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As Qatar Emir Visits Canada, Just What is Doha Up To?
By HENRY SREBRNIK (Sept. 19/24) Qatar…home of Hamas leaders, Al-Jazeera, host of soccer’s 2022 World Cup, and wealth beyond measure. And everyone’s favourite centre for “negotiations” to end the war Hamas unleashed on Israel a year ago. It’s become everyone’s go-to country, a veritable “light unto the nations.”
However, as the 1946 song “Put the Blame on Mame” has it, in a different context, of course, “That’s the story that went around, but here’s the real lowdown” … about this duplicitous Persian Gulf emirate.
Even before the Gaza war began, there was an upswing of commentary celebrating a shift in the policies and behavior of Qatar: away from promoting and subsidizing radical Islamist groups, and towards “deconfliction” and moderation.
Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the country’s emir, has been basking in the glow of international approval, depicting the country as a global influencer and peacemaker. The Qataris want to make themselves indispensable.
It plays into Doha’s ongoing attempts to create an illusion of rebranding as a moderating actor in the Middle East and beyond, pushed by various propagandists in the West on Qatar’s payroll, including more than a few American university centres and departments awash in Qatari money.
The emir and other officials spent two days in Canada Sept. 17-19, meeting with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and cabinet ministers. The Gaza war was on the agenda, of course. Indeed, Jewish-Canadian leaders urged Trudeau to criticize him over his patronage of Hamas. But being able to tap into Qatar’s wealth via business and trade was more likely on Trudeau’s mind.
Qatar has one of the highest per capita incomes in the world, at $110,000 a year. And while its total population is some 2.7 million, most of these are guest workers, including European lawyers and consultants at the top of the scale, and at the bottom South Asian labourers. Only some 313,000 are native Qataris, the ones who benefit from the riches it derives from the sale of oil and gas.
The Peninsula, an English language daily newspaper published in Doha, ran an article on the occasion of the emir’s visit by noting the expanding trade and investment cooperation between Canada and Qatar, especially with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in June between the Qatar Financial Center and the Canada Arab Business Council, a non-profit organization that aims to enhance trade and investment relations between Canada and the Arab world.
The MoU “aims to establish an integrated framework for cooperation and coordination in specific sectors through joint initiatives and the exchange of information and expertise, with a focus on stimulating growth and promoting innovation in areas such as financial services and professional business services.” Ahmed Hussen, Minister of International Development participated in a signing ceremony with Lolwah bint Rashid Al-Khater, Qatar’s Minister of State for International Cooperation.
More than 9,000 Canadian expatriates live in Qatar, working in Canadian and Qatari companies and institutions. From January to July, Canada exported goods valued at $103.45 million to Qatar, while Qatar’s exports to Canada amounted to $90.27 million.
There is also a partnership in academic programs, as the University of Calgary has been in Doha since 2006, offering a Bachelor of Nursing program, along with the College of the North Atlantic, which transformed into the University of Doha for Science and Technology. Furthermore, there are several Doha-based schools that offer Canadian curricula.
In their meeting, Sheikh Tamim expressed his aspiration to work with Trudeau to advance their bilateral cooperation across multiple sectors in order to “contribute to enhancing regional and global peace and stability.” Bilateral relations between the two countries were discussed, especially in the fields of investment, economy and international cooperation, “in addition to developments and situations in the Gaza Strip and the occupied Palestinian territories.”
Qatar has been very successful in its efforts to shape public opinion in Canada, as well as in the far more important United States. The amount of money that Qatar has poured into universities, schools, educational organizations, think tanks, and media across America, and the number of initiatives that Qatar uses to influence American opinion, is overwhelming.
According to a 2022 study from the National Association of Scholars, Qatar is the largest foreign donor to American universities. It found that between 2001 and 2021, the petrostate donated a whopping $4.7 billion to U.S. colleges. The largest recipients are some of America’s most prestigious institutions of higher learning. They include Carnegie Mellon University, Ivy League Cornell University, Georgetown University in Washington, Virginia Commonwealth University, and Texas A & M. These schools have partnered with the regime to build campuses in Doha’s “education city,” a special district of the capital that hosts satellite colleges for American universities. (Texas A&M decided earlier this year to shutter its branch campus in Qatar.)
Georgetown University in Qatar, for instance, was hosting the “Reimagining Palestine” conference Sept. 20-22. The event engages scholars, experts, and the public “in timely and relevant dialogues on globally significant issues,” according to a description of the gathering. One of the speakers, Wadah Khanfar, “was active in the Hamas movement and was one of its most prominent leaders in the movement’s office in Sudan,” the Raya Media Network, a Palestinian outlet, tells us. In the months following Oct. 7, the campus has hosted a variety of seemingly anti-Israel events.
Since 2008, Qatar has donated nearly $602 million to Northwestern University, whose journalism school is ranked as one of the best in the world, to establish a school of journalism in Qatar. The Northwestern University campus in Qatar and Qatari broadcaster Al-Jazeera in 2013 signed a Memorandum of Understanding to “further facilitate collaboration and knowledge transfer between two of Qatar’s foremost media organizations.” Are Northwestern’s interests really aligned with Qatar?
Qatari state-financed entities also often fund individual scholars or programs in the United States without official disclosure or being directly traceable to a government source, thus avoiding public scrutiny. For example, Ivy League Yale University disclosed only $284,668 in funding from Qatar between 2010 and 2022. Researchers at the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) in a report released in June, though, found that this amount reflected only a small fraction of the money and services the university and its scholars had in fact received over that period. The most common channel for hard-to-track Qatari support for Yale came from individual research grants originating from the Qatar National Research Fund, and their report found 11 Yale-linked QNRF grants which came to at least $15,925,711.
Recent research from the Network Contagion Research Institute indicated that at least 200 American universities illegally withheld information about approximately $13 billion in Qatari contributions. Also, according to the report, from 2015 to 2020 institutions that accepted money from Middle Eastern donors had on average, 300 percent more antisemitic incidents than those institutions that did not.
Overall, the report found that “a massive influx of foreign, concealed donations to American institutions of higher learning, much of it from authoritarian regimes with notable support from Middle Eastern sources, reflects or supports heightened levels of intolerance towards Jews, open inquiry and free expression.”
Much of Doha’s engagement with the world is run out of the Qatar Meeting, Incentive, Conference and Exhibition (MICE) Development Institute (QMDI), which promotes Qatar as a good place for business. The annual Doha Forum gathers major policymakers from around the world.
Qatar’s influence-buying strategies are a textbook example of how to transform cash into “soft” power. The relationship between one of Washington, D.C.’s top think tanks and Qatar, for example, began in 2002, when the emirate underwrote a Doha conference featuring then Qatari Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassem Al Thani and former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk, at the time the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. (Hamad oversaw Qatar’s $230 billion sovereign wealth fund until 2013.) In 2007, Brookings followed up by opening a centre on Doha. It didn’t end well. In 2021 the institute ended its relationship with Qatar amidst an ongoing FBI investigation.
Still, Washington treads carefully when it comes to criticizing Qatar. It’s not just about money. After all, the Al-Udaid Air Base is home to the U.S. military’s Central Command (CENTCOM), and the country is just across the Persian Gulf from Iran. In fact, Washington’s relationship with Qatar is so close that in 2022 the White House officially designated the emirate a “major non-NATO ally.” The Qataris, realizing that their very existence would be threatened were the U.S. to relocate its CENTCOM operations to the UAE or Saudi Arabia, in January hastened to nail down the agreement for another decade.
Yoni Ben-Menachem, a senior researcher at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, told the Jewish News Service (JNS) that the Gulf country is more dangerous than Hamas or Hezbollah since it is extraordinarily wealthy and thus in a position to influence U.S. administrations.
Qatar has for many years been involved in financing the campaigns of the Democratic Party, he claimed, “especially Hillary Clinton’s campaign” in 2016. He added that former U.S. President Bill Clinton is known to have flown to Qatar to bring back suitcases full of cash.
According to Jonathan Ruhe, director of foreign policy at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), Qatar has portrayed itself as “indispensable to U.S. interests in the Middle East, including negotiations with the Taliban, reconstruction aid for past Gaza conflicts, and building the massive Al-Udeid base for U.S. forces.”
Yet although it hosts the Pentagon’s regional command, Qatar has long supported terrorism. For decades, it has opened its doors to Islamist terrorists, Taliban warlords and African insurgents. Doha housed the Taliban’s political office before that group returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021.
Beginning in 2012, the Israeli government allowed Qatar to deliver cash to Gaza. Over the next nine years, Qatar provided $1.5 billion. Prior to the outbreak of the present conflict, Doha subsidized Hamas to the tune of $360 million to $480 million a year. With one third of that money, Qatar bought Egyptian fuel that Cairo then shipped into Gaza, where Hamas sold it and pocketed its revenue. Another third went to impoverished Gazan families, while the last third paid the salaries of the Hamas bureaucracy.
The leaders of Hamas, including Khaled Mashaal and the late Ismail Haniyeh, who was chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau until assassinated by Israel in July, have been regular guests in Doha, living in luxury. (The emir sat in the front row with mourners during Haniyeh’s funeral in Doha.) Qatar has defended Hamas’s presence in the country.
“This was started to be used as a way of communicating and bringing peace and calm into the region, not to instigate any war,” Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani told U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken last October. “And this is the purpose of that office.” Blinken seemed to buy this. At a press conference in Doha in February, he asserted that “we’re very fortunate to have Qatar as a partner.”
As far back as 2007, when Hamas seized control of Gaza, Qatar recognized that “adopting” the group would be a worthwhile opportunity: connections with Hamas in Gaza grants Qatar influence and status in the Middle East and beyond. In addition, they bolster the popular Arab perception of Doha as working for the Palestinian cause. In 2012, the emir became the first head of state to visit Gaza, pledging $400 million to Hamas. At the same time, the Qataris became the exclusive mediators between Israel and Hamas.
The U.S. has accused the Qataris of harboring members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC). But at the same time the Qataris are an important intermediary between America and Iran. Doha has enjoyed good relations with the Biden administration, which it helped in the American hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan three years ago.
While organized as a private company, the Al-Jazeera television network is the voice of Qatar’s regime. Founded in 1996 and financed by the then-emir of Qatar, it has described terrorist attacks that killed Israeli non-combatants as martyrdom operations and even posted articles describing Israel as “the Zionist entity.” For years, Al-Jazeera aired all of Osama bin Laden’s speeches. The late Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader Yusuf Al-Qaradawi was based in Doha and for years hosted a prime-time program on the network. The war on Israel was declared on Al-Jazeera by Hamas military commander Muhammad Deif last October 7. Its operations in Israel were finally terminated by Jerusalem in May.
Qatar has been using the immense wealth it has accumulated to turn Al-Jazeera into an international media conglomerate, spreading Muslim Brotherhood propaganda, Hamas’ original sponsor, on a global scale. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 by the cleric Hassan al-Banna as a reaction to his perception that the Muslim world had become week in relation to the West. The royal family of Qatar has since been using the Muslim Brotherhood to minimize political opposition against them. In exchange for allowing the Brotherhood to use the country as a base for its international operations, the Brotherhood makes sure that there is no political threat based on organized religion against the Qatari monarchy.
A major shock to Qatar’s economy occurred when some Gulf Cooperation Council members — Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — imposed an embargo on Qatar from 2017 to 2021. The reason for the embargo was Qatar’s support for the Brotherhood.
Qatar owns other news media that are equally awful. The London-based daily newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi in June published an article entitled “War Criminal Blinken Wages Diplomatic Campaign to Eliminate Palestinian Resistance and Buy Time for Israeli War in Gaza.”
Qatar is not a neutral agent, despite its attempts to portray itself as such. Time and again, it has supported the region’s most radical nations and paramilitaries, all to the detriment of American and Western interests. Its malign influence activities the United States reflect the broader issue of foreign manipulation in America’s political landscape.
“Qatar has been playing a dual role since the beginning of the Gaza war. On the one hand, it is a well-known supporter of Hamas, and even finances it with a lot of money, and on the other hand, it is trying to help in the deal for the release of the Israeli hostages,” remarked Dr. Udi Levy, a former senior official of Israel’s Mossad spy agency in April. But the U.S. relationship with Qatar will continue as long as the American government finds it useful in the on-again off-again negotiations to have Hamas release the remaining Israeli hostages.
Henry Srebrnik is a professor of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island.
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Israel’s opposition will decide the country’s future. Here are their choices.
Israel’s opposition is approaching a choice that could determine not only who governs the country but whether it can address some of the gravest threats to its future.
Gadi Eisenkot, the former military chief seeking to replace Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, can form a government with Arab support or he can make costly concessions to the ultra-Orthodox and form a coalition with them.
Accepting the support of Arab lawmakers breaks a political promise but costs relatively little in policy concessions. Bringing the ultra-Orthodox parties into the government almost certainly sacrifices reforms essential to Israel’s economic and social survival.
Negotiations now underway suggest a possible outcome that is less straightforward than either choice: an Arab-backed government that eventually brings in the ultra-Orthodox on considerably less favorable terms.
The decision rests largely with Avigdor Lieberman — and the outcome may surprise everyone.
The latest developments
To recap, Eisenkot commands 48 seats in the 120-member Knesset. Another 19 belong to Arab parties, an unprecedented number whose support is effectively available without major policy concessions. Together, they would have 67 seats, a comfortable majority. But most of Eisenkot’s prospective coalition partners promised not to form a government dependent on Arab parties. Accepting Arab support would break that promise.
Lieberman, a 68-year-old secular nationalist who broke years ago with Netanyahu, his former boss, has over the past week been pushing hard for negotiating with the 14 lawmakers from the ultra-Orthodox, or Haredi, parties, longtime allies of Netanyahu’s Likud. Controlling seven seats himself, he could deny Eisenkot a majority. But giving in to Haredi demands would compromise another central opposition promise: ending sweeping military draft exemptions for tens of thousands of yeshiva students.
Lieberman, who has been appointed by the Knesset to head its Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, conceded that under his proposals “not everyone will be drafted.” This is a dramatic break with his central election promise.
And the costs of the different broken promises are profoundly different.
The consequences of each choice
The Arab parties are asking for relatively little, principally a crackdown on organized crime and violence in Arab communities. The Haredim want to preserve not only draft exemptions but also government funding for schools that refuse to teach core subjects, subsidies encouraging prolonged religious study, and institutional arrangements that impede economic integration.
These demands threaten Israel’s future.
Only about half of working-age Haredi men are employed, and many Haredi boys receive little instruction in mathematics, English and other subjects essential to participation in a modern economy. The community already constitutes roughly one-sixth of Israel’s population and has exceptionally high birthrates.
Research published by the Bank of Israel found that public expenditure attributable to an average Haredi household approaches 13,000 shekels monthly, including benefits, subsidies and government services.
As the Haredi share of the population grows, preserving this system becomes increasingly unsustainable. The consequences could include higher taxes, declining productivity and an exodus of economically productive Israelis who see no prospect of change.
For years, the hope was that a centrist government freed from Netanyahu’s dependence on the Haredim could finally implement essential reforms. Now a government formed to replace him risks perpetuating precisely the same system.
This would be devastating to those reservist Israelis who have just spent three years of war constantly shuttled from one front to another, being promised that eventually, should the opposition come to power, the burdens will be distributed more evenly. The idea was that Netanyahu – whose right wing has rarely had a Knesset majority with the Haredim – depends on the existing arrangement whereas the opposition does not.
Lieberman’s sudden willingness to abandon his opposition to ultra-Orthodox privileges – one TV anchor described it as “hating the Arabs more than the Haredim” – complicates matters and raises another interesting scenario.
What to watch for
If it turns out that the Haredi price is too high for the opposition to pay, these talks may fall apart. That could happen if, for example, the Haredi parties insist on an “override clause” enabling the Knesset to overturn the expected Supreme Court veto of any deal legalizing the now-informal sweeping draft exemptions for seminary students.
That would mean that unless a deal with the Arabs were revived – or the even less likely option of joining Netanyahu was seriously considered – Israel would be headed toward another round of elections. And in those elections, Lieberman would face the very real prospect of being wiped out – or failing to make the threshold of 3.25 percent of the vote; he won 6 percent on Oct. 27, largely on the strength of his anti-Haredi position.
The prospect of political extinction may focus his mind and make him more amenable to the Arab option.
Eisenkot himself appears prepared to pursue it, possibly forming a 48-member coalition supported from outside by Arab lawmakers.
Such a government would not necessarily be as unstable as Netanyahu claims. Israel’s constructive vote of no confidence requires 61 lawmakers to agree on an alternative government. Netanyahu’s bloc has only 53 seats. Removing Eisenkot through that mechanism would effectively require Arab lawmakers to help reinstall Netanyahu, an exceedingly unlikely prospect.
At least one Arab party, Ra’am, has indicated willingness to meet Eisenkot’s conditions, including recognition of Hamas as a terrorist organization.
And there is a further possibility that could change the entire calculation.
Once Eisenkot demonstrates that he can form a government with Arab support, the Haredim would no longer be indispensable. Their bargaining power would diminish, and they might eventually choose to join the government on much less favorable terms. Shas’s participation in the Rabin government formed in 1992 offers a historical parallel.
That would turn the current negotiations on their head. The opposition could establish a government without agreeing to the Haredim’s most damaging demands, while leaving open the possibility of their eventual participation.
Watch for the moment the Haredi demands become unacceptable to Lieberman. That may be the point at which Israel’s next government finally begins to take shape.
The post Israel’s opposition will decide the country’s future. Here are their choices. appeared first on The Forward.
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Before he died, an Orthodox leader worked quietly on a guide to LGBTQ+ inclusion. Few will ever read what he wrote.
After Rabbi Moshe Hauer died suddenly at 60 in October 2025, the tributes that poured in from his peers lauded his drive to expand the tent of Orthodox Judaism.
As executive vice president of the Orthodox Union, the largest umbrella organization for Orthodox synagogues in the U.S., Hauer had designed programs to foster greater inclusion of community members who were often marginalized, like unmarried adults and people with disabilities.
But another Hauer initiative in that vein, carefully developed under the radar, only became known a year after his death: A policy for how Orthodox communities might better include members who are gay and transgender.
The existence of the project was largely unknown until this fall, when the OU’s in-house magazine, Jewish Action, produced a tribute to Hauer on the occasion of his first yahrzeit. An article revealed that Hauer had been working on “a framework of communal guidelines” for LGBTQ+ inclusion — and briefly quoted it — before stating that it was unlikely to ever be published.
“For such communal guidelines to be accepted within the Orthodox community, the author would need to be widely respected, with unimpeachable credentials,” Rabbi Yisrael Motzen, the head of OU’s inclusion initiative, wrote in the article. “It is hard to imagine someone other than Rabbi Hauer taking on this much-needed project.”
Any official guide to including LGBTQ+ members would have been a first for the Orthodox Union, and had the potential to be a watershed. Orthodox tradition regards same-sex relationships as being in violation of halacha, or Jewish law, and in 2022 the OU reiterated its halachic opposition to same-sex marriage, even as it affirmed legislation protecting it. The OU has offered even less indication of its stance on trans issues.
The revelation of Hauer’s lost project comes during a period of uncertainty for LGBTQ+ issues in Orthodox Judaism. The question of how gay identity can coexist with halacha, seen for much of the 21st century as an existential concern for Modern Orthodox Judaism, has in recent years moved to the backburner, as Israel advocacy and antisemitism have moved to the forefront. LGBTQ+ advocates, after years of making inroads toward queer acceptance in Orthodox communities, say a decade’s worth of progress is now unraveling.
What impact the publication of OU guidelines would have, whether during Hauer’s lifetime or now, is up for debate. Some believed any plausible OU guidance would have been self-defeating — that hardliners would have dismissed it while more liberal groups would inevitably have said it fell short. But everyone interviewed for this article agreed that the OU, because of its stature in the Orthodox world, was in a unique position to help.

“Having such a prominent organization have any kind of recognition, or even use words that are respectful and not demeaning, would be a big deal,” said Rachael Fried, chief executive of JQY, an organization that supports LGBTQ+ Orthodox teens and young adults.
It was admittedly difficult for those who had not seen the document to speculate on its impact. It remains unclear how much Hauer wrote or how many other people knew about it, as well as whether he was still working on it when he died or whether he had shelved it. Reached by email, Motzen said he did not want to elaborate on its contents because Hauer was “very careful about how he discussed his position.” A spokesperson for the OU sent a statement in response to a detailed list of questions about the document.
“Leaders at the OU engage in scholarship and discussion on a number of important issues facing our community,” the spokesperson wrote. “The work that was mentioned in the Jewish Action article is an unfinished example of such scholarship and just one of many works left unfinished by Rabbi Hauer, zt”l at the time of his tragic passing.”
The document would have almost certainly restated the OU’s opposition to same-sex relationships as a matter of halacha. The question is what else it might have said. Hauer’s earlier writing on LGBTQ+ Orthodox Jews, recollections from people who knew him, and an account from one person who read the document offer clues.
‘Private spiritual heroism’
The appointment of Hauer in 2020 as the top religious authority at the OU defied a trend at the organization. A longtime pulpit leader in Baltimore, he had been ordained not by Yeshiva University, but by Ner Israel Rabbinical College, a Haredi yeshiva.
As executive vice president, Hauer cultivated relationships between the OU and Haredi world, which both fit into his broader vision of building bridges across the spectrum of observance and accompanied a rightward shift of Orthodoxy both religiously and politically.
The yeshiva system from which Hauer emerged tends to be less receptive toward LGBTQ+ inclusion than Modern Orthodox spaces. And in recent years, rising Haredi membership at some Orthodox synagogues has made them less hospitable to queer congregants, according to Saundra Sterling Epstein, who runs the Welcoming Shuls Project, a registry of LGBTQ+-friendly synagogues and clergy.
“I can’t tell you how many communities in this country,” Epstein said, “where people went to shul X, and cannot go there anymore because it has been taken over by a very ‘black hat’ population.”
But Hauer’s views on LGBTQ+ issues did not fall neatly into right-wing ideology. In 2006 — around the time others in the Orthodox world were promoting conversion therapy — Hauer conveyed in writing his sympathy toward gay Orthodox Jews.
In a post on the Orthodoxy blog Cross-Currents, Hauer said that having worked with several gay Orthodox Jews, he understood that the difficulty of being “forced to face life with their most basic drive unmet” — that is, to remain celibate rather than violate the prohibition against gay sex — was impossible for him to comprehend, and he praised their self-sacrifice.
To a reader 20 years later, aspects of the post might come across as outdated even in the Orthodox world. Hauer wrote that homosexuality was “sometimes apparently genetic, and many, many other times caused by trauma, most typically child sexual abuse.” (Major scientific and medical organizations, including the American Psychological Association and the National Institutes of Health, say there is no evidence that sexual orientation is determined by trauma or abuse.)
Other remarks in the post, like referring to a Pride parade as a moral outrage celebrating “sexual deviance,” reflected Orthodox mores around modesty, not just sexuality. Still, the blog post showed that Hauer wanted to help. “I am concerned for the pain and alienation that they inevitably feel in these tumultuous days,” he said, offering that their “quiet and private spiritual heroism” in remaining celibate might be “what is keeping our world going.”
A similar tone comes through in the excerpt printed in Jewish Action.
The article provided just one sentence from the unpublished document: “[I] humbly recognize the unimaginable challenges confronting Orthodox Jews with exclusively same-sex attraction or gender dysphoria as they struggle with both halachic observance and their place within the Orthodox community,” Hauer wrote, according to the article.
The spirit of compassion comported with the experience of Ron Citro, a gay former member of Bnei Jacob Shaarei Zion, the Orthodox congregation Hauer led in Baltimore. Citro, who attended the synagogue from 1997 to 2001, was not out with his partner in the congregation. He said Hauer had the two over for Shabbat meals “many, many times.”
“We don’t know if he knew, so we don’t know what he thought about us,” Citro said. “All we know is that he didn’t try to set us up with women, and we were always invited together.”
“I think he just cared about treating people with respect,” he added, “and not defining them or uncovering their secrets.”
Not everyone was impressed by Hauer’s public statements — whether published in 2006 or 2026. And some found little to distinguish between them, which they said encapsulated how far Orthodox institutions were lagging behind the rest of society, including segments of their own membership.
Rabbi Shua Brick, an Orthodox educator who publicly came out as gay in 2023, said that describing LGBTQ+ people as having “exclusively same-sex attraction,” as Hauer had in the unpublished document, was a “very destructive and insidious way to talk about it.”
“Because of the amount of pressure communally that there is to try to marry a woman,” Brick said, “I would super over-index on any fleeting moment that I kind of thought women were interesting, because I thought my life depended on it.”

Fried, the JQY director, contrasted the language Hauer used with other statements made by Orthodox leaders, especially around trans issues. She cited comments made by prominent rabbis in the last two years who referred to gender affirming surgery as “castration.”
“The thing that’s so noteworthy to me is the kindness in it,“ Fried said of the Jewish Action excerpt. “It starts ‘I humbly recognize the challenges.’ That to me is a really big deal.”
The lines Orthodox leaders drew
While the Orthodox Union has not publicly disseminated a position on LGBTQ+ inclusion, the two other umbrella institutions in the Orthodox mainstream did publicly announce policies, albeit in different ways.
Yeshiva University’s position was stated in and out of court, where a lawsuit brought in 2021 by gay students led to the establishment — and shortly thereafter, the dissolution — of an LGBTQ+ undergraduate affinity group. The school said in March 2025 that a Pride club was “antithetical to the undergraduate program in which the traditional view of marriage and genders being determined at birth are transmitted.”
Less well-known is the policy of the Rabbinical Council of America, a professional organization for the Orthodox rabbinate. In 2016, the RCA passed a resolution that prohibited rabbis from acknowledging gay relationships or weddings and urged celibacy for gay Orthodox Jews. It did not consider trans issues. But it also said that gay congregants should not be excluded from synagogue functions any more than those who do not observe the laws of Shabbat.
Rabbi Mark Dratch, who led the RCA when the resolution was passed, described the difficulty of reaching consensus on the resolution, which took pains to emphasize the need for empathy and sensitivity toward gay community members — and even noted that the Torah frowns upon celibacy.
“We recognize that these strictures provide no permitted outlet for those with homosexual desire, thereby creating the extraordinary demand of lifelong abstinence as well as the absence of companionate love,” the resolution read. “Although some overcome these and other challenges, we deeply empathize with those who face them.”
“It doesn’t go as far as some would have liked,” Dratch said in an interview. “It goes too far, probably, for what other people would have liked. Looking at it now, there are things that people who supported it then may now be uncomfortable with. But it’s a challenge.”
Hauer’s role at the OU, of course, carried very different demands from running a synagogue. And running the OU had higher stakes than the RCA. As executive vice president, Hauer was charged with setting the religious policy for an organization that serves hundreds of synagogues and schools, runs youth education programs and summer camps and certifies kosher food.
As the face of the organization, Hauer had a lot riding on any statement, much less one on a topic as fraught as LGBTQ+ inclusion. One step too far to the left, and those on the right might cast aspersions on OU’s other work, including kosher certification, a multimillion-dollar business. Moreover, he risked a setback in his central mission as head of the OU: uniting the Orthodox fabric.
Imagining impact
While Motzen, the author of the Jewish Action article, wrote in it that an OU-led LGBTQ+ inclusion effort was “much-needed,” some Orthodox advocates doubted whether it would change minds.
Epstein, the Welcoming Shuls Project director, was complimentary of Hauer, saying that he was known to deal compassionately with LGBTQ+ synagogue members at his Baltimore synagogue.
But she named respected Orthodox leaders who had offered more progressive guidance than Hauer’s excerpt suggests. Among them were Rabbi Benny Lau, a prominent Israeli rabbi who in 2020 urged gay Orthodox Jews to live openly and seek long-term partners, and Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg, a renowned expert on Jewish law who proposed a halachic framework for gender affirmation surgery.
Despite those rabbis’ prestige, she said, they had not managed to move the needle in the Orthodox mainstream. And there were signs that years of progress are now being eroded. Several shuls Epstein once considered welcoming to queer Jews have recently begun shunning them as their membership became more predominantly Haredi.
“I think there’s this mentality — and I think it’s gotten worse — that, ‘My mind is made up. Don’t confuse me with the facts,’” Epstein said.
With the Orthodox Union standing behind Hauer’s call, though, it’s possible the impact would have been more widely felt.
Misha Holleb, who is trans and launched a now-defunct LGBTQ+-inclusive Orthodox prayer group, said merely acknowledging that gay and trans alienation was a problem in the Orthodox world would count as a “baby step” for the OU.
“They think that they’re moving the needle, and they are, which is the sad thing,” said Holleb.
Holleb said he had recently left Orthodoxy in part because of how he was treated in those spaces. “The best you can hope for is the kind of homophobia and transphobia that’s reflected in that statement,” he said.
Dratch, the former RCA head, agreed with Epstein that Hauer would have been wading into controversy no matter what the document said. But that did not mean there was no point in publishing it.
Passing a resolution, as his former organization had, served a long-term purpose even if people disagreed with it.
“This is the challenge of leadership,” Dratch said. “It would have been easier for nobody to say anything, and behind the scenes try to resolve each case as it comes. But that’s not responsible when you’re leading a community. You need to change attitudes because you need to change people’s opinions.”
For the OU, he said, publishing anything could help kickstart an exchange of ideas among rabbinic leadership or between leadership and community members.
That was just the impact Fried, the JQY director, said she hoped the Jewish Action piece would have.
One challenge her organization has is reaching people who would benefit most from its support. The stigma against LGBTQ+ identity is so great in the Orthodox world that many community publications won’t run ads for JQY.
Hauer’s attempt at tackling the issue, even if it didn’t land, left her feeling optimistic the Orthodox world would trend toward normalization.
“Even Jewish Action publishing this is a positive sign,” she said.
Citro, Hauer’s old congregant in Baltimore, now lives with his husband on the Upper West Side of Manhattan, where they attend a synagogue that uses Orthodox liturgy but allows both women and men to lead prayer services, a model known as a partnership minyan. There are lots of gay couples at the synagogue, he said, and no limits placed on them.
The one-sentence excerpt in Jewish Action struck Citro as generic and safe. Nevertheless, he was curious about the rest.
“I would like to see it,” he said, “and I would like to draw my own conclusions from it.”
The post Before he died, an Orthodox leader worked quietly on a guide to LGBTQ+ inclusion. Few will ever read what he wrote. appeared first on The Forward.
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Hunter College student government cancels cultural event, and Jewish students say Hillel was the reason
Hunter College’s Undergraduate Student Government canceled a cultural arts festival that had been set for Monday — and some Jewish groups are saying it was because of Hillel’s involvement. A Hunter alumna says it was a long time coming. The cancellation also follows a similar decision on another campus, with Hillels increasingly under attack.
USG put out two disparate statements on the cancellation. The first, signed by USG President Sumaiya Ahmed and Vice President Ahmad Waraich, said the student government had miscommunicated about the event and that not all members were aware it was even happening.
“We hear what the student body has said, and we have made the decision to cancel the event as it doesn’t align with our values or the values of the students we represent as the Hunter community,” the statement, released on Saturday, read.
Yonathan Eilon, Hillel student president, read dozens of comments on the post before they were all deleted.
“Almost the entire comment section was full of people just saying that it was canceled because of Hillel in one way or another,” he told the Forward. “Either because USG doesn’t want to work with Hillel, or because other student groups don’t want to work with Hillel.”
Elion added that some groups don’t actually have an issue with Hillel, but are afraid of backlash so they’ll refuse to collaborate. This is disappointing, he said, because Hillel is actively seeking intercultural dialogue.
The other groups involved in the festival included the Taiwanese Student Association, the Peruvian Student Association, the Chinese Student and Scholar Association and Students for Justice in Palestine.
But less than 24 hours after the first statement, USG put out another. This time it did not include signatures and specifically cited safety concerns.
“If we, as a Student Government, are not able to provide a safe and secure space for all our students, then we cannot continue to move forward with an event,” read the statement. “As planning progressed, several participating student organizations withdrew, creating additional difficulties in moving forward with the event as originally envisioned.”
This alarmed Eilon, who told the Forward he is concerned about keeping himself and other Jewish students safe. He has attended Hunter since 2023, and said there has been an “abundance” of what he calls “ambient antisemitism.” This includes social isolation students experience for sharing their Jewish background, to banners at pro-Palestinian protests that say “Bring the war home,” Eilon said.
Hunter professor Leah Garett, who directs the Jewish Studies Center, is suing City University of New York, which oversees Hunter, alleging antisemitic discrimination. Her lawsuit accuses the university of allowing protesters to intimidate and harass Jewish campus members under the guise of free speech.
Hunter Hillel put out its own statement about the cancellation of the event, writing: “Jewish students should never be singled out, scapegoated, or made to feel unwelcome because of who they are and the antisemitic response online to the cancellation notice has been egregious and inappropriate.”
Hunter College, USG, SJP, the Taiwanese Student Association, the Peruvian Student Association, and the Chinese Student and Scholar Association did not respond to the Forward’s requests for comment.
New York City Council members Eric Dinowitz and Virginia Maloney urged the university to launch a Title VI investigation to determine if the incident amounted to discrimination based on race, color and national origin.
CUNY’s website makes clear that its students cannot be denied access to a program or activity based on their perceived or actual origin. Groups that protest Hillel are quick to say they are against the club’s connection to Israel, rather than against its Judaism.
Moshe Spern, activist and president of United Jewish Teachers — a network of Jewish teachers from across New York City public schools — is not convinced.
“When Jewish students participating is the dealbreaker, the spin doesn’t change the outcome,” he wrote in response to USG’s second statement.
Hillels increasingly scrutinized
The controversy at Hunter comes as Hillels across the country are increasingly protested by pro-Palestinian student organizations that take issue primarily with the Jewish student club sponsoring Birthright and Perspectives trips to Israel. This year, New York City’s New School student government voted to cut ties with Hillel and strip its funding, though they lack the authority to take these steps.
At the University of Oregon, protesters burned an American-Israeli flag outside of a Hillel House, and flyers naming and attacking its director were distributed around campus. At Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, a festival similar to Hunter’s was canceled due to the inclusion of Wildcats for Israel, a club housed within Hillel that describes itself as focused on Israeli culture and society.
The instances are part of an ongoing debate about Zionist bans. While bans against people for political beliefs are sometimes legal, bans may be illegal if Zionist is simply a substitute for Jew.
For Gabi Schiller, an American Israeli Hunter alumna who graduated in spring 2023, the festival controversy is not a surprise. If anything, she said it’s been a long time coming.
Schiller, who engages in pro-Israel activism, told the Forward that she and other Zionist-leaning students had wanted to bring in speakers to facilitate discussion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with other groups. This was before Oct. 7, and she said that the sentiment at Hillel was not to “rock the boat.”
“The tension builds and builds until either it eventually explodes or it leads to a complete boycott of Jewish life altogether,” Schiller said. “Because no one was brave from either side, brave enough to be willing to sit down and talk — not just have an interfaith event, but talk about the elephant in the room, which is the conflict.”
At Hunter, Hillel’s office is right next to the Muslim Student Association. Despite their close proximity, Schiller said there was hardly interaction between the two groups during her time as a student.
“It’s so sad to me,” Schiller reflected.
For now, students are waiting to hear what, if anything, the university has to say. USG has gone quiet on the matter since releasing its second statement, even disabling comments on its most recent statement with the caption:
“Comments have been turned off due to safety concerns and hateful rhetoric. Hunter College seeks to promote inclusivity and safety for all students.”
The post Hunter College student government cancels cultural event, and Jewish students say Hillel was the reason appeared first on The Forward.

