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Why New York’s Sephardic Jews are more Zionist — and more wary of Mamdani — than their Ashkenazi neighbors
Differences between Ashkenazi, Mizrahi, and Sephardic Jews have come sharply into focus since Zohran Mamdani became mayor. In the greater New York City area, 10% of Jews identify as Mizrahi or Sephardic, two groups that report stronger connections to Israel and more conservative political views than Ashkenazi Jews, according to a new national study.
Aaron Cohen, a Moroccan Jew raised in Venezuela, and a New York City–based financial adviser, said, “I think it will be hard to find Sephardic Jews who voted for Mamdani because of how important Israel is to us.” For us, he said, “there is no divide between being against Israel and antisemitism.” He added that many in these communities who escaped socialist countries are also wary of Mamdani’s democratic socialist policies.
Unlike Ashkenazi Jews, most Sephardic and Mizrahi Jews arrived in the United States between the 1950s and 1990s, often fleeing openly anti-Jewish regimes and socialist regimes in the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America. While some were able to immigrate to the U.S., many found that their only viable refuge was Israel, under the Law of Return, which grants every Jew the right to Israeli citizenship.
“Sephardic Jews are very Zionistic, because the state of Israel changed our lives,” Cohen said. “A lot of Jews from Morocco were saved by the fact that they were able to go to Israel. The same was true for Iranian Jews, Egyptian Jews, and so on.”
According to the study, conducted for JIMENA: Jews Indigenous to the Middle East and North Africa, 31% of Mizrahi Jews and 28% of Sephardic Jews in the U.S. hold Israeli citizenship, compared with just 5% of Ashkenazi Jews. And 80% of Mizrahi and Sephardic Jews say they feel somewhat or very emotionally connected to Israel, compared with 69% of Ashkenazi Jews.
Mamdani has been outspoken in his criticism of Israel and identifies as anti-Zionist. He has repeatedly stated Israel does not have a right to exist as a Jewish state, but rather “as a state with equal rights.” An Anti-Defamation League report from December found that 20% of Mamdani’s administrative appointees have ties to anti-Zionist groups.
Those positions land poorly in these communities where, for many, Israel functioned as a lifeline. Ralph Betesh, a 22-year-old Syrian Jew from Midwood, described the Syrian Jewish community in New York, the city’s largest Sephardic community, as “super, super pro-Israel.” Before the election, he said, “In every Syrian group chat, they were sending things like, ‘Please everyone, go register to vote. This is crucial. It’s a once-in-a-lifetime election,’” Batesh said. “Even in shul, they would urge people to go vote.”
The primarily Syrian congregation Shaare Zion in Brooklyn, one of the largest Sephardic synagogues in North America, sent a letter to congregants before the High Holidays stating that to attend services, one must show proof of voter registration. While the synagogue did not endorse a specific candidate, the letter warned of “a very serious danger that can affect all of us.”
Memories of persecution and socialism
For Yisrael Cohen-Vásquez, a 21-year-old Lebanese, Iranian, Spanish, and Moroccan Jew who grew up in Buenos Aires and moved to New York at 13, the intensity of the reaction is rooted in the proximity of persecution. “The pogroms that happened to us are as recent as the 1990s,” he said. “This is not generational trauma. This is my parents’ trauma that I grew up listening to.”
Michael Anwarzadeh, an Iraqi Jew from Manhattan, expressed a similar view. “We understand, Iraqis, what having someone who is anti-Jewish in power means,” he said. “I can say that because my parents lived through it. I grew up listening to them, and I learned those lessons.”
Cohen-Vásquez is particularly alarmed by Mamdani’s recent decision to revoke the IHRA definition of antisemitism and lift restrictions on boycotts of Israel. “All these policies that are being changed are exactly what was introduced to Mizrahi communities in the ’70s and ’80s,” he said. “These were the indicators, the litmus tests, for the beginning of the pogroms.”
Beyond concerns over antisemitism and Jewish safety, Cohen-Vásquez said his family’s experiences “whether Lebanese, Argentinian, or Iranian” have also made him deeply skeptical of Mamdani’s “socialist policies.”
That perspective, he added, has often left him feeling misunderstood when sharing his views with Ashkenazi peers. “I feel like I had to defend myself and explain my family story,” Cohen-Vásquez said. At the same time, he said he was heartened by conversations with non-Jews in New York who had immigrated from socialist countries and, as he put it, “got it.”
“I felt more seen and understood by the Dominicanos and the Puerto Ricans in Washington Heights, and by African American communities in Harlem and Queens, than by Ashkenazi Jews.”
While Mizrahi and Sephardic Jews emphasize their deep attachment to New York, many describe a relationship shaped by repeated displacement and hard-earned lessons about how quickly safety can erode. “When you talk to anybody in our community now, you say, ‘Okay, where would you go?” Aaron Cohen said. “What’s your plan B? What’s your plan C?’”
The post Why New York’s Sephardic Jews are more Zionist — and more wary of Mamdani — than their Ashkenazi neighbors appeared first on The Forward.
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Erdogan Names Prosecutor Who Led Opposition Crackdown as Turkey Justice Minister
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan speaks during a ceremony for the handover of new vehicles to the gendarmerie and police forces in Istanbul, Turkey, Nov. 28, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Murad Sezer
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan appointed as his new justice minister Akin Gurlek, the Istanbul chief prosecutor behind the unprecedented crackdown on the main opposition party, drawing fierce criticism and defiance from the party on Wednesday.
Since his appointment as chief prosecutor in 2024, Gurlek has overseen a wave of arrests and indictments targeting the Republican People’s Party (CHP), including investigations into the Istanbul mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu, Erdogan‘s main political rival who has been jailed since his arrest in March last year.
In a 4,000-page indictment last November, Gurlek demanded a prison sentence of more than 2,000 years for Imamoglu for allegedly leading a vast corruption network, sparking Turkey‘s largest street protests in a decade.
The first hearing in that case, accusing hundreds of defendants linked to the Istanbul municipality of corruption and bribery, will be held next month.
A scuffle broke out in Turkey‘s parliament ahead of Gurlek’s swearing-in after opposition lawmakers protested against his appointment.
Main opposition CHP deputies gathered around the speaker’s podium to block Gurlek, calling his nomination “an attack on the rule of law.” TV footage showed lawmakers pushing and throwing punches and ruling AK Party lawmakers forming a protective ring around Gurlek as he read his oath.
FIRST CABINET SHUFFLE SINCE 2023 VOTE
In the first cabinet shuffle since mid-2023 elections, Gurlek replaced Yilmaz Tunc, who was first elected as a member of parliament in 2007.
The Official Gazette announcement also said that Erdogan had appointed Erzurum provincial governor Mustafa Ciftci as interior minister, replacing Ali Yerlikaya, who was the Istanbul governor before his appointment as minister.
A reason for the shuffle was not given.
Hundreds of party members and elected officials have been detained in Gurlek’s crackdown, which has been criticized as anti-democratic and politicized by opposition parties, rights groups and some foreign leaders – claims the government denies, saying the judiciary is independent.
CHP leader Ozgur Ozel said Gurlek’s cabinet appointment continued a “judicial coup attempt” while he was prosecutor and amounted to the latest step in a major attack on his party.
“We will not surrender… They cannot stop our march to power,” Ozel told reporters at a memorial ceremony for a former party leader, adding that there was no fair political competition left.
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France to Increase Visas for Iranian Seeking Refuge Amid Crackdown, Minister Says
French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noel Barrot holds a press conference at the Pine Residence, the official residence of the French ambassador to Lebanon, in Beirut, Lebanon, Feb. 6, 2026. Photo: REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
France will increase the number of visas for Iranians seeking asylum as a result of the recent crackdown by Iranian authorities, Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said on Wednesday.
Speaking in parliament, Barrot said Paris wanted to support the Iranian people by any means possible.
“In particular by welcoming opponents persecuted by the regime who are seeking asylum and refuge in France. We will increase our humanitarian visas for asylum purposes for these individuals whom we must protect,” he said.
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How Social Media Got Hamas Casualty Figures Wrong
A Palestinian man points a weapon in the air after it was announced that Israel and Hamas agreed on the first phase of a Gaza ceasefire, in the central Gaza Strip, October 9. Photo: REUTERS/Mahmoud Issa
As the Israel-Hamas ceasefire continues to hold, many analysts have begun examining available data to better understand Hamas’ casualties throughout the war. This is no easy feat, considering Hamas has consistently lied and inflated the civilian casualty figures. The reality of urban warfare provides other challenges for the IDF to count every eliminated terrorist.
Varying numbers regarding Hamas’ casualty figures have been recently touted on social media. But many of them lack sources, or a breakdown of the statistics.
Conversely, some analysts, such as HonestReporting board member Salo Aizenberg, have done an exceptional job at critically analyzing the available casualty numbers.
The Hamas-run Ministry of Health has reported over 70,000 deaths in Gaza, including civilians.
But closer examination of these numbers displays that it also includes an estimated 22,000-25,000 Hamas fighters, around 11,000 natural deaths, and 4,000 casualties caused by internal fighting amongst Gazans. With 1,000 deaths attributed to reporting errors, this suggests that 25,000 casualties were terrorists, and 36,000 were civilians.
One suggestion that has gained momentum on social media suggests that the actual number of Hamas casualties is double this number, at 50,000 combatant deaths.
However, pre-war estimates by the IDF suggest that Hamas had 35,000 combatants. US estimates believe that Hamas recruited 10,000-15,000 new combatants throughout the war. This means that if the IDF had killed 50,000 Hamas terrorists, there would be virtually no Hamas terrorists left — an analysis that is unfortunately not accurate.
Hamas had an estimated 50K combatants during the war (35K pre-war + 15K recruits). It is thus impossible that 50K have been killed. The best estimate remains about 25K combatants from all groups killed. The ME24 report misinterpreted what Hamas announced. https://t.co/LID34TpYAP
— Aizenberg (@Aizenberg55) February 9, 2026
The claim of 50,000 eliminated Hamas terrorists is based on an announcement by the Hamas-run Ministry of Social Development of the start of a new program that would provide NIS 500 to the widows of Gazans killed in the war.
By February 8, 2026, payments had been made to 19,306 widows, totaling NIS 9.653 million or over three million US dollars.
This claim, which is about a new Hamas-run Ministry of Social Development program is untrue on multiple levels — on figures, characterization, and comparison with the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry’s death toll. Short
to explain: https://t.co/KrAYiFvvBK
— Gabriel Epstein (@GabrielEpsteinX) February 8, 2026
The Ministry of Social Development further stated that 50,000 widowed families were set to receive these benefits, implying that more than widowed wives would be receiving the payments. This is likely where some analysts misinterpreted Hamas’ statement and took it to mean that for every Hamas terrorist, one wife would receive a payment. However, this payment is not exclusively for the wives of terrorists, and not every Hamas combatant would have been married by the time of his death.
What these numbers do suggest, however, is that claims of unreported casualties are likely to be false. The ability to receive a payment for reporting a death would presumably encourage many Gazans to submit claims of being widowed.
Since the early days of the war, news outlets and influencers on social media have blindly repeated Hamas’ claim that the majority of casualties were women and children. The claim implied that the IDF was specifically targeting both groups.
Beyond this claim not being true — men of combat age account for around 46.7% of total casualties — data from the World Health Organization (WHO) displays that 603,000 children under the age of 10 were vaccinated at the beginning of 2025. This number exceeds the pre-war population of that age group, indicating that the overall population of young children has remained stable or even grown despite the war.
The WHO—not Hamas or Israel—delivered one of the most decisive Gaza war data points. It reported 603,000 children under 10 vaccinated in early 2025—MORE than the pre-war population of that age group! Every claim of excessive or undercounted fatalities collapses with this data. pic.twitter.com/HmfRJuY1zT
— Aizenberg (@Aizenberg55) January 21, 2026
With births being the same as, if not higher than, pre-war numbers, the claims of underreported casualties and casualties disproportionately targeting children fall apart. Despite this data being publicly available and offering important information about the war’s human toll, it has received no attention in media coverage, allowing the misleading child casualty narrative to persist.
These two case studies of terrorist casualty statistics and the reported number of children under 10 during the war highlight the need to analyze all available data with scrutiny. It is not enough to rely on unverified claims about casualty figures. Instead, accurate conclusions must be based on transparent analysis conducted by credible analysts who rely on publicly available data, verifiable sources, and clear methodology. Only through rigorous examination can casualty figures be properly understood, rather than simply repeated without question.
The author is a contributor to HonestReporting, a Jerusalem-based media watchdog with a focus on antisemitism and anti-Israel bias — where a version of this article first appeared.