Israel’s election has produced a messy result: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s governing bloc has suffered a major defeat, losing perhaps 11 seats compared with its victory in 2022. Yet the country could still end up with Netanyahu as prime minister. Or a broad unity government that preserves part of the existing order. Or a repeat election.

According to near-final results, Netanyahu and his allies have won just 53 seats in the 120-member Knesset, down from the 64 that gave them a comfortable majority four years ago. The opposition has secured 67 seats, one of the strongest showings for the anti-Netanyahu camp in decades. You might think this would be interpreted as a decisive rejection of the incumbent government and a mandate for political change – yet things are not exactly so.

The complication is that the opposition’s seats include 19 held by Arab parties, whose dramatic electoral gains appear to have been driven by a surge in turnout among Israel’s Arab citizens. The Jewish-led opposition parties together hold just 48 seats, leaving them well short of the 61 needed for a parliamentary majority. And several of their leaders have promised to avoid a coalition with the Arab parties.

That pledge was always difficult to reconcile with Israel’s electoral math – as well as with the promise of equality in its Declaration of Independence. Indeed, the moderate camp has for decades depended on Arab votes for a parliamentary majority, even when Arab parties remained formally outside the governing coalition. The promises in this round were designed to reassure Jewish voters moving away from Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc, many of whom distrust the Arab parties on security, Palestinian nationalism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Now opposition leaders may have to choose between their principal campaign objective – removing Netanyahu, which the country needs desperately – and a secondary promise that should never have been made.

Further complicating the picture are Likud allegations of fraud – expected standard operating procedure – which on Thursday received a boost by reports of an investigation that Qatar might have bribed Israeli Arabs to vote.

A major wild card is President Trump, who seems determined to save Netanyahu and may pressure the main opposition leader, Gadi Eisenkot, to acquiesce. No one should be surprised if Trump engineers another Iran war – or, conversely, promises peace plans with the Palestinians and Saudi Arabia – to scramble the Israeli equation in ways that might help his fellow right-wing populist.

There are several possible routes to a government, each involving concessions and risks.

1. An opposition government supported by the Arab parties

The most direct path would be for Eisenkot to accept the parliamentary support of the Arab parties and form a government backed by the 67 lawmakers elected in opposition to Netanyahu’s bloc. This could involve bringing Ra’am, the pragmatic Islamist party led by Mansour Abbas that joined the governing coalition in 2021, into the government, and perhaps relying on outside support from the Joint Arab List, which is less Zionist-friendly.

The latter arrangement would allow the Jewish-led opposition to control the cabinet while giving Arab parties considerable influence without requiring them to assume responsibility for policies they oppose.

They could concentrate initially on domestic priorities, on which they all agree, including restoring democratic institutions, establishing a state commission of inquiry into the Oct. 7 failures, addressing the cost of living, combating crime in Arab communities and reversing controversial authoritarian reforms of Netanyahu’s outgoing government. Additional parliamentary support on individual issues could help reduce dependence on any single faction.

Avigdor Lieberman, the anti-Netanyahu, anti-religious nationalist whose Yisrael Beiteinu party won seven seats, could prove the toughest obstacle. Opposed to a coalition that relies on an Arab safety net, he could potentially demand a turn as prime minister in exchange for his support. Conceivably, some from Netanyahu’s bloc might later join in as well.

2. A unity government under Netanyahu, excluding the far right

A second possibility is a broad national unity government joining Netanyahu’s Likud with most of the Jewish-led opposition while excluding his ultranationalist partners, especially the globally toxic  Itamar Ben-Gvir. Such an arrangement would command a substantial parliamentary majority and could be presented as an answer to Israel’s political divisions and security challenges.

Trump, who aggressively endorsed Netanyahu, will probably push for this, and Eisenkot could be receiving some phone calls from the White House.

Netanyahu would argue he should be the prime minister of such a government – or at least go first in a rotation. He’d argue his Likud is still the largest party, but that is actually irrelevant under the Israeli system – only the blocs count.

For Netanyahu, unity would offer an opportunity to shed his most controversial partners while remaining at the helm, claiming national reconciliation.

For Eisenkot and other opposition leaders, the political cost would be enormous. Having campaigned to end Netanyahu’s rule and won a 67-seat majority, they would look weak. They also could find themselves responsible for government decisions that would enrage their supporters, like additional settlements in the West Bank.

3. Defections from the opposition give Netanyahu another majority

A third possibility involves Netanyahu persuading opposition lawmakers to change sides, allowing him to assemble a governing majority despite his bloc’s electoral defeat.

Netanyahu could also attempt to recruit such individual lawmakers through ministerial appointments, policy concessions or promises of political influence. Parliamentary rules governing defections could complicate these efforts, particularly for lawmakers seeking to break away individually. But it is possible. One potential figure is, again, Lieberman, whose Yisrael Beiteinu party has been among Netanyahu’s fiercest opponents. A former defense minister and veteran coalition negotiator, Lieberman holds nationalist positions closer to the traditional right than to the liberal opposition, although his longstanding hostility toward Netanyahu would make any reconciliation dramatic – and he has ruled it out. But he has also ruled out a coalition with the Arabs.

The prospect of major cabinet portfolios, a broader realignment of the right and the avoidance of another election could nevertheless become appealing options.

The broader implication is that Netanyahu could retain power through post-election maneuvering.

4. A unity government under Eisenkot, with Netanyahu in senior ministry

A fourth scenario, albeit unlikely, would flip the odd assumption that Netanyahu must lead a unity-government.  Using his leverage in parliament, Eisenkot could become prime minister with Netanyahu accepting a senior cabinet position, perhaps as foreign minister or defense minister. Netanyahu would remain a prominent national figure, potentially representing Israel abroad or overseeing a major policy portfolio, while Eisenkot assumed responsibility for leading the government.

There would, however, be significant legal complications. Netanyahu’s ongoing criminal trial blocks him legally from serving as an ordinary cabinet minister rather than prime minister (which, due to a loophole, is possible). Assigning him a portfolio would require legislation and invite judicial scrutiny.

Another main obstacle: Netanyahu is pathologically fixated on retaining the premiership, and almost no one in Israel thinks he would accept such an arrangement over new elections.

5. Another election

The final possibility is that the parties fail to reach an agreement and Israel returns to the polls.

President Isaac Herzog plays an important procedural role, consulting parliamentary factions and assigning the task of forming a government to a Knesset member. The process could begin next week, and the initial mandate normally lasts 28 days, with a possible 14-day extension. Further procedures allow other candidates to seek a majority before another election becomes necessary.

A prolonged deadlock could leave Netanyahu heading a caretaker government while Israel prepares for another election – which is why he probably would not mind.

Another election would raise questions about whether the exceptionally high Arab turnout that helped produce the opposition’s majority could be sustained. Arab voter participation has historically fluctuated, and the latest result could represent either a lasting political transformation or a temporary surge driven by the campaign – then suppressed by bitterness over their exclusion.

For the Jewish-led opposition, returning to the polls would risk squandering its electoral achievement while giving Netanyahu another opportunity to reshape the contest around security, national identity and the legitimacy of Arab parliamentary influence.

If I wore Eisenkot’s shoes

If I were Eisenkot, I would give Lieberman whatever is needed to buy his cooperation and form a government with an Arab parliamentary safety net, remove Netanyahu and secure the premiership.

I would immediately pursue broadly popular policies: a state commission of inquiry into Oct. 7, universal conscription including Arab and Haredi national service, a crackdown on Jewish terrorism in the West Bank and organized crime, particularly in Arab communities, and reversal of Netanyahu’s authoritarian reforms.

I would maintain a firm line against Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, and close the legal loophole allowing criminal defendants to serve as prime minister.

I would do all that in the first month. In the second, I would invite Likud into a unity government on these terms. Competent governance, relief from the threats of global economic sanctions and incumbency could build momentum, making any subsequent election prospects more favorable.

All that would require focus, determination and a bit of courage. As a former military chief, Eisenkot should be up to the task.

Netanyahu would scream bloody murder. Give him a megaphone, recommend a valium, and send him a copy of Israel’s Declaration of Independence, which promises equality to the Arabs.

The opposition’s leaders have a chance to show us whether they are worthy of leadership. Their decision will determine whether the election becomes a turning point in Israeli politics or another chapter in Netanyahu’s remarkable record of political survival.

The post Israel’s messy election result: Five scenarios for what could happen next appeared first on The Forward.

אַבֿרהם און שׂרה, טאַטע און מאַמע פֿונעם ייִדישן פֿאָלק, האָבן ביידע געהאַט די זעלבע השקפֿה און שליחות אין לעבן. פֿונדעסטוועגן האָט יעדער איינער פֿון זיי געלייגט דעם טראָפּ אויף אַן אַנדער אַספּעקט פֿונעם לעבן.

אַבֿרהם האָט זיך מער געוואָנדן אַרויסצו, צו דער וועלט בכלל, מיטן ציל אַרײַנצוברענגען אין איר דעם באַוווּסטזײַן וועגן איר באַשעפֿער. שׂרה, פֿון דער צווייטער זײַט, האָט זיך מער קאָנצענטרירט אינעווייניק, זאָרגנדיק פֿאַרן פֿיזישן און גײַסטיקן וווילזײַן פֿון איר זון יצחק — דער איינציקער גליד וואָס האָט געזאָלט ווײַטער פֿירן די טויזנט־יאָריקע קייט וואָס זײַן פֿאָטער האָט אָנגעהויבן.

אַ ייִד וואָס לעבט אין אַ ניט־ייִדישער געזעלשאַפֿט האָט דרײַ מעגלעכקייטן: זיך אָפּצוזינדערן, זיך צו אַסימילירן אָדער זיך צו אינטעגרירן.

דער וואָס פֿילט זיך באַדראָט פֿון דער געזעלשאַפֿט, אָדער פֿילט אַז ער האָט נישט עפּעס באַזונדערס בײַצוטראָגן ווי אַ ייִד, קלײַבט געוויינטלעך אויס צו האַלטן זײַן ייִדישקייט אין שטוב און אין שול, בעת אויף דער גאַס פֿירט ער זיך ווי אַ „נאָרמאַלער“ בירגער. ער האָט ליבער נישט צו פֿאַרעפֿנטלעכן זײַן ייִדישקייט.

דער וואָס זעט גאָרנישט באַזונדערס אין דעם וואָס ער איז אַ ייִד — בפֿרט אויב ער האַלט זיך נישט פֿאַר „רעליגיעז“ — אָדער וויל דאָס פֿאַרבײַטן אויף אַ לעבנסשטייגער, וואָס פּאַסט זיך בעסער צו דער געזעלשאַפֿט אַרום אים, קלײַבט אָפֿט אויס זיך צו אַסימילירן. דאָס הייסט: ער פֿאַרלאָזט זײַן ייִדישע אידענטיטעט כּדי אָנצונעמען אַ וועלטלעכע און מער „אוניווערסאַלע“ אידענטיטעט.

דער וואָס איז זיכער אין זײַן ייִדישקייט און אין דעם בײַטראָג וואָס ער קען, דווקא פֿון זײַן ייִדישקייט, געבן דער גאַנצער מענטשהייט, דאַרף נישט אַנטלויפֿן און דאַרף זיך אויך נישט אַסימילירן. זײַן ברירה איז זיך צו אינטעגרירן אין דער אַלגעמיינער געזעלשאַפֿט דווקא ווי אַ ייִד, און זי צו באַרײַכערן פֿון זײַן אייגענעם באַזונדערן אָרט.

פֿאַרשטייט זיך, אַז כּדי זיך געזונט צו אינטעגרירן און האָבן אַן השפּעה אויף דער ברייטערער געזעלשאַפֿט, דאַרף מען האָבן שטאַרקייט און קלאָרקייט וועגן דער אייגענער אידענטיטעט, און זײַן שטאָלץ מיט די אחריות וואָס די אידענטיטעט ברענגט מיט זיך.

אַבֿרהם און שׂרה זענען די פּראָוטאָטיפּן פֿון דער דינאַמיק פֿון דער ייִדישער משפּחה דורכויס די דורות. דער מאַן איז דער וואָס באַשעפֿטיקט זיך, קודם־כּל, מיט דער דרויסנדיקער וועלט; די פֿרוי איז די וואָס דערנערט און בויט די אינערלעכע וועלט פֿון דער משפּחה. נאָר דער וואָס האָט געהאַט און האָט נאָך אַלץ אַ שטאַרקע אינערלעכע וועלט קען זיך שטעלן אַנטקעגן דער דרויסנדיקער וועלט און זי באַאײַנפֿלוסן.

פֿון דער אידענטיטעט פֿונעם ייִדישן פֿאָלק, לאָמיר איצט אַריבערגיין צו דער אידענטיטעט פֿונעם ייִדישן לאַנד.

ארץ־ישׂראל: דאָס לאַנד פֿון די ייִדן, אָדער אַ ייִדיש לאַנד?

ארץ־ישׂראל איז דאָס נאַציאָנאַלע ירושה־גוט פֿונעם ייִדישן פֿאָלק. לויט הלכה־אויטאָריטעטן איז יעדער ייִד אויף דער וועלט דער נאַטירלעכער בעל־הבית פֿון לכל־הפּחות אן „אמה על אמה“ — 0.48 קוואַדראַט־מעטער — לאַנד אין ארץ־ישׂראל. דאָס איז אונדזער אייביקע ירושה.

עס זענען דאָ דרײַ שטעט אין ארץ־ישׂראל וועמענס קויפֿן דורך ייִדן איז דאָקומענטירט אין תנ״ך: חבֿרון, שכם און ירושלים. עס וואָלט געדאַרפֿט זײַן מער ווי קלאָר, אַז ס׳איז נישטאָ קיין אָרט פֿאַר אַ מחלוקת וועגן דער היסטאָרישער און לעגאַלער פֿאַרבינדונג צווישן די שטעט און דעם ייִדישן פֿאָלק — וויפֿל עס זאָלן נישט זײַן אַזעלכע וואָס ווילן זיי, חס ושלום, מאַכן „Judenrein“.

אין דער פּרשה חיי שׂרה לייענען מיר ווי אונדזער פֿאָטער אַבֿרהם האָט אָפּגעקויפֿט פֿון עפֿרון החתי די „מערת המכפּלה“ און די אַרומיקע פֿעלדער, מיטן בפֿירושן ציל דאָרט צו באַערדיקן זײַן פֿרוי שׂרה. שפּעטער זענען דאָרט אויך באַערדיקט געוואָרן די אָבֿות יצחק און יעקבֿ, צוזאַמען מיט זייערע פֿרויען רבֿקה און לאה.

דאָס אַלץ איז דאָקומענטירט אין דער תּורה — אַ דאָקומענט וואָס ווערט באַטראַכט ווי היסטאָריש לעגיטים דורך מער ווי 50 פּראָצענט פֿון דער הײַנטיקער וועלט־באַפֿעלקערונג.

כאָטש אַראַבער קענען טענהן אַז זיי שטאַמען אויך פֿון אַבֿרהם דורך זײַן זון ישמעאל און האָבן דעריבער אַ לעגיטימע תּבֿיעה אויף די דאָזיקע לענדער, איז דאָס אַ טעותדיקע טענה צוליב צוויי סיבות.

ערשטנס, זענען די אַראַבער וואָס וווינען הײַנט אין ארץ־ישׂראל נישט די אָפּשטאַמיקע פֿון ישמעאל, נאָר זענען אַריבערגעפֿירט געוואָרן אין אַנדערע געגנטן דורך דעם אַסירישן קעניג און שׂונא פֿון די ייִדן, סנחריבֿ.

צווייטנס, אַפֿילו ווען מיר וואָלטן אָנגענומען אַז זיי זענען בני ישמעאל, קומט זיי דערפֿאַר נאָך נישט ארץ־ישׂראל, ווײַל ישמעאל איז געווען דער זון פֿון שׂרהס דינסט הגר. אַבֿרהם האָט אים געגעבן זײַן ירושה נאָך בײַם לעבן און אים אַוועקגעשיקט ווײַט פֿון ארץ כּנען.

ארץ־ישׂראל איז נישט בלויז דאָס לאַנד פֿון די ייִדן; עס איז אַ ייִדיש לאַנד.

אייגנטום איז אַ צופֿעליקער און ענדערלעכער מצבֿ: הײַנט האָב איך עס, מאָרגן האָסטו עס. עס איז נישטאָ קיין מהותדיקער חילוק אין מײַן אויטאָ פֿון איידער איך האָב עס דיר פֿאַרקויפֿט ביז נאָך דעם וואָס עס איז געוואָרן דײַן אייגנטום; פֿריִער איז עס געווען מײַנס, און איצט איז עס דײַנס.

מיט ארץ־ישׂראל איז אָבער אַנדערש. דאָס לאַנד איז באַשאַפֿן געוואָרן פֿאַרן ייִדישן פֿאָלק, כּדי דאָס פֿאָלק זאָל קענען אויספֿירן זײַן תּכלית: אַנטפּלעקן דעם אויבערשטנס אָנוועזנהייט אין דעם פֿיזישן וועלט אויפֿן בעסטן אופֿן, און פֿון דאָרט, ווי דאָס האַרץ, אַרויספּאָמפּען אָט די אָנערקענונג און באַגײַסטערונג אין דער גאַנצער וועלט.

נישט אומזיסט רופֿט די גאַנצע וועלט דאָס לאַנד „דאָס הייליקע לאַנד“. דערמיט דערקענט מען, אַז אַפֿילו די ערד גופֿא פֿון ארץ־ישׂראל איז הייליק.

אין אַנדערע ווערטער: די פֿאַרבינדונג צווישן ארץ־ישׂראל און עם־ישׂראל איז נישט בלויז היסטאָריש אָדער צופֿעליק. זי איז מהותדיק און נשמהדיק. דאָס לאַנד און דאָס פֿאָלק טיילן אַ שליחות וואָס דער אויבערשטער האָט זיי געגעבן, און די פֿולע אויספֿירונג פֿון דער שליחות איז אָפּהענגיק פֿון ביידע.

ווען מיר קעמפֿן פֿאַר אונדזער לאַנד, טראַכטן מיר נישט בלויז פֿאַר אונדזערט וועגן, נאָר אויך לטובֿת אונדזערע שׂונאים. אויך פֿאַר זיי איז עס צום גוטן, אַז זיי זאָלן לאָזן דעם ייִדישן פֿאָלק אויספֿירן זײַן שליחות אין זײַן לאַנד, בשעת זיי קענען בשלום אויספֿירן זייער שליחות אין דעם לאַנד וואָס געהערט צו זיי.

ווען דער דאָזיקער פּונקט וועט זײַן קלאָר בײַ אונדז, וועט אונדז זײַן גרינגער זי קלאָר צו מאַכן אויך פֿאַר אַנדערע.

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(JTA) — BIRMINGHAM, Mich. – The Republican Jewish Coalition typically isn’t known for drawing committed Democrats to its events.

But that’s what happened Wednesday night at the Townsend Hotel in suburban Detroit, when a campaign event for GOP U.S. Senate nominee Mike Rogers attracted several Jews from the other side of the aisle. Those included Jason Turkish, a Democratic lawyer and megadonor best known as the fiancé of pro-Israel Democratic U.S. Rep. Haley Stevens.

Turkish did not speak at the event. But just before it started, he had gone public with his declaration that he was voting for Rogers, and his conviction that Abdul El-Sayed, the Democratic nominee and former county health director who beat his partner in the primary, was antisemitic.

“This choice for me, in the end, was very simple,” Turkish told reporters from the sidelines. He cited recent instances of El-Sayed not answering whether Iran or Israel poses a bigger threat to the United States, and of the candidate only softly distancing himself from a PAC ad that blamed Israel for the price of groceries.

“History will remember who stands where in this moment, and it will not remember Abdul El-Sayed kindly,” Turkish said.

Turkish’s public stance against his party’s nominee, whom Stevens herself has endorsed while not directly campaigning for him, was yet another indication of the deep distrust and anger many of Michigan’s pro-Israel Jewish voters have voiced toward El-Sayed throughout this campaign. Republicans are hoping that will translate into more Jewish lifelong Democrats, like Turkish and former Stevens campaign chair David Kramer, pulling the lever for Rogers instead.

“I love it,” Rogers, a former congressman, told reporters about Turkish’s endorsement. From the stage, the candidate was clear about what he thinks of El-Sayed: “He’s beyond antisemitic. He hates Jews.”

Turkish insisted that despite his Rogers vote, he was not a Republican.

“I will vote for Democrats up and down the ballot,” he said. “This isn’t some major departure. You can support Democrats up and down the ballot and make a choice to choose country over party in one race.”

When asked by reporters at a different campaign event about Turkish, El-Sayed responded, “I’m building a movement to take on the challenges that Donald Trump is facing. If folks have issues that are more important to them than that, that’s fine.”

Most of the Jews in the RJC room were committed Republicans, who booed a mention of progressive Jewish megadonor George Soros and cheered the name of far-right Jewish U.S. Rep. Randy Fine.

The newfound Jewish discomfort with the Democratic nominee and the desire to send a message to the party were a key part of the pitch that Rogers and Texas GOP Sen. Ted Cruz made to the estimated 500 attendees at the RJC event.

“People who are lifelong Democrats who want to vote for Democrats for every other office, I’m not advocating that,” Cruz joked to the room. “But even if that’s where you are,” he urged, “say there is a line that is too far, and this is that line.”

RJC spokesperson Sam Markstein told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency that he had to fetch more chairs for overflow seating. Markstein said turnout for Wednesday’s event was double what the RJC had drawn for a similar gathering in 2024 in support of Rogers’ first, unsuccessful Senate run — when the GOP was stronger nationally than it is now.

Hundreds of Jews in the state have signed a pledge to vote for Rogers, though a rival pledge to vote for El-Sayed has nearly twice as many signatures.

El-Sayed’s comments following the March terror attack on the Temple Israel preschool, in which he stated, in part, “Hurt people hurt people,” haunt his perception among Jews months after he apologized for them. An Israeli strike in Lebanon had killed members of the attacker’s family.

At the RJC event, signs read “No, Abdul: Hurt People Help People” and “Mike Will Keep Us Safe.” Some attendees carried a parody picture book called “Hurt People Hurt People,” featuring an El-Sayed-like “Dr. Context” caricature who consoles the Big Bad Wolf instead of the Three Little Pigs.

The RJC has made a $2 million ad buy with pro-Rogers commercials featuring members of Temple Israel, some of whom spoke to the crowd. A separate Jewish organization, the Combat Antisemitism Movement, has made its own ad buy for Rogers via a new political advocacy arm, featuring one of the same Temple Israel moms.

The GOP sales pitch to Jews has also veered into darker territory, which was evident Wednesday night. Onstage, both Cruz and Rogers claimed that El-Sayed receiving Senate-level security clearance for intelligence briefings would pose a risk to national security.

“The risks are too high that he would share sensitive information with the Muslim Brotherhood,” Cruz said, echoing a growing conservative attack line against the Democrat. He also called El-Sayed a “jihadist leprechaun.”

Rogers said that Hasan Piker, the anti-Israel streamer who campaigned with El-Sayed, “should go back to Turkey, where he belongs.”

Asked later by JTA about his comment, Rogers said he was referring to Piker’s dual Turkish citizenship, and said, “I just thought if he wanted to go back there because he hates America so much, I’d pay for the ticket.”

Rogers appeared to distance himself from comments that U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. made at a Grand Rapids campaign event earlier this week with the candidate present. Kennedy had claimed that Arabs “don’t produce science” and “don’t win the Nobel Prize.”

“Sometimes the campaign takes lefts and rights,” Rogers told reporters, when asked about Kennedy. “What I’m concerned about is what’s happening here. Our Arab community is showing lots of support.” The substantial Arab American community in this swing state makes it a key player in elections, and Republicans have been walking a tightrope between weaponizing El-Sayed’s faith against him and keeping on board Arab Americans who voted two years ago for President Donald Trump.

Rogers sought to make clear to the Jews in the room that he was aligned with Cruz, a pro-Israel stalwart who has picked public fights with far-right commentator Tucker Carlson. Cruz, though, has been a vocal proponent of war in Iran, while Rogers recently told JTA in an interview that “we met our objectives” in Iran and should wind down the war there.

On Wednesday, Rogers took a more hawkish tone on Iran. “I’d love to see this wrapped up, but I don’t think we can leave it where they have any ability to hurt our friends and neighbors,” he said. “So their army, navy, air force has to be as diminished as they can.”

Both men also took time from the stage to denounce antisemitism from the right.

At their donor events, Rogers said, “Without fail. I would get three or four or five young, white men who would come up and say, ‘You’re not going to take Jewish money, are you?’”

Rogers chalked up the problem to college campuses, calling for efforts to “get Qatari money out of our colleges.”

This article originally appeared on JTA.org.

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