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The Cornerstone Is Cracking: Why Egypt’s Internal Decay Threatens the Middle East’s Longest Peace

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi attends a meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken at the Presidential Palace in Cairo, Egypt, June 10, 2024. Photo: Amr Nabil/Pool via REUTERS

The 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel has long been the geopolitical cornerstone of the Middle East, establishing a stable southern flank for Israel and a cooperative, if “cold,” relationship with its largest Arab neighbor.

Today, this cornerstone is under unprecedented threat. The danger doesn’t primarily come from a hostile external power, but from within the Egyptian state itself. The internal, non-cyclical fragility of Egypt is rapidly dissolving the “cold peace” into a state of volatile strategic dissonance.

The regional crises of the past two years — the Gaza War and the Houthi maritime attacks — acted as catastrophic accelerants, instantly translating Egypt’s deep structural decay into geopolitical instability along the shared border. The stability of the Middle East’s longest peace now depends on the rapidly deteriorating economic and social health of the Egyptian state.

The core of Egypt’s fragility is the fiscal collapse of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s “Second Republic,” a system defined by military-led state capitalism.

The military establishment and its senior officer corps regard their dominance over key sectors of the economy as an inherent entitlement. This dominance severely crowds out the legitimate private sector, undermining competitiveness and preventing the creation of an economy that can generate sufficient employment.

This crony system, fueled by expensive priorities and massive borrowing, has created a state of unsustainable sovereign debt. For the upcoming fiscal year, Egypt is projected to spend an astonishing 65 percent of its annual budget merely on servicing existing debt payments. This burden starves productive investment and social welfare programs, forcing painful cuts.

Massive, repeated bailouts from the IMF and Gulf states have consistently prevented “dramatic failure.” However, they also create a moral hazard, allowing the Sisi regime to avoid the necessary structural reform — namely, loosening the military’s economic grip — thereby sustaining the underlying instability. The institutional contradiction is stark: the entity providing short-term security (the Egyptian military) is the same entity impeding the long-term economic stability required for peace to endure.

Beneath the economic crisis lies a massive, alienated youth surge. Egypt’s young population (Gen Z) harbors profound political disillusionment and distrust. With over 60% of workers in the informal sector, and a university degree no longer a reliable pathway to employment, economic despair is widespread. The resulting legitimacy crisis compels the regime to adopt an aggressive foreign policy to ensure its own survival. Adopting a hostile, nationalist stance toward Israel — especially over Gaza — functions successfully as a surrogate for anti-regime politics, diverting popular resentment away from domestic failure.

This fragile domestic foundation collided with the regional shock of the Houthi attacks. The resulting trade diversion caused Suez Canal revenues to plummet by 61.2% in the first quarter of the 2024–2025 fiscal year. This catastrophic loss of foreign currency instantly translated the structural fragility into geopolitical volatility.

The consequence is a rapid strategic transformation of the peace framework. Egypt is shifting from an accommodated counter-terrorism partner to a state establishing a conventional deterrence posture against Israel. This is evident in the military buildup in the Sinai Peninsula, which some Israeli officials contend exceeds the limits of the 1979 Military Annex. The dispute over control of the Gaza-Egypt border, the Philadelphi Corridor, is the most volatile point of tension, as Israel’s security interest in stopping smuggling conflicts directly with Egypt’s existential fear of mass displacement into Sinai. Furthermore, Egypt suspended high-level security coordination channels following the Gaza conflict, removing a crucial lubricant from the “cold peace” and elevating the risk of tactical misunderstandings.

The durability of the 1979 Treaty requires the United States and Israel to address Egyptian fragility not as an economic problem, but as a core national security imperative. Western partners must impose strict conditionality on aid to enforce the loosening of the military’s grip on the economy. Beyond this, long-term security requires substantial funding for non-military economic development and social inclusion in the Sinai Peninsula to address root grievances. Finally, immediate US-led diplomatic pressure is necessary to reinstate suspended security coordination and formalize new, jointly monitored security arrangements for the Philadelphi Corridor.

The internal decay of the Egyptian state is transforming the Mideast’s longest peace into a conventional hostility. If the cornerstone of the region is allowed to crumble, the stability of the entire region will collapse with it.

Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx

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UAE Rules Out Joining Gaza Stabilization Force for Now, Backs Peace Efforts

Aid donated by the UAE for the people of Gaza is stored in a warehouse at the port of Limassol, Cyprus, Nov. 7, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Yiannis Kourtoglou

The United Arab Emirates does not yet see a clear framework for the proposed international stability force in Gaza and, under the current circumstances, will not take part, a senior Emirati official said on Monday.

Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the UAE president, said Abu Dhabi would continue to support political efforts toward peace and remain a leading provider of humanitarian aid.

“The region remains fragile, yet there is reason for cautious optimism,” he told the Abu Dhabi Strategic Debate.

The Gaza ceasefire deal aimed at ending hostilities between Israel and Hamas was brokered by the United States, with Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey also mediating.

Washington has drafted a United Nations Security Council resolution proposing a two-year mandate for a transitional governance body and an international stabilization force in Gaza.

The force, known as the International Stabilization Force (ISF), would be authorized to “use all necessary measures” to demilitarize Gaza, protect civilians and aid deliveries, secure Gaza‘s borders, and support a newly trained Palestinian police force, according to a draft seen by Reuters.

US President Donald Trump said last week that the stabilization force for Gaza would deploy “very soon,” adding that “Gaza is working out very well.”

The US has approached several countries, including Indonesia, the UAE, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and Azerbaijan, about contributing to the force, a senior US official had told Reuters, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Israel has ruled out Turkish participation. Azerbaijan has said it does not plan to send peacekeepers to Gaza unless there is a complete halt to fighting.

Though Washington has ruled out sending US soldiers into Gaza, the US official said around two dozen US troops were in the region in coordination and oversight roles to help prepare for the potential deployment.

Gargash said progress over Gaza depended on reaffirming the principles of the Abraham Accords – dialogue, coexistence, and cooperation – as the only sustainable path to a viable Palestinian state. The UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco established ties with Israel under the Trump-brokered Abraham Accords in 2020.

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IAEA Inspectors Visited Iranian Nuclear Sites Last Week, Foreign Ministry Says

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi arrives on the opening day of the agency’s quarterly Board of Governors meeting at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, Nov. 20, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Lisa Leutner

Inspectors of the UN nuclear watchdog IAEA visited Iranian nuclear sites last week, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson said on Monday, according to state media, a week after the IAEA urged Iran to “seriously improve” cooperation.

The IAEA has carried out about a dozen inspections in Iran since hostilities with Israel in June, but last week highlighted it had not been given access to nuclear facilities such as Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, which were bombed by the United States.

“As long as we are a member of the NPT [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons], we will abide by our commitments, and just last week, IAEA inspectors visited several nuclear facilities, including the Tehran Research Reactor,” Esmaeil Baghaei said, without naming the others.

The International Atomic Energy Agency chief Rafael Grossi said last week that Iran must “seriously improve” cooperation with the United Nations inspectors to avoid heightening tensions with the West.

Iranian officials have blamed the IAEA for providing a justification for Israel’s bombing in a 12-day war in June, which began the day after the IAEA board voted to declare Iran in violation of obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Baghaei’s comments on Monday were in response to Grossi saying last week that Iran “cannot say ‘I remain within the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons treaty,’ and then not comply with obligations.”

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The immigrant NYers Zohran Mamdani cherishes all feel warmth for their homelands. Why can’t Jews?

My family was never American; we were New Yorkers. My great-grandparents came from the old country to the Lower East Side as children; they moved to Harlem and to the Bronx and there they raised my grandparents. My grandparents married and moved to Great Neck, which was not yet a Jewish suburb, where my father was born and raised. And then in their 20s my parents moved back into the city, to the Upper West Side, in the late 1960s, where a few years later I was born and raised. Until the age of 46, I’d lived in New York City almost all my life.

I adore the city and everything about it. What I love most about it, I think, was what the great Jewish New Yorker Horace Kallen called its “cultural pluralism.” New York is a vast collection of different nationalities — the greatest such collection ever assembled in one place — all living together, neighborhood by neighborhood. The City (there is only this one City) and not the soulless slab of glass and concrete jutting out of Turtle Bay, is the true United Nations.

New Yorkers hail from over 150 different nations; there are enormous populations of Dominicans, Chinese, Mexicans and Guyanese, Jamaicans, Ecuadorians, Haitians, Indians, Russians, and Trinidadians, Bangladeshis and more, blanketing the city from Arthur Avenue in the Bronx out to Flushing and down to the Rockaways. Subway signs are written in four, five, six languages; each train car some space shuttle out of Star Trek, teeming with New Yorkers of every possible complexion and dress from every corner of the globe.

So I was very moved when Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani spoke in his acceptance speech last week of “Yemeni bodega owners and Mexican abuelas; Senegalese taxi drivers and Uzbek nurses; Trinidadian line cooks and Ethiopian aunties” all of whom, he said, had turned out to vote for him. And I was deeply moved by his vision of returning the city to its everyday, working class people, so that New York might “remain a city of immigrants: a city built by immigrants, powered by immigrants and, as of tonight, led by an immigrant.” (Whether this speech accurately reflected his actual median voter, who was more likely to be a recent college graduate living in Bushwick than a working mother of four in Flushing, is another matter.)

But as he spoke, I turned to thinking about Ibrahim, a young handsome Yemeni who ran his family bodega around the corner from my former home in Brooklyn. We used to speak about Yemen — he had strong views about which Yemeni singers I should listen to — and how much he loved and missed it; he and his cousins would travel back there to stay for years at a time, returning to Brooklyn to earn and send remittances home. And I thought of all the Pakistani and Bangladeshi cab drivers I’ve had over the years, and how every last one of them told me about the house they’d always dreamt of building in the countryside of Pakistan or Bangladesh, for their parents if not for them or their now-local children. I thought of the apartment of the girl who lived downstairs from me in the building I grew up in on West 90th street, with whom I was half in love, her family Trinidadian Indians, and the apartment heavy with plants and oversized rattan furniture and the moist exhaust of the humidifier that was always blowing; her apartment felt, I imagined, like Trinidad itself, and the curry tasted as it did back home. And I think always of Delsie, the Jamaican woman who cared for me when my mother went back to work, who scolded and spoiled me and regaled me with stories about Montego Bay.

All of my fellow New Yorkers loved their home across the ocean; all of them sent money and love to their families and countrymen, sustaining that tie as much as they could.

And the Jews? Well, we were the same, but also different. For one thing, we had been in the city longer. We’d left our mark on the Lower East Side where my Chinese-Brazilian best friend lived generations ago, on its landscape and on its idiom, but we’d long moved on to other neighborhoods, as the progress of my own family demonstrates. But also, according to Horace Kallen, the Jews of his day (the 1910s) were different from the other immigrant communities of New York in the way they related to the Old Country:

[Jews] do not come to the United States from truly native lands, lands of their proper natio and culture. They come from lands of sojourn, where they have been for ages treated as foreigners, at most as semi-citizens, subject to disabilities and persecutions. They come with no political aspirations against the peace of other states such as move the Irish, the Poles, the Bohemians. They come with the intention to be completely incorporated into the body-politic of the state. . . .

Yet, once the wolf is driven from the door and the Jewish immigrant takes his place in our society a free man and an American, he tends to become all the more a Jew. The cultural unity of his race, history and background is only continued by the new life under the new conditions. The Jewish quarter. . .  has its sectaries, its radicals, its artists, its literati; its press, its literature, its theater, its Yiddish and its Hebrew, its Talmudical colleges and its Hebrew schools, its charities and its vanities, and its coordinating organization, the Kehilla, all more or less duplicated wherever Jews congregate in mass. Here not religion alone, but the whole world of radical thinking, carries the mother-tongue and the father-tongue, with all that they imply.

This was the position of the Jews of New York until mid-century; a “nation and culture” without a homeland to pine for.

But, of course, then the Jews — like the Irish, and the Poles, and the Czechs — regained a homeland. And fitfully, not without controversy and dissension, we, too, came to love it, and maintain a deep, unbreakable attachment to it, and seek to support it. In this, we became like the Poles and Irish and Czechs — and also like the Armenians and the Macedonians and, yes, the Palestinians, supporting “political aspirations” for our people that can rub up “against the peace of other states”). Such is the complexity of national attachments. And some of us, in fact, were so deeply attached that we left our first love, the city of our birth, to upbuild it.

I won’t argue that what Israel is to New York Jews is identical to what Yemen is to Ibrahim. The Jews’ homeland is different from other homelands, because Jewish history is different from other peoples’ history. But it’s just as precious to us. And listening to Mamdani, I wondered why his Whitmanesque reveries have no room for that attachment. I wondered why, based on his past statements, he intended not to embrace our love and grief for Israel but instead — by seeking to localize his longest-standing political priority — to turn the grievances of his Yemeni bodega owners and Mexican abuelas and Senegalese taxi drivers and Uzbek nurses and Trinidadian line cooks and Ethiopian aunties against us and against the Jewish homeland.

I realize that I am homesick for a city that was also a Jewish city, my city, that I fear is gone. And the pain that I felt when the new mayor summoned a vision of that vanished city — an ersatz vision, with no room in its heart for Jews as we really are — was a deep pain.


The post The immigrant NYers Zohran Mamdani cherishes all feel warmth for their homelands. Why can’t Jews? appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

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