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As Qatar Emir Visits Canada, Just What is Doha Up To?
By HENRY SREBRNIK (Sept. 19/24) Qatar…home of Hamas leaders, Al-Jazeera, host of soccer’s 2022 World Cup, and wealth beyond measure. And everyone’s favourite centre for “negotiations” to end the war Hamas unleashed on Israel a year ago. It’s become everyone’s go-to country, a veritable “light unto the nations.”
However, as the 1946 song “Put the Blame on Mame” has it, in a different context, of course, “That’s the story that went around, but here’s the real lowdown” … about this duplicitous Persian Gulf emirate.
Even before the Gaza war began, there was an upswing of commentary celebrating a shift in the policies and behavior of Qatar: away from promoting and subsidizing radical Islamist groups, and towards “deconfliction” and moderation.
Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the country’s emir, has been basking in the glow of international approval, depicting the country as a global influencer and peacemaker. The Qataris want to make themselves indispensable.
It plays into Doha’s ongoing attempts to create an illusion of rebranding as a moderating actor in the Middle East and beyond, pushed by various propagandists in the West on Qatar’s payroll, including more than a few American university centres and departments awash in Qatari money.
The emir and other officials spent two days in Canada Sept. 17-19, meeting with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and cabinet ministers. The Gaza war was on the agenda, of course. Indeed, Jewish-Canadian leaders urged Trudeau to criticize him over his patronage of Hamas. But being able to tap into Qatar’s wealth via business and trade was more likely on Trudeau’s mind.
Qatar has one of the highest per capita incomes in the world, at $110,000 a year. And while its total population is some 2.7 million, most of these are guest workers, including European lawyers and consultants at the top of the scale, and at the bottom South Asian labourers. Only some 313,000 are native Qataris, the ones who benefit from the riches it derives from the sale of oil and gas.
The Peninsula, an English language daily newspaper published in Doha, ran an article on the occasion of the emir’s visit by noting the expanding trade and investment cooperation between Canada and Qatar, especially with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in June between the Qatar Financial Center and the Canada Arab Business Council, a non-profit organization that aims to enhance trade and investment relations between Canada and the Arab world.
The MoU “aims to establish an integrated framework for cooperation and coordination in specific sectors through joint initiatives and the exchange of information and expertise, with a focus on stimulating growth and promoting innovation in areas such as financial services and professional business services.” Ahmed Hussen, Minister of International Development participated in a signing ceremony with Lolwah bint Rashid Al-Khater, Qatar’s Minister of State for International Cooperation.
More than 9,000 Canadian expatriates live in Qatar, working in Canadian and Qatari companies and institutions. From January to July, Canada exported goods valued at $103.45 million to Qatar, while Qatar’s exports to Canada amounted to $90.27 million.
There is also a partnership in academic programs, as the University of Calgary has been in Doha since 2006, offering a Bachelor of Nursing program, along with the College of the North Atlantic, which transformed into the University of Doha for Science and Technology. Furthermore, there are several Doha-based schools that offer Canadian curricula.
In their meeting, Sheikh Tamim expressed his aspiration to work with Trudeau to advance their bilateral cooperation across multiple sectors in order to “contribute to enhancing regional and global peace and stability.” Bilateral relations between the two countries were discussed, especially in the fields of investment, economy and international cooperation, “in addition to developments and situations in the Gaza Strip and the occupied Palestinian territories.”
Qatar has been very successful in its efforts to shape public opinion in Canada, as well as in the far more important United States. The amount of money that Qatar has poured into universities, schools, educational organizations, think tanks, and media across America, and the number of initiatives that Qatar uses to influence American opinion, is overwhelming.
According to a 2022 study from the National Association of Scholars, Qatar is the largest foreign donor to American universities. It found that between 2001 and 2021, the petrostate donated a whopping $4.7 billion to U.S. colleges. The largest recipients are some of America’s most prestigious institutions of higher learning. They include Carnegie Mellon University, Ivy League Cornell University, Georgetown University in Washington, Virginia Commonwealth University, and Texas A & M. These schools have partnered with the regime to build campuses in Doha’s “education city,” a special district of the capital that hosts satellite colleges for American universities. (Texas A&M decided earlier this year to shutter its branch campus in Qatar.)
Georgetown University in Qatar, for instance, was hosting the “Reimagining Palestine” conference Sept. 20-22. The event engages scholars, experts, and the public “in timely and relevant dialogues on globally significant issues,” according to a description of the gathering. One of the speakers, Wadah Khanfar, “was active in the Hamas movement and was one of its most prominent leaders in the movement’s office in Sudan,” the Raya Media Network, a Palestinian outlet, tells us. In the months following Oct. 7, the campus has hosted a variety of seemingly anti-Israel events.
Since 2008, Qatar has donated nearly $602 million to Northwestern University, whose journalism school is ranked as one of the best in the world, to establish a school of journalism in Qatar. The Northwestern University campus in Qatar and Qatari broadcaster Al-Jazeera in 2013 signed a Memorandum of Understanding to “further facilitate collaboration and knowledge transfer between two of Qatar’s foremost media organizations.” Are Northwestern’s interests really aligned with Qatar?
Qatari state-financed entities also often fund individual scholars or programs in the United States without official disclosure or being directly traceable to a government source, thus avoiding public scrutiny. For example, Ivy League Yale University disclosed only $284,668 in funding from Qatar between 2010 and 2022. Researchers at the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) in a report released in June, though, found that this amount reflected only a small fraction of the money and services the university and its scholars had in fact received over that period. The most common channel for hard-to-track Qatari support for Yale came from individual research grants originating from the Qatar National Research Fund, and their report found 11 Yale-linked QNRF grants which came to at least $15,925,711.
Recent research from the Network Contagion Research Institute indicated that at least 200 American universities illegally withheld information about approximately $13 billion in Qatari contributions. Also, according to the report, from 2015 to 2020 institutions that accepted money from Middle Eastern donors had on average, 300 percent more antisemitic incidents than those institutions that did not.
Overall, the report found that “a massive influx of foreign, concealed donations to American institutions of higher learning, much of it from authoritarian regimes with notable support from Middle Eastern sources, reflects or supports heightened levels of intolerance towards Jews, open inquiry and free expression.”
Much of Doha’s engagement with the world is run out of the Qatar Meeting, Incentive, Conference and Exhibition (MICE) Development Institute (QMDI), which promotes Qatar as a good place for business. The annual Doha Forum gathers major policymakers from around the world.
Qatar’s influence-buying strategies are a textbook example of how to transform cash into “soft” power. The relationship between one of Washington, D.C.’s top think tanks and Qatar, for example, began in 2002, when the emirate underwrote a Doha conference featuring then Qatari Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassem Al Thani and former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk, at the time the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. (Hamad oversaw Qatar’s $230 billion sovereign wealth fund until 2013.) In 2007, Brookings followed up by opening a centre on Doha. It didn’t end well. In 2021 the institute ended its relationship with Qatar amidst an ongoing FBI investigation.
Still, Washington treads carefully when it comes to criticizing Qatar. It’s not just about money. After all, the Al-Udaid Air Base is home to the U.S. military’s Central Command (CENTCOM), and the country is just across the Persian Gulf from Iran. In fact, Washington’s relationship with Qatar is so close that in 2022 the White House officially designated the emirate a “major non-NATO ally.” The Qataris, realizing that their very existence would be threatened were the U.S. to relocate its CENTCOM operations to the UAE or Saudi Arabia, in January hastened to nail down the agreement for another decade.
Yoni Ben-Menachem, a senior researcher at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, told the Jewish News Service (JNS) that the Gulf country is more dangerous than Hamas or Hezbollah since it is extraordinarily wealthy and thus in a position to influence U.S. administrations.
Qatar has for many years been involved in financing the campaigns of the Democratic Party, he claimed, “especially Hillary Clinton’s campaign” in 2016. He added that former U.S. President Bill Clinton is known to have flown to Qatar to bring back suitcases full of cash.
According to Jonathan Ruhe, director of foreign policy at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), Qatar has portrayed itself as “indispensable to U.S. interests in the Middle East, including negotiations with the Taliban, reconstruction aid for past Gaza conflicts, and building the massive Al-Udeid base for U.S. forces.”
Yet although it hosts the Pentagon’s regional command, Qatar has long supported terrorism. For decades, it has opened its doors to Islamist terrorists, Taliban warlords and African insurgents. Doha housed the Taliban’s political office before that group returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021.
Beginning in 2012, the Israeli government allowed Qatar to deliver cash to Gaza. Over the next nine years, Qatar provided $1.5 billion. Prior to the outbreak of the present conflict, Doha subsidized Hamas to the tune of $360 million to $480 million a year. With one third of that money, Qatar bought Egyptian fuel that Cairo then shipped into Gaza, where Hamas sold it and pocketed its revenue. Another third went to impoverished Gazan families, while the last third paid the salaries of the Hamas bureaucracy.
The leaders of Hamas, including Khaled Mashaal and the late Ismail Haniyeh, who was chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau until assassinated by Israel in July, have been regular guests in Doha, living in luxury. (The emir sat in the front row with mourners during Haniyeh’s funeral in Doha.) Qatar has defended Hamas’s presence in the country.
“This was started to be used as a way of communicating and bringing peace and calm into the region, not to instigate any war,” Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani told U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken last October. “And this is the purpose of that office.” Blinken seemed to buy this. At a press conference in Doha in February, he asserted that “we’re very fortunate to have Qatar as a partner.”
As far back as 2007, when Hamas seized control of Gaza, Qatar recognized that “adopting” the group would be a worthwhile opportunity: connections with Hamas in Gaza grants Qatar influence and status in the Middle East and beyond. In addition, they bolster the popular Arab perception of Doha as working for the Palestinian cause. In 2012, the emir became the first head of state to visit Gaza, pledging $400 million to Hamas. At the same time, the Qataris became the exclusive mediators between Israel and Hamas.
The U.S. has accused the Qataris of harboring members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC). But at the same time the Qataris are an important intermediary between America and Iran. Doha has enjoyed good relations with the Biden administration, which it helped in the American hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan three years ago.
While organized as a private company, the Al-Jazeera television network is the voice of Qatar’s regime. Founded in 1996 and financed by the then-emir of Qatar, it has described terrorist attacks that killed Israeli non-combatants as martyrdom operations and even posted articles describing Israel as “the Zionist entity.” For years, Al-Jazeera aired all of Osama bin Laden’s speeches. The late Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader Yusuf Al-Qaradawi was based in Doha and for years hosted a prime-time program on the network. The war on Israel was declared on Al-Jazeera by Hamas military commander Muhammad Deif last October 7. Its operations in Israel were finally terminated by Jerusalem in May.
Qatar has been using the immense wealth it has accumulated to turn Al-Jazeera into an international media conglomerate, spreading Muslim Brotherhood propaganda, Hamas’ original sponsor, on a global scale. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 by the cleric Hassan al-Banna as a reaction to his perception that the Muslim world had become week in relation to the West. The royal family of Qatar has since been using the Muslim Brotherhood to minimize political opposition against them. In exchange for allowing the Brotherhood to use the country as a base for its international operations, the Brotherhood makes sure that there is no political threat based on organized religion against the Qatari monarchy.
A major shock to Qatar’s economy occurred when some Gulf Cooperation Council members — Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — imposed an embargo on Qatar from 2017 to 2021. The reason for the embargo was Qatar’s support for the Brotherhood.
Qatar owns other news media that are equally awful. The London-based daily newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi in June published an article entitled “War Criminal Blinken Wages Diplomatic Campaign to Eliminate Palestinian Resistance and Buy Time for Israeli War in Gaza.”
Qatar is not a neutral agent, despite its attempts to portray itself as such. Time and again, it has supported the region’s most radical nations and paramilitaries, all to the detriment of American and Western interests. Its malign influence activities the United States reflect the broader issue of foreign manipulation in America’s political landscape.
“Qatar has been playing a dual role since the beginning of the Gaza war. On the one hand, it is a well-known supporter of Hamas, and even finances it with a lot of money, and on the other hand, it is trying to help in the deal for the release of the Israeli hostages,” remarked Dr. Udi Levy, a former senior official of Israel’s Mossad spy agency in April. But the U.S. relationship with Qatar will continue as long as the American government finds it useful in the on-again off-again negotiations to have Hamas release the remaining Israeli hostages.
Henry Srebrnik is a professor of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island.
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Could a foie gras ban remove chopped liver from the deli menu?
Could an effort to defend ducks and curb the cruelty that some believe creates foie gras accidentally outlaw a favorite staple in Jewish delis? One Jewish resident of Washington D.C. fears that could be the case.
A measure on the ballot in Washington next Tuesday would bar the sale or distribution of “any fattened bird liver product within the District of Columbia.”
Activists say the legislation aims to ban the sale of any product resulting from force-feeding a bird, including foie gras. But the D.C. ordinance defines “fattened bird liver product” as “any food product or by-product made from the livers of birds fattened through any method or practice … regardless of marketing terminology.” It includes foie gras, pâtés, spreads, and processed meat products derived from the livers of “ducks, geese, chickens, turkeys, guineas, or squabs.”
“I am a fan of all things liver,” said Jordan Weissmann, an editor at the Progressive Policy Institute, who calls himself a libertarian when it comes to gastronomic matters. “I grew up eating chopped liver. I’m a fan of schmaltz and all pâtés, but there are much bigger issues facing Washington D.C. right now. So I was not going to get too fired up about this.”
Then a friend suggested he look at the language of the ordinance. Its lack of specificity, leaving enforcement up to interpretation, ruffled his feathers.
“My eyes popped out of my head,” he told the Forward. “It sounds like a sweeping ban. I immediately fired off a tweet.” That post and the conversation it generated has since gone viral, garnering thousands of views and hundreds of comments.
Pro-Animal DC, the campaign that drafted the ban, insists that’s not the intention. The law simply seeks to end the torture of farm-raised fowl.
“When laws are enforced this would not affect Jewish delis or chopped chicken liver,” said Natalie Fulton, media and content lead for Pro-Animal DC. She said when regulators enforce laws, they look at their entirety. They don’t look at “a sentence taken out of context.”
In addition to ending the sale of poultry products, the proposed ordinance also makes force-feeding birds illegal within the District. It doesn’t regulate possession of force-fed products or affect what Bubbe puts in the blender.
Fulton acknowledges that the definition of poultry, including chickens, is quite broad.
“We basically put that in there to make sure foie gras producers wouldn’t just shift to chickens. I’m not even sure it’s possible biologically. It safeguards if someone tries to get around the law that way.” If the initiative passes, she said, the City Council can clarify the language to prevent any confusion.
French for “fatty liver,” foie gras is the liver of a duck or goose that has been deliberately fattened by force-feeding, a process the industry calls gavage.
Workers insert a tube down the bird’s esophagus to pump in grain and fat, causing the liver to swell with fat until it is many times its normal size. The organ is then harvested, deveined, and seasoned in a variety of ways before it is baked in a terrine or pan-seared.
Mark Caro, author of The Foie Gras Wars, a book about a local war between Chicago chefs that escalated into a nationwide and international debate and a citywide ban of foie gras that lasted two years before it was repealed, writes that chopped liver is in fact a direct descendant of foie gras, which was once central to Jewish cuisine.
“The most-repeated theory is that foie gras survived thanks to Jews who had learned of force-feeding practices while under Roman rule and carried the tradition around Europe as they kept getting kicked out of countries,” Caro wrote. It even became the topic of a Talmudic commentary on animal cruelty by 11th Century French rabbi Rashi, as Judaic law prohibits tza’ar ba’alei chayim, or the suffering of animals.
But there were practical reasons to force feed geese at the time, Caro wrote. In the Mediterranean, Jews could cook with olive oil. In Babylonia, they could use sesame oil. But as Jews migrated north and west across Europe, they needed something besides pork fat, beef fat and butter to conduct heat in their skillets. The chosen alternative was poultry fat, or schmaltz, extracted from fattened goose livers.
In his book, Caro also includes the story of Holocaust survivor and third-generation Hungarian goose farmer Moshe Friedman, who in 1948 began producing fat goose livers on a kibbutz in the new Jewish state, and made it one of Israel’s first exports.
Israel is now one of 20 countries that bans foie gras produced by force feeding. California, New York City, Pittsburgh, Portland, Ore., and Brookline, Mass. all prohibit stores and restaurants from selling products from force-fed ducks and geese. A similar measure is on the ballot this fall in Denver.
Weissmann just hopes the Denver ordinance is more precise.
“You’d have to be an overzealous vegan to throw all the pâté out of Whole Foods,” he said. “You never know.”
The post Could a foie gras ban remove chopped liver from the deli menu? appeared first on The Forward.
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DSA to LA mayoral favorite Nithya Raman: BDS or our endorsement — pick one
When Nithya Raman told Jewish Angelenos last month that she believed the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement was a “legitimate” form of protest, she didn’t go far enough for the Democratic Socialists of America, whose national leadership threatened to expel her for not championing the Israel boycott outright.
The organization’s staunchly anti-Zionist politics have long clashed with Raman, a progressive councilmember who is running for mayor of Los Angeles — and in a dead heat with incumbent Karen Bass in a recent L.A. Times poll. Though she has called the war in Gaza a genocide, Raman has never been a hardliner on Israel, raising the question of whether the DSA would dig in its heels or back a popular candidate who doesn’t meet all of its criteria.
The answer arrived on Monday night in a pair of resolutions by the DSA’s National Political Committee, which together struck some form of compromise. The committee voted not to expel Raman — at least not before the election. But it threatened to revoke the LA chapter’s earlier endorsement if she does not commit to supporting BDS in a town hall that the LA chapter is expected to convene on Saturday.
Even that measure, though, may not have teeth. It’s unclear whether the LA chapter will actually convene for such a meeting — or whether the national organization even could pull the local group’s endorsement. In a statement following the vote, DSA-LA co-chair Leslie Chang said the chapter was standing by its endorsement.
”Our members voted in a supermajority, democratic decision to support her campaign and we are excited to continue knocking on doors for Nithya and our entire slate through Nov. 3,” Chang said.
The expulsion timeline, on the other hand, gives her until Jan. 1 to endorse BDS and sign on to DSA’s campaign to stop the shipment of weapons for Israel out of Los Angeles International Airport. (Municipal authorities have limited direct legal jurisdiction over international aviation and cargo regulations.)
The lengthy resolutions reflect the fierce competition between ideology and pragmatism inside the DSA as its members increasingly run for and win public office. With Zohran Mamdani at the helm of New York City, a Raman victory would mean DSA members run City Hall in the country’s two largest cities. But many in the organization believe Raman’s politics dilute the brand.
Raman, who in 2020 became the first DSA member elected to LA’s City Council, has sought to thread a needle on Israel during her time in office and on the campaign trail. DSA’s Los Angeles chapter voted to censure her after she accepted an endorsement from Democrats for Israel–Los Angeles, a liberal Zionist group. At the time, Raman told DFI-LA she believed Israel had a right to exist, departing from DSA dogma.
She also touts her support for the Jewish community after Oct. 7. In the wake of the attack, Raman — whose district includes some of the city’s largest Jewish neighborhoods — criticized the DSA for a statement she said was “unacceptably devoid of empathy.”
She has also disappointed some Jewish constituents by supporting a ceasefire in Gaza in early 2024 and by telling controversial left-wing influencer Hasan Piker earlier this year she believed the war was a genocide. She reiterated the genocide remark at the Jewish community forum Sept. 29, crossing what the local Jewish federation said was a “red line” for political candidates.
Thanks to a wave of support from less-active DSA members, the Los Angeles chapter endorsed Raman Sept. 2 by a 937 to 484 vote.
The Raman campaign declined to comment for this story.
‘For a Fighting Anti-Zionist DSA’
DSA-LA’s endorsement came under the microscope of the National Political Committee after it was revealed that the chapter had failed to include a question about BDS in its candidate questionnaire.
The omission of BDS violated a rule about pro-Palestinian policy the national organization passed last year. Known as R22, the rule outlines conditions for revoking endorsements or expelling a member if they make certain pro-Israel statements, such as saying that Israel has “a right to defend itself” or opposing BDS.
Chapter leaders called the missing question an “oversight.”
Meanwhile, Raman’s language on the Israel boycott — if not her stance on the issue — has changed over time.
Back in 2020, when she was running for council, Raman told the Jewish Journal of Greater Los Angeles, “I absolutely do not support BDS,” adding, “At a time when hate crimes are rising in LA and across the world, it is dangerous for a candidate to be so closely aligned with a political movement bent on demonizing Israel and the Jewish people.”
She has spoken less forcefully against boycotting during her campaign. In the Jewish community forum last month, she said that while BDS was a legitimate form of peaceful protest, it was not part of her platform or her focus on LA.
Massive groans in the Skirball auditorium when Nithya Raman defends BDS as a “legitimate form of protest.” Question from @AJCGlobal. https://t.co/W2Uml0lPMI
— Louis Keene (@thislouis) September 30, 2026
In a statement to LA’s DSA chapter sent in advance of Monday’s vote, Raman’s stance on BDS was vague, seemingly supporting BDS as a form of pressure on Israel but stopping short of adopting it herself.
“I believe the best way for working Angelenos to stand in solidarity with Gaza is through non-violent protest, legislative action and diplomatic pressure, including BDS,” Raman said.
DSA members on X appeared split on whether the statement satisfied the requirements of R22.
A second round of questions
The questions Raman will be expected to answer at an Oct. 31 town hall are a familiar list of anti-Zionist litmus tests. In addition to receiving a point-blank question about her support for BDS, she will be asked to make two commitments: to refrain from any affiliation with “Zionist lobby groups” and to oppose any legislation that harms Palestinians.
She will also be asked to oppose legislation “that would allow direct financial donations of any kind to Israel and/or settler NGOs who carry out the mission of Israeli settlement and Palestinian dispossession/displacement, such as the Jewish National Fund,” and to condemn weapons shipments from LAX.
If the meeting doesn’t happen by Oct. 31, the resolution says, the national committee will order DSA-LA to pull the endorsement. And if DSA-LA refuses to comply — either by not holding a meeting or maintaining its endorsement — the chapter and its leadership could be censured.
DSA-LA leadership didn’t seem particularly troubled by the possibility of a break from the national committee.
“As DSA-LA is a membership-driven organization,” Chang, its co-chair, said, “any decision around our electoral strategy lies with our members and we will be maintaining our endorsement of Nithya and all our candidates.”
Meanwhile, the resolution calling for Raman’s expulsion if she has not complied by Jan. 1 adds that if she doesn’t win Nov. 3, “all deadlines and proposed disciplinary votes for CM Raman and the LA chapter in this proposal shall be null and void.”
If she does not win the election, Raman’s council term will end in 2028.
The post DSA to LA mayoral favorite Nithya Raman: BDS or our endorsement — pick one appeared first on The Forward.
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What can we make of the initial results of the Israeli elections?
אַ גרױסער יום-טובֿ איז געפֿײַערט געװאָרן אין ישׂראל, דעם 27סטן אָקטאָבער — אַ יום-טובֿ פֿאַר דעמאָקראַטיע און אַ יום-טובֿ פֿאַר ייִדן.
דאָ האָבן אַלע רעגיסטרירטע בירגער פֿון 18 יאָר און עלטער געהאַט די מעגלעכקײט צו שטימען פֿאַר אײנער פֿון 35 פּאָליטישע פּאַרטײען: סײַ ייִדישע און סײַ ניט-ייִדישע פּאַרטײען, כּדי אױסצוקלײַבן אַ נײַע רעגירונג פֿאַר אַ קאַדענץ װאָס — לױטן געזעץ — דאַרף אױסהאַלטן 4 יאָר. אין דער אמתן איז זעלטן װען עס האַלט אַזױ לאַנג אױס, נאָר אין די װאַלן פֿון 2022 האָט בנימין נתניהוס רעגירונג טאַקע אױסגעהאַלטן.
עטלעכע פֿאַקטן וועגן די איצטיקע װאַלן
- איבער 12,000 שטימערטער זײַנען געװען צעשפּרײט איבער אַרום 1,200 ייִשובים.
- טױזנטער ישׂראלים מיט שטימרעכט זײַנען ספּעציעל אָנגעפֿלױגן פֿון אַנדערע לענדער, כּדי אָנטײלצונעמען אין די װאַלן. צװישן זײ — די װעלט-באַרימטע אַקטריסע גל גדוט (גאַל גאַדאָט) װאָס האָט לעצטנס באַקומען אַן ערן־דאָקטאָראַט פֿון בר־אילן אוניװערסיטעט.
- צענדליקער טױזנטער סאָלדאַטן האָבן געשטימט פֿאַרן וואַלטאָג, דעם 27סטן. די רעזולטאַטן װעלן שפּעטער צוגעגעבן װערן און קענען האָבן אַ ממשתדיקע השפּעה אױף דעם אַרױסקום.
- עס האָבן געשטימט 5,695,682 פֿון די בירגער מיט שטימרעכט (7,331,981). דאָס איז אַרום 77.7% — דער העכסטער פּראָצענט מענטשן וואָס האָבן געשטימט במשך פֿון לאַנגע יאָרן.
די פּרעלימינאַרע רעזולטאַטן מיט אַ טאָג שפּעטער
לױט די אַנקעטעס פֿון עטלעכע טעג פֿאַר די װאַלן האָט מען פֿאָרױסגעזאָגט אַז פֿון די מעגלעכע 120 כּנסת־ערטער װעלן בערך 52 גיין פֿאַר די שותּפֿים פֿון נתניהון; 54 פֿאַר די קעגנערס פֿון נתניהו, און 14 פֿאַר די אַראַבישע פּאַרטײען.
װי נאָר דאָס װײלן האָט זיך געשלאָסן 10 אַ זייגער אין אָוונט , האָבן די פֿאַרשײדענע אױספֿרעג-פֿירמעס שױן אָנגעהױבן אַרױסזאָגן זײערע נבֿיאות. עס איז שוין אָנגענומען, אַז זײַט-בײַ-זײַט מיט אַ צאָל וויכטיקע שטימערטער, שטעלט מען אױס שטימקעסטלעך, און מע בעט די װײלער אַרײַנװאַרפֿן אין קעסטל אַ קאָפּיע פֿון זײער אױסװײל. בערך 600 אַזעלכע שטימקעסטלעך האָט מען אויפֿגעשטעלט איבער אַ צאָל ייִשובים. די אויספרעג-פֿירמעס באַאַרבעטן די דאָזיקע „פּאַראַלעלע“ רעזולטאַטן צוזאַמען מיט געװיסע אַנדערע פֿאַקטאָרן און מאַכן אַ סך-הכּל פֿון װי עס װעלן אפֿשר אױסזען די לעצטגילטיקע רעזולטאַטן.
די פֿיר הױפּט טעלעװיזיע־סטאַנציעס האָבן אַלע געהאַט אָנגעשטעלט אױספֿרעג-פֿירמעס, און דרײַ פֿון זײ האָבן געהאַט מער אָדער װײניקער די זעלבע רעזולטאַטן: אַז נתניהוס בלאָק האָט פֿאַרשפּילט. די פֿערטע טעלעװיזיע־סטאַנציע, ארוץ 14, װאָס רעכנט זיך פֿאַר אַ גרױסן שטיצער פֿון די רעכטע און פֿון נתניהון – האָט לרובֿ געגעבן ענלעכע רעזולטאַטן, אָבער אָנגעװיזן אַז נתניהו װעט זײַן דער געװינער.
װי אַ רעזולטאַט פֿון די דאָזיקע מוסטער-שטימען, האָבן נאָך האַלבער נאַכט געמאָלדן סײַ גדי אײַזנקאָט פֿון דער „ישר“ פּאַרטײ, װאָס האָט באַװיזן 23 שטימען, סײַ נפֿתּלי בענעט פֿון דער „ביחד“ פּאַרטײ מיט יאיר לפּיד (מיט 12 שטימען) — אַז נתניהו און זײַן בלאָק האָט פֿאַרשפּילט.
נתניהו, דאַקעגן, האָט זיך ניט אונטערגעגעבן, און דעקלאַרירט אַז ער האָט די גרעסטע פּאַרטײ, און אַז מע דאַרף װאַרטן אױף די אמתע שטימען, װאָס מע װעט צומאָרגנס דערגאַנצן. און מיט דעם איז מען געגאַנגען שלאָפֿן – אַז נתניהוס קעגנערס האָבן געװוּנען.
אַ גאַנצע נאַכט האָט מען געציילט די אמתע שטימען. אין דער פֿרי האָבן מענטשן זיך אױפֿגעװעקט צו גאָר אַן אַנדער רעאַליטעט. סײַ נאָכן אױססאָרטירן און אָפּצײלן בערך אַ דריטל פֿון די שטימען 7 אַ זייגער אין דער פֿרי, סײַ ווען מע האָט שוין איבערגעציילט 50% מיט צוויי שעה שפּעטער, האָט אױסגעזען אַז נתניהו און זײַן בלאָק פֿון דער איצטיקער רעגירונגס קאָאַליציע װעט האָבן די מערסטע ערטער אין דער כּנסת און װעט קענען צוריק װערן די אָנפירענדיקע פּאַרטיי אין לאַנד.
די אַראַבישע פּאַרטײען האָבן אויך געהאַט גרױס דערפֿאָלג. זײערע שטיצערס זײַנען אַרױס אין די טױזנטער צו שטימען (מע זאָגט אַז בן-גבֿיר און זײַן פּאַרטײ האָט זײ אָנגעבייזערט) און באַקומען אַ גרעסערע צאָל ערטער אין כּנסת װי װען עס איז. די פֿאַרגרעסערטע צאָל אַראַבישע װײלער האָבן אױך פֿאַרגרעסערט דעם מינימום צאָל שטימען װאָס אַ קלענערע פּאַרטײ האָט געמוזט אָנזאַמלען כּדי צו דערגרייכן דעם מינימום פֿון 4 ערטער. אױב אין די פֿריִערדיקע װאַלן פֿון 2022 האָט אַ פּאַרטײ באַדאַרפֿט אַרײַנציִען 155,000 שטימען, איז שאַרף געװאַקסן דער מינימום נעענטער צו 184,000 צוליב דער הױכער צאָל װײלער (ייִדן און ניט-ייִדן) װאָס זײַנען אַרױס שטימען.
נאָכן איבערציילן בערך 77% פון די שטימען הײַנט ביז 2 אַ זייגער נאָך מיטאָג, ווערן די 120 כּנסת־מיטגלידער אײַנגעטיילט אַזוי: נתניהוס בלאָק — 54, די קעגנער — 49 און די אַראַבישע פּאַרטייען — 17.
צי די רעזולטאַטן וועלן זיך בײַטן נאָך דעם ווי מע האָט איבערגעציילט 100% וועט מען נאָך זען. מע דאַרף אויך אין זינען האָבן די עטלעכע הונדערט טױזנט שטימען פֿון די סאָלדאַטן. דאָס קען נאָך אַרױסראַטעװען יועז הענדעלס „מילואימניקים“ פּאַרטײ, וואָס איך האָב באַשריבן אין אַ פֿריִערדיקן אַרטיקל.
סך-הכּלען און מעגלעכע אױסקומען
געװיסע פּאַרטײען פֿון נתניהוס בלאָק האָבן פֿאָדערונגען װאָס קענען זײַן פֿאַר אים שװער אױסצופֿירן. למשל, די חרדים האָבן געזאָגט אַז זײ װעלן זיך דאָס מאָל ניט פֿאַראײניקן מיטן ליכּוד, כּל־זמן מע װעט ניט באַפֿרײַען צענדליקער טױזנטער פֿרומע יונגעלײַט פֿון מיליטער-דינסט. בן-גבֿיר האָט געפֿאָדערט אַז ער זאָל זײַן דער פֿאַרטײדיקונג־מיניסטער. אַנדערע פּאַרטײען װעלן זיכער האָבן נאָך פֿאָדערונגען.
עס קען זײַן, אַז נתניהו װעט װעלן זיך אָפּטשעפּענען פֿון די קאָפּװײטיקן פֿון זײַנע ביז-איצטיקע שותּפֿים, און זוכן זיך צו פֿאַראײניקן מיט געװיסע פּאַרטײען פֿון זײַנע פּאָליטישע קעגנערס.
די מערסטע ציוניסטישע פּאַרטײען װאָס האָבן זיך קעגנגעשטעלט נתניהוס בלאָק, װעלן זיכער ניט װעלן זיך פֿאַראײניקן מיטן ליכּוד כּל־זמן נתניהו איז אין דער שפּיץ. צי װעט ער זײַן גרײט צו זײַן אויפֿן צװײטן אָרט? לױט די איצטיקע געזעצן קען ער ניט װערן אַ מיניסטער אַזוי לאַנג ווי מע פֿירט קעגן אים אַ משפּט. צי װעט עמעצער צוליב דעם אײַנפֿירן אַן ענדערונג אינעם געזעץ?
די װאָס האָבן הײַנט אפֿשר דעם גרעסטן כּוח זײַנען די צװײ אַראַבישע פּאַרטײען. װי פּראַגמאַטיש װעלן זײ קענען זײַן? זײ װעלן כּמעט װי זיכער זיך ניט פֿאַראײניקן מיט אַ טײל פֿון נתניהוס בלאָק. די גרעסערע גרופּע האָט זיך אױסגעדריקט אַז זײ זײַנען גרײט אַלץ צו טאָן כּדי נתניהו זאָל ניט קענען צוריק װערן דער פּרעמיער. פֿון דער אַנדערער זײַט זײַנען ליכּודס אײנציקע מעגלעכע שותּפֿים די פּאַרטייען אין דער אַנטי-נתניהו מחנה. די מערסטע פֿון זײ האָבן צוגעזאָגט זײערע װײלער אַז זײ װעלן קײנמאָל ניט װערן שותּפֿים פֿון די אַראַבישע פּאַרטײען.
אין מײַן פֿריִערדיקן אַרטיקל האָב איך דערציילט וועגן דעם קאַנדידאַט יואבֿ סעגאַלאָװיטש – דעם געוועזענעם, פֿאַרדינסטפֿולן הויפּט פֿון דער ישׂראל־פּאָליציי וואָס פֿיגורירט אויפֿן צווייטן אָרט אין דער איסלאַמישער רע״ם פּאַרטײ. איז מעגלעך אַז די ציוניסטישע פּאַרטייען וועלן זײַן גרייט צו מאַכן אַ קאָאַליציע מיט זיי? ס׳קלינגט אוממעגלעך אָבער אין דער ישׂראל־פּאָליטיק קענען תּמיד פֿאָרקומען סורפּריזן.
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