
Army also called for the adoption of notions of “blood, soil, language, and love of one’s own.”
Follow Dion J. Pierre @DionJPierre.
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Why Did the US Just Lift Sanctions on Iranian Oil?
The Liberian-flagged oil tanker Ice Energy transfers crude oil from the Iranian-flagged oil tanker Lana (former Pegas), off the shore of Karystos, on the Island of Evia, Greece, May 26, 2022. REUTERS/Costas Baltas
According to estimates, on the eve of the current war, some 140 million barrels of Iranian oil were floating at sea. This oil had already been produced and loaded onto tankers, and the vast bulk of it had already passed through the Strait of Hormuz before the war broke out. The Chinese had bought most of this oil, but chose to leave it at sea because their strategic reserves were full of the medium-sour oil that Iran produces, and US sanctions on the Iranian banking system made it difficult to resell the oil to other customers. Iranian oil tankers were thus left waiting for months near China’s shore.
On March 20, 2026, the US announced a temporary 30-day lifting of sanctions on the sale and delivery of Iranian oil. The permit applies only to oil that was already loaded onto tankers by that day, and the oil in question must be unloaded by April 19.
The US is attempting to quickly calm the market by allowing countries to buy these millions of barrels of oil. As a significant portion of this oil had already been sold to China, Washington is effectively allowing Beijing, if it so wishes, to release the cargo to be sold in Japan, India, South Korea, and other Asian countries interested in Iranian medium-sour oil.
Even if the Chinese opt to keep all the oil for themselves, the result will still relieve the market, because similar types of oil — primarily Russian medium-sour — can then flow to other customers in Asia. According to the US Secretary of Energy, these tankers could begin arriving at Asian ports within three to four days.
The type of oil is very important here, because it determines who can benefit from the American sanctions relief on Iran’s oil. Oil grades are defined by two main indicators: density (“light” vs. “heavy”) and sulfur content (“sweet” vs. “sour”). The oil’s grade affects the costs of transportation and refining, as well as the types of distillates that can be produced from it. Light and sweet oil can produce more gasoline, diesel fuel, and jet fuel. Heavy oil is more suitable for bunker oil for ships or bitumen for asphalt. Refineries are usually built to operate most efficiently with a specific grade of crude oil. They can process other oil grades if necessary, but not at the same level of profitability or efficiency.
Iranian oil is mostly medium-sour. Not every refinery can produce the same distillates from it with the same efficiency, and not all countries in Asia have the necessary refining capacity in the first place. Countries like India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore are well-suited for this oil and have more advanced refining capabilities. In contrast, countries that depend more on imported distillates and less on independent refining, such as the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and Australia, are more vulnerable to prolonged disruptions and would benefit from Iranian oil only indirectly.
This is where China comes into the picture. It has a huge domestic refining capacity and significant reserves, and thus has great influence on gasoline and diesel prices throughout Asia. Even without the American relief on Iranian oil, Beijing could have released some of its strategic reserves or distillates into the market and eased prices for its neighbors — but it has no interest in doing so. As early as the first week of the war, China announced restrictions on distillate exports, leading to a dramatic increase in gasoline and diesel prices in Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam. China may be using this as a political lever to increase pressure on the US to end the fighting, or it may at the very least be planning to turn energy into a regional bargaining tool and sell distillates to its neighbors in exchange for political benefits.
The main criticism of the American move is that lifting oil sanctions strengthens the Iranian regime and enriches its coffers during the war. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent claims that Washington will monitor sales and make it difficult for Iran to access these revenues, emphasizing the continuation of the “maximum pressure” policy on Iran’s ability to use the international financial system. However, he has not explained how the US will prevent Iran from circumventing the restrictions, as it has done so far. In its trading with China, Iran has often used barter transactions, cash, or payments in yuan rather than dollars to circumvent sanctions. It has also used intermediary companies and countries (mainly Oman and Malaysia) to “launder” the source of its oil, and has relied on offshore bank accounts in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Mauritius, and elsewhere with the full knowledge of the countries involved.
It can be argued, however, that Iran’s ability to circumvent US restrictions has been reduced since the beginning of the war, now that Iran itself has bombed some of the countries where it holds offshore accounts. The United Arab Emirates, for example, announced on March 5 that it is considering freezing Iranian accounts in the country. This allows the US to say with greater confidence that it has more control over revenue coming from Iranian oil sales, whether or not this is in fact the case.
In the short term, this seems to be a relatively calculated move by the US. According to the administration’s own statements, its goal is not to provide relief to Iran’s economy but to quickly release oil that has already been produced and is now at sea. The move is designed to relieve pressure on the market for about two weeks. From Washington’s perspective, this is a limited price it is willing to pay to buy time, stabilize the energy market, and preserve greater freedom of action in the war, at least until it can greatly reduce Iran’s ability to close the Strait of Hormuz.
Dr. Elai Rettig is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Studies and a senior research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University. He specializes in energy geopolitics and national security. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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Israel and Canada Both Use American Fighter Jets — But Politics Keeps Them Apart
A US Marines F-35C Lightning II is staged for flight operations on the flight deck of the US Navy Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln in support of the Operation Epic Fury attack on Iran from an undisclosed location March 3, 2026. Photo: US Navy/Handout via REUTERS
After the attack by the US and Israel on Iran, Canada issued a statement recognizing that Iran is the main source of terror in the Middle East, that it has one of the world’s worst human rights records, and that it can not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons. I was pleased to see that it also recognized Israel’s right to defend itself and provide security to its people.
When it comes to security, Israel and Canada are very different. Israel has had to face the hostility of its neighbors ever since its birth in 1948, whereas Canada has not had to worry for decades. Yet, the two countries are similar in having to rely on US warplanes for their defense.
The seemingly endless arms race between Israel and its enemies has resulted in the development of an increasingly sophisticated Israeli arms industry and a large arms export business.
The title of a recent Economist Magazine article, “Israel may not be popular, but its weapons are,” says it all. Israel’s weapons exports amounted to almost $15 billion in 2024, about 10% of total Israeli exports. But Israel still relies on the US for warplanes.
In 1956, 70 years ago, the situation for Israel was dire. Periodic terrorist incursions from the West Bank, then under Jordanian jurisdiction, and from Egyptian-controlled Gaza, resulted in numerous Israeli casualties. Arms embargoes imposed by the US and Britain in 1948 made it difficult for Israel to defend itself. (The US embargo lasted until 1965, almost two decades after the state’s founding.)
In 1956, the Canadian government, after some debate, approved a request from Israel to buy 24 F86 Sabre jet interceptors, produced under license from the US by Canadair Ltd, Montreal. In justifying the decision, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent pointed out that Egypt, with airfields only 10 minutes flying time from Tel Aviv, had received 200 MIG-15 jet fighters and 40 to 50 Ilyushin jet bombers from the Soviet Union.
The Canadian Sabre jets never made it to Israel. The outbreak of the Suez Crisis in late 1956, when Israel attacked Egypt in concert with France and Britain, led to the cancellation of the deal. (Lester B. Pearson, then Canada’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and later Prime Minister, helped resolve the crisis through the creation of a UN peacekeeping force. Pearson was awarded the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts.)
For the Israelis, it didn’t really matter. The French government had agreed to supply Israel with Mystère jets, and France remained Israel’s main source of jet fighters for the next decade.
In fact, at the time of the Sabre jet discussions with Israel, Canada was developing a state-of-the-art supersonic jet fighter of its own — the Avro Arrow. However, the project was cancelled abruptly in 1959, even though early production models had flown successfully. The cancellation, a disaster for the Canadian aerospace industry, was based on cost. It was cheaper to buy American jets.
Israel went through a very similar experience. During the mid-1980s, Israel developed its own advanced fighter jet, the Lavi (Hebrew for lion). The Lavi was a small, highly maneuverable, supersonic jet with advanced electronic capabilities. In 1987, it too was cancelled, after early models were at the flight testing stage. The reason? Cost. It was cheaper to buy jets from the US.
At the recent World Economic Forum at Davos, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney spoke of the need for middle powers, such as Canada, to become more autonomous and proactive in world affairs. Coincidentally, Canada is in the midst of having to decide which jet fighter would be best for its future defense needs: the American made F-35, the same plane that is the current mainstay of Israel’s air force, or the Gripen, a fighter jet produced in Sweden.
Sophisticated jet fighters are expensive to design and build, although Sweden, a country with a population and economy about the same size as that of Israel, has managed to do so. (For example, one F-35 fighter jet can cost well over $100 million.) A 2025 article by Udi Etsion in The Jerusalem Post suggests that to lessen the financial burden, Israel should seek a partner for the development of its own stealth fighter jet.
Why not Canada? After all, both Canada and Israel are seeking combat aircraft self-sufficiency. But Canada, once considered by some the best place for Jews, has experienced an exponential increase in antisemitism since October 7, 2023, along with an erosion in support for Israel.
In fact, after initially supporting the strike on Iran, Prime Minister Carney has backtracked and now expresses “regret” for the strike. That Carney recently traveled to China, the UAE, and Qatar to shore up trade relations, but omitted Israel — one of the best performing economies in the world — speaks volumes. When it comes to the Middle East, even a match made in heaven is not a sure thing.
Jacob Sivak, a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, is a retired professor, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.
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Lessons From South Africa for Israel
Anti-Israel protesters march through the streets of the township of Lenasia in Johannesburg, South Africa, Oct. 6, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Ihsaan Haffejee
There was a time when South Africa found itself pushed to the margins of the international community. The reason was clear and widely condemned — its system of Apartheid, which enforced racial separation and denied political rights to the majority of its citizens.
What ultimately changed South Africa’s trajectory was not a single moment but a combination of internal evolution and external demand. The apartheid system became untenable both morally and practically. Leaders began to recognize that reform was unavoidable. The release of Nelson Mandela symbolized a broader shift, but what followed mattered just as much. Negotiations replaced repression, elections replaced exclusion, and a new national vision began to take shape.
South Africa’s reentry into the global community was not granted automatically. It was earned through visible transformation and a commitment to a more inclusive future.
In current debates, parallels are often drawn between that period in South Africa’s history and the situation of Israel. These comparisons are powerful, but they are also frequently misleading. The foundation of South Africa’s isolation was a domestic system explicitly built on racial hierarchy — whereas Israel’s reality is fundamentally different.
Israel emerged in 1948 as a sovereign state following a war of annihilation launched against it by five Arab armies. Today in Israel — as has always been the case — Arab citizens have the exact same legal rights and protections as Jews. Palestinians living under the control of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza do not get those rights — just like Mexicans and Canadians don’t get the rights of Americans. But that is not apartheid.
Still, South Africa’s experience offers insights into how international perceptions are formed and how they can change. In both cases, global opinion has proven to be a significant force. Media narratives, activist movements, and diplomatic alignments all contribute to shaping how a country is viewed abroad.
One of the clearest lessons from South Africa is that perception follows action, but it also depends on communication. The country did not simply dismantle apartheid behind closed doors. It made its transformation visible to the world. The new leadership articulated a message of reconciliation and unity that resonated far beyond its borders. That message was reinforced by concrete steps that aligned with widely held international values.
For Israel, the challenge is different but not unrelated. It is not a matter of replicating South Africa’s path, because the underlying circumstances are not the same. Rather, it is about understanding how to navigate an environment in which scrutiny is constant and narratives can quickly harden into assumptions.
Actions that promote stability, economic opportunity, and coexistence can have an impact not only on the ground but also in the court of global opinion — and they need to be amplified, even if the world doesn’t want to cover the story.
Equally important is the need for Israel to tell a fuller story. Israel is often defined internationally by conflict, yet that is only part of its reality. It is also a society marked by democratic institutions, cultural diversity, and technological innovation. Within its borders, there are ongoing debates about policy, identity, and the future. These elements reflect a dynamic and pluralistic country that is not always visible in external coverage.
Leadership plays a decisive role in shaping how these stories are conveyed. South Africa’s transition was guided by figures who understood the importance of tone as well as substance. The emphasis on reconciliation helped shift the global narrative. In Israel’s case, leadership that highlights pragmatism, restraint, and a willingness to engage can influence how the country is perceived, even in a challenging environment.
The broader takeaway is that international standing is not fixed. It evolves over time, influenced by decisions, policies, and the narratives that accompany them. South Africa’s transformation illustrates how a country can move from isolation to acceptance when its actions and its message align with a clear vision of the future.
Israel’s situation remains complex and often contentious. Yet complexity does not preclude progress. By focusing on practical steps that improve lives, by engaging with the international community in a confident and transparent manner, and by ensuring that its story is told in full, Israel can continue to strengthen its position on the world stage.
History does not repeat itself exactly, but it often provides useful guidance. South Africa’s experience is not a blueprint, but it is a reminder that change is possible and that perception can shift when reality and narrative move together.
Sabine Sterk is the CEO of Time To Stand Up For Israel.