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Did Hamas’ Innovation — or Israel’s Complacency — Lead to October 7 Massacre?
Hamas terrorists kidnapping Israeli women at the Nahal Oz base near the Gaza Strip on Oct. 7, 2023. Photo: Screenshot
Israel possesses one of the world’s most sophisticated intelligence capabilities with which to obtain and provide information on its adversaries’ capabilities, intentions and actions. That intelligence serves to guide Israel’s policymakers in deciding on courses of action. Yet on October 7, Hamas was able to carry out an unprecedented attack on Israeli soil with devastating consequences.
What core intelligence challenges did Israel fail to meet in the run-up to this event?
Critically, Israeli intelligence failed to grasp the disruptive changes in Hamas’ approach to Israel — a failure that was facilitated by a related failure of organizational implementation. Explicit advance knowledge of a Hamas attack at the unit level of the intelligence apparatus was not considered valuable, so it was not translated into a competitive advantage. Drawing on public information distilled through Yakov Ben-Haim’s info-gap theory, this article analyzes these two intelligence challenges related to the October 7 attack. It also discusses a means of managing uncertainty that seeks to reduce the impact of surprises on policy outcomes.
Some elements of human affairs are fundamentally unknowable because of the vast uncertainty inherent in human behavior. Scholars of economics apply the concept of Knightian uncertainty, which addresses the difficulty of forecasting in view of the unknowability of all possible events and market innovations. But when it comes to intelligence, predictive errors can also arise from deception and denial.
If a change in the adversary’s camp is truly innovative, there is no prior experience from which probabilities can be deduced. Shackle-Popper indeterminism (SPI) is a concept in which human behavior depends on what we know. When we do not have a prior incident from which to learn and draw conclusions, undetermined elements interfere with our attempts to predict future human behavior. Since policymakers must make critical decisions in contexts that are both uncertain and limited in resources and time, intelligence is needed to reduce the uncertainty as much as possible. The question thus arises: Did Israeli intelligence fail in its core task to reduce uncertainty to the greatest extent possible in the run-up to October 7, or did we witness a disruptive terrorist “innovation” by Hamas that was almost impossible to predict?
This analysis draws on info-gap theory, which originally comes from engineering design and safety analysis. An info-gap is not simply a gap in one’s knowledge or information. It is “a gap with significant consequences for the outcome of a decision.” It describes “the disparity between what is known and what needs to be known in order to reliably and responsibly make a decision.”
Accordingly, the intelligence services’ task of reducing uncertainty has two meanings. The first is to reduce uncertainty (ignorance, ambiguity, and the potential for surprise) by increasing knowledge and understanding of situations or actors. This is the traditional understanding of intelligence. The second is to reduce vulnerability to uncertainty by managing the negative consequences of ignorance, ambiguity, or surprise on the outcome of a policy or decision.
Info-gap theory argues that uncertainty is not negative per se as long as the adverse consequences of a defined policy can be reduced. It proposes the concept of robust satisficing — a term that combines the words “satisfy” and “suffice” — which aims to enhance the robustness of policies against info-gaps with significant consequences. In such a scenario, policymakers define the minimum requirements necessary to achieve a defined goal while intelligence is tasked with constantly evaluating this policy “in terms of how large an info-gap it can tolerate and still achieve the policymaker’s stated goals.” Ideally, intelligence regularly assesses the degree to which current data, knowledge, and understanding can err or change such that a policy will continue to meet the policymaker’s defined outcome requirements. A policy is considered robust when only large surprises would have negative consequences. It has low robustness when even minor surprises affect the outcome negatively.
Concerning Hamas, Israeli policymakers’ minimum outcome requirement would have been to contain the terrorist organization in Gaza and avoid direct combat friction to the greatest extent possible to protect Israel from harm. To achieve this, Israel pursued a policy of maintaining technological and military superiority vis-à-vis Gaza concurrently with bribing Hamas to keep it “weakened and deterred.” According to the principle of robust satisficing, intelligence should have evaluated these policies against info-gaps. How much could Israel err in its understanding of Hamas’ behavior, capabilities and intentions? To what extent would Israel’s policy of technological and military superiority paired with bribing Hamas still ensure the minimum outcome requirement of containing Hamas in Gaza?
Since leaving Gaza in 2005, Israel was largely successful in mitigating the negative impact of repeated rounds of violence and rocket attacks by using Iron Dome and conducting limited military operations. We also now know that Hamas actively deceived Israel by exhibiting restraint over the years as a pretense that it was satisfied with the status quo. Thus, based on prior experience and knowledge, the policy of technological and military superiority plus bribery was considered robust. This presumably led Israeli decision-makers to tolerate info-gaps concerning unusual Hamas behavior.
Recurring conflict patterns and Hamas deception over the years reinforced a common and, in retrospect, wrong understanding by Israel’s intelligence and policymaking echelons that the country’s policies to control Gaza were sound. This ultimately made them blind to the disruptive change in Hamas’ intentions and approach that a practice of robust satisficing might have helped to counteract. As a consequence, this blindness appears to have caused them to lower the level of what needed to be known to ensure the minimum outcome requirement of containing Hamas in Gaza.
Paradoxically, when you lower the level of what needs to be known, the commitment to a policy increases and the tolerance for info-gaps grows. In an illustration of this tendency, Israeli policymakers decided to shift resources away from the Hamas problem to other areas. This included, for example, reducing the military presence at the Gaza border and halting the practice of eavesdropping on hand-held radios of Hamas militants, which was considered a waste of time. Both decisions would prove to have devastating consequences on October 7.
Israel’s “blinded” understanding of Hamas rendered new intelligence on unusual activities at the Gaza border more “tolerable,” which in turn facilitated the second failure in the run-up to October 7. Israeli intelligence failed to organizationally implement new knowledge because that knowledge was not considered sufficiently valuable to be deemed worthy of translation into a competitive advantage. Reports show that at the unit level of the Southern Command of 8200, explicit information of a pending Hamas attack existed based on the previously obtained “Jericho Walls” operation plan and mounting evidence of unusual events in Gaza. However, not only was this information dismissed “top-down” by the responsible superiors, but the highly sophisticated technological tools of Israeli intelligence failed to identify the existing signs as strong.
To return to the two meanings of reducing uncertainty: The bottom-up elements of Israeli intelligence did indeed work to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity concerning a pending attack, as described by the term’s first meaning. Tragically, they were not successful at implementing this information beyond their unit for further use. That is because Israeli intelligence failed to evaluate and reduce the negative consequences of a potential surprise on policy outcomes, which is the second meaning of reducing vulnerability to uncertainty.
Some form of organizational “top-down” barriers, facilitated by a “blinded” understanding of the situation, impeded a process of robustly satisficing the existing info-gap about unusual Hamas behavior. Again, the question is whether this organizational tolerance for non-implementation of new information for further use was facilitated because policymakers and top security officials lowered the requirements of what needed to be known to ensure the minimum outcome requirement concerning Hamas in the first place.
The Israeli security establishment and policymakers came to consider their policies of technological and military superiority vis-à-vis Gaza plus bribery of Hamas as very strong, based on prior experience and understanding. This led them to tolerate larger and larger info-gaps and eventually made them blind to the disruptive change in Hamas’s intentions and capabilities. October 7 thus arrived as a catastrophic surprise — a terrorist “innovation” that disrupted existing policies.
The top-down tolerance for info-gaps concerning Hamas seemed to contribute to the second intelligence failure of organizational implementation, by which explicit and mounting knowledge about a pending Hamas attack was not acted upon. As discussed, the practice of robustly satisficing info-gaps can help manage uncertainty and surprise, including deception by adversaries, to ensure minimum policy outcomes. A robustness question in the run-up to October 7 could have been, “How much could our knowledge and understanding about our technological superiority over Gaza and Hamas’s capabilities err without altering the final assessment of the unusually aggressive military activities at the Gaza border and, more strikingly, the obtained ‘Jericho Walls’ plan?” Had the relevant policymakers and intelligence echelons regularly challenged their understanding of existing policies, the evidence of unusual Hamas activities might have been interpreted quite differently. An attack could have been identified as not only possible but even plausible.
Stefanie Kirchweger…Stefanie Kirchweger is a PhD student at the Department of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University, in a cotutelle agreement with the Department of Political Science at the University of Innsbruck, Austria. Her research is focused on international intelligence relations and foreign policy. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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US Official Calls Gaza Ceasefire Talks in Doha the Most Constructive in Months
An Israeli tank maneuvers, amid the Israel-Hamas conflict, near the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, July 9, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Amir Cohen
The latest negotiations in Doha to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza and a hostage deal have been the most productive in months, and negotiators will reconvene next week in Cairo hoping to conclude it, a senior Biden administration official said on Friday.
“It was consensus of all of the participants over the past 48 hours that there’s really a new spirit here to drive it to a conclusion,” the official said, speaking to reporters on the condition of anonymity.
He still cautioned that work remained to be done.
“This is a very difficult, complex deal.”
On Friday, the US, with help from mediators Qatar and Egypt, put forward a bridging proposal the three countries believe would close all gaps between warring parties Israel and Hamas, the official said.
The past two days in Doha were probably “the most constructive 48 hours” that the parties have had in months, the official said.
“The Israeli team that was here was empowered … We made a lot of progress in the number of issues that we’ve been working on,” the official said.
The latest round in months of talks to end the war in Hamas-ruled Gaza began on Thursday between Israel and mediators. The Palestinian terrorist group Hamas was not directly involved in the talks but was kept briefed on progress.
The White House sent CIA Director Bill Burns and US Middle East envoy Brett McGurk. Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani and Egypt’s intelligence chief Abbas Kamel were also taking part.
The negotiations took place in the shadow of a feared regional escalation. Iran, which backs Hamas, has threatened to retaliate against Israel after the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31.
There will be engagements over the course of next week between working groups that will discuss everything from the list of hostages, the sequence by which the hostages would be released and the Palestinian prisoners.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken will travel to Israel on Sunday.
The conflict began on Oct. 7 when Hamas fighters rampaged into Israel, killing around 1,200 people and seizing around 250 hostages. Israel responded with a military campaign in neighboring Gaza aimed at freeing the hostages and dismantling Hamas’ military and governing capabilities.
The Israeli military says it has eliminated 17,000 terrorists in Gaza during its campaign.
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Court injunction at Vancouver Island University ends the campus encampment trend (for now)
A Supreme Court of British Columbia justice in Vancouver issued an injunction to Vancouver Island University on Aug. 15 to remove a pro-Palestinian encampment, the last of its kind at a Canadian university, from its campus in Nanaimo within 72 hours, or by Aug, 18 at 9:30 a.m. PDT. Jewish organizations were pleased by the […]
The post Court injunction at Vancouver Island University ends the campus encampment trend (for now) appeared first on The Canadian Jewish News.
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‘Token Ethnic President’: Pro-Hamas Crowd Launches Racist Verbal Assault on Black Americans Over Harris Support
Anti-Zionist TikTok user calls African Americans “disgusting” for supporting Kamala Harris. Photo: Screenshot
Anti-Zionist activists recently launched a barrage of racist attacks against African Americans on social media, triggering an exchange of insults as well as arguments over the Arab world’s role in enslaving Black Africans.
“Black people also wear a uniform and get on a plane and come to our countries and kill us!” one influencer said in a compilation of TikTok posts shared by pro-Israel activist Hen Mazzig. “You vote the same f—king melanated f—king people to government that sign papers to kill us. I don’t want to hear it anymore!”
“Keep Palestinians names out of your f—king mouths when you’re trying to defend your decision for voting for Kamala,” another said, referring to Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris, who is Black.
TikTok user “Dan1ahan” charged that Black Americans “switched up 180 on Palestinians and people who are Palestinian activists the second we have a Black woman running for office,” describing the alleged betrayal as “disgusting.” Touching on the upcoming US presidential election, one Arab woman said all Black people want is a “token ethnic president” in office.
Black TikTok influencers descended on the platform in droves to denounce the comments, with several announcing that they intended not only to remove Gaza-related content from their profiles but also to cease engaging in anti-Zionist activity entirely. The conversation escalated in subsequent posts, touching on the continuance of Black slavery in the Arab world and what young woman called “voracious racism” against African Americans.
“What’s even crazier is that earlier people were like, oh these are bots, no — this is how people really feel. And she made a video that’s a real human being that feels exactly that way,” an African American woman said. “These are people who feel like they are entitled to the support of Black people no matter what, that they get to push us around and tell us who the hell we get to vote for if we support them … They’ve lost their minds.”
An African American male said, “Why don’t we talk about the Arab slave trade? And keep in mind that the Arabs have enslaved more Black people than the Europeans combined.” Another African American woman accused Arabs of not denouncing slavery in Antebellum America.
“We spend our money with you,” she said. “We stand in solidarity with you, and you keep asking for more, and more, and more, and it’s never enough.”
This is not the first time that anti-Zionists have hurled racist abuse and expletives at Black Americans while denigrating their accomplishments and status as full citizens of the United States.
In April, an anti-Zionist student group at George Washington University (GWU) in Washington, DC staged an unprecedented protest of a talk by US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield at the university’s Elliot School of International Affairs.
“Zionist imperial puppet,” “imperial and blackface,” and “from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free” were among the chants yelled by members of the Student Coalition for Palestine (GWSCP) outside the building — a clamoring which could be heard throughout the Elliot School. Thomas-Greenfield was at GWU to speak at an event held to encourage Black youth to pursue careers in foreign affairs. GWSCP protested her appearance because she had vetoed multiple UN Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire in Gaza, where Israel has been waging a military campaign against Hamas following the terrorist group’s Oct. 7 massacre of Israeli civilians.
In a pamphlet distributed to everyone who showed up to the event, the students accused Greenfield of being a “puppet,” alluding to the fact that she is a Black woman holding a distinguished presidential appointment. GWSCP seemed to suggest that the color of Greenfield’s skin excluded the possibility that she is an agent of her own destiny.
“For as long as we have been here, we have resisted these systems of oppression, but the United States of Amerikkka [sic] has always used Black bodies as puppets to carry out repression and dissent,” the pamphlet said. It also compared Greenfield to Black enslaved persons who had been assigned, against their will, to work as overseers of other enslaved persons on cotton plantations.
Later, according to GWU’s official student newspaper, the group encircled Dean of Student Affairs Colette Coleman, an African American woman, outside the building. One member of the group began “clapping in her face” while others screamed that she should resign.
That same month, at Vanderbilt University in Tennessee, anti-Zionists occupying an administrative building verbally abused a Black officer, whom they accused of betraying his racial identity. “Shame on you!” they shouted at him. Someone else said, “You are Black in America, and you’re not standing with the marginalized people of the world. What does that make you?”
Follow Dion J. Pierre @DionJPierre.
The post ‘Token Ethnic President’: Pro-Hamas Crowd Launches Racist Verbal Assault on Black Americans Over Harris Support first appeared on Algemeiner.com.