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In a shift, Hebrew College will now admit and ordain rabbinical students whose partners are not Jewish
(JTA) — Hebrew College will begin admitting and ordaining rabbinical students in interfaith relationships, according to new admissions standards revealed on Tuesday.
The decision makes the pluralistic seminary outside of Boston the second major rabbinical school in the United States to do away with rules barring students from dating or marrying non-Jews. The Reconstructionist Rabbinical Seminary was the first to do so in 2015.
Hebrew College’s decision comes as rabbinical schools compete over a shrinking pool of applicants and after decades of rising rates of intermarriage among American Jews.
Rabbi Sharon Cohen Anisfeld, Hebrew College’s president, announced the policy change in an email to students and graduates on Tuesday evening. She said the decision, which followed a year and a half of review, came amid a broad revision of the seminary’s “guiding principles for admission and ordination.”
Those new guiding principles were published on the admissions page of Hebrew College’s website late Tuesday, replacing different language that had included the partner policy. “We do not admit or ordain rabbinical students with non-Jewish partners,” the page had previously said, adding that applicants whose partners were in the process of converting would be considered.
“This is a really exciting moment for Jewish communities everywhere,” said Jodi Bromberg, the CEO of 18Doors, a Jewish nonprofit that supports interfaith families. “We all will get to benefit from Jewish leaders in interfaith relationships who have been sidelined from major seminaries up to now.”
Hebrew College has set aside time on Wednesday for its roughly 80 rabbinical students and others to process their reactions about the change, which Anisfeld had previously said she expected to be intense no matter the decision. She declined to comment late Tuesday, saying that she was focused on communication with members of her community.
“This has not been a simple process and, in addition to the strong feelings raised by the policy itself, there have been complex feelings about various stages of the process we’ve undertaken over the past year,” Anisfeld wrote in a message to students in October, in a series of emails obtained by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
Hebrew College’s policy change reflects a longstanding and sometimes painful dynamic in American Jewish life: While nearly three-quarters of non-Orthodox Jews who married in the last decade did so to non-Jews, few traditional rabbinical schools have been willing to train or ordain rabbis in interfaith relationships. Their policies have roots in Jewish law, known as halacha, which prohibits marriages between Jews and non-Jews. But they also reflect anxiety among American Jewish leaders over whether high rates of intermarriage threaten the future of Judaism, and whether rabbis must model traditional practices in their families.
At Hebrew College, which launched its rabbinical school 20 years ago, the prohibition against interfaith relationships had been the only admissions requirement rooted in Jewish law beyond the rule that applicants must be considered Jewish according to at least one Jewish movement. There was no requirement that rabbinical students keep kosher or observe Shabbat.
When the school’s leadership first solicited feedback from students a year ago, several took aim at what they said was hypocrisy in the approach to Jewish law.
“This is the one area of students’ halachic life where I am acutely aware that the school does not trust us, does not think we are capable of navigating our own personal lives, and does not believe that the choices we may make for ourselves have the capacity to expand and enrich our Jewish practice,” wrote one student, according to a collection of anonymous comments shared among students at the time.
A chuppah at a Jewish wedding. More than 60% of American Jews who have married in the last decade have done so to non-Jewish partners, according to a 2021 study from the Pew Research Center. That proportion rises to nearly 75% for non-Orthodox American Jews. (Scott Rocher via Flickr Commons)
Most of the 15 comments that students and graduates shared with their peers called for doing away with the ban on interfaith student relationships, often citing the benefits of having Hebrew College-ordained rabbis reflect the families they are likely to serve.
“We should be training rabbis for the Jewish community that exists and that we want to cultivate, not the one we wish existed or that existed in the past,” one student wrote. “Having intermarried rabbis could do a lot of good: perhaps having role models for a fulfilling, active, intermarried Jewish can help people feel welcomed, not just grudgingly tolerated after the fact — and can increase the likelihood that those intermarried couples want to raise Jewish children.”
Several students and graduates wrote that the policy as it stood incentivized students to obscure their relationships, denying them dignity and preventing their mentors and teachers from fully supporting them. Several suggested that prohibiting students in interfaith partnerships could have a disproportionate effect on queer Jews and Jews of color.
At least one person argued against changing the policy, instead suggesting that the school strengthen enforcement and clarify expectations about other Jewish practices and values.
“By changing the policy Hebrew College is sending the message to the Jewish world that love-based marriages are more sacred than the covenant with which we made at Sinai,” that student wrote, referring to the moment in Jewish tradition when God first spoke to the Israelites. “However, by not changing the policy Hebrew College is affirming that students learn the art of lying. Therefore, my suggestion is to keep the policy but change the ethics on how it is enforced.”
Those comments followed a two-day workshop, facilitated by experts in conflict resolution, about the policy a year ago. The experience was challenging for many of those in attendance, according to the student comments.
“The pain of the need to hide was on full display during Winter Seminar, and I found myself wondering if I could remain in a community whose first response was anything other than to seek healing for the hurt that the policy has inflicted,” one wrote at the time.
With tensions high, an initial deadline to decide whether to keep the policy came and went last June. In late October, Anisfeld wrote to students with an update. A special committee including both rabbinic and academic faculty members had been meeting regularly since July, she said, and would be presenting their recommendation by the end of January.
Last week, she said in her message to students and graduates on Tuesday, Hebrew College’s board approved the policy change and admissions principles revisions.
The decision could renew pressure on other rabbinical schools amid steep competition for students. Several non-traditional rabbinical schools that do not have a requirement about the identities of students’ spouses have grown in recent years, while Hebrew College; the Reform movement’s Hebrew Union College; and the Jewish Theological Seminary and the Ziegler School of Rabbinic Studies in the Conservative movement all shrunk. Hebrew College recently completed a move to a shared campus after selling its building under financial duress.
“We continue to hear from folks who want to be rabbis and up until this moment had really limited choices,” said Bromberg. “I can’t help but think that this will have a really positive impact on the enrollment in Hebrew College’s rabbinic program.”
The pressure could be especially acute for Hebrew Union College, the Reform seminary with three campuses in the United States. (Because of declining enrollment, the school is phasing out its Cincinnati program.) HUC does not admit or ordain students in interfaith relationships, even though the Reform movement, which does not consider halacha to be binding, permits its rabbis to officiate at intermarriages and to be intermarried themselves.
That policy, which the movement reaffirmed after extensive debate in 2014, has drawn resentment and scorn from some who say it is the only thing holding them back from pursuing Reform ordination.
“All my life, my community had told me that no matter who you are or who you love, you are equal in our community and according to the Divine. But now it feels like I’ve been betrayed, lied to, misled,” Ezra Samuels, an aspiring rabbinical student in a queer relationship with a non-Jewish man, wrote on Hey Alma in 2020, expanding on a viral Twitter thread.
But even the Conservative movement, which bars rabbis from officiating at intermarriages and only recently began permitting members of its rabbinical association to attend intermarriages, is grappling openly with how to balance Jewish law and tradition against the reality around interfaith relationships.
The movement recently held a series of online meetings for members of its Rabbinical Assembly to discuss intermarriage, sparking rumors that the movement could be headed toward policy changes. That’s not the case, according to movement leaders — though they say other shifts may be needed.
“There are no proposals at present to change our standard,” said Rabbi Jacob Blumenthal, the CEO of the RA and United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, the movement’s congregational arm. “But there is a conversation about what are the ways that we can provide more pastoral guidance to colleagues, especially around moments of marriage.”
The Pew study found new high rates of intermarriage in the Jewish community. (iStock/Getty Images)
Keren McGinity, the USCJ’s interfaith specialist, previously directed the Interfaith Families Engagement Program, a now-defunct part of Hebrew College’s education school. She declined to comment on the internal conversations underway within the Conservative movement. But in 2015, she argued in an op-ed that the Jewish world would benefit from more rabbis who were intermarried.
“Seeing rabbis — who have committed their careers, indeed their lives to Judaism — intermarry, create Jewish homes and raise Jewish children should convincingly illustrate how intermarriage does not inhibit Jewish involvement,” she wrote, citing her research on intermarried couples.
That argument got a boost two years ago, when a major survey of American Jews found that most children of intermarried couples were being raised Jewish. And on Tuesday, McGinity said she was glad to hear that Hebrew College was dropping its partner requirement, which she said she knew had caused students to leave the program in the past.
“The decision to admit rabbinical students who have beloveds of other faith backgrounds is a tremendous way of leading in the 21st century, illustrating that interpartnered Jews can be exemplars of Jewish leaders,” she said.
She added, “Knowing my colleagues, I can only imagine the hours and hours of thought that went into this decision.”
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Quotation Marks That Silence Iran
Traces of an Iranian missile attack in Tehran’s sky, amid the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, April 3, 2026. Photo: Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS
There are times when journalism errs not in what it states — but in how it chooses to frame the issue. Quotation marks, the ultimate symbol of fidelity to another’s words, can also become instruments of distortion when stripped of the conditions in which those voices exist: fear, coercion, and imposed silence.
Recently, the British newspaper The Guardian — one of the most influential media outlets in the world — published the following statement from a man in Tehran: “Nothing good can come of this, since obviously the US and Israel don’t give a damn about the Iranian people.”
Presented in quotation marks, the phrase acquires an air of legitimacy. But what is not in quotation marks is precisely what matters most: who can speak freely within Iran.
The statement appeared in an article whose title was, in itself, a warning: “Iran calls on young people to form human chains around power plants as Trump deadline looms.”
The article described an official call for young people to surround power plants as a deadline set by the United States approached, under threat of attack. This was not a marginal detail, but the very core of the report: civilians being summoned to physically occupy potential targets — a practice that, by deliberately exposing the population to risk, violates not only international law, but any basic notion of humanity.
The coverage noted that attacks on civilian infrastructure can constitute war crimes, a correct — but incomplete — statement. It omitted the fact that the use of civilians as human shields, or the deliberate placement of populations in the line of fire, is equally a grave violation of international humanitarian law. This is not an isolated practice: the Iranian regime and its proxies have repeatedly relied on the exposure — and, ultimately, the sacrifice — of civilians as a method of warfare, both in defense and in attack. In its most literal sense, this is terrorism.
The question, then, is not only what this man said, but under what conditions he could have said anything different.
The reality is unequivocal. Estimates from independent organizations indicate that the death toll from the 2026 protests in Iran may have reached as high as 43,000 — people killed for daring to challenge the regime. This is part of a systematic policy of repression.
The executions of young protesters continue, often under charges such as “war against God” — a vague formulation that, in practice, turns dissent into a capital crime. In Iran, disagreement is not merely dangerous. It is, daily, a death sentence.
This pattern is neither new nor incidental. For years, the Iranian regime has exercised strict controls over information, suppressing dissent not only through force, but through fear that shapes what can be said — and what must remain unsaid.
Journalists operate under severe restrictions, and ordinary citizens face imprisonment or worse for statements deemed disloyal. In such an environment, even seemingly spontaneous public opinion becomes inseparable from the boundaries imposed by the state. What is presented to the outside world as a civilian voice may, in reality, be a reflection of survival.
This dynamic is further compounded by the regime’s broader strategy, often mirrored by its regional proxies, of embedding military objectives within civilian spaces. The result is a systematic blurring of lines between combatant and non-combatant — one that not only endangers lives, but also distorts how those lives are represented in global narratives. In Iran, what is said cannot be taken at face value—nor should it be presented as such.
So is it legitimate to treat a statement gathered under a system that punishes dissent with death as an authentic expression of public opinion? Or are we, however unintentionally, amplifying the narrative of a regime that controls words?
When the international press publishes quotes without acknowledging the climate of coercion in which they are spoken, it risks becoming a vehicle for propaganda.
Quotation marks are not neutral. They carry the weight of what can be said — and of everything that has been silenced.
In authoritarian regimes, the question is not only whether we are listening — but what, exactly, we are being allowed to hear. By ignoring context, are we helping create the conditions for Iranians to one day speak freely — or are we helping silence them for good?
Nira Broner Worcman is a Brazilian journalist, CEO of Art Presse Communications, and author of A Sisyphean Task (translated from the Brazilian edition, Enxugando Gelo), on media coverage of the war between Israel and terrorist groups. She was a Knight Science Fellow at MIT and earned her master’s degree at NYU’s Science, Health, and Environmental Reporting Program.
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The Pakistan Gambit: Why Islamabad’s Mediation Should Worry Israel
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif meet in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Sept. 17, 2025. Photo: Saudi Press Agency/Handout via REUTERS
The two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran has been widely celebrated as a triumph of Pakistani diplomacy. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has received effusive international praise, and Islamabad has positioned itself as the indispensable broker of a deal that pulled the region back from the edge of catastrophic escalation.
The congratulations, however, are premature. For Israel and for American policymakers thinking seriously about long-term regional security, the architecture of this ceasefire and the identity of its architect should raise as many questions as the ceasefire itself.
Let’s start with what Pakistan actually is in this equation.
Islamabad is not a neutral party in the conventional sense. It shares a long border, and deep cultural and religious ties with Iran. It represents Iranian diplomatic interests in Washington, where Tehran maintains no embassy. It is home to the world’s second-largest Shia Muslim population. It has simultaneously cultivated a strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia and maintains a close alliance with China, which is Iran’s largest trading partner — and which, according to reporting, helped bring Tehran to the negotiating table.
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister coordinated with counterparts from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt before flying to Beijing for further consultations. This is not the profile of a disinterested mediator. It is the profile of a state managing an extraordinarily complex set of overlapping interests, some of which are structurally misaligned with the security requirements of the United States and Israel.
Field Marshal Asim Munir’s personal rapport with Donald Trump is real, and it clearly mattered in the final hours before the deadline. But personal rapport is not a substitute for strategic alignment. The same Pakistani military establishment that built this relationship with the Trump White House has also spent decades maintaining ties with actors whose interests are fundamentally hostile to the American-led regional order.
Pakistan does not formally recognize Israel. It has never been part of the Abraham Accords architecture. It has no stake in ensuring that any final agreement with Iran leaves the Jewish State with an enhanced (or acceptable) security environment. Its interest is in ending a war that was disrupting its oil imports, threatening regional stability on its doorstep, and straining an economy already under severe stress. Those are legitimate national interests, but they are Pakistan’s interests, not Israel’s or America’s.
The contradiction at the heart of this ceasefire emerged almost immediately. Sharif declared publicly that the truce covered the conflict everywhere, explicitly including Lebanon. Netanyahu’s office issued a correction within hours, stating clearly that the ceasefire does not extend to Lebanon, where Israel continues operations against Iranian-backed Hezbollah. That is not a minor discrepancy in diplomatic language. It reflects a fundamental divergence in what the parties believe they agreed to.
Iran and Pakistan have an interest in framing the ceasefire as broadly as possible, foreclosing Israeli military options across every front simultaneously. Israel has an interest in preserving its freedom of action in Lebanon, which remains a live theater of operations with direct implications for its northern security. The fact that the broker of this deal publicly endorsed the Iranian and Pakistani interpretation, rather than the Israeli one, tells you something important about where Islamabad’s equities actually lie.
Then there is the deeper problem of what Iran brought to the table. The framework Tehran submitted includes demands for the lifting of all sanctions, release of frozen assets, American military withdrawal from regional bases, war reparations, and explicit recognition of Iran’s right to nuclear enrichment. This is not the negotiating position of a country that has been strategically defeated. It is a maximalist agenda that, if accepted in whole or in part, would leave Iran in a stronger regional position than it occupied before the war began.
The Iranian leadership has been explicit internally that it views the ceasefire as a validation of its wartime objectives. That self-assessment should be taken seriously. Regimes that believe they have won tend to negotiate accordingly.
The Islamabad talks will be shaped by this opening dynamic. The United States enters those negotiations having accepted Iran’s 10-point proposal as a workable basis for discussion, under time pressure, brokered by a state with deep ties to Tehran and no relationship with Israel. The agenda will be set by the parties who designed the framework. Iran’s nuclear file, its ballistic missile program, and its proxy network across the Levant will all be subject to negotiation in an environment that is structurally tilted toward Iranian preferences.
Israel’s task in the coming two weeks is to ensure that Washington understands the distinction between ending a war and ending a threat. A ceasefire that reopens the Strait of Hormuz while leaving Iran’s centrifuges operational is not a security achievement. It is a commercial arrangement with an existential footnote. A final agreement that includes American military retrenchment from the region under Iranian pressure is not stability. It is the precondition for the next conflict, fought under worse conditions.
Pakistan may have earned its diplomatic moment. But the morning and days after a ceasefire is when the real negotiation begins, and Israel cannot afford to let Islamabad write the terms.
Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx
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How South Africa Embraced Iran — and Isolated Its Own People
South African President Cyril Ramaphosa in Chatsworth, South Africa, May 18, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Rogan Ward
It’s sometimes tough to be a proud South African. Not because of the place or her people, but because the African National Congress (ANC), the political party that leads our current “government of national unity” and which was once the party of Nelson Mandela, has become an abject embarrassment — and destroyed the ideals it was founded on.
On the domestic front, they have led the country into ruin, as massive levels of governmental incompetence and corruption have led to literally crumbling infrastructure, ruinous public institutions, massive wealth inequality, and one of the highest violent crime rates in the world.
And yet, however disgraceful the ANC has been in local matters, they’re even worse in foreign policy, where the government has aligned itself with the absolute worst, most despotic regimes on the planet. But more than cozying up to Putin’s Russia and Xi’s China, it’s the ANC’s close relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran (and its proxies) that is the darkest stain on its increasingly tarnished reputation.
The ANC and the Islamic Republic: Brothers in Arms
The ANC and the Islamic Republic have over the years built a relationship that is almost romantic in its intensity and faithfulness. Never has the ANC had a bad word to say about the regime, and never has the regime failed to correspond in kind. Though, of course, the ANC’s loyalty is not entirely freely given reports that it clearly enjoys some financial support from the Islamic Republic.
Either way, whether out of misplaced loyalty to their “fellow revolutionaries” or mercenary self-interest, the ANC has stood by the Islamic Republic through thick and thin; through its nuclear ambitions, its persecution of religious minorities, and its mass murder of tens of thousands of innocent protesters.
The South African government was one of the few around the world to mourn the death of Ali Khamenei — and even as it has effectively cut diplomatic ties with Israel, even refusing the offer of Israeli NGOs to help solve the country’s water problems and to help fix our decrepit national health services, it proudly hosts all sorts of senior Iranian regime officials and maintains ever close ties to the Iranian embassy here.
Unsurprisingly, the ANC’s years-long relationship with the Islamic Republic intensified almost exponentially in the immediate aftermath of October 7, 2023. South Africa and the ANC immediately shifted the focus from the Israeli victims, to Palestinians who it said were experiencing “genocide,” “war crimes,” and “apartheid” before Israel’s defensive war even started.
Aside from taking Israel to international court, the ANC supported all of the attacks taken by Iran and its proxies against Israel. And then came the current war between Iran and the combined forces of the United States and Israel, and things took a bit of a turn once again.
Of Moral Bankruptcy and Terrible Alliances
To those of us paying attention, it’s been all but impossible to miss how different the ANC’s role has been in this war. The Islamic Republic clearly hasn’t used the ANC to constantly legitimize its cause or to propagate its propaganda in the way it did during the Gaza war. It doesn’t need to.
The ANC has already played its role perfectly in turning Israel into the ultimate aggressor on the world stage, and with President Trump’s historically low popularity both at home and abroad, the Islamic Republic may have already won what may be the most crucial battle for its survival: the war over public opinion.
And yet, even as the ANC tries to walk a fine line in not alienating Washington completely and has tried to present itself as a neutral party in the war — even offering to mediate talks between the Islamic Republic and the US — its allegiances remain as clear as ever.
Though it’s hardly the first liberal-democratic government to chafe with the Trump administration, the ANC-captured Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) has seemingly done everything in its power to antagonize Trump. Don’t get me wrong, Trump being Trump, a lot of this is his fault, especially with his insistence on there being a “white genocide” happening in South Africa and being decidedly undiplomatic in his thoughts on the ANC. But he’s also right about certain things. There really is no “white genocide” — as President Ramaphosa pointed out correctly, it’s not a question of race but of a high crime rate that targets everyone equally (this is somehow good news?) — but Trump is hardly imagining the ANC’s incompetence or its troubling tight relationships with the enemies of the free world.
The simple, inescapable truth is that the ANC is far more tolerant of tyrants and Islamist theocracies than it is of its fellow liberal-democracies.
Regardless of what you think of the current war in Iran, the ANC’s behavior towards the Islamic Republic since it massacred its own citizens by the tens of thousands over just a couple of days, has been nothing less than disgraceful.
It has also created an environment in South Africa where institutions fall directly in line with its terrible foreign policy. The University of Pretoria, for example, has stoked all kinds of controversy for its decision to “platform” the Islamic Republic’s ambassador to South Africa, while the University of Cape Town has decided to bestow an honorary doctorate on Imtiaz Sooliman, the “philanthropist” and founder of Gift of the Givers, known for his antisemitic statements — and especially his concerning ties to various radical Islamist groups.
A Million Wrongs Make a Right?
There is, however, a silver lining or two in all of this. The ANC is such an unmitigated train wreck at this point that it might be good that it is currently standing so fully on the wrong side of history. It has shown itself to be so wildly incompetent, corrupt, and morally twisted that it would almost be worse if it stood with America and Israel in all of this.
More hopefully, South Africa itself may benefit most from the ANC’s dreadful alliances, ironically. Ten years ago, the thought of the ANC losing power in the country was all but unthinkable — but given what’s happened over the past decade, that might be changing.
What is truly miraculous about all this, though, is that despite everything, South Africa genuinely remains a great place to be a Jew. Yes, there is still some antisemitism and like all Diaspora communities we still need armed security at our shuls, schools, and communal events, but despite the ANC’s best efforts to ingratiate itself to our very worst enemies, there is far less antisemitism here than in most countries and, at least within broadly Jewish and/or cosmopolitan areas, seldom any real need to hide our Jewishness.
And it is of the greatest of all possible ironies that we largely have the ANC to thank for this. At least the version of it that was around in 1994 — that crafted such an inclusive constitution and did its very best to engender a society where bigotry of any sort is entirely unacceptable. Except, of course, to sing “Kill the Boer.”