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How Arnold Horween, an unsung Jewish Harvard hero, changed American sports

(JTA) — Decades before Sandy Koufax sat out the first game of the 1965 World Series because it fell on Yom Kippur, and 18 years before Greenberg chased Babe Ruth’s single-season home run record in the late 1930s, a college athlete made some overlooked Jewish sports history.

Arnold Horween, a burly Chicagoan, became the first Jewish captain of the Harvard University football team in 1920 — an achievement that sent ripples through American culture.

Horween, who would later play and coach in the early years of what would become the NFL, was born to Jewish immigrants from Ukraine. He became a star player at Harvard, helping the Crimson go undefeated in both 1919 and 1920 after returning from serving in World War I. (His brother Ralph also played at Harvard and in the NFL, and they were the first and only Jewish brothers to play in the NFL until Geoff and Mitchell Schwartz.)

But it was Horween’s unanimous selection as the team’s captain, and more importantly, his appointment in 1926 as the team’s coach, that would prove unprecedented.

“In American Jewish culture, the only thing greater than being the captain of the Harvard Crimson, the only higher station in American culture might have been the president, or the coach of Harvard, which he eventually becomes,” said Zev Eleff, the president of Gratz College and a scholar of American Jewish history.

Eleff explores Horween’s story and its impact in his recent book, “Dyed in Crimson: Football, Faith, and Remaking Harvard’s America,” released earlier this year. He traces the history of Harvard athletics in the early 1900s, exploring how Horween, along with Harvard’s first athletic director, Bill Bingham, altered the landscape of America’s most prestigious college.

Horween’s ascendance came at a time when Harvard instituted quotas to limit the number of Jewish and other minority students it accepted — a practice the school would employ throughout the 1920s and 30s. His story also took place amid a political landscape that featured the rise of Father Charles Coughlin, the antisemitic “radio priest,” and the reemergence of the Ku Klux Klan.

As Eleff underscores in the book, Horween did not fit the model of a “Boston Brahmin,” the class of elite, Christian, aspirationally manly men whose supremacy was unquestioned at Harvard Yard. Horween broke that mold, instead instilling a team culture where a love of the sport was almost as important as winning — the Ted Lasso effect, if you will.

“Dyed in Crimson” also uses early 20th century Harvard as an allegory for the broader theme of how sports can change society.

“The theme of the book, something that’s uniquely American, is how the periphery can influence the mainstream,” said Eleff. “How people on the sidelines can really make an influence.”

Eleff spoke to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency about how Horween’s story fits into the pantheon of Jewish American sports legends and what it says about Jews’ ability to succeed in America.

This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

Let’s dig into Horween’s story. I liked the idea of him as like an earlier version of Koufax or a Greenberg, but to be honest, I had never heard of him. Why do you think his story isn’t as well known as other Jewish athletes? 

I think it has everything to do with the emergence of Major League Baseball. College football was America’s sport in the 1910s and 1920s. It was a big money sport, when there was very little money outside of the New York Yankees. And I think that Horween’s star started to sort of decline with Harvard football, but also the emergence of other sports.

The other reason is because the idea of the Jewish ballplayer loomed large. The New York Giants, for decades, tried to identify a Jewish superstar. They actually passed on Greenberg. There was a thought after Greenberg that there was Jewish DNA for baseball, and the signing of Koufax was directly linked to this notion. It was this eugenics-like link that you need a Jewish ballplayer. For the Giants, it was ticket sales. So the commotion about Greenberg and Koufax is more about Jewish identity. And baseball is, as a professional sport in New York, Queens, Brooklyn, the Bronx, different than college football, particularly in New England at this time. Frankly, Jews lived near the Polo Grounds, they didn’t live near Harvard Yard.

Arnold Horween shown in The Baltimore Sun on November 16, 1927. (Wikimedia Commons)

For Horween, obviously he’s not at the level of a Greenberg or Koufax talent-wise, but he also didn’t seem to care as much personally about his Jewish identity. You write in the book that there were some Jews who took issue with the fact that Horween was not practicing, but there were also many Jews who were simply proud he was Jewish. What do you think about that dynamic? 

There becomes a sort of disconnect between lived religion and the perception and what they come to represent — the mantle that they wear almost towers above the practice. Horween eschewed the opportunity to claim the mantle of Jewish leadership, Jewish celebrity. But we do see in its moment that he is the topic of rabbinic sermons, that The American Hebrew and other Jewish press are reporting on him. They are elated. In American Jewish culture, the only thing greater than being the captain of the Harvard Crimson — it’s hard for people to realize, but in the moment when they were part of the big three [alongside Princeton and Yale] — the only higher station in American culture might have been the president, or the coach of Harvard, which he eventually becomes.

One of the parts of this book that I enjoyed learning about is the extent to which college football in the early 20th century was all about honor, masculinity, gentlemanliness. And at the time, that kind of stands in contrast to how Jews were viewed — that Jews were not masculine, Jews couldn’t fit into that mold of the “Harvard man.” 

Being on the sports team, that was probably far beyond Jewish expectations. Not to say that Jews could not be athletic, but very often the varsity players weren’t picked for their talent but rather their surnames. What the sea change at Harvard is, [within] gentlemanly culture — in which “gentlemanly” is a Protestant, Christian masculinity — Horween is not Protestant. What allows him a pathway into that elite group is that drive to win. And as a player, he’s good luck. He never loses. He becomes a signature player for victory who even wins the Rose Bowl.

But as a coach, he subverts that. What he and Bill Bingham do is their campaign isn’t necessarily for winning, it’s for having fun, it’s for enjoying the game.

In the 1910s and 20s, college football was the peak of American sports, but that’s certainly not the case anymore. What do you think would be the modern comparison for someone like Horween?

Is Becky Hammon with the Spurs, the first woman [to act as] head coach in basketball, something like that? Or the very important discussions about people of color as coaches in the NFL? Sports and education are, for some reason or another, where change is made in American life. Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 ends, at least officially, segregation. Title IV, what is basically American law for anti-discrimination based on sex, is based on women’s college sports. You have the breaking down of color barriers and Jackie Robinson, Muhammad Ali and Vietnam. You have the first [openly] gay athletes, you have questions of breaking the glass ceiling for women and Serena Williams.

It’s absolutely 100% true that sports doesn’t matter. Who wins the World Series is of no great consequence to most people’s lives. Although it’s interesting, if you drive up I-95 on a Sunday, you will see that the bumper stickers and the flags change. There is some sort of passion, obviously, about sport. But it’s absolutely true that for some reason or another in the 20th century and 21st century in American sport, really important social and cultural decisions, and political decisions, are made in American sport.

Zev Eleff, president of Gratz College and author of “Dyed in Crimson.” (Courtesy)

Another main topic in the book is that the goal for immigrants, especially Jews, was Americanization, assimilation — that to become part of the mainstream was the marker of success. But that seems to be the case for Jews in a very different sense than it is for Catholics and for Blacks. 

The major contribution of this book to American Jewish history beyond telling this story is  to complicate notions of Americanization. Jews and Catholics in particular view Americanization very, very differently. The Catholic experience is to create parallel systems. If you’re a good Catholic boy with immense football talent, play for Notre Dame, play for Boston College. Don’t play for the Protestant mainstream. Cream them on the football field. Create parallel systems.

The Jewish experience is not so. Outside of Orthodox day schools in the early 20th century, it was anathema, it was considered almost heretical, for American Jews to [go] to private schools. To the contrary, the so-called golden citadels of the public schools — that is the agent of Americanization. Jews don’t establish their own educational systems. They somehow Americanize and acculturate into the mainstream. We don’t compete with Harvard, we get into Harvard.

Thinking about the antisemitism of that time — the quotas, Father Coughlin, all of that — how do you think that compares to what we’re seeing today? 

Historians disagree about the 1920s. Was it a time of great prominence of American Jews? There was affluence in the roaring ’20s. There were institutions that were created, there was creativity, from the Orthodox and Mordecai Kaplan certainly, across the board, the Jewish Theological Seminary. American Judaism was at a certain high point in the 1920s. At the same time, there were quotas, and there was rising antisemitism. I think today we also have to deal with the tension of, on the one hand, there are great opportunities for Jews in the United States; at the same time, there is antisemitism. And so from the 1920s to the 2020s, 100 years later, you see a model for how to grapple with those tensions.

What do you hope, more than anything else, someone takes away or learns from your book?

It’s a book that begins like a punch line: a working class Protestant, a Catholic and a Jew walk into a football field. But it ends with something I think a lot more pronounced, which is, it’s a story about change. As a historian, I study change, particularly in American Judaism, broadly in American religion and Jewish Studies. Change is the best asset that a historian has to study. I wasn’t interested in just finding another Sandy Koufax story, replicating that story. This is a story that isn’t just about a Jew who happened for his moment to become quite successful and quite famous, or a Catholic or a former mill hand turned first athletic director in college history. It’s really about how people on the periphery influence the mainstream.

—
The post How Arnold Horween, an unsung Jewish Harvard hero, changed American sports appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

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Rep. Hakeem Jeffries prioritizes settler violence as Democratic majority remains divided over Israel

Rep. Hakeem Jeffries of New York, who is set to become the next speaker of the House, said in an interview published over the weekend that he plans to advance legislation targeting violent Israeli settlers in the West Bank when the new Congressional term begins in January, offering an early indication of how he intends to manage the growing divide over Israel within the Democratic Party.

“What I have made clear is that within the first 100 days, I think the most decisive step that we can take relative to the situation in the West Bank is to move the West Bank Settler Violence Protection and Prevention Act,” Jeffries said in an interview with The New York Times published Saturday. At least 225 incidents of settler violence were documented during 2025 and part of 2026 by Israeli watchdog Yesh Din.

The bill was introduced last year by Rep. Jerry Nadler, co-chair of the Congressional Jewish Caucus, who is retiring at the end of the year. It has 174 Democratic co-sponsors. France and the U.K. are among the countries that have already imposed sanctions on violent Israeli settlers. Former President Joe Biden announced similar measures in 2024, but President Donald Trump reversed them shortly after taking office in 2025.

At the same time, Jeffries stopped short of endorsing a pair of bills to block some U.S. weapons sales to Israel, a demand of progressive Democrats. “I haven’t articulated a position one way or the other with respect to any of these bills,” Jeffries said, “because we’re going to have a conversation about the steps that we need to take together as a caucus.”

The distinction is important for Jeffries, a longtime supporter of Israel, as he’s preparing to lead a Democratic majority that is increasingly divided over Israel. His approach suggests he wants to address concerns about Israeli government policies without endorsing measures to end some U.S. military support for Israel. Many Jewish Democrats have also criticized the policies of the current right-wing Israeli government, particularly on settlement expansion and violence against Palestinians in the West Bank.

The party’s divide over Israel goes deeper 

The Democratic Party’s sweeping midterm victories have given Jeffries considerable room to manage the debate over Israel without depending on the votes of its most progressive members. Jeffries was nominated Wednesday by an overwhelming majority of his Democratic colleagues to become speaker, pending a House floor vote when the new Congress convenes on Jan. 3. Only 11, including the six newly elected members affiliated with the Democratic Socialists of America, voted against.

Rep. Ro Khanna of California, a Democrat who has pushed for restrictions on military assistance to Israel, acknowledged that political reality, saying that progressives “have not succeeded in getting any commitments yet on Gaza or Israel.”

The debate is unlikely to end with one vote. Jeffries will still face pressure from a growing movement inside Congress to end all U.S. military aid to Israel, including defensive and offensive weapons sales.

On Election Day earlier this month, President Donald Trump said that the U.S. would halt roughly $4 billion in annual aid to Israel by the end of 2026. He was unclear how he would implement that, given the current memorandum of understanding between the U.S. and Israel runs through 2028.

Earlier this year, 103 of 212 Democrats supported a measure to eliminate the annual military assistance to Israel and another 10 abstained. Dozens also co-sponsored a pair of measures – the Block the Bombs Act and Ceasefire Compliance Act – that would restrict certain offensive arms sales to Israel and increase oversight of Israel’s policies in the West Bank and in Gaza. The DSA said in a post-election event that it is planning to use its growing influence to push for a full arms embargo against Israel and ultimately “break” the longstanding alliance between the U.S. and the Jewish state.

Jeffries’ long record of supporting Israel

Jeffries, 56, has consistently defended the U.S.-Israel relationship since his election to the House in 2012, even as other Democrats have become more critical of Israel’s government.

In recent weeks, progressive activists have resurfaced clips of Jeffries and Sen. Chuck Schumer expressing strong support for Israel in speeches each made to Jewish groups, arguing that the leadership is out of step with voters’ changing perspectives.

Among them: declaring, “Israel today, Israel tomorrow, Israel forever,” at a 2014 rally in support of Israel; in 2023, describing Jerusalem as New York City’s sixth borough; and, in 2025, saying that the U.S. “can’t take our foot off the gas pedal until Iran is brought to its knees.”

In the Times interview, Jeffries said the suffering of Palestinian civilians in Gaza was “unacceptable, unsustainable and un-American.” He also said the early moves made by the incoming Congress will make a two-state solution more viable. In a new memoir published last week, Biden warned Israelis they may not be able to count on the same level of support from future American leaders if the status quo continues. “I hope Israel wakes up,” he writes. “The days of American leaders like me — passionate defenders of Israel to the core — are passing.”

Even if the House passes the settler sanctions bill, it could face a Republican filibuster in the Senate or a veto from Trump.

For now, Jeffries has the votes and the political standing to set the agenda on settler violence, but without making major concessions to the Democratic Party’s most outspoken Israel critics.

The post Rep. Hakeem Jeffries prioritizes settler violence as Democratic majority remains divided over Israel appeared first on The Forward.

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Mark Ruffalo opposes Schumer for Senate leader, citing “religious beliefs and loyalties”

(JTA) — Actor Mark Ruffalo, an outspoken progressive and Israel critic, cited concerns over “entrenched religious beliefs and loyalties” in endorsing U.S. Sen. Chris Van Hollen for Senate majority leader over U.S. Sen. Chuck Schumer, the current Democratic caucus leader and a Jewish lawmaker from New York.

In a Saturday post on X, Ruffalo framed his endorsement of Van Hollen – and concerns about religious beliefs and loyalty – as being more than just about Israel.

“Israel is just one issue in a whole host of reasons Van Hollen is the right leader for our times,” Ruffalo posted. “We need Justice, we need leadership that follows the will of the people not entrenched religious beliefs and loyalties.”

Schumer is the highest-ranking Jewish elected official in U.S. history and has led the Senate’s Democratic caucus since 2017, including as majority leader from 2021 until 2025. Since the midterm elections, Schumer, the pro-Israel stalwart, has faced a chorus of progressive voices who are seeking a change in the leadership of the Democratic caucus.

Three veteran senators – Vermont independent Sen. Bernie Sanders, Democratic Sens. Elissa Slotkin of Michigan and Jeff Merkley of Oregon –have endorsed Van Hollen of Maryland for majority leader. Van Hollen also has the support of two newly elected senators who will take office in January, Abdul El-Sayed of Michigan and Peggy Flanagan of Minnesota.

Van Hollen is an outspoken critic of Israel who has led efforts to investigate the country’s human rights practices and pressure its right-wing government. He has drawn blowback from some Jewish leaders in recent years over his criticism of Israel and of AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobbying group.

Schumer, who has longstanding ties to AIPAC and the pro-Israel community, has described himself as a “Shomer Yisrael” (“guardian of Israel”), noting that his surname derives from the Hebrew word shomer. Still, he has become increasingly critical of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in recent years, going so far as giving a speech from the Senate floor in 2024 calling for new elections and leadership in Israel.

Ruffalo, known for his work in “The Avengers” franchise, “Spotlight” and “The Kids Are All Right,” has been a divisive figure in the Jewish community. In an August Instagram Story, he linked Skydance CEO David Ellison, the chief driver of the then-proposed Paramount-Warner Bros. merger, to tech giant Oracle, which Ruffalo accused of powering “an apartheid system of oppression” in Gaza.

Oracle was co-founded by Ellison’s father, Larry Ellison, one of the world’s richest men; both Ellisons are Jewish and prominent Israel supporters. Oracle also owns a stake in the social media network TikTok’s U.S. operations, and has long been a target of progressives who point to the company’s links to, and public support for, Israel.

In a social media post that was reported in September to be no longer available, Ruffalo described Larry Ellison as a “classic oligarch” who is “crushing workers and consolidating the wealth of the world for their own power and concentrated dominance.”

Ruffalo drew criticism from Jewish organizations, including the Jewish Federation Los Angeles, which said the actor’s comments “combined Jewish wealth, media control, secret technology and sinister global power,” drawing on “recognizable antisemitic tropes with a long and dangerous history.”

In response to the criticism, Ruffalo denied being antisemitic or anti-Israel, and said “criticizing the actions of the Israeli prime minister, a military technology contract, or the executives who supply it is not the same as criticizing Jewish people.” He added that “my views come from my own political convictions and should never be interpreted as hostility toward Jewish people, for whom I have deep love and respect.”

Some 170 notable Jewish personalities signed an open letter supporting him.

This article originally appeared on JTA.org.

The post Mark Ruffalo opposes Schumer for Senate leader, citing “religious beliefs and loyalties” appeared first on The Forward.

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Israel does not need fake ‘unity’ with Netanyahu – it needs to move forward

For Israelis exhausted by years of political upheaval, bitter polarization and war, the appeal of national unity might seem obvious. Surely a country facing so many challenges would benefit from leaders putting aside their differences and working together.

Naftali Bennett breathed new life into this enduring hope by meeting last week with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, apparently without coordinating with his presumed opposition partners. But this revived discussion of a government that united the opposition and Netanyahu’s Likud party was short-lived. Bennett has since advocated a broad government under former IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot, with Netanyahu as a junior partner or more.

Except that Netanyahu has so dramatically upset many Israelis that the possibility of him having any role in the next government has sparked a very animated discussion.

It begs questions: What exactly is a national unity government? Why has Israel repeatedly resorted to one? And when did the understandable yearning for national solidarity become confused with the notion that elections need not produce winners and losers?

Israel’s unity governments

Unity governments are largely an Israeli invention. Germany, whose parliamentary system resembles Israel’s in important respects, has repeatedly been governed by grand coalitions between its principal center-right and center-left parties. This tends to happen when there are many splinter formations who are so radical that the centrists on either side would rather “reach across the aisle.”

Israel’s experience with unity has taken on an additional significance. Its history of war and national emergency has imbued political unity with an almost sacred quality, drawing on the deeply rooted Jewish ideal of achdut or solidarity. But an agreement between rival politicians to share power is not the same thing as national solidarity.

Israel’s first national unity government was formed on the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War, when Menachem Begin’s opposition movement joined a Labor-led administration that already enjoyed a parliamentary majority. It was an emergency arrangement rather than a political necessity.

The defining precedent came in 1984, seven years after Begin’s historic election victory ended nearly three decades of Labor dominance. Israel had developed a competitive two-bloc system, with Labor on one side and Likud, supported by right-wing and religious parties, on the other.

Unlike Americans, Israelis do not directly elect their head of government. Also unlike Americans – where a vote in Wyoming is worth many votes in California – each vote counts the same. Israelis elect a 120-member Knesset, and the decisive question is which parties can assemble a parliamentary majority. The largest individual party is not necessarily the one that governs. In 2009, for example, Kadima won more seats than Likud, but Netanyahu formed the government because he could assemble a coalition.

In 1984, the rival blocs were effectively tied, 60–60. Neither could govern independently. Labor’s Shimon Peres and Likud’s Yitzhak Shamir therefore agreed to share power, rotating the premiership after two years.

The results were remarkable. Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon, retaining a security zone in the south, and implemented an economic stabilization program that brought runaway inflation under control. Peres honored the rotation agreement in 1986.

Yet unity had its limits. In 1987, Peres reached an understanding with Jordan’s King Hussein that might have opened an important diplomatic path toward resolving the Palestinian question. Shamir blocked it. The episode demonstrated how a government capable of making difficult decisions could also prevent them.

The 1988 election produced a different situation. Likud and its right-wing and religious allies had approximately 65 seats, enough to govern without Labor. Shamir nevertheless formed another unity government, this time without rotating the premiership. It collapsed in 1990.

Later unity governments under Ariel Sharon arose amid the trauma of the Second Intifada and, subsequently, to facilitate Israel’s disengagement from Gaza.

These experiences illustrate an important distinction. Some unity governments were born of parliamentary necessity, others of national emergency, and still others of a desire to implement policies that would otherwise be politically impossible. None demonstrated that bringing opposing parties into the same cabinet was generally pratical.

The most recent experiment came in 2020, when Netanyahu and Benny Gantz agreed to rotate the premiership after three inconclusive elections. Netanyahu would serve first, followed by Gantz. But the government collapsed over the failure to pass a budget, long before Gantz’s turn arrived. Gantz’s supporters accused Netanyahu of deliberately exploiting a loophole in the agreement; Netanyahu disputed responsibility.

The contrast with 1986, when Peres honored his commitment to Shamir, helps explain, in part, why Netanyahu has become so toxic.

Unity today?

That history raises questions about the present enthusiasm for unity. The first is whether there is a pressing karmic need for Netanyahu to be banished. The second is whether any new unity agreement could be sustained. The third, and perhaps the most fundamental, is what such a government could actually accomplish.

Israel faces profound disagreements over accountability for Oct. 7, judicial independence, military obligations for the ultra-Orthodox, the future of the West Bank and the place of Arab citizens in its democracy. These are not merely disputes over the pace of reform. They concern the direction in which the country should move.

A unity government that postponed these questions would not necessarily reconcile the country. It might simply institutionalize paralysis.

There is also a peculiar asymmetry in the Israeli discussion of unity.

When Netanyahu’s right-religious bloc won 64 Knesset seats in 2022, he formed a government without inviting his opponents to participate. Nobody seriously argued that the millions of Israelis who voted for opposition parties were thereby entitled to representation in the cabinet. Netanyahu had won a parliamentary majority and proceeded to govern.

That is how parliamentary democracy works.

Yet when the possibility arises that Netanyahu’s opponents might assemble a majority, the argument for unity frequently resurfaces. The implication is that the votes of Likud supporters must somehow be honored through Netanyahu’s continued participation in government, even if a different parliamentary majority is available.

The present situation is admittedly complicated. Netanyahu’s bloc lacks a majority, while Eisenkot and his prospective partners face difficult choices concerning cooperation with Arab parties and the ultra-Orthodox. A broad coalition may be one way to overcome those obstacles.

But political difficulty is not the same as democratic necessity. A parliamentary majority that includes Arab parties, or depends on their support, is no less legitimate than one that includes Likud. Nor does respecting the millions of Israelis who support Netanyahu require that he remain in government.

This is where the language of national unity becomes misleading. Reconciliation among citizens is an essential national objective. Sharing cabinet positions among politicians is a particular political arrangement, whose merits depend on the policies it can implement.

Israel’s history demonstrates that unity governments can accomplish extraordinary things when their participants share an urgent purpose. It also demonstrates how fundamental disagreements can turn them into mechanisms for mutual veto.

Bennett’s intervention has made the possibility of another such government a serious political question. But the discussion should not begin and end with the distribution of ministries, the order of a rotation or the reassuring symbolism of rival leaders sitting around the same cabinet table.

It should begin with what the government intends to do.

Democratic elections exist to allow citizens to choose between competing political programs. Sometimes the result makes cooperation between rivals unavoidable. Sometimes a national emergency makes it desirable. But unity cannot become a substitute for accepting that elections have consequences.

Israel needs national solidarity. Whether it needs another national unity government is an entirely different question. My answer is a categorical no. So extreme is Netanyahu’s chicanery that any deal with him would be a terrible mistake that would be a tragedy for Zionism itself. If Israel is to survive it needs Netanyahu out.

 

The post Israel does not need fake ‘unity’ with Netanyahu – it needs to move forward appeared first on The Forward.

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