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It’s Not a Border with Lebanon — It’s a Front
Israeli firefighters work following rocket attacks from Lebanon, amid ongoing cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, near the border on its Israeli side, June 13, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Avi Ohayon
Israel’s traditional security concept consisted of a defensive strategy based on mainly offensive tactics. After the Yom Kippur War, the IDF was criticized for focusing too much on its offensive ethos and making poor defensive preparations. The October 7 attack naturally raised the issue of defense to the top of Israel’s list of priorities, but behind the obvious need to strengthen our defense lies an important discussion of principle. Before billions are poured into concrete molds to beef up the border obstacles, this discussion needs to be held consciously and methodically.
The key question is this: What is the main lesson we should learn from the October 7 attack?
The first possibility is that the main failure was in the defense concept. This begins with the wrong early warning assumption and continues with poorly designed defensive positions. If this is indeed the main lesson, the fix is relatively simple. Better defensive infrastructures should be built, the border should be better manned, and the dependence on warning should be reduced. A huge investment in rebuilding the border defense infrastructure will be required, as well as another huge investment in stationing large forces on the borders for years. This appears at first glance to be a direct, clear, and necessary lesson from October 7.
But there is a fly in the ointment. When we examine the development of Israel’s defense concept in recent decades, we find that this is precisely the lesson Israel has drawn again and again from its conflicts. After the withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, we invested enormously in strengthening the northern border with a barrier, outposts, technologies, and new roads. We did it again after the Second Lebanon War, drawing operational lessons from the previous obstacle such as the need to pave more rear axes for movement hidden from the eyes of the enemy. But it soon became clear that behind the border fence, Hezbollah had become a real army. So once again, the IDF embarked a few years ago on a refortification plan for the northern border, known as the “Integrating Stone” project. Yet more billions were poured into refortifications. The decision to evacuate the northern settlements at the beginning of the Iron Swords War shows that even that enormous and expensive defense infrastructure did not provide enough protection, at least in the eyes of the decision makers.
The story of the Gaza border is no different. A modern and sophisticated defense system was established upon the Israeli withdrawal in 2005. Less than a decade later, during Operation Protective Edge in 2014, it became clear that the enemy had spent the interim digging over 30 axes of tunnels into our territory, bypassing the new and advanced defense system.
The IDF “learned its lesson” from this discovery and embarked on yet another vast new border project, this time including an underground barrier and a major renewal of the defense infrastructure on the ground. We all saw the failure of this project on October 7.
Strengthening border obstacles and reinforcing them with additional units is of course not a wrong step to take. The danger is that we will once again be satisfied with learning technical lessons and miss the more essential ones. The key lesson to be learned from October is the failure of the defensive strategy that allowed the terrorist armies to build up major strength on our borders without hindrance.
Israel’s flawed border strategy rested on two false assumptions. The first was that Hamas and Hezbollah could be tamed through withdrawals and understandings. The second was that they could be deterred by the threat of Israeli air power, since they had both assumed “state responsibility.” According to this logic, the organizations should have been reluctant to use their forces against us because of the price Israel would likely exact from the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.
By relying on these two false assumptions, Israel allowed the threat on its borders to build up without interruption. Every military expert knows that “the first line will be breached.” This means there is no chance of stopping a significant attack on a border line that has no depth. Under conditions in which an enemy is constantly present and ready, there is no chance for early warning. The defense forces will always be surprised.
As we know, the State of Israel lacks operational depth. The settlements mark the border line. That is why we implemented a defensive strategy for most of our history that entailed an offensive tactical approach. In other words, the other lesson to be learned is that a defensive deployment that is not supported by an offensive initiative in enemy territory will not be enough.
In the decades during which we adopted a strategy of defense and deterrence from the air, the border turned from an imaginary line drawn on maps into an actual barrier in military thinking, with very practical consequences. For example, when the IDF chose to establish new units, it established them mainly for defensive needs (border patrol units, for instance, and air defense battalions). The IDF now finds itself with no choice but to put some of those units into combat in Gaza.
In 2020, the Border Patrol Corps was established in the ground forces. Apparently, the IDF had adapted itself to the challenges of the hour. In practice, the new corps was established on the ruins of the Combat Intelligence Collection Corps, which was responsible for army reconnaissance. This happened at the exact moment when the IDF’s operating concept stated that “uncovering a stealthy enemy” within the framework of land warfare is the key to battlefield success. While the operating concept strove to restore military decisiveness and gave critical weight to combat intelligence collection, the IDF’s practical decisions ran in the opposite direction. The collapse of the line in Gaza and the destruction of the means of collection on the borders of Gaza and Lebanon – failures forced on Israel by the enemy within mere hours – indicates that the cancellation of combat collection retroactively harmed the defense mission as well. The establishment of the Border Defense Corps did not strengthen our defense. What happened to us?
This is what happened: The border turned from a political line into a military conceptual fixation. Gradually, military thought became enslaved to the division between “our territory” and “their territory.” Only intelligence and the Air Force are to operate in “their territory.” “Our territory” is where defense takes place, but as “our territory” is protected and safe, there is no point in making strict preparations there that meet basic tactical rules. “Maneuver” is the act in which ground forces cross the fence into enemy territory. The ground forces are to prepare for this, but the strategy is to avoid it.
But the simple truth is that “maneuvering” is not defined by enemy territory. Freeing Kibbutz Beeri and the Nahal Oz outpost from Hamas occupation required offensive battles – maneuvers that were no less and perhaps even more challenging than the occupation of Gaza. In general, “defense” turned out to be the more difficult tactical scenario, not the easier one. The reality is that even when defense is conducted in our territory as it is conducted today in the north, and not in a surprise scenario, threats to our forces are still significant. The Air Force’s air defense is not as effective at the front as it is on the home front. The front is more loaded with enemy threats and forces that need to be defended against. It is also constantly changing.
The distinction between “front” and “home front” is more suitable for military thinking than the political definitions of “our territory” and “their territory.” At the “front,” which is on both sides of the border, defensive and offensive battles take place. They are all a form of maneuver. At the front, there is a reality of tactical dynamism and great many threats. It requires not only intelligence but also combat reconnaissance and monitoring at the unit level. It requires not only the national air defense umbrella but its own tactical defense umbrella. The months of attrition in the north in the face of anti-tank missiles and UAV launches make this clear. The defensive battle is required not only to prevent enemy achievements but also to create the conditions for retaking the initiative and attack, which includes taking advantage of opportunities. The defense divisions have to know what is happening across the border and must be able to prevent evolving threats. That is why they were previously called “territorial divisions” and not “defense divisions.” This principle, by the way, is called “forward-depth.”
We must not be naive. An exercise in military thinking will not immediately change political strategy. It is possible that the reality after the current war will not yet allow the Northern Command to enjoy offensive and preventive freedom of action into Lebanese territory. If so, we will have to strive for this as a strategic result in the next round. But even if this is the case, it is still correct that we build the force in a way that suits reality, not in a way that repeats the mistakes of the past – spending billions to sanctify the border line with barriers that will eventually fail.
Instead of thinking “defense” versus “maneuvering,” “our territory” versus “their territory,” we must think “front” versus “rear.” The forces at the front are required to be capable of defensive and offensive battles in the most difficult conditions. The front should benefit from good intelligence and air support but should not be dependent on them, especially not in surprise scenarios. We learned that the hard way. Defense needs its own intelligence assessment, one that relies more on combat gathering. We have learned that such collection should rely on mobile capabilities and unmanned aircraft, because cameras mounted on masts do not meet the definition of tactical combat collection. They are too easy a target.
I am not the only person to make these arguments. IDF senior officials have previously recognized the danger of establishing a “defensive army” versus an “attack army” and the conceptual obstacle that the fence poses to our military thinking.
As always, in the future, there will be operational constraints and sectors that will have to be reduced to strengthen others. Sustainable defense cannot be based on an obstacle, light forces and assistance from Tel Aviv alone, nor on a premise of a constant large standing force. It should be built from the presence of significant reserve forces at the front. Training facilities close to the border will allow this without harming the IDF’s ability to prepare. The front should maintain independence in the areas of combat gathering, available fire support and tactical air defense. The border obstacle should be perceived not as the center but as a supporting factor.
On the way towards the restoration of Israel’s traditional defense strategy, defense through preventive and decisive attacks, it is also necessary to remove the misperception of the border. From now on, call it a front.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal recently retired from military service as commander of the Dado Center for Multidisciplinary Military Thinking. He is a well-known military thinker both in Israel and abroad. His works have been published in The Military Review, War on the Rocks, Small Wars Journal, at the Hoover Institution, at Stanford, and elsewhere. His book The Battle Before the War (MOD 2022, in Hebrew) dealt with the IDF’s need to change, innovate and renew a decisive war approach. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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George Washington University Suspends Students for Justice in Palestine for One Year
Demonstrators gather at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. on March 21, 2025 to protest the war in Gaza. Photo: Bryan Dozier/NurPhoto via Reuters Connect.
George Washington University (GW) has suspended the Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) chapter operating on its campus until Spring 2026, punishing the group for a series of unauthorized demonstrations it held on school property last month, according to a recent report in The GW Hatchet.
The move marks one of the severest disciplinary sanctions SJP has provoked from the GW administration since it began violating rules on peaceful expression and assembly, as well as targeting school officials for harassment, following Hamas’ Oct. 7 massacre across southern Israel. Until next May, SJP is barred from advertising and may only convene to “complete sanctions or consult with their advisor,” according to report.
A number of SJP chapters around the country have been disbanded or suspended by university administrators over the past two years.
The gatherings in question occurred during GW’s so-called “Palestine Liberation Week,” the Hatchet added. Administrators repeatedly told SJP to “cease” the activity, but it the ignored their directives, choosing instead to charge ahead with a “teach in” and another event to which it denied an administrator access. By the time the group’s leaders were hauled before the disciplinary panel which shut it down for an entire academic year, it had racked up a bundle of additional misconduct charges for, the Hatchet said, “disorderly conduct, discrimination, and non compliance” — of which it was ultimately found not guilty.
SJP will be placed on probation for one year after its suspension is lifted, the paper continued, during which it must request and acquire prior approval for any expressive activity. Additionally, members will be required to attend “teach-ins on university policy” for “ten consecutive semesters.”
As previously reported by The Algemeiner, George Washington University has been a hub of extreme anti-Zionist activity that school officials have struggled to quell. A major source of the troubling conduct is SJP, which recently escalated its behavior by issuing an ominous warning to a professor who was involved in crafting a proposal to relocate Palestinians in Gaza.
“This notice is to inform you that you are hereby evicted from the premises of the George Washington University,” SJP wrote in a missive it taped to the office door of international affairs professor Joseph Pelzman, who first shared the resettlement plan with Trump’s presidential campaign in July 2024, according to an account of events he described to the podcast “America, Baby!” the following month.
Denouncing Pelzman as the “architect of genocide,” SJP added, “Pelzman’s tenure is only one pernicious symptom of the bloodthirsty Zionism permeating our campus … The proprietors of this eviction notice demand your immediate removal.”
SJP’s threat to Pelzman, an accomplished academic who has focused heavily on the Middle East region, came as the group served probation for breaking a slew of school rules during the 2023-2024 academic year — a term which saw it heap abuse on school officials, visitors to campus representing former US President Joe Biden’s administration, and African Americans. Earlier this year, SJP held a “teach-in” that commemorated the First Intifada, an outbreak of Palestinian terrorism which began in Dec. 1987 and, lasting for nearly six years, claimed the lives of scores of Israelis.
Follow Dion J. Pierre @DionJPierre.
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Far-Left Antisemitism Surged 324.8% Around the World in 2024, New Report Finds
A pro-Hamas march in London, United Kingdom, Feb. 17, 2024. Photo: Chrissa Giannakoudi via Reuters Connect
Global antisemitism surged by a staggering 108 percent in 2024 compared to the prior year, fueled largely by far-left ideology, according to a new report.
The Combat Antisemitism Movement (CAM), a coalition of hundreds of organizations that fight anti-Jewish bigotry around the world, has released its annual report of antisemitic incidents, identifying 6,326 total cases last year with the vast majority — 4,329, or 68.4 percent — fueled by far-left ideology, a reversal from the group’s 2022 research in which the far right dominated and the 2023 findings which found a parity between the political spectrum’s two extremes.
“We are now facing the most severe wave of antisemitism since the end of the Second World War, a phenomenon that demands urgent global attention,” the CAM report states in its introduction. “Jewish communities worldwide have been subjected to an unrelenting onslaught of violence, harassment, and systemic discrimination, fueled by a fusion of far-left, far-right, and Islamist extremism. The international failure to combat this resurgence threatens the very security and stability of Jewish life around the world.”
CAM’s researchers found that incidents motivated by far-left beliefs had increased 324.8 percent from 2023 and Islamist-centered incidents (461) jumped 54.8 percent, while far-right-driven incidents (461) had fallen 54.8 percent. CAM attributed “radicalized social movements, media disinformation campaigns, and efforts to target Jewish communities under the guise of anti-Israel activism” as the primary culprits behind the jump in leftist antisemitism. The group also stated that Islamist recruitment tactics specifically target “vulnerable individuals susceptible to radicalization.”
To explain for the drop in right-wing incidents, the report’s authors suggested that “amid widespread and intensive media coverage of the Israel-Hamas war and related protests, political activity, and antisemitism – typical of far-left and Islamist circles – relatively less coverage is dedicated to far-right antisemitic incidents.”
While the report documents an increase in anti-Israel antisemitic speech, it also explains that classical antisemitism remains more likely to motivate hate crimes including vandalism, threats, and assaults.
“Far-right incidents are slightly more likely to manifest as violence and much more likely to involve vandalism than far-left incidents,” the report states, noting that 4.6 percent (21 of 461) of far-right incidents included violence or threats, compared to 3 percent (132 of 4,329) of far-left incidents. “Such trends suggest that far-right antisemites have a greater propensity than far-left antisemites to damage property or harm others,” CAM said.
Of the 6,326 total recorded incidents, 4,907 (77.6 percent) involved hate speech, 822 (13 percent) included vandalism, and 597 (9.4 percent) manifested as physical violence or threats.
The report also noted an increase of 63.7 percent in antisemitic incidents (712) which analysts could not identify with an ideology. These comprised 11.3 percent of the year’s total.
Incidents on campus also drew special attention from researchers, with 1,069 recorded at universities globally, up 120.8 percent compared to 2023 and by 198 percent compared to 2022. CAM’s analysts identified that periods with the highest incidents took place in mid-April and mid-May, correlating with when student activists’ anti-Israel protests hit their peaks.
Groups named as responsible for these demonstrations include Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), Faculty for Justice in Palestine (FJP), and Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP). “These groups have systematically targeted Jewish students through social exclusion, harassment campaigns, and the dissemination of antisemitic propaganda disguised as political discourse,” the report states.
Researchers also offered a geographic picture of incidents, finding that 70.6 percent took place in the United States (2,553) and Western Europe (1,916). The states with the most incidents were New York (668), California (329), Washington, DC (157), Illinois (145), and Pennsylvania (142), comprising 56.4 percent of US incidents. Factors cited for these states’ higher numbers include the presence of large cities and universities.
The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) also released an annual audit of antisemitic incidents last month, with its research focused on the US and drawing from direct reports the group had received. Researchers counted 9,354 incidents, a 5 percent increase from 2023’s 8,873 incidents, a 344 percent increase over the past five years, and an 893 percent explosion over the past 10 years.
“The rise of antisemitism in 2024 is not a historical aberration — it is a defining moment in modern history,” CAM said when announcing the report. “Without resolute action now, the world risks entering a new dark era where antisemitism is once again condoned, allowed to fester, and institutionalized. Such a process creates a downward spiral, as hate begets hate, leading to the persecution and violence that have typified the Jewish experience over the millennia.”
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Trump Vows to Pursue ‘Total Dismantlement’ of Iranian Nuclear Program
US President Donald Trump speaks to reporters at the White House in Washington, DC, US, April 23, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque
US President Donald Trump said his goal to achieve the complete “dismantlement” of Iran’s nuclear program during a Sunday interview on NBC’s “Meet the Press.”
Trump made the comments during a sit-down discussion anchor Kristen Welker.
“Total dismantlement. Yes, that is all I would accept,” Trump told Welker regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The comments
The US president cautioned that the “world will be destroyed” if Tehran is able to acquire a nuclear weapon.
“I want Iran to be really successful, really great, really fantastic. The only thing they can’t have is a nuclear weapon,” Trump added. “If they want to be successful, that’s OK. I want them to be so successful.”
The president’s comments come amid increasing pressure by Republican lawmakers to clearly outline his position on whether the US should take a more forceful stand against Tehran’s nuclear program, which Western officials believe is ultimately meant to build nuclear weapons. Iran claims its nuclear activities are only for civilian energy purposes.
Trump indicated that he would accept the creation of a civilian nuclear program for Iran, echoing comments from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio that the White House would support giving Tehran “a pathway to a civil, peaceful nuclear program.”
Tehran has repeatedly claimed that its nuclear program is for civilian purposes rather than building weapons. However, the UN’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reported last year that Iran had greatly accelerated uranium enrichment to close to weapons grade.
The UK, France, and Germany said in a statement at the time that there is no “credible civilian justification” for Iran’s recent nuclear activity, arguing it “gives Iran the capability to rapidly produce sufficient fissile material for multiple nuclear weapons.”
Lawmakers and analysts who wish for a tough US posture toward Iran have expressed concern about the ongoing US-Iran talks to reach a nuclear deal, arguing the Trump administration has seemingly vacillated positions on Iran’s nuclear efforts.
US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff drew backlash last month when, during a Fox News interview, he suggested that Iran would be allowed to pursue a nuclear program for so-called civilian purposes, saying that Iran “does not need to enrich past 3.67 percent.” The next day, Witkoff backtracked on these remarks, writing on X/Twitter that Tehran must “stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment and weaponization program.”
Some members of the former Obama administration have expressed cautious optimism that the approach of Trump and his team to the current nuclear talks might mirror the steps they took to reach the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 2015 deal which placed temporary restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of major international sanctions. Trump withdrew the US from the accord during his first presidential term in 2018, arguing it was too weak and would undermine American interests.
However, many high-profile lawmakers believe that the Trump administration should aggressively pursue the complete destruction of the Iranian nuclear program, arguing that such a program poses a substantial threat not only to Israel but also to the United States.
“We cannot negotiate with Iran. It’s time to destroy their nuclear program and neutralize the remaining capabilities of its proxies. I remain steadfast with Israel. Provide whatever is necessary to carry this out,” Sen. John Fetterman (D-PA) posted on X/Twitter on Sunday.
Israel has been among the most vocal proponents of dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu arguing that the US should pursue a “Libyan option” to eliminate the possibility of Tehran acquiring a nuclear weapon by overseeing the destruction of Iran’s nuclear installations and the dismantling of equipment.
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